

AMERICA AT WAR

A HANDBOOK OF PATRIOTIC EDUCATION REFERENCES

Edited by ALBERT BUSHNELL HART *for the*
Committee on Patriotism through Education
of the National Security League


With Preface by JAMES M. BECK



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COMMITTEE ON PATRIOTISM
THROUGH EDUCATION *of the*
NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE

With Preface by

JAMES M. BECK

PUBLISHED FOR
THE NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE
BY
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
NEW YORK
1918

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PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PREFACE

One of the striking features of the great world war is that, concurrently with the most amazing display of physical force that the world has ever seen, there has been an equally amazing conflict of ideas and arguments. The war has its spiritual as well as its material aspects, and it is possible that the former will surpass in continuing importance the latter.

From 1914 to 1918, the world has had its greatest moral controversy. Prince Bismarck, in a notable speech in the Reichstag in 1885, stated that, if Germany should wage an aggressive war upon France, the "imponderables" would be against Germany; and he added that these "imponderables" far outweighed in importance the "ponderables." The greatest of the "imponderables" is the public opinion of civilization.

From the beginning of the war, Germany has recognized the weight of this "imponderable." Concurrently with the marching of its titanic armies, it has waged an unprecedented press campaign to justify itself at the bar of public opinion. In part, this appeal to the judgment of mankind has been made openly in the forum of public opinion by arguments, often more voluble than valuable, but in greater part it has been secretly made by sinister methods, such a bribery, espionage, intrigue and the world-wide circulation of untruths.

As Germany has attempted to demoralize economic conditions in Russia by flooding that country with counterfeit money, similarly it has tried to demoralize civilization by the wide circulation of base counterfeits of truth. Such was the address at the beginning of the war of the ninety-three German intellectuals, which only resulted in destroying for decades to come respect for the integrity of German scholarship. The ultimate purpose was to convince, or at least confuse, the public opinion of the world as to the merits of the quarrel, so that Germany could thereby gain a moral victory concurrently with the material victory which at the beginning it so confidently but erroneously anticipated.

An idea is greater than an army, but unfortunately the evil consequences of a falsehood are only less potential than the beneficent force of a truth. Thus the *debâclé* of Russia is due largely to Germany's powerful propaganda. Germany realizes that the final result of this war may depend upon the question, which of the two groups of nations can longest preserve the *morale* of their civilian populations—and Germany further recog-

PREFACE

nizes that its future position in the community of nations, whether successful or, defeated, will depend to a large extent upon the attitude of the world towards Germany's claims and pretensions.

For these reasons, it is quite as vital to keep just ideas to the forefront as to send our men to the firing line. It is not enough to defeat Germany on the field of battle. It is essential that the world should be convinced that its defeat was just and its punishment merited. Indeed, it may be essential to the future peace of the world that the German people shall also be convinced that they were duped and misled as to the causes of the war.

Above the roar of the cannon and the dust of the battle, there is this incessant conflict of truth and falsehood and conflicting ideas; and it is all essential that the ideas, which make for democracy, humanity, justice and truth, shall not be over-borne by miasmatic untruths. An uncontroverted falsehood, put into circulation by the German propaganda, does far more harm than a single cloud of poison gas. The latter poisons the lungs, the former the very souls of men.

For this reason, the National Security League has done a public service in preparing and circulating this American War Manual. In a compact form, it gives us the basic facts with respect to the causes of the war and its subsequent developments, and references to the pertinent data. It renders a special service in a nation, which, like the United States, is naturally pacific, in again bringing to the attention of the American people the continuing importance of preparedness.

This compact volume, with each page crowded with valuable facts and quotations, cannot be other than most helpful in bringing home to the average American that his country is not only fighting for the basic principles of civilization, but for the prestige and independence of the United States.

JAMES M. BECK.

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

This book is the work of the Committee on Patriotism through Education, enlarged and enriched by the suggestions of many members of the General Committee at conferences at Chautauqua July 2nd to 7th, 1917. As the title sets forth, it is intended to aid speakers, writers, readers and thinking people in general to visualize the present situation of the United States of America and to make the difficulties and dangers of the times clear to other people. Examination of the table of contents will bring out three features of the book:

1. A mass of references to books, collections and magazine articles has been brought together and then classified and distributed so as to fit into the system of this book. This matter appears in Chapters I-III, classified according to subject. In Chapters IV-VIII many of the same books, and a multitude of magazine articles are classified on the general analysis. All the published works there mentioned are intended to appear in the select bibliographies at the beginning of the book, with place and date of publication. Many of those books are referred to in more than one of the chapters and perhaps in several of the sections. The purpose has been, throughout, to refer to books in print and periodicals easily available to American readers. Most of the books are in English. Besides the specific references at the heads of the chapters, many of the sections have also an apparatus of specific reference.

2. Following the specific references in each chapter is an analysis of the subject matter, the purpose of which is to select out the most important elements and events in the prodigious mass of happenings; and then to arrange them in some systematic form, so that the relation to each other of diplomatic statements, methods of warfare and the controlling motives and standards of the various nations concerned may be clearly seen.

Such an analysis might be much farther developed. In the Contents, the sections, marked by letters of the alphabet, A, B, C, etc., and sub-sections, marked by figures 1, 2, 3, etc., are printed at one view, so as to give an impression of the outline as a whole. In the text are inserted numerous sub-sub-sections marked by small letters (a), (b), (c), etc., which still farther extend the subject matter. The main points throughout the outline are covered by some of the adjacent references, either sectional or chapter; though of course there can be no guarantee that every minor point is explicitly treated in a reference as printed in the book. The general point of view of the analysis is to go far down into the bottom of the tangled confusion of motives, declarations and criticisms.

3. The third point in the book is the documents and extracts which have been collected from a great variety of sources and are intended to be illustrations and proofs of some of the most important subjects; for instance, extracts from reputable German writers are used to show the German conception of the State, and of the national duty of Germany to conquer other countries. The facts of the loss of the *Lusitania* are set forth in the report of the official British Commission which took testimony immediately after the murders. Such illustrative extracts might be multiplied tenfold; and the references will furnish an indefinite number of additional materials. No two editors would make just the same selection of such material; and the requirements of space have caused many interesting and valuable first-hand statements to be left out of the book.

How can the book be used to advantage? The supposition is that it will go into the hands of those who wish to know how to prepare themselves for addresses or magazine articles or to talk intelligently on the causes, conduct and prospects of the war between the United States and Germany. Through Chapter IV—"Why Is There War in Europe"—he can inform himself as to the real reasons why such a frightful catastrophe has come upon the world. The roots of these fearful rivalries run very deep. From the French point of view war has been impending ever since Alsace-Lorraine was wrested away by the Germans. From the German point of view war has probably seemed inevitable since the disappoint-

ment at the conference of Algeciras in 1906. The Turks have been involved in a struggle for existence ever since the Young Turk Revolution in 1908. Austria-Hungary and Russia have been at swords points since the incorporation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1909. Great Britain has faced the danger of war since formally entering the Entente in 1904. Nevertheless the question, what were the motives and cross-motives, the hopes of subject races, the territorial ambitions of empires, and how the world forces finally came into a clash in 1914, is still hard to solve; and yet the position of the United States as a party in the European War must of necessity be affected by what statesmen and leaders of informed public opinion believe to be the guiding desires and determinations of the various European nations. Chapter IV offers an outline of the subject, some first hand material and abundant references to discussions of that topic.

All this is preparatory to the main subject of Chapter V, "Why the United States had to enter the Conflict?" With few exceptions, the American people are convinced that the war is a frightful but unavoidable necessity. What are the grounds for that belief? The book attempts to make clear the manner in which the war has come to be directed toward our principles, our trade and peace within our borders. Without any effort to raise up feelings of hatred or revenge toward our enemies, it is part of the nation's duty to keep in mind the intolerable aggressions upon our rights, property and lives which lasted through the two years and three-quarters between the outbreak of war in Europe and the declaration of war by the United States. The section headings under Chapter V are a summary of the grievances and dangers already experienced and looming up in the future which make war a necessity. This is a fundamental question which every thinking American ought to face. The digest of the subject and the accompanying references and extracts are a means of forming a judgment for one's self and enabling the reader to communicate his convictions to other minds.

The sixth chapter deals with the means of making war and is especially intended to bring into relief the prodigious expenditure of men, food, clothing, equipment, artillery, munitions, airships and submarines that

will have to be made if the United States is to be a real factor in the war. The three main points are: the supply and training of men and officers; the industrial reorganization of the country to meet the terrific strains of the war; and the spirit of loyalty, democracy and sacrifice which alone will carry the nation through the crisis. Speakers, writers and readers absolutely must understand the conditions and difficulties of modern warfare if they are to influence their fellow countrymen in the direction of taking part in the war heart and soul, whether as soldiers or workmen or business men or farmers.

The seventh chapter takes up the specific task of carrying on war alongside allies and against enemies who are thousands of miles away. It deals with the question of applying the resources and the spirit of the nation to the immediate task in front of us, the task of putting men, ships and material into place and organizing them in skilled, modern fashion so that they may push the enemy backward. The Americans have been an unmilitary people and most of their soldiers have still to learn the every-day duties of the men in the trenches, and the men behind the lines who are keeping up the communication with the rear, the failure of which would mean disaster.

Chapter VIII is a summary of the discussions and a guide to the materials on the interlaced questions of Peace at the end of the Great War and World Peace.

A small book intended for the daily use of public speakers on the questions of the war, defence, national efficiency, and the future of the United States has been published by the National Security League, under the title, *Handbook of the War for Public Speakers*. It is a sister volume to *America at War*.

How can the materials thus brought together and organized in this volume serve a useful purpose at the present moment? That is the task which justifies the existence of the Committee. The book has come out in the belief that there is an opportunity throughout the country to impress people by word of mouth with the seriousness of the situation, the unavoidableness of the war and the way of salvation of the nation. The news-

papers reach millions and have heroically striven to teach the lesson of large scale preparedness. However, they do not exclude a campaign of public meetings and addresses which the Committee on Patriotism Through Education has made its particular duty and effort. The book is intended to be something like the political campaign book to be carried in the pocket, read on the cars, used as a source of arguments and a reservoir of quotations. The expectation is that it will be revised from time to time to meet the changes in situation and to take account of the new documents and discussions as they come along. It has necessarily been prepared in haste and doubtless contains some errors of statement and citation. The Committee will be at all times grateful for suggestions of ways to make it more useful for its purpose.

ALBERT BUSHNELL HART,

Editor for the Committee.

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CHAPTER I.

AIDS TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE WAR.

A. [§1] CHRONOLOGIES AND LISTS OF EVENTS.

It is often very important for the searcher to find the precise date of events with which he has to deal. A list from Library of Congress, *The United States at War*, is reprinted in *Handbook* §1. See short list of aids in §32 below. The following lists will be found serviceable for the period antecedent to the war, and particularly for military, civil and diplomatic occurrences during the war.

American Journal of International Law. (N. Y., Baker, Voorhis; quarterly since 1909.) Each number contains a list of significant events for the preceding months.

American Library Annual. (Since 1911; N. Y., Bowker, 1912—.) (Preceded by the *Annual Literary Index*, 1892-1904, and *Annual Library Index*, 1905-1910.) Contains an index to dates of current events, covering the years 1895 to 1914, which is continued by *Information* (cited below).

American Year Book. (Since 1910; N. Y., Appleton, 1911—.) At the end of each volume is a chronology of public events.

Boston Transcript. Publishes at frequent intervals a cumulative chronology.

Independent. (N. Y. weekly.) Current summaries of International events.

Information, A Continuous Cyclopaedia and Digest of Current Events.

[1915 to 1917.] (N. Y., Cumulative Digest Corporation, 1915-1917.)

Issued monthly, and cumulated quarterly and annually; continued from July, 1917, under title *Business Digest*, which is issued weekly and cumulated quarterly.

Library of Congress. (H. B. B. Meyer, compiler.) *The United States at War.* (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1917.) The chronology at pages 8-13 reprinted in *Handbook of the War*, §1.

Matteson, David M. *Epitome of United States History.* (In Vol. XL of American Statesmen Series, Boston, etc. (Houghton, Mifflin, 1917.)

Extends through election of 1916; and includes diplomatic data.

New York Times Current History—The European War. In each number beginning with Vol. II appears a brief classified summary of events. Use also the indexes that are prefixed to the volumes.

Ploetz, Carl. *Ploetz's Manual of Universal History from the Dawn of Civilization to the Outbreak of the Great War of 1914.* (Trans. and enlarged by W. H. Tillinghast, Boston, etc., Houghton, Mifflin, 1915.)

Earlier editions called *Ploetz's Epitome*; extends into 1914; well indexed.

Political Science Quarterly. (Boston, Ginn, quarterly since 1886.) Record of political events printed formerly half-yearly; now as an annual supplement.

Providence Journal. *A Few Lines of Recent American History.* (23 pp., Providence Journal, June 11, 1917.) Includes events specially noted in the newspaper which issues it.

Putnam, George P. *Putnam's Handbook of Universal History.* (N. Y., Putnam, 1914.) Chronology of various countries in parallel columns; extends to August, 1914.

World's Work. (Garden City, Doubleday, Page; Vol. XVIII, 135-136, Sept., 1914.) Contains a chronology of the diplomacy that led to war.

B. PUBLIC DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS.

1. [§2] The Council of National Defense.

The war has called out a special machinery to act alongside with and often in supremacy over, the usual officials and authorities. Most of these new instrumentalities are grouped under a body called "The Council of National Defense." This body is made up of six of the ten members of the cabinet under the chairmanship of the Secretary of War. It was formed under an act of Congress of August 29, 1916, and became very important when the war broke out on April, 1917. The President of the United States has practically a veto upon any of its proceedings in the last resort.

The following description of the Council of National Defense is reprinted from, Library of Congress, *The United States at War* (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1917), pp. 40-46, under date of June 1, 1917. Changes of the personnel of the Council take place from time to time.

Some of the publications are listed below, §20.

(A) Membership and Organization.

Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, chairman.

Secretary of Navy, Josephus Daniels.

Secretary of Interior, Franklin K. Lane.

Secretary of Agriculture, David F. Houston.

Secretary of Commerce, William C. Redfield.

Secretary of Labor, William B. Wilson.

Director of council and advisory commission, Walter S. Gifford.

Secretary of council and advisory commission, Grosvenor B. Clarkson.

(B) Sections and Boards of Council.

(a) Aircraft production board, Howard E. Coffin, chairman.

(b) Munitions standards board, Frank A. Scott, chairman.

Subcommittee on Army and Navy artillery, S. M. Vauclain, chairman.

Subcommittee on Army and Navy projectiles, H. W. Van Dervoort, chairman.

Subcommittee on fuses and detonators, E. A. Deeds, chairman.

Subcommittee on gauges, dies, etc., F. C. Pratt, chairman.

Subcommittee on optical instruments, F. A. Scott, chairman.

Subcommittee on small arms and munitions, J. E. Otterson, chairman.

(c) General munitions board, Frank A. Scott, chairman.

Subcommittee on price problems, Frank A. Scott, chairman.

Subcommittee on armored cars, Col. J. H. Rice, chairman.

Subcommittee on Army vehicles, William Butterworth, chairman.

Subcommittee on emergency construction and contracts, W. A. Starrett, chairman.

Subcommittee on machine guns, B. W. M. Hanson, chairman.

Subcommittee on optical glass, Dr. R. A. Millikan, chairman.

Subcommittee on priority, Gen. J. B. Aleshire, chairman.

Subcommittee on storage facilities, M. L. Cook, chairman.

Subco-operative committee—Defense committee of American Institute of Accountants, E. S. Suffern, chairman.

(d) Commercial economy board, A. W. Shaw, chairman.

(e) Interdepartmental advisory committee.

(f) Committee on shipping, William Denman, chairman.

(g) Committee on women's defense work, Dr. Anna Howard Shaw, chairman.

(h) Committee on coal production, F. S. Peabody, chairman.

(i) Section of co-operation with States, George F. Porter, chairman.

(C) Advisory Commission.

Nominated by council, appointed by the President:

Daniel Willard, chairman.

Howard E. Coffin.

Dr. Hollis Godfrey.

Julius Rosenwald.

Bernard M. Baruch.

Samuel Gompers.

Dr. Franklin H. Martin.

(D) Committees and Co-operative Committees of the Advisory Commission.

(a) Transportation and communication, Daniel Willard, chairman.

a. Telegraphs and telephones, Theodore N. Vail, chairman.

b. Railroad transportation, Fairfax Harrison, chairman.
Subcommittee on car service, C. M. Sheaffer, chairman.

- Subcommittee on express, D. S. Elliott, chairman.
 - Subcommittee on military equipment standards, J. T. Wallis, chairman.
 - Subcommittee on military transportation accounting, A. H. Plant, chairman.
 - Subcommittee on military passenger tariffs, E. L. Bevington, chairman.
 - Subcommittee on military freight tariffs, L. Green, chairman.
 - Subcommittee on materials and supplies, H. B. Spencer, chairman.
- c. Cars, S. M. Vauclain, chairman.
 - d. Locomotives, S. M. Vauclain, chairman.
 - e. Electric railroad transportation, Gen. George H. Harries, chairman.
- (b) Munitions, Howard E. Coffin, chairman.
 - Automotive transport, Karl W. Zimmerschied, chairman.
 - Gas and electric service, John W. Lieb, chairman.
 - National industrial conference board, L. A. Osborne, chairman.
- (c) Engineering and education, Dr. Hollis Godfrey, chairman.
 - Subcommittee on general engineering, Dr. Hollis Godfrey, chairman.
 - Subcommittee on production engineering, Dr. Hollis Godfrey, chairman.
 - Subcommittee on universities and colleges, Dr. Hollis Godfrey, chairman.
 - Subcommittee on secondary and normal schools, Dr. Hollis Godfrey, chairman.
- (d) Supplies, Julius Rosenwald, chairman.
 - Cotton goods, Lincoln Grant, chairman.
 - Woolen manufacturers, John P. Wood, chairman.
 - Shoe and leather industries, J. F. McElwain, chairman.
 - Knit goods, Lincoln Cromwell, chairman.
- (e) Raw materials, Bernard M. Baruch, chairman.
 - a. Alcohol, Horatio S. Rubens, chairman.
 - b. Aluminum, Arthur V. Davis, chairman.
 - c. Asbestos, magnesia, and roofing, Thomas F. Manville, chairman.
 - d. Brass, Charles F. Brooker, chairman.
 - e. Cement, John E. Morron, chairman.
 - f. Chemicals, Dr. William H. Nichols, chairman.
 - Acids, H. R. Grasselli, chairman.
 - Alkalies, J. D. Pennock, chairman.

Coal tar by-products, William H. Childs, chairman.

Electro chemicals, J. J. Riker, chairman.

Fertilizers, Horace Bowker, chairman.

Miscellaneous chemicals, Edward Mallinckrodt, Jr., chairman.

Pyrites, A. D. Ledoux, chairman.

Sulphur, Henry Whiton, chairman.

g. Copper, John D. Ryan, chairman.

h. Lead, Clinton H. Crane, chairman.

i. Lumber, R. H. Downman, chairman.

j. Mica, L. W. Kingsley, chairman.

k. Nickel, Ambrose Monell, chairman.

l. Oil, A. C. Bedford, chairman.

m. Rubber, H. Stuart Hotchkiss, chairman.

n. Steel and steel products, Elbert H. Gary, chairman.

Alloys, James A. Farrell, chairman.

Pig tin, John Hughes, chairman.

Sheet steel, W. S. Horner, chairman.

Steel distribution, James A. Farrell, chairman.

Scrap iron, Eli Joseph, chairman.

Ferro-manganese, Arthur A. Fowler, chairman.

Tubular products, James A. Campbell, chairman.

Tin plate, J. I. Andrews, chairman.

Pig iron, iron ore, and lake transportation, H. G. Dalton, chairman.

o. Wool, Jacob F. Brown, chairman.

p. Zinc, Edgar Palmer, chairman.

(f) Labor, Samuel Gompers, chairman.

a. Wages and hours, Frank Morrison, chairman.

b. Mediation and conciliation, V. Everit Macy, chairman.

c. Welfare work, L. A. Coolidge, chairman.

Industrial safety, L. R. Palmer, chairman.

Sanitation, Dr. William A. Evans, chairman.

Dust and fumes, Col. Lewis T. Bryant, chairman.

Lighting, L. B. Marks, chairman.

Structural safety, Robert D. Kohn, chairman.

Fatigue, Dr. Thomas Darlington, chairman.

Public education in health matters, Dr. Alvah H. Doty, chairman.

Vocational education, H. E. Miles, chairman.

d. Women in industry, Mrs. J. Borden Harriman, chairman.

- e. Information and statistics, Frederick L. Hoffman, chairman.
- f. Press, Grant Hamilton, chairman.
- g. Publicity, Dr. Edward T. Devine, chairman.
- h. Cost of living, domestic economy, S. Thurston Ballard, chairman.
- i. Medicine and surgery, Dr. Franklin H. Martin, chairman.
 - General medical board, Dr. Franklin H. Martin, chairman.
 - Co-operative committee of manufacturers.
 - Standardization of medical and surgical supplies and equipment, Dr. Frank F. Simpson, chairman.

(E) Functions.

To co-ordinate the industries and resources for the national security and welfare, by investigations resulting in recommendations to the President and heads of the executive departments, concerning railroads, waterways, and other means of transporting troops and supplies, the increase of domestic production of needed supplies, development of seagoing transportation, and the gathering and dissemination of information concerning these matters.

(F) Authority.

Created by Section 2 of Army appropriation act of August 29, 1916 (64 Cong., Public Act 242, H. R. 17498).

(G) Headquarters.

Munsey Building, Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, D. C.

(H) Further Information.

Subcommittees will send further information so far as they have it.

2. [§3] Accounts and Discussions of the Council.

Congressional Record. (65th Cong. First Session, pp. 3592-3597, June 8, 1917.) List of the personnel of the subordinate committees of the council.

Engineering Magazine. (Sept., 1916.) Describes the Naval Consulting Board, which preceded the council.

Everybody's Magazine. Creel, George. "The Sweat of War" (June, 1917). On the work of the council.

Independent. (April 21, May 5, 1917.) On phases of activity.

Iron Trade Review. (Jan. 11, 1917.) Describes similar organizations elsewhere.

New Republic. (June 2, 1917.) On war supplies work.

New York Times Current History. VI, 234. On organizing for economic defense.

Outlook. (July 4, 1917.) On organization.

Science. (May 25, June 8, June 16, 1917.) On coal and other sub-committees.

Scientific American. (March 5, 1917.) On economic mobilization.

Survey. (March 17, April 28, 1917.) Historical and descriptive.

World's Work. (April, June, 1917.) On work of council at Washington in war times.

3. [§4] State Councils and Other Official Organizations.

The best list of the state organizations and federal centers of organization in the states is to be found in

Committee of Public Information. *National Service Handbook*. (Wash., the Committee, 1917), pp. 203-226.

To this should be added the state branches of many of the national patriotic societies enumerated in §5 below, especially the National Security League, which has over two hundred state and local branches, and the Red Cross.

C. [§5] PATRIOTIC SOCIETIES.

Since the breaking out of the European war in 1914, a large number of private societies have been organized for arousing public sentiment and providing for sick, wounded and suffering soldiers of various nations. The following are selected from the list printed in the Library of Congress, *United States at War*, pp. 18-27, which comes down to June, 1917. Many of these societies issue publications to some of which reference is made in §10 below, and elsewhere in this book. Many publications are sent free by application or sold at nominal prices.

American Academy of Political and Social Science, Thirty-sixth and Woodland Avenue, Philadelphia, Pa.

American Ambulance Field Service in France, 14 Wall Street, New York City, William R. Hereford, treasurer.

American Association for Labor Legislation, 131 East Twenty-third Street, New York City.

American Boys' Naval and Marine Scouts, 51 Chambers Street, New York City.

American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, Charles R. Crane, treasurer, 1 Madison Avenue, New York City.

American Committee on War Finance, Amos Pinchot, chairman, 60 Broadway, New York City.

American Economic Association, Allyn A. Young, secretary, Ithaca, N. Y.

American Food Conservation League, Mrs. Mary H. Gregory, New Rochelle, N. Y.

American Institute of Architects has listed and cross indexed all the architects of the United States who wish to make their services available to the United States, and this information is on file in its office, The Octagon, Washington, D. C.

American National Committee for the Encouragement of the Democratic Government of Russia, Charles R. Flint, Equitable Building, New York City.

American Peace Society, Colorado Building, Washington, D. C.

American Pediatric Society, Howard C. Carpenter, secretary, 1805 Spruce Street, Philadelphia, Pa. Reports to Council of

National Defense what it can do to care for children during war time.

Association for International Conciliation, American Branch, 407 West One Hundred and Seventeenth Street, New York City.

Boy Scouts of America, 200 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

Civilian Committee, Naval Training Cruise, 52 William Street, New York City.

College Men's Training Corps, 19 West Forty-fourth Street, New York City.

Columbia University Committee for Women's War Work.

Columbia University, Division of Intelligence and Publicity, Morningside Heights, New York City.

Committee of Sixty to Conserve the Grain Supply in War Time by Diverting it from the Manufacture of Intoxicants, Irving Fisher, of Yale, president.

Committee of the American Ambulance in Russia, Hamilton Fish, Jr., chairman; William H. Hamilton, treasurer, 11 Broadway, New York City.

Committee on Patriotism Through Education, of the National Security League, Robert M. McElroy, chairman, 31 Pine Street, New York City.

Committees of Safety. See National Committee of Patriotic and Defense Societies.

Farm Cadet Bureau, organized under Military Training Commission, State of New York, Arthur Payne, executive secretary, 68 William Street, New York City.

Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, 105 East Twenty-second Street, New York City.

"Friends of the German Republic" Association, J. Koettgen, organizing secretary, New York City.

Girls' National Honor Guard, 34 West Twenty-eighth Street, New York City.

Home Club War Relief Work, Mrs. Franklin K. Lane, chairman, Home Club, Washington, D. C.

Home defense leagues. See National Committee of Patriotic and Defense Societies.

Jewish League of American Patriots. Warheit Building, 163 East Broadway, New York City.

Junior Naval Reserves, 25 West Forty-fifth Street, New York City.

League for World Peace. International headquarters, Woodward Building, Washington, D. C.

League of Catholic Women for Civic Social Reform, 154 East Thirty-eighth Street, New York City.

Marine Scouts, 51 Chambers Street, New York City.

Merchants' Association of New York, Woolworth Building, 233 Broadway, New York City. Has undertaken to mobilize the country banks of New York State to assist the farmers to raise larger crops.

Military Engineering Committee of New York, 29 West Thirty-ninth Street, New York City. J. S. Langthorn, secretary; Joseph Struthers, office manager.

Military Training Camps Association, 19 West Forty-fourth Street, New York City.

National Aerial Coast Patrol Commission.

National American Woman Suffrage Association, 171 Madison Avenue, New York City. Organizing clubs to train women in agricultural work, to provide employment, and teach loyalty to immigrants.

National Board for Historical Service, 133 Woodward Building, Washington, D. C.

National Board of Underwriters, 76 William Street, New York City. Placed at the disposal of the Government the services of a veritable army of investigators and a fund of classified information concerning the Nation's resources and industrial capabilities.

National Child Labor Committee, 105 East Twenty-second Street, New York City. Efforts to spare children from war's blight.

National Committee of Patriotic and Defense Societies, 929 Southern Building, Washington, D. C. To co-ordinate the efforts of twenty-eight or more patriotic and defense organizations, such as Daughters of the American Revolution, National Civic Association, Army League, Navy League, etc. Information concerning home defense leagues, committees of safety, etc.

National Consumers' League, 289 Fourth Avenue, New York City.

National Council of Women. Co-ordinating the work of societies, such as National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage, Woman's Christian Temperance Union, General Federation of Women's Clubs, Congress of Mothers, etc.

National League for Women's Service, 259 Madison Avenue, New York City. Registration of women for industrial service; to train girl students for farming and dairying.

National Rifle Association of America, 1502 H Street, Washington, D. C.

NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE, 31 PINE STREET, NEW YORK CITY. ACTIVE CAMPAIGN FOR HOME DEFENSE LEAGUES IN ALL PARTS OF THE COUNTRY.

National War Relief Committee, 42 Broadway, New York City.

Naval Training Association of the United States, 26 Cortlandt Street, New York City.

Preparedness League of American Dentists, 576 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

Red Cross European War Relief Fund, 130 East Twenty-second Street, New York City; National Red Cross headquarters, Washington, D. C.

Special Aid Society for American Preparedness, 601 Boylston Street, Boston, Mass.

United States Boy Scouts, 7 Maiden Lane, New York City.

Woman's Liberty Loan Committee, Mrs. W. G. McAdoo, chairman, Washington, D. C.

Woman's Relief Corps, 1917 Colfax Street, Minneapolis, Minn.

Woman's Section of the Navy League, 1606 Twentieth Street, Washington, D. C.

Woman's Department, National Civic Federation, 1 Madison Avenue, New York City.

Young Men's Christian Association, National War Work Council, 124 East Twenty-eighth Street, New York City.

D. [§6] COMPENDIUMS AND BOOKS OF REFERENCE.

The searcher into the European War will find convenient summaries and condensed narratives in the annuals. The following are the most available, all of them provided with tables of contents and indexes through which they may be conveniently reached. See the brief list in *Handbook*, §16.

The American Year Book—A Record of Events and Progress. (N. Y., Appleton, annual since 1910.) Includes general summaries and discussion of international events and issues. Well indexed.

The Annual Register—Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad. (London, etc., annual beginning year 1758.) Compilation of documents and also secondary statements of events.

Cyclopedia of American Government. (Edited by McLaughlin, Andrew C., and Hart, Albert Bushnell; 3 vols., N. Y., Appleton, 1914.) Two thousand five hundred articles with recent bibliography; including discussion of international law, international relations, and military and naval organization.

Information Annual—A Continuous Cyclopedia and Digest of Current Events. (N. Y., Cumulative Digest Co., annual since 1915.)

The International Year Book—A Compendium of the World's Progress. (N. Y., Dodd, Mead, annual 1898-1902 and since 1907.) Articles on current international questions.

The World Almanac and Encyclopedia. (N. Y., Press Publishing Co., annual since 1873.) Many useful lists and tables.

E. PERIODICALS.

1. [§7] General Use.

A vast amount of important material, timely and penetrating, can be found in the current periodicals since the outbreak of the war in 1914. The following are the principal periodical indexes which lead the searcher to articles on specific topics. A great number of titles of articles are classified and can be found in the analyzed sections of this *America at War*. The following list is far from including all the periodicals that contain war material, but in it may be found the exact titles of a large number of the weekly, monthly and quarterly publications which pay most attention to international and public law and to the questions arising out of the present war. In addition, every person who wishes to keep in touch with the progress of the war, to understand its meaning, and to confront the questions which arise with regard to peace at the end of the war and world peace hereafter, ought to follow closely at least one good daily paper. The Boston, New York, Philadelphia and Chicago dailies all pay great attention to the war. The New York papers usually publish more detail than those of other cities. Among them the *New York Times* is remarkable for its abundance of telegraphic news, correspondence and articles on the war. Among the critical weeklies, which regularly discuss war questions, the most incisive are *The Nation*, New York, and *The New Republic*, New York. See the brief list in *Handbook*, §15.

2. [§8] Indexes to Periodicals.

The indexes to periodicals (§9) will lead the searcher to illuminating articles on almost any desired topic.

Faxon, Frederick Winthrop (Editor.) *Annual Magazine Subject Index*. (Boston, Boston Book Co., annual since 1907.) Select subject index to about 160 periodicals.

Public Affairs Information Service, *Bulletin—A Co-operative Clearing House of Public Affairs Information*. (White Plains, Wilson, annual cumulation since 1915.) Indexes select periodicals and current books on public affairs.

Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. (White Plains, Wilson Co., monthly.) Indexes about 100 periodicals, also *Annual Cumulation*, since 1896, and five-year *Cumulative Volumes* since 1900.

Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature—Supplement. Index to Selected Periodicals Not Included in the Readers' Guide. (White Plains, Wilson; 5 times a year, cumulative.) Also *Annual Cumulation* and composite volume since 1907.

3. [§9] List of Periodicals Especially Useful.

Academy of Political Science, *Proceedings*. (Quarterly.) (N. Y. Acad. Pol. Sci., Columbia Univ.)

The Advocate of Peace. (Monthly.) (Washington, D. C.) Official organ of the American Peace Society. Takes the side of the pacifist.

Aerial Age. (Weekly.) (N. Y.)

Aeronautics. (Weekly.) (London.)

American Academy of Political and Social Science, *Annals*. (Bi-monthly.) (Philadelphia.) Deals with events of diplomacy and war.

The American Economic Review. (Quarterly.) (Princeton, N. J.) Organ of the American Economic Association. Deals with questions of industry, finance, etc., from an expert point of view.

The American Historical Review. (Quarterly.) (N. Y., Macmillan.) Organ of American Historical Association.

The American Journal of International Law. (Quarterly.) (N. Y., Baker, Voorhis & Co.) Acknowledged authority on questions of international law, international relations and public policy. Invaluable supplements of documents.

The American Political Science Review. (Quarterly.) (Baltimore, Waverly Press.) Organ of the American Political Science Association; expert articles in government and diplomacy.

The American Red Cross Magazine. (Monthly.) (Garden City, Doubleday, Page.) Organ of the American Red Cross.

The American Review of Reviews. (Monthly.) (N. Y., Review of Reviews Co.) Mostly reprints from other magazines. Well illustrated.

Army and Navy Journal—Gazette of Regular and Volunteer Forces. (Weekly.) (N. Y.)

The Atlantic Monthly. (Boston, Atlantic Monthly Co.) Many interesting articles of weight on public affairs.

Boy's Life. (Monthly.) (N. Y.) Official organ of the Boy Scouts of America.

The Century Illustrated Monthly Magazine. (N. Y., Century Co.) A few articles on public events.

Collier's Weekly. (N. Y., Collier.) Illustrated; editorials and articles on public affairs.

Commerce and Finance. (Weekly.) (N. Y., T. H. Price.) Edited in a lively way and contains invaluable discussions of business, public and private.

Current History. (Monthly.) (N. Y., New York Times.) Gathered into volumes under title *New York Times Current History*—an invaluable repository of materials of every kind on the war. (See §17.)

Flight. (Weekly.) (London.) Aeronautics.

The Fortnightly Review. (London, Chapman and Hall.) One of several English reviews devoted to current political and international topics.

Dasgrössere Deutschland Wochenschrift für deutsche Welt und Kolonialpolitik. (Dresden, Das grössere Deutschland.)

- Harper's Monthly Magazine.* (N. Y., Harper & Brothers.)
- History Teacher's Magazine.* (Monthly.) (Philadelphia, McKinley.)
Strong on teaching about the war.
- The Independent* (Weekly.) (N. Y., Independent Corpr.) Gives valuable records of the war and has been prominent in promoting the idea of a "Peace League of Nations."
- International Conciliation.* (N. Y., Am. Assoc. for Internl. Conciliation; monthly since 1909.) Nos. 83-90, 94-96, 101-104, 110, 111, 114. Very convenient and valuable.
- International Polity News.* (Monthly.) (Boston, Federation of International Polity Clubs.)
- Journal of the Military Service Institution.* (Bi-monthly.) (Governor's Island.)
- Journal of the Royal United Service Institution.* (Quarterly.) (London.)
- Journal of the United States Artillery.* (Bi-monthly.) (Fort Monroe.)
- The Literary Digest.* (Weekly.) (N. Y., Funk & Wagnalls.) Made up of extracts from and analysis of articles in other periodicals—a good guide to public opinion.
- The Military Historian and Economist.* (Quarterly.) (Cambridge, Harvard University Press.)
- The Military Surgeon.* (Monthly.) (Wash.)
- The Nation.* (Weekly.) (N. Y., Evening Post, since 1866.) Very full on international events and controversies.
- National Economic League Quarterly.* (Boston, Nat. Econ. League.)
- The National Service.* (Monthly.) (Garden City, N. Y., Military Training Publishing Corp.) Very full on military matters.
- The Nation's Business.* (Monthly.) (Washington, Chamber of Commerce of the U. S.) Organ of the powerful Chamber of Commerce of the United States.
- The Navy and Merchant Marine.* (Monthly.) (Washington.) Under the editorial direction of the National Marine League of the U. S.
- The New Armenia.* (Fortnightly.) (N. Y.) Organ of Armenians in the United States—very well written.
- The New Europe.* (Weekly.) (London, Constable.) Very valuable on European conditions.
- The New Republic—A Journal of Opinion.* (Weekly.) (New York.) Excellent comments on the war and constructive preparedness. Sagacious discussion of the possibilities of peace. Strong on new principles. Readable throughout.
- The North American Review.* (Monthly.) (N. Y., The North Am. Review.) Chiefly devoted to public questions—valuable articles by many hands.
- Official Bulletin.* (Daily.) (Washington, U. S. Division of Official Bulletin.) Official publication of the government with early lists of important documents.
- The Outlook.* (Weekly.) (N. Y., Outlook Co.) Illustrated. Very good short articles and editorials on public affairs.
- The Political Science Quarterly.* (Quarterly.) (N. Y., Ginn & Co.) Organ of Academy of Political Science of N. Y. Valuable materials.
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics.* (Quarterly.) (Cambridge, Harvard University Press.) Serious articles on finance, commerce and business.
- Rivista Marittima.* (Monthly.) (Rome.)
- The Scientific American.* (Weekly.) (N. Y., Munn & Co.) Acknowledged authority on scientific topics, especially the modern methods of warfare on sea and land.
- Scribner's Magazine.* (Monthly.) (N. Y., Scribner's.)
- Sea Power—The Nation's Defense.* (Monthly.) (N. Y., Sea Power Pub. Co.) Organ of Navy League. Beautifully illustrated.
- The Survey.* (Weekly.) (N. Y., Survey Association, Inc.) Primarily on social reforms but very valuable on many topics of preparedness and war.
- United States Naval Institute. *Proceedings.* (Bi-monthly.) (Annapolis.)
- The Unpopular Review.* (Quarterly.) (N. Y., Holt & Co.)
- The World Court.* (Monthly.) (N. Y., World's Court League.) Serviceable reprints of documents and discussions of international affairs.
- World's Work.* (Monthly.) (Garden City, Doubleday, Page.) Abounds in articles and illustrations on public affairs. Close up to date.

The Yale Review. (Quarterly.) (New Haven, Yale Pub. Assoc.) Many good articles on public questions.

F. [§10] PUBLICATIONS OF SOCIETIES.

A large amount of valuable material on the war appears in the publications of the general societies concerned with public and international matters, especially societies organized for propagating information and opinions, most of which were organized since the beginning of the war with reference to that contest. Many of these societies publish periodicals, the titles of which appear in detail in the section on periodicals (§9). For a list of societies see §5 above.

Membership in most of these societies is open to any applicant of good character, who is interested in the purpose of the society; and members in nearly all instances receive the publications of their society without payment outside the annual dues. Many of the propaganda societies distribute their publications on application. The societies which have most to do with the war are the following:

- Academy of Political Science. (New York.) *Political Science Quarterly.* (See *Proceedings*, §9.)
- American Academy of Political and Social Science. (Philadelphia.) *Annals.* (See §9.)
- American Association for International Conciliation. (New York.) *International Conciliation.* (See §9.)
- American Historical Association. (Washington.) *American Historical Review.* (See §9); *Annual Reports* (1889—.) (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1890—.)
- American Institute of International Law, *Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations.* (Wash., 1916.)
- American League to Limit Armaments, *Memorandum of Points in Opposition to the Increase of the Army and Navy.* (N. Y., the League, 1915.)
- American Peace Congress. *Proceedings.* (Biennial since 1907.)
- American Peace Society. (Washington.) *Advocate of Peace.* (See §9.) *Annual Reports* (1829—.) (Wash., Am. Peace Soc., 1830—.) *History and Work.* (Wash., Am. Peace Soc., 1914.)
- American Political Science Association. (Baltimore.) *American Political Science Review.* (See §9.) *Proceedings* (1904-1914.) (Various imprints, 1905-1914.)
- American Railway Association. Special committee on National Defense. (Washington.) *Railroads' War Board: Official Information.* (Wash., 1917—.)
- American Red Cross. (New York.) *The American Red Cross Magazine.* (See §9.)
- See Library of Congress, *U. S. at War*, pp. 86-87.
- American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes. *Proceedings of National Conference.* (1910—.) (Baltimore, Waverly Press, 1911—.) *Publications.* (Quarterly; Baltimore, 1910—.)
- American Society of International Law. (Washington.) *American Journal of International Law.* (See §9.) *Proceedings of Annual Meeting.* (1907—.) (Various imprints, 1908—.)
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (Washington.) *Pamphlets.* (1914—.) (Washington, The Endowment, 1914—.) *Publications* (1913—.) (Washington, The Endowment, 1914—.) *Year Book* (1911—.) (Washington, The Endowment, 1912—.)
- Chamber of Commerce of the United States. (Washington.) *The Nation's Business.* (See §9.) *Referendum on Economic Results of the War and American Business.* (N. Y., Am. Assoc. for Internat. Conciliation, 1915.)
- Church Peace Union. (New York.) *Church and International Peace* (1914—.) (N. Y., Church Peace Union, 1914—.)

- Clark University. (Worcester.) *Clark University Addresses—The Problems and Lessons of the War.* (N. Y., Putnam, 1916.)
- Columbia University. *Columbia War Papers* (1917—). (N. Y., Columbia Univ., 1917—.)
- Committee on Patriotism Through Education. *Outline of Plan for Public Addresses and Lectures Framed by a Conference at New York, May 12, 1917.* Reprint. (N. Y., Nat. Sec. League, 1917.) See also National Security League (§5).
- League to Enforce Peace, American Branch. (New York.) *Enforced Peace; Proceedings of First Annual National Assemblage* (1916.) (N. Y., League to Enforce Peace, 1916.) *Independence Hall Conference* (1915.) (N. Y., League to Enforce Peace, 1915.)
- Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration. *Report of the Annual Meetings* (1895—). (Lake Mohonk, 1895—.)
- Minnesota, Members of the Faculty of the University of. *Facts About the War.—Memoranda, Synopses and Significant Items.* (Minneapolis, Univ. of Minn., 1917.)
- National Economic League. (Boston.) *The National Economic League Quarterly.* (See §9.)
- National Marine League of the United States. (New York.) *Navy and Merchant Marine.* (See §9.)
- NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE. (New York.) *America at War.* (N. Y., Appleton, 1917.) *Handbook of the War.* (N. Y., The League, 1917.) *Patriotism Through Education Series.* (N. Y., The League, 1917—.) *Proceedings of the Congress of Constructive Patriotism* (1917.) (N. Y., The League, 1917.)
- National Society for the Advancement of Patriotic Education. (N. Y.) *Some Facts of American History; a Condensation of Upton's "Military Policy."* (N. Y., Nat. Soc. for Advancement of Pat. Educ., 1916.)
- Navy League of the United States. (Washington.) *Publications. Pamphlets—Sea Power.* (See §9.)
- New York Chamber of Commerce. *American Merchant Marine.* (N. Y., Chamber of Commerce, 1915.) *Report on the Common Defense.* (N. Y., Chamber of Commerce, 1916.)
- New York Peace Society. *Year Book* (1906—.) (N. Y., 1907—.)
- Organization Centrale pour une Paix Durable. (The Hague.) *Une Paix Durable.* (The Hague, 1916.) *Recueil de Rapports.* (2 vols., The Hague, Nijhoff, 1916.)
- Rockefeller Foundation. (New York.) *Annual Report* (1913—.) (N. Y., Rockefeller Foundation, 1915.) *Work of the War Relief Commission.* (N. Y., Rockefeller Foundation, 1915.)
- The Union of Democratic Control. (London.) *Pamphlets.*
- World Peace Foundation. (Boston.) *Pamphlet Series* (1908—.) (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1909—.)
- World's Court League. (New York.) *World Court.* (See §9.)

G. PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

1. [§11] General Treatises.

Most of the controversies arising out of the origin, outbreak and conduct of the Great War involve questions of principles which regulate the administration of the governments concerned, especially the relations between nations. The most important treatises on these subjects, especially considering the questions of warfare by land and sea, capture, prize, etc., are the following:

- Alvarez, Alejandro. *Le Droit International Américain* (Paris, Pedone, 1910.)
- Balch, Thomas W. *L'Evolution de l'arbitrage International.* (Phila., Allen, Lane & Scott, 1908.)
- Bonfils, Henry. *Manuel de Droit International Public.* (7th ed., by Fauchille; Paris, Rousseau, 1914.)
- Cyclopedia of American Government.* Edited by A. C. McLaughlin and

- Albert Bushnell Hart. (3 vols.; N. Y., Appleton, 1913.) Includes numerous articles on public and international law. Good index.
- Dupuis, Charles. *Le Droit de la Guerre Maritime d'après les Conférences de la Haye et de Londres.* (Paris, Pedone, 1911.)
- Foster, John W. *The Practice of Diplomacy.* (Boston, etc., Houghton, Mifflin, 1906.)
- Geffcken, F. H. *Die Gesamtinteresse als Grundlage des Staats und Völkerrechts.* (Leipzig, Deichert, 1908.)
- Hall, William E. *A Treatise on International Law.* (6th ed., by Atley; Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1909.)
- Halleck, Henry W. *International Law.* (4th ed., by Baker; 2 vols.; London, Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1908.)
- Hershey, Amos S. *The Essentials of International Public Law.* (N. Y., Macmillan, 1912.)
- Hertslet, Sir Edward. *The Map of Europe by Treaty Since Peace of 1814.* (4 vols.; London, Buttersworths, etc., 1875-1891.)
- Jellinek, Georg. *Das Recht des Modernen Staates: Allgemeine Staatslehre.* (3d ed.; Berlin, Häring, 1914.)
- Lawrence, Thomas J. *The Principles of International Law.* (4th ed.; Boston, Heath, 1910.)
- Mahan, Alfred T. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783.* (Boston, Little, Brown, 1890.)
- Mahan, Alfred T. *The Interest of America in International Conditions.* (Boston, Little, Brown, 1910.)
- Mérignhac, Alexander. *Traité de Droit Public International.* (3 vols. published; Paris, Librairie Generale de Droit, 1905-1912.)
- Oppenheim, Lassa. *International Law.* (2nd ed., 2 vols.; N. Y., Longmans, Green, 1912.)
- Perels, Ferdinand. *Das allgemeine öffentliche Seerecht im deutschen Reiche.* (Berlin, Mittler, 1901.)
- Phillipson, Coleman. *Wharton's Elements of International Law.* (5th ed.; N. Y., Baker, Voorhis, 1916.)
- Pradier-Fodéré, Paul. *Traité de Droit International Public Européen et Américain.* (8 vols.; Paris, 1885-1906.)
- Scott, James B. (Editor). *Cases on International Law.* (St. Paul, West, 1902.)
- Scott, James B. (Editor). *The Hague Court Reports.* (N. Y., Oxford Univ. Press, 1916.)
- Scott, James B. (Editor). *Recommendations on International Law of the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress.* (N. Y., Oxford Univ. Press, 1916.)
- Scott, James B. (Editor). *Resolutions of the Institute of International Law Dealing with the Law of Nations.* (N. Y., Oxford Univ. Press, 1916.)
- Stockton, Charles H. *Outlines of International Law.* (N. Y., Scribner, 1914.)
- Stowell, Ellery C., and Munro, Henry F. (Editors). *International Cases.* (2 vols., Boston, etc., Houghton, Mifflin, 1916.)
- Treaties and Conventions Between the United States and Other Powers.* (1776-1913.) (3 vols.; Wash., Govt. Printing Office, 1910-1913.)
- United States Naval War College. *International Law Topics and Discussions.* (15 vols. to 1915; Wash., Govt. Printing Office, 1901-1916.) The title varies.
- Westlake, John. *International Law.* (2nd ed., 2 vols.; Cambridge, England, University Press, 1910-1913.)
- Wilson, George G., and Tucker, George F. *International Law.* (6th ed., Boston, etc., Silver, Burdett, 1915.)

2. Special Works on Sea Power.

See §§ 62, 63 below.

(a) [§12] Sea Power Before the War.

- Colquhoun, Archibald Ross. *Germany and Sea Power.* (London, Pitman, 1909.)

- Fulton, Thomas W. *The Sovereignty of the Sea*. (London, Blackwood, 1911.)
- Grotius, Hugo. *The Freedom of the Seas*. (Scott's ed.; N. Y., Oxford Univ. Press, 1916.)
- Hettner, Alfred. *England's Weltherrschaft und der Krieg*. (Leipzig, etc., Teubner, 1915.)
- Hislam, Percival A. *The Admiralty of the Atlantic: an Enquiry Into the Development of German Sea Power, Past, Present and Prospective*. (N. Y., Longmans, Green, 1908.)
- Hurd, Archibald S., and Castle, Henry. *German Sea Power; Its Rise, Progress, and Economic Basis; with Maps and Appendices Giving the Fleet Laws, etc.* (London, Murray, 1913.)
- Murray, Gilbert. *Great Britain's Sea Policy. A Reply to an American Critic*. (London, Unwin, 1917.)

(b) [§13] Declaration of London (1909).

- Barclay, Sir Thomas. "The Declaration of London." *Fortnightly Review*. (July, 1911.)
- Baty, Thomas. *Britain and Sea Law*. (London, Bell, 1911.) A criticism of the Declaration of London.
- Baty, Thomas. "The Declaration of London." *Empire Review*. (July, 1911.)
- Bentwich, Norman DeMattos. *The Declaration of London*. (London, Wilson, 1911.)
- Bowles, Thomas Gibson. *Sea Law and Sea Power as They Would Be Affected by Recent Proposals*. (London, Murray, 1910.)
- Cohen, Arthur. *The Declaration of London*. (London, Univ. of London Press, 1911.)
- "The Declaration of London." *Round Table*. (Mar., 1912.)
- "The Declaration of London." *Quarterly Review*. (Apr., 1911.)
- Stowell, Ellery C. "The International Naval Conference and the Declaration of London," *Am. Polit. Science Review*. (Nov., 1909.)
- Wilson, H. W. "The Declaration of London and Its Surrender to Germany," *National Review*. (Mar., 1911.)

(c) [§14] Law of Capture and Prize.

- Holland, Thomas E. *Proposed Changes in Naval Prize Law*. (London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1914.)
- Huberich, Charles H. (*Das englische Prisenrecht in seiner neuesten Gestalt*. (Berlin, Heymanns, 1915.)
- Wehberg, Hans. *Capture in War on Land and Sea*. (London, King, 1911.) By a German pacifist.

3. [§15] Special Works on Laws of War on Land.

See §109 below.

- Baty, Thomas, and Morgan, John H. *War: Its Conduct and Legal Results*. (London, Murray, 1915.)
- Holland, Thomas E. *The Laws of War on Land*. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1908.)
- Jacomot, Robert. *Les Lois de la Guerre Continentale*. (Paris, Pedone & Fournier, 1913.)
- Spaight, J. M. *War Rights on Land*. (London, Macmillan, 1911.)
- Strupp, Karl. *Das Internationale Landkriegsrecht*. (Frankfurt am Main, Baer, 1914.)
- United States Army War College. *The Rules of Land Warfare*. (Wash., Govt. Printing Office, 1914.)

CHAPTER II.

GENERAL AUTHORITIES ON THE WAR.

A. [§16] LIST OF BIBLIOGRAPHIES.

The bibliography which occupies Chapters II and III in this work is an attempt to collect and classify the principal book titles in several languages on the war. Current material may easily be found through the periodical indexes (§8) and the list of periodicals (§9). Many of the general books [see §17 to 21 inclusive and Chapter IV] contain bibliographies. Among the lists of war books and war articles the following are especially useful:

- Bacon, Corinne. *Best Books on the War; an Annotated List Including Some Books Useful in the Understanding of the Present Situation.* (19 pp.; White Plains, Wilson, 1914.)
- Blakeslee, George H. *A Selected List of Books on the Present War.* (Reprinted from *Journal of Race Development*, VIII. (July, 1917.) Very useful annotated list.
- Boston Public Library. *Selected List of Books Relating to the European Crisis.* (Boston, Public Library, 1914.)
- Business Digest; a Current Digest of Business Progress.* (N. Y., Cumulative Digest Corporation, 1917—.) Issued weekly and cumulated; digests about fifty business journals.
- Cumulative Book Index.* (White Plains, Wilson, 1914—.) Published monthly and cumulated; catalogues all books published in the United States; books relating to the war under "European War"; there is a special subheading for bibliography.
- Deutsche Kriegsliteratur.* (Leipzig, Hinrichs, 1915—.) Complete list of German books and pamphlets on the war, appearing in periodical parts.
- English Catalogue of Books, 1911-1915.* (London, Publishers' Circular, 1916.) Books on the war are catalogued under title "War."
- Great Britain, Stationery Office. *List of Publications Issued by His Majesty's Stationery Office in Connection With Events Arising from the State of War.* (London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1916.) Continued by supplements.
- Hicks, Frederick C. *Internationalism; a Selected List of Books, Pamphlets, and Periodicals.* (N. Y., Am. Assoc. for International Conciliation, 1913; No. 64 of *International Conciliation*.)
- International Military Digest, 1915—.* (N. Y., Cumulative Digest Corporation, 1915—.) Issued monthly and cumulated; digests some eighty periodicals.
- Lange, F. W. T., and Berry, W. T. *Books on the Great War; an Annotated Bibliography of Literature Issued During the European Conflict.* (5 vols. to 1917; London, Grafton, 1915—.) Not well classified. Vols. I-III bound together with a general index.
- Library of Congress (Meyer, H. H. B., compiler). *List of References on Europe and International Politics in Relation to the Present Issues.* (Wash., Govt. Printing Office, 1914.)
- Library of Congress (Meyer, H. H. B., compiler). *United States at War; Organization and Literature.* (Wash., Govt. Printing Office, 1917.) Free on application. A very useful pamphlet, in 157 sections: chronological summaries, lists of private societies and Government organizations; bibliography, indexes, etc.

- Lyons, Bibliothèque municipale. *Catalogue du Fonds de la Guerre*. (Paris, Chiron, 1917—.) Bi-monthly issues beginning January, 1917.
- Mez, John R. *Peace Literature of the War—Material for the Study of International Polity*. (N. Y., Amer. Assoc. for Internat. Conciliation, 1916.)
- Military Academy (of the U. S.). *Classified List of Works on Military and Professional Subjects*. (Rev. ed.; West Point, U. S. Military Academy, 1916.)
- New York Public Library. *Bulletins*. (N. Y., 1914-1917.) Includes "European War—Diplomatic History" and "European War—Recent Accessions."
- New York Times Sunday Magazine*. Lists of war books from time to time.
- Perkins, Clarence. "Bibliography of Recent European History," in *History Teacher's Magazine*, V. 292. (Nov., 1914.)
- Prothero, George W. *List of Publications Bearing on the War; also Second List*. (London, Central Committee for Nat. Patr. Organizations, 1914-1915.)
- Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature*. (White Plains, Wilson Company, 1914—.) Standard index to periodical articles.
- Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature, Supplement*. (White Plains, Wilson Company, 5 times a year.) To a list of periodicals not included in the above, both those works are cumulated into "Annual Cumulations" and larger volumes.
- St. Louis Public Library. *Monthly Bulletins* (1914—.) Lists books bearing on the European War.
- Superintendent of Documents, *Price Lists* (of government publications.) (Wash., Govt. Printing Office.) Especially No. 65 on *Foreign Relations, Diplomacy, International Law, Mexico, European War*.
- Wöchentliches Verzeichnis der erschienenen und der vorbereiteten Neuigkeiten des deutschen Buchhandels*. (Leipzig, Börsenverein der deutschen Buchhändler, 1914—.) Standard guide to German current literature.

B. [§17] GENERAL HISTORIES.

A complete history of the Great War is of course impossible till it is completed and terms of peace are adjusted. There are, however, several small books which deal with diplomacy alone or the general events of the war up to the date of publication; and there are also several series of large, comprehensive works which are in progress and of which several volumes have already been issued. The most important of both types of war history are included in the following list:

- Allen, George H., Whitehead, Henry C., and Chadwick, Admiral F. E. *The Great War*. A series of non-partisan volumes on the causes of and motives for war; on the mobilization of the moral and physical forces; on the conduct of the hostilities; and on the final results. (Phila., Barrie, 1915—.)
- Barron, C. W. *The Audacious War*. (Boston, etc., Houghton Mifflin, 1915.)
- Bullard, Arthur. *The Diplomacy of the Great War*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1916.) A rather gossipy account of world conditions before and during the war.
- Bullard, Arthur. *The Story of the War*. (N. Y., Outlook, 1914.)
- Johnson, Rossiter (Editor). *The War in Europe: Its Causes and Consequences*. (N. Y., Sully, 1914.)
- The New York Times. *Current History—The European War*. (6 or 12 vols. to Sept., 1917; N. Y. Times Co.) Bound volumes of the periodical *Current History*, with special introductions and volume indexes. A repository of most interesting and valuable articles, speeches and documents. Contains much of the diplomatic correspondence, and a record of the events which led America into the war.
- Price, M. P. (Editor). *The Diplomatic History of the War*. (Rev. ed.; London, Allen & Unwin, 1915.)
- Reynolds, Francis J., and others (Editors). *The Story of the Great War*. (5 vols. to 1916; N. Y., Collier & Son, 1916.) Admirable narrative of conditions, diplomacy and warfare; illustrated.

The Times (London) *History of the War*. Issued weekly. (10 vols. published; London, Times, 1914—.)

Simonds, Frank H. *The Great War*. (2 vols. published; N. Y., Kennerley, 1914—.) Review of the movements of the armies and the meaning of those movements by a skilled military critic and historian.

C. [§18] COLLECTIONS OF DOCUMENTS.

The official correspondence at the outbreak of the war was published by the governments concerned, in sets more or less complete, besides which there are numerous reprints and collections made by individuals. The German government has published its own "White Book" in an official English version. The following are the principal sets of such collections:

American Association for International Conciliation, *Official Documents Regarding the European War*, Series I-XIV (Nos. 83-90, 93-96, 101, 103, 104.) Contains the *British White Paper*, *German White Book*, *Russian Orange Book*, *Austrian Red Book*, *Italy's Green Book*, *Serbian Blue Book*, *Official Japanese Documents*, *Turkish Official Documents*, etc.—all in English versions. These are numbers of the (monthly) *International Conciliation*. The series is very convenient and comprehensive and may be had (so long as the editions last) by application to the Association, Post Office, Sub-station 84, New York City.

✓ *American Journal of International Law*. (N. Y., Baker, Voorhis, quarterly since 1907.) "Diplomatic Correspondence Between the United States and Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral Rights and Commerce. (Special supplements, July, 1915; Oct., 1916.)

Beer, Max (Editor). *Das Regenbogen-Buch*. (Bern, Wyss, 1915.) German editions and translations of the seven principal official collections of diplomatic documents.

Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War. (London, Unwin, 1915.) Printed under the authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office.

• Droste, C. L. *Documents on the War of the Nations. The Lusitania Case*. (Richmond, Va., Dietz Print. Co., 1915.) A pro-German argument and collection.

Das Deutsche Weissbuch. (Berlin, Carl Heymann, 1914.) The German text differs in some particulars from the English; the latter may be found in the collections indicated in other works.

England's Complicity in the Great War. An Examination of Official Documents and of English Documents in particular. (Berlin, Liebheit & Fess, S. D.) *The Problem of Neutrality When the World is at War*. (House Doc., 64 Cong. 2 sess. No. 2111.) Reprint of documents on the controversy with Germany.

Thiesen, 1914.) A German discussion printed in English.

Germany, Foreign Office. *Germany's Reason for War with Russia. How Russia and her Ruler betrayed Germany's Confidence and thereby made the European War. With Original Telegrams and Notes*. (48 pp.; Berlin, Liebheit & Thiesen, 1914.)

Italian Foreign Office. *Il libro verde. Documenti diplomatici*. (Milan, Treves, 1915.)

Mach, Edmund von. *Official diplomatic documents relating to the outbreak of the European war*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1916.) By an American pro-German. Withdrawn from sale by publishers because of alleged inaccuracies. Half the book consists of photographic reproductions of the various "Books"; useful for those who desire to consult the original texts.

Massow, Wilhelm von (Editor). *Dokumente zur Geschichte des Krieges 1914*. 1Bd. *Das deutsche Weissbuch und die Verhandlungen mit England*. 2bd. *Aus Tagen des Kriegsausbruchs*. 3bd. *Weitere aktenstücke zur Geschichte des Weltkrieges. Die Kriegstagen des preussischen Landtages*. (Universal-Bibliothek, Nos. 5713, 5722, 5741; Leipzig, Reclam, 1914-1915.)

- ✓ *New York Times Current History. The European War.* (N. Y. Times, 6 or 12 vols., published to Sept., 1917.) Many documents are reprinted in the series.
- New York Times. *Why England, Germany and Russia went to war; the "White papers" of England and Germany, the "Orange paper" of Russia, and other diplomatic correspondence and documents republished from the New York Times.* (N. Y. Times, 1914.)
- ✓ Scott, James Brown. *Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War.* (2 vols., N. Y., Oxford Univ. Press, 1916.) Good collection for the first period.
- Second livre orange russe. Guerre avec la Turquie.* (Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1915.)
- State Department. *Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral Rights and Commerce.* (5 Nos.; May 7, 1915; Oct. 21, 1915; Aug. 12, 1916; Oct. 10, 1916; April 4, 1917. Wash. Govt. Print. Office, 1915-1917.) The official United States set of war documents.
- Stowell, Ellery C., and Munro, Henry F. *International Cases; Arbitrations and Incidents; illustrative of International Law.* (2 vols.; Boston, etc., Houghton Mifflin, 1916.) Including cases arising during the war.
- Struycken, Antonius Alexis Hendrikus. *The German white book on the war in Belgium.* (London, etc., Nelson, 1916.) Includes commentary by Professor A. A. H. Struycken.

D. [§19] COLLECTIONS OF EXTRACTS.

Among the most valuable sources for an understanding of the spirit and temperament of the various nations and the point of view of the warring peoples on the causes, outbreak and conduct of the war, are the collections of brief extracts, of which the titles of the most important are as follows:

- Archer, William. *Gems of German Thought.* (Garden City, Doubleday, Page, 1917.)
- Bacon, Corinne. *Selected Articles on Military Training.* (The Abridged Debaters Handbook Series; White Plains, Wilson, 1915.)
- Bang, Jacob Peter. *Hurrah and hallelujah; the teaching of Germany's poets, prophets, professors and preachers; translated from the Danish by Jesse Bröchner.* (N. Y., Doran, 1917.)
- Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von. *Sechs Kriegsreden des Reichskanzlers.* (Berlin, Hobbing, 1916.)
- Bingham, Alfred. (Editor.) *Handbook of the European War, Volume II.* (White Plains, Wilson, 1916.) Fits in with Sheip's book. (See below.)
- Chamberlain, Houston Stewart. *Deutsches Wesen. (Ausgewählte Aufsätze.)* (München, Bruckmann, 1916.) By an Englishman naturalized in Germany.
- Chapman, John Jay. *Deutschland Ueber Alles; or Germany Speaks.* (N. Y., Putnams.) A collection of utterances of representative Germans—statesmen, military leaders, scholars, poets.
- Committee on Public Information. *War message and facts behind it, delivered before Congress April 2, 1917, with annotations, giving the leading facts on which the rupture with Germany was developed, the issues on international law, and contrasting the spirit of Prussianism and Americanism.* (Rev. ed.; Washington, Govt. Print. Office, 1917.)
- Das Englandbuch der täglichen Rundschau; ein Zeit- und Kulturspiegel.* (Berlin, Tägliche Rundschau, 1915.)
- England on the witness stand: the Anglo-German case tried by a jury of Englishmen.* (N. Y., The Fatherland, 1915.)
- Germany's War Mania. The Teutonic Point of View as Officially Stated by her Leaders.* (N. Y., Dodd, Mead, 1915.) A collection of utterances on Germany's doctrine of force by distinguished Germans, including William II., the Crown Prince, Bethmann-Hollweg, Prince von Bülow, General von Bernhardt, Field Marshal von der Goltz, and Prof. Delbrück.

- Hart, Albert Bushnell, and Lovejoy, Arthur O. (Editors.) *Handbook of the War for Public Speakers*. (N. Y., National Security League, 1917.) Brief bibliographies, summaries and extracts. Issued as a companion book to this *America at War* by the Committee on Patriotism Through Education.
- O'Regan, John R. H. (Editor.) *The German War of 1914. Illustrated by Documents of European History, 1815-1915*. (London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1915.) Valuable documents on neutrality and the war.
- Out of Their Own Mouths*. (N. Y., Appleton, 1917.) A collection of utterances of German statesmen, scholars and publicists illustrating the spirit of German leaders, their standards of international conduct and their aims in the war.
- Reeley, Mary Katharine. (Editor.) *Selected Articles on World Peace, including International Arbitration and Disarmament*. (Handbook Series; 2d ed.; White Plains, Wilson Co., 1916.)
- Reich, Emil. *Germany's Swelled Head*. (2nd ed.; London, Methuen, 1914.) By a Hungarian. Contains numerous citations from German writers.
- Sheip, Stanley S. (Editor.) *Handbook of the European War*. (Handbook Series; White Plains, Wilson Co., 1914.) Brief discussions and useful classified extracts.
- Stein, Ludwig. (Compiler.) *England and Germany, by leaders of public opinion in both empires*. (London, Williams and Norgate, 1912.)
- Tönnies, Ferdinand. *Warlike England as Seen by Herself*. (N. Y., Dillingham, 1915.) By a German sociologist. Seeks to show that throughout its history England has been "the greediest for power and the most bellicose of all nations."
- Wilson, Woodrow. *Why We Are at War*. (N. Y., Harpers, 1917.) A convenient collection of the President's speeches and messages, 1913-1917.

E. [§20] GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS.

The United States Government puts forth an immense amount of printed material bearing on the war. A special branch of the government is the Committee on Public Information, which makes it its business to prepare and send out in great quantities materials which will aid the people of the United States to form a correct judgment on the war.

Many of these publications are listed in Library of Congress, *The United States at War, Organization and Literature* (see below). The messages and addresses of the President can be easily found in *Collections of Documents* (§18 above) and all those addressed to Congress appear in the *Congressional Record* (see below) and other government publications. Most of these publications can be had free through a Senator or member of the House.

- Agriculture, Department of. *Food Thrift Series*. (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1917—.)
- Commerce, Department of. *Statistical Abstract of the United States*. (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, annual since 1878.) Official material on population, trade, industry, commerce, etc.
- Committee on Public Information. *Official Bulletin*. (Wash., daily since May, 1917.) Contains official proclamations and notifications.
- Committee on Public Information, *Red, White and Blue Series*. (Wash., The Committee, 1917.) Speeches, articles and reprints. Free on application (with a few exceptions).
- Committee on Public Information. *War Information Series*. (Wash., the Committee, 1917.) Excellent pamphlets, some in foreign languages. Free on application.

- Congress of the United States. *Congressional Record*. (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, frequent parts issued during sessions of Congress, and bound volumes afterwards.) Verbatim record of the debates of the two houses of Congress, obtainable on terms stated in *U. S. at War*. (See below.)
- Labor Statistics, U. S. Bureau of. *Monthly Review of the U. S. Bureau of Labor of labor statistics*. (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1915——.)
- Library of Congress. (H. H. B. Meyer, Compiler.) *The United States at War, Organization and Literature*. (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1917.) Variety of useful information. Free on application.
- National Board for Historical Service. *History and the Great War—Opportunities for History Teachers*. (Wash., Bureau of Education, Circular, Sept., 1917.) Relation of present war to the world's history.
- Navy Department. *Annual Reports*. (Wash., Govt. Print. Office.) Details of naval organization and operations.
- State Department. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States*. (Wash., Govt. Print. Office.) Annual volumes including correspondence with other nations.
- War Department. *Annual Reports*. (Wash., Govt. Print. Office.) Details of military organization and operations.
- War Department. *Mobilization of Industries*. (Doc. 517, Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1916.)

F. WAR MAPS.

1. [§21] World Geography Previous to the War.

Ever since the outbreak of the war, magazines, weeklies and daily papers have published sketch maps of the geographical situation of Europe and the progress of campaign and military movements. Convenient summaries of European geography up to the outbreak of the war are the following:

- Century Atlas*. (Rev. ed., N. Y., Century Co., 1914.) Conveniently arranged and indexed.
- Harmsworth Atlas and Gazetteer of the World*. (London, Carmelite House, 1917.) More detail on Europe than in American atlases.
- Muir, Ramsay. *Hammond's New Historical Atlas for Students*. (2nd ed., N. Y., Hammond, 1914.) From the European point of view.
- Rand, McNally & Co., *International Atlas of the World*. (Chicago, Rand, McNally, 1915.)
- Shepherd, William R. *Historical Atlas*. (N. Y., Holt, 1911.) Shows the development of the nations of the world.

2. [§22] Current Maps.

Among the publications which contain the most frequent useful war maps, including data for a treaty of peace, are the following:

- American Review of Reviews* (1914——.) (N. Y., Review of Reviews Co.) Frequent detail maps.
- Buchan, John. *Nelson's History of the War*. (17 vols. pub., London, Nelson, 1914——.)
- Fayle, C. Ernest. *The Great Settlement. With Maps*. (N. Y., Duffield, 1915.) What terms of settlement at end of war would give best prospect of lasting peace. The conditions which caused this war.
- Independent* (1914——.) (N. Y., Independent Corporation.) Occasional detail maps.
- McKinley, Albert E. *Wall Outline Maps*. (Phila., McKinley Co.) Suitable for bases for maps to use in lectures.
- McKinley, Albert E. *War Outline Maps*. (Phila., McKinley Co.) Nos. 91-96. Suitable for map study.

- National Review*. (1914—.) (London.) Maps illustrating the condition of the various fronts.
- The New Europe*, I. (Jan. 11, 1917.) "The Pan-German plan as realized in the war."
- The New Republic*. (Jan. 20, 1917.) Maps of Alsace Lorraine, Poland, Italia Irredenta, South Slav States, Bohemia, Transylvania and Constantinople.
- New York Times Current History*. (N. Y., Times, 1910—, monthly), and *Current History of the European War*, reprints of the monthly issues in volumes.
- Philip, George. *Philip's Large Scale Strategical War Map of Europe*. (London, 1916-1917.) In four sheets; scale of 1 inch to 10 or 18 miles.
- Philip, George. *Philip's Strategical Map of Mesopotamia and Asia Minor*. (London, Philip, 1916.) Scale of 1 inch to 40 miles.
- Reynolds, Francis J. (Editor.) *The Story of the Great War*. (5 vols. pub., N. Y., Collier, 1916—.) Numerous maps.
- Stanford, Edward. *Stanford's War Maps*. (London, Stanford, 1914—.) A series of maps of various scales, usually covering a limited field.
- World's Work*. (1914—.) (Garden City, Doubleday, Page.) Various detail maps.

G. [§23] WAR PICTURES.

Many of the daily newspapers publish maps, cartoons, portraits and war scenes, particularly the Sunday editions of the great American newspapers, with their elaborately illustrated supplements. Cartoons are a feature of the dailies as well as the weekly and monthly press; and some draftsmen, especially Raemaker, have gained world fame with their work with the pencil. See also list of periodicals, §9 above. The following list includes the most important of these publications:

- Allen, G. H., and others. *The Great War*. (3 vols. pub., Phila., Barrie, 1915—.)
- American Review of Reviews*. (Monthly, New York.)
- The Century Magazine*. (Monthly, New York.)
- Collier's*. (Weekly, New York.)
- The Graphic*. (Weekly, London.)
- The Great War in Pictures*. (Monthly, Berlin, Stilke, 1915—.) German pictures.
- Hanotaux, Gabriel. *Histoire Illustrée de la Guerre de 1914*. (Publ. in parts. Paris, Gounouilhou, 1914—.)
- The Illustrated London News*. (Weekly, London.)
- Illustrirte Zeitung*. (Weekly. Leipzig. J. J. Weber.)
- L'illustration*. (Weekly, Paris.)
- The Independent*. (Weekly, New York.)
- Der Krieg in Wort und Bild*. (Weekly, Berlin.)
- Leslie's Weekly*. (Weekly, New York.)
- The Literary Digest*. (Weekly, New York.)
- Le Monde Illustré*. (Weekly, Paris.)
- New York Times Current History*. (Monthly, New York.) Chiefly portraits and cartoons.
- Raemaker's Cartoons*. (26 pts., London, Land and Water, 1916-1917.)
- Reynolds, F. J. (Editor.) *The Story of the Great War*. (5 vols. pub.; N. Y., Collier, 1916.)
- Saturday Evening Post*. (Weekly, Phila.)
- Scribner's Magazine*. (Monthly, N. Y.)
- The Sphere*. (Weekly, London.)
- World's Work*. (Monthly, Garden City.)

H. [§24] WAR NOVELS.

The war has presented themes for many works of fiction, some of which are written by those who have been on the ground and can accurately sketch the background. Several are by newspaper correspondents. A few titles follow:

- Andrews, Mary R. S. *The Three Things*. (Boston, Little, Brown, 1915.)
 Benjamin, René. *Private Gaspard*. (N. Y., Brentano, 1915.)
 Bourget, P. C. J. *Night Cometh*. (N. Y., Putnam, 1916.)
 Brooks, Alden. *The Fighting Man*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1917.) Short stories.
 Brown, George R. *My Country*. (Boston, Small, Maynard, 1917.)
 Buchan, John. *Greenmantle*. (N. Y., Doran, 1917.)
 Cable, Boyd. *Grapes of Wrath*. (N. Y., Dutton, 1917.) Short stories.
 Chambers, R. W. *Dark Star*. (N. Y., Appleton, 1917.)
 Chambers, R. W. *Who Goes There!* (N. Y., Appleton, 1915.)
 Cholmondeley, Alice. *Christine*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.) A vivid picture, in the form of letters, of the tendencies of German thought and feeling just before the war.
 Comfort, W. L. *Red Fleece*. (N. Y., Doran, 1915.)
 Daudet, Léon A. *La Vermine du Monde*. (Paris, Fayard, 1916.)
 Dyer, Walter A. *Pierrot: Dog of Belgium*. (Garden City, Doubleday, Page, 1915.)
 Ervine, St. John G. *Changing Winds*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.)
 Fraser, John Foster. *Deeds that will never die; a series of stories of heroism in the present war*. (N. Y., Funk & Wagnalls, 1915.)
 Kueller, J. van A. *A Young Lion of Flanders*. (N. Y., Stokes, 1917.)
 Locke, W. J. *The Red Planet*. (N. Y., Lane, 1917.)
 Macgill, Patrick. *The Red Horizon*. (London, Jenkins, 1916.)
 McKenna, Stephen. *Sonia*. (N. Y., Doran, 1917.)
 Meynell, W. *Aunt Sarah and the War*. (N. Y., Putnam, 1915.)
 Meynell, W. *Halt! Who's There?* (N. Y., Putnam, 1916.)
 Noble, Edward. *Outposts of the Fleet*. (Boston, etc., Houghton Mifflin, 1917.) Short stories.
 Oppenheim, Edward Phillips. *Vanished Messenger*. (Boston, Little, Brown, 1914.)
 Palmer, Frederick. *The Last Shot*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1914.)
 Richards, H. G. *Shadows*. (N. Y., Dodd, Mead, 1917.)
 Rutledge, Marice. *Children of Fate*. (N. Y., Stokes, 1917.)
 Tracy, Louis. *The Day of Wrath*. (N. Y., Clode, 1916.)
 Varela, Benigno. *Pol el Kaiser!* (Barcelona, Yris, 1915.) Short stories in Spanish.
 Wells, H. G. *Mr. Britling Sees It Through*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1916.)
 Wells, Herbert G. *The Soul of a Bishop*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.)
 Wells, Herbert G. *God the Invisible King*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.)

I. WAR VERSE.

1. [§25] Poems On and In the War.

The war has given rise to a literature of verse of which some of the best in three languages appears in the following list:

- Binyon, Laurence. *The Cause: Poems of the War*. (Boston, etc., Houghton Mifflin, 1917.)
 Binyon, Laurence. *The Winnowing Fan*. (London, Mathews, 1914.)
 Brooks, Rupert. *1914 and Other Poems*. (London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1915.)
 Cannan, May W. *In War Time*. (N. Y., Longmans, Green, 1917.)
 Chesterton, G. K. *Poems*. (London, Burns & Oates, 1915.)
 Frankau, Gilbert. *A Song of the Guns*. (Boston, etc., Houghton Mifflin, 1916.)
 Hewlett, Maurice. *Singsongs of the War*. (London, Poetry Bookshop, 1914.)
 Hinkson, Mrs. Katharine T. *The Holy War*. (London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1916.)

- Johnson, Robert U. *Poems of War and Peace*. (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1916.)
- Lawson, Henry. *Song of the Dardanelles*. (London, Harrap, 1916.)
- Lee, Joseph. *Ballads of Battle*. (N. Y., Dutton, 1916.)
- MacGill, Patrick. *Soldier Songs*. (N. Y., Dutton, 1917.)
- Norton, Sara. *New Nursery Rhymes on Old Lines*. (Boston, Merrymount, 1916.)
- Noyes, Alfred. *The Lord of Misrule*. (N. Y., Stokes, 1915.)
- Peabody, Josephine P. *Harvest Moon*. (Boston, etc., Houghton Mifflin, 1916.)
- Scollard, Clinton. *Ballads, Patriotic and Romantic*. (N. Y., Gomme, 1916.)
- Seaman, Owen. *Made in England; Verses*. 2d. ed.; London, Constable, 1916.)
- Seeger, Alan. *Poems*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1916.)
- Skeyhill, Tom. *Soldier Songs from Anzac*. (London, Unwin, 1917.)
- Strong, Archibald T. *Sonnets of the Empire before and during the Great War*.
- Watson, William. *The Man Who Saw and Other Poems arising out of the War*. (N. Y., Harper, 1917.)
- War Poems*. (Garden City, Doubleday, Page, 1917.)

2. [§26] Collections of War Verse.

Verses on the war have been published freely in the magazines. (See §9.) The *Vigilantes special service*, which is sent widespread through the country to be reprinted in newspapers, includes verses. Note also the following collections:

- Committee on Public Information. *The Battle Line of Democracy: Prose and Poetry of the World War*. (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1917.) Free on application.
- Cunliffe, J. W. (Compiler.) *Poems of the Great War*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1916.)
- Erskine, John. (Editor.) *Contemporary War Poems*. (N. Y., Am. Assoc. for Int. Conciliation, 1914.)
- Peter, C. (Compiler.) *Deutschlands Kriegesänge aus dem Weltkrieg*. (Oldenburg, Stalhing, 1914.)
- Poems of the Great War*. (5th ed., London, Chatto & Windus, 1914.)
- Songs and Sonnets for England in War Time, inspired by the Great War*. (N. Y., Lane, 1914.)
- Underwood, John C. (Compiler.) *War Flames*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.) Selections grouped by nations.

3. [§27] Text of National Patriotic Songs.

Many demands are made for exact texts of our great national songs, for reprint and other use. Accordingly, the five most important are here printed.

(a) America.

BY SAMUEL FRANCIS SMITH

My country, 'tis of thee,
 Sweet land of liberty;
 Of thee I sing.
 Land where my fathers died,
 Land of the pilgrim's pride,
 From every mountain-side
 Let freedom ring.

My native country, thee,
 Land of the noble free,
 Thy name I love.
 I love thy rocks and rills,
 Thy woods and templed hills;
 My heart with rapture thrills,
 Like that above.

Let music swell the breeze,
 And ring from all the trees—
 Sweet freedom's song.
 Let mortal tongues awake,
 Let all that breathe partake;
 Let rocks their silence break,
 The sound prolong.

Our fathers' God! To Thee,
 Author of liberty,
 To thee we sing.
 Long may our land be bright,
 With freedom's holy light;
 Protect us by Thy might,
 Great God, our King!

(b) Battle Hymn of the Republic.

BY JULIA WARD HOWE.

1. Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord;
 He is trampling out the vintage where the grapes of wrath are stored;
 He hath loosed the fateful lightning of His terrible swift sword;
 His truth is marching on.

CHORUS.

Glory! glory! Hallelujah!
 Glory! glory! Hallelujah!
 Glory! glory! Hallelujah!
 His truth is marching on.

2. I have seen Him in the watch-fires of a hundred circling camps;
 They have builded Him an altar in the evening dews and damps;
 I can read His righteous sentence by the dim and flaring lamps;
 His day is marching on.

Chorus.

3. I have read a fiery gospel, writ in burnished rows of steel:
 "As ye deal with my contemners, so with you my grace shall deal;
 Let the Hero, born of woman, crush the serpent with His heel,
 Since God is marching on."

Chorus.

4. He has sounded forth the trumpet that shall never call retreat;
 He is sifting out the hearts of men before His judgment seat;
 Oh, be swift, my soul, to answer Him! be jubilant, my feet;
 Our God is marching on.

Chorus.

5. In the beauty of the lilies, Christ was born across the sea,
 With a glory in His bosom that transfigures you and me;
 And He died to make men holy; let us die to make men free,
 While God is marching on.

Chorus.

(c) Hail Columbia!

BY JOSEPH HOPKINSON.

Hail! Columbia! happy land!
 Hail! ye heroes, heav'n-born band,
 Who fought and bled in freedom's cause,
 Who fought and bled in freedom's cause,
 And when the storm of war was gone,
 Enjoyed the peace your valor won;
 Let independence be your boast,
 Ever mindful what it cost,
 Ever grateful for the prize;
 Let its altar reach the skies.

CHORUS.

Firm, united let us be,
 Rallying round our liberty,
 As a band of brothers joined,
 Peace and safety we shall find.

Immortal patriots, rise once more!
 Defend your rights; defend your shore!
 Let no rude foe with impious hand,
 Let no rude foe with impious hand,
 Invade the shrine where sacred lies
 Of toil and blood the well-earned prize;
 While offering peace, sincere and just,
 In heav'n we place a manly trust,
 That truth and justice may prevail,
 And every scheme of bondage fail.

Chorus.

Sound, sound the trump of fame!
 Let Washington's great name
 Ring thro' the world with loud applause!
 Ring thro' the world with loud applause!
 Let ev'ry clime to freedom dear
 Listen with a joyful ear;
 With equal skill, with steady pow'r,
 He governs in the fearful hour
 Of horrid war, or guides with ease
 The happier time of honest peace.

Chorus.

Behold the chief, who now commands,
 Once more to serve his country stands,
 The rock on which the storm will beat!
 The rock on which the storm will beat!
 But armed in virtue, firm and true,
 His hopes are fixed on heav'n and you.
 When hope was sinking in dismay,
 When gloom obscured Columbia's day,
 His steady mind, from changes free,
 Resolved on death or liberty.

Chorus.

(d) Red, White, and Blue.

BY DAVID T. SHAW.

- O, Columbia, the gem of the ocean,
 The home of the brave and the free,
 The shrine of each patriot's devotion,
 A world offers homage to thee.
 Thy mandates make heroes assemble,
 When Liberty's form stands in view;

Thy banners make tyranny tremble,
 When borne by the red, white and blue.
 When borne by the red, white and blue;
 When borne by the red, white and blue;
 Thy banners make tyranny tremble,
 When borne by the red, white and blue.

2. When war wing'd its wide desolation,
 And threatened the land to deform,
 The ark then of freedom's foundation,
 Columbia, rode safe thro' the storm.
 With the garlands of vict'ry around her,
 When so proudly she bore her brave crew,
 With her flag proudly floating before her,
 The boast of the red, white and blue.
 The boast of the red, white and blue;
 The boast of the red, white and blue;
 With her flag proudly floating before her,
 The boast of the red, white and blue.

3. The star-spangled banner bring hither;
 O'er Columbia's true sons let it wave.
 May the wreaths they have won never wither,
 Nor its stars cease to shine on the brave.
 May the service united ne'er sever,
 But hold to their colors so true;
 The Army and Navy for ever!
 Three cheers for the red, white and blue!
 Three cheers for the red, white and blue!
 Three cheers for the red, white and blue!
 The Army and Navy for ever!
 Three cheers for the red, white and blue!

(e) Star Spangled Banner.

BY FRANCIS SCOTT KEYES.

1. Oh, say, can you see, by the dawn's early light,
 What so proudly we hailed at the twilight's last gleaming;
 Whose broad stripes and bright stars, thro' the perilous fight,
 O'er the ramparts we watched, were so gallantly streaming?
 And the rockets' red glare, the bombs bursting in air,
 Gave proof thro' the night that our flag was still there!

CHORUS.

Oh, say, does that star-spangled banner yet wave
 O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave?

2. On the shore dimly seen thro' the mists of the deep,
 Where the foe's haughty host in dread silence reposes,
 What is that which the breeze, o'er the towering steep,
 As it fitfully blows, half conceals, half discloses?
 Now it catches the gleam of the morning's first beam,
 In full glory reflected now shines on the stream;
- CHORUS.
- 'Tis the star-spangled banner! Oh, long may it wave
 O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave.
3. And where is that band who so vauntingly swore
 That the havoc of war and the battle's confusion
 A home and a country should leave us no more?
 Their blood has washed out their foul footsteps' pollution!
 No refuge could save the hireling and slave
 From the terror of flight or the gloom of the grave.

CHORUS.

And the star-spangled banner in triumph doth wave
 O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave.

4. Oh, thus be it ever when freemen shall stand
 Between their loved home and wild war's desolation;
 Blest with vict'ry and peace, may the heav'n-rescued land
 Praise the Pow'r that hath made and preserved us a nation.
 Then conquer we must, when our cause it is just,
 And this be our motto, "In God is our trust."

CHORUS.

And the star-spangled banner in triumph shall wave
 O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave.

J. [§28] WAR PLAYS.

Several dramas have been based upon the war, some of which have been produced in many places. The following is a brief list. Several open air pageants have been prepared, of which *The Carnegie Tech War Pageant*, first presented by the students of the Carnegie Institute of Technology of Pittsburgh has been repeated at Chautauqua and in various places in West Virginia. It could be secured for other places.

- Artizibashef, Michael. *War: A Play in Four Acts*. (N. Y., Knopf, 1916.)
 Barrie, J. M. "*Der Tag*"; or *The Tragic Man*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1914.)
 Brownell, Atherton. *Unseen Empire: A Peace Play in Four Acts*. (N. Y., Harper, 1914.)
 Dix, Beulah M. *Moloch*. (N. Y., Knopf, 1916.) An indictment of war.
 Galsworthy, John. *The Mob: A Play in Four Acts*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1914.)
 James, May F. *Weighed in the Balance*. (Boston, Gorham Press, 1917.)
 Mygatt, Tracy D. *Watchfires*. (N. Y., 1917.) Peace play.
 Noyes, Alfred. *A Belgian Christmas Eve*. (N. Y., Stokes, 1915.) Dramatic poem.
 Phillips, Stephen. *Armageddon: a Modern Epic Drama*. (N. Y., Lane, 1915.)
 Roberts, C. V. II. *The Sublime Sacrifice; a War Drama*. (N. Y., etc., Torch Press, 1917.)
 Wentworth, Marion C. *War Brides: A Play in One Act*. (N. Y., Century, 1915.)

K. SELECT LISTS OF WAR MATERIALS.

1. [§29] Valuable Free Material.

The United States Government through its various departments and bureaus, and especially through its Committee on Public Information, distributes material to applicants, much of which is of great significance. Numerous private societies do the same and are anxious to distribute their publications widely. The following titles will be found useful.

See also List of Patriotic Societies (§5 above) and the Publications of Societies (§10 above).

- American Association for International Conciliation. *Official Documents Regarding the European War*, Series I-XIV (Nos. 83-90, 93-96, 101, 103, 104). Contains most of the official series of documents, etc., all in English version. These are numbers of the (monthly) *International Conciliation*. See §18 above.
The Battle Line of Democracy. Prose and Poetry of the World War. (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1917.) See §25 above.
 Belgium, Commission of Inquiry. *Case of Belgium in the Present War: An Account of the Violation of the Neutrality of Belgium and of the Laws of War on Belgian Territory*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1914.) See §99 below.

- Bryce, James, Viscount. Chairman of Committee. *Evidence and documents laid before the committee on alleged German outrages.* (London, Unwin, 1915. N. Y., Macmillan, 1915.) See §110 below.
- Bryce, James, Viscount. (Chairman of Committee.) *Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages appointed by His Britannic Majesty's Government.* (N. Y., Macmillan, 1915.) See §110 below.
- Columbia War Papers.* (N. Y., Columbia University, 1917.) See §10 above.
- Committee on Public Information, *National Service Handbook.* (Wash., the Committee, 1917.) See §4 above.
- Committee on Public Information. *Red, White and Blue Series.* (Wash., the Committee, 1917.) See §20 above.
- Committee on Public Information. *War Information Series.* (Wash., the Committee, 1917.) See §20 above.
- Emery, Henry C. *Some Economic Aspects of War.* (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1914.) See §120 below.
- Great Britain—Foreign Office, 1916. *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-16. Documents presented to Viscount Grey by Viscount Bryce.* (London, Unwin, 1916.) See §113 below.
- Library of Congress. (H. H. B. Meyer, compiler.) *List of References on Europe and International Politics in Relation to the Present Issues.* (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1914.) See §16 above.
- Library of Congress. (H. H. B. Meyer, compiler.) *United States at War; Organization and Literature.* (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1917.) See §16 above.
- Mez, John R. *Peace Literature of the War. Material for the study of international polity.* (N. Y., Amer. Assoc. for Internat. Conciliation, 1916.) See §16 above.
- Navy Department. *Annual Reports.* (Wash., Govt. Print. Office.) See §20 above.
- New York (City). Mayor's Committee on National Defence. *The Mobilization of the National Guard, 1916. Its Economic and Military Aspects. Reports of the executive committee.* (N. Y., 1917.) See §131 below.
- State Department. *Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral Rights and Commerce.* (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1914-1917.) See §18 above.
- War Department. *Annual Reports.* (Wash., Govt. Print. Office.) See §20 above.
- Wilson, President Woodrow. Committee on Public Information. *War message and facts behind it, delivered before Congress April 2, 1917, with annotations.* (rev. ed.; Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1917.) See §19 above.

2. [§30] A Ten Dollar List.

A minimum list which should be at the service of the speaker at all times appears in *Handbook of the War*, §9, in which are also included some of the gratis material. The following is a revised list of books costing together about ten dollars:

- Archer, William. *Gems of German Thought.* (N. Y., Doubleday, Page, 1917; \$1.25.)
- Beck, James M. *The War and Humanity.* (2d ed., N. Y., Putnam, 1917; \$1.50.) On America's concern in the war.
- Bernhardi, Friedrich von. *Germany and the Next War.* (N. Y., authorized Am. translation, Longmans, 1912; \$.75.) By the chief exponent of the philosophy of Prussian militarism, a general who has had a command in the European war.
- Hart, Albert Bushnell, and Lovejoy, Arthur O. (Editors.) *Handbook of the War for Public Speakers.* (N. Y., Nat. Security League, 1917; \$.25.) This is the briefer companion book to *America at War*, made up on about the same plan except that it contains summary statements at the beginning of each chapter and that the bibliography is confined to a few pages, intended to be carried in the pocket by public speakers.
- Roosevelt, Theodore. *Fear God and Take Your Own Part.* (N. Y., Doran, 1916; \$1.50.)

- Seymour, Charles. *The Diplomatic Background of the War*. (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1916; \$2.00.) One of the clearest views of the approach to the war.
- Toynbee, Arnold Joseph. *Armenian Atrocities; the Murder of a Nation*. (N. Y., Dutton, \$.25.) Brief but authoritative account of the massacres in Armenia, and of the relation of German officials thereto.
- Wilson, Woodrow. *Why We Are at War*. (N. Y., Harpers, 1917, \$1.50.) A convenient collection of the President's speeches and messages.
- Wood, Leonard. *Our Military History: Its Facts and Fallacies*. (Chicago, Reilly & Britton, 1916; \$1.00.) Brief account of the difficulties and sacrifices of volunteer armies.

3. [§31] A Twenty-five Dollar List.

See "Twenty-five Dollar List" in *Handbook of the War*, §10. A small collection available for small libraries and private shelves is the following:

- Archer, William. *Gems of German Thought*. (See §30 above; \$1.25.)
- Beck, James M. *The War and Humanity*. (See §30 above; \$1.50.)
- Bernhardi, Friedrich von. *Germany and the Next War*. (See §30 above; \$.75.)
- Eliot, Charles W. *The Road Toward Peace: A contribution to the study of the causes of the European war and of the means of preventing war in the future*. (Boston, etc., Houghton, Mifflin, 1915; \$.50.) See §150 below.
- Hart, Albert Bushnell, and Lovejoy, Arthur O. (Editors.) *Handbook of the War for Public Speakers*. (See §30 above; \$.25.)
- Hart, Albert Bushnell. *The War in Europe: Its Causes and Results*. (N. Y., Appleton, 1914; \$1.00.) A brief account of the conditions of the war and relations of the United States.
- McClure, Samuel S. *Obstacles to Peace*. (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1916; \$2.00.) A clear discussion of the difficulties of adjustment at the end of the war.
- Out of Their Own Mouths*. (N. Y., Appleton, 1917; \$1.00.) A collection of utterances of German statesmen, scholars and publicists, illustrating the spirit of German leaders, their standards of international conduct and their aims in the war.
- Rogers, Lindsay. *America's Case Against Germany*. (N. Y., Dutton, 1917; \$1.50.) An untechnical presentation of the legal aspect of America's case, and a review of the diplomatic correspondence, with citations of the principal passages.
- Roosevelt, Theodore. *Fear God and Take Your Own Part*. (See §30 above; \$1.50.)
- Seymour, Charles. *The Diplomatic Background of the War*. (See §30 above; \$2.00.)
- Steinmetz, Charles P. *America and the New Epoch*. (N. Y., Harper, 1916; \$1.00.)
- Stowell, Ellery C. *The Diplomacy of the War of 1914. The Beginnings of the War*. (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin, 1915; \$5.00.) Careful review and analysis by an expert in international affairs.
- Toynbee, Arnold Joseph. *Armenian Atrocities; the Murder of a Nation*. (See §30 above; \$.25.)
- Wilson, Woodrow. *Why We Are At War*. (See §30 above; \$.25.)
- Wood, Leonard. *Our Military History; Its Facts and Fallacies*. (See §30 above; \$.25.)

4. One Hundred Select Titles.

For the convenience of those who wish to make a moderate sized collection of the best books and periodicals on the war, the following list of titles has been selected out of the various bibliographies in Chapters I, II, and III. The titles are arranged in the same order as the classified bibliography in Chapter III. The books in this list will all be found also somewhere

in the main bibliography, and can be reached through the references after each title to the section of this work, in which the same title appears in conjunction with other books of similar contents; in many cases they are furnished with brief critical notes. The designation of place, of publication, publisher and date of publication will make it easy to order books.

In addition to the list of one hundred select titles, every library and small collection should contain all or most of the gratis publications enumerated in §29. Many significant titles have necessarily been omitted in bringing down the number to one hundred; and additional valuable publications are coming from the press all the time. See "Additional Books" in *Handbook of the War*, §11. The buyer can keep track of such new issues through the *Indexes to Periodicals* (§8) and the *List of Bibliographies* (§16).

(a) [§32] Aids to the Searcher.

- The American Journal of International Law*. Quarterly. (N. Y., Baker, Voorhis & Co.) See §9 above.
- The American Review of Reviews*. Monthly. (N. Y., Review of Reviews Co.) See §9 above.
- The American Year Book. A Record of Events and Progress*. (N. Y., Appleton, annual since 1910.) See §6 above.
- Collier's Weekly*. (N. Y., Collier's.) See §9 above.
- Current History*. Monthly. (N. Y., New York Times.) See §9 above.
- Hart, Albert Bushnell, and Lovejoy, Arthur O. (Editors.) *Handbook of the War for Public Speakers*. (N. Y., National Security League, 1917.) See §19 above.
- Hershey, Amos S. *The Essentials of International Public Law*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1912.) See §11 above.
- The Independent*. Weekly. (N. Y., Independent.) See §9 above.
- The Literary Digest*. Weekly. (N. Y., Funk & Wagnalls.) See §9 above.
- McKinley, Albert E. *War Outline Maps*. (Blank maps.) (Phila., McKinley Co.) See §22 above.
- The Nation*. Weekly. (N. Y., Evening Post.) See §9 above.
- The New Republic: A Journal of Opinion*. (N. Y., Republic Pub. Co.) See §9 above.
- Out of Their Own Mouths*. (N. Y., Appleton, 1917.) See §19 above.
- The Outlook*. Weekly. (N. Y., Outlook Co.) See §9 above.
- Putnam, George P. *Putnam's Handbook of Universal History*. (N. Y., Putnam, 1914.) See §1 above.
- Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature*. (White Plains, Wilson Co., monthly.) See §8 above.
- The Scientific American*. (N. Y., Munn & Co.) See §9 above.
- Treaties and Conventions Between the United States and Other Powers*. (1776-1913.) (3 vols., Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1910-1913.) See §11 above.
- Wilson, George G., and Tucker, George F. *International Law*. (6th ed., Boston, etc., Silver, Burdett, 1915.) See §11 above.
- The World Almanac and Encyclopedia*. (N. Y., Press Publishing Co., 1873—.) See §6 above.
- World's Work*. Monthly. (Garden City, Doubleday, Page.) See §9 above.

(b) [§33] General Works.

- Congress of the United States, *Congressional Record*. (Wash., Govt. Print. Office.) See §20 above.
- Hayes, Carlton, J. H. *A Political and Social History of Modern Europe*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1916.) See §50 below.
- Hazen, Charles Downer. *Europe Since 1815*. (N. Y., Holt, 1910.) See §50 below.
- Johnson, Rossiter. (Editor.) *The War in Europe: Its Causes and Consequences*. (N. Y., Sully, 1914.) See §17 above.

- The New York Times. *Current History, The European War*. (6 or 12 vols. to Sept., 1917, N. Y., Times Co.) See §17 above.
- Reynolds, Francis J., and others. (Editors.) *The Story of the Great War*. (5 vols. to 1916, N. Y., Collier & Son, 1916.) See §17 above.
- Shepherd, William R. *Historical Atlas*. (N. Y., Holt, 1911.) See §21 above.
- Simonds, Frank H. *The Great War*. (2 vols. pub.; N. Y., 1914.) See §17 §56 below.

(c) [§34] Ultimate Causes of the War.

- Beck, James M. *The Evidence in the Case*. (N. Y., Putnam, 1914.) See §55 below.
- Dernburg, Bernhard. *Germany and the War. Not a defense, but an explanation*. (N. Y., The Fatherland, 1915.) See §53 below.
- Guyot, Yves. *The Causes and Consequences of the War*. (London, Hutchinson, 1916.) See §52 below.
- Hart, A. B. *The War in Europe: Its Causes and Results*. (N. Y., Appleton, 1914.) See §31 above, §56 below.
- Meyer, Edward. *England, its political organization and development and the war against Germany*. Translated by Helene S. White. (Boston, Ritter, 1916.) See §61 below.
- Millard, T. F. *Our Eastern Question*. (N. Y., Century, 1916.) See §67 below.
- Milyovkov, Paul. *Russia and Its Crisis*. (Chicago, Univ. of Chic. Press, 1906.) See §48 below.
- Morel, Edmund Deville. *Morocco in Diplomacy*. (London, Smith, Elder, 1912.) See §60 below.
- Rose, J. Holland. *The Development of the European Nations*. (N. Y., Putnam, 1916.) See §39 below.
- Sloane, William Milligan. *The Balkans; A Laboratory of History*. (N. Y., Eaton & Mains, 1915.) See §41 below.
- Wendell, Barrett. *The France of To-day*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1907.) See §43 below.
- Zangwill, Israel. *The Principle of Nationalities*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.) See §70 below.

(d) [§35] Connections of Germany With the War.

- Bernhardi, Friedrich von. *Germany and the Next War*. Tr. by Allen Powles. (London, E. Arnold, 1912.) See §78 below.
- Buelow, Bernhard Heinrich Martin Karl, Graf von. *Imperial Germany*. Translated by Marie A. Lewenz. (N. Y., Dodd, Mead, 1914.) See §82 below.
- Cheradame, André. *The Pan-German Plot Unmasked*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1917.) See §86 below.
- Dewey, John. *German Philosophy and Politics*. (N. Y., Holt, 1915.) See §77 below.
- Francke, Kuno. *German Ideals of To-day and Other Essays on German Culture*. (Boston, Houghton, 1907.) See §75 below.
- Gauss, Christian. *The German Emperor as Shown in his Public Utterances*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1915.) See §84 below.
- The German Army From Within. By a British Officer Who Has Served In It*. (N. Y., Doran, 1914.) See §79 below.
- Germany's War Mania; the Teutonic Point of View as Officially Stated by Her Leaders*. (N. Y., Dodd, Mead, 1915.) See §74 below.
- I Accuse*. (N. Y., Doran, 1915.) Indictment of German Government, by a German. See §82 below.
- Lewin, Evans. *The German Road to the East: An Account of the Teutonic Aims in the Near and Middle East*. (N. Y., Doran, 1917.) See §93 below.
- Lichtenberger, Henri et Andre. *La question d'Alsace-Lorraine*. (Paris, Chapelot, 1915.) See §88 below.
- McCabe, Joseph. *Treitschke and the Great War*. (N. Y., Stokes, 1914.) See §78 below.

- Repplier, Agnes, and White, J. William. *Germany and Democracy, the Real Issue*. The views of two average Americans; a reply to Doctor Dernburg. (Phila., Winston, 1914.) See §80 below.
- Rohrbach, Paul. *Zum Weltvolk hindurch*. (Stuttgart, Engelhorn, 1914.) See §89 below.

(e) [§36] Course of the European War.

- Bédier, Joseph. *German Atrocities from German Evidence*. (Paris, Colin, 1915.) See §110 below.
- Bullard, Arthur. *Diplomacy of the Great War*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1916.) See §98 below.
- Chitwood, Oliver Perry. *The Immediate Causes of the Great War*. (N. Y., Crowell, 1917.) See §98 below.
- Coxwell, C. Fillingham. *Through Russia in War Time*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1917.) See §107 below.
- Gauvain, Auguste. *Les origines de la guerre Européenne*. (Paris, Colin, 1915.) See §97 below.
- Hay, Ian [pseudonym for Ian Hay Beith]. *The First Hundred Thousand*. (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1916.) See §104 below.
- Huard, Francis Wilson (Baroness Huard). *My Home in the Field of Honor*. (N. Y., Doran, 1916.) Absorbing narrative by a lady caught in the Battle on the Marne.
- Phillipson, Coleman. *International Law and the Great War*. (London, Unwin, 1915.)
- Price, Morgan P. *The Diplomatic History of the War*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1914.) See §94 below.
- Rohrbach, Paul. *Warum es der deutsche Krieg ist*. (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-anstalt, 1914.) See §96 below.
- Seymour, Charles. *The Diplomatic Background of the War*. (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1916.) See §98 below.
- Stowell, Ellery Cory. *The Diplomacy of the War of 1914*. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1915.) See §94 below.
- Toynbee, Arnold H. *The Deportation of Women and Girls from Lille*. (Official French note and other documents.) (N. Y., Doran, 1916.) See §112 below.

(f) [§37] Relations of the United States to the War.

- Baldwin, James Mark. *America's Neutrality: Its Cause and Care*. (N. Y., Putnam, 1917.) See §123 below.
- Coolidge, A. C. *United States as a World Power*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1908.) See §115 below.
- Fish, Carl Russell. *American Diplomacy*. (N. Y., Holt, 1915.) See §115 below.
- Hale, William Bayard. *American Rights and British Pretensions on the Seas. The facts and the documents, official and other, bearing upon the present attitude of Great Britain toward the commerce of the United States*. (N. Y., McBride, 1915.) See §123 below.
- Hart, A. B. *The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation*. (Boston, Little, Brown, 1916.) See §116 below.
- Huidekoper, Frederic L. *The Military Unpreparedness of the United States*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1915.) See §129 below.
- Johnson, Willis Fletcher. *America's Foreign Relations*. (2 vols., N. Y., Century, 1916.) See §115 below.
- Johnston, R. M. *Arms and the Race, the Foundations of Army Reform*. (N. Y., Century, 1915.) See §132 below.
- Jones, John Price. *America Entangled. The secret plotting of German spies in the United States, and the inside story of the sinking of the Lusitania, with introduction by Roger B. Wood*. (N. Y., Laut, 1917.) See §128 below.
- Kellor, Francis A. *Straight America: A Call to National Service*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.) See §130.
- Lippmann, Walter. *The Stakes of Diplomacy*. (N. Y., Holt, 1915.) Excellent discussion of problems on American diplomacy.
- Perry, Ralph Barton. *The Free Man and the Soldier*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1916.) See §132 below.

- Pratt, Edwin A. *The Rise of Rail Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914*. (London, King, 1915.) See §120 below.
- Roosevelt, Theodore. *Fear God and Take Your Own Part*. (N. Y., Doran, 1916.) See §117 below.
- Seton-Watson, Robert William. *The War and Democracy*. (London, Macmillan, 1915.) See §119 below.
- Steinmetz, Charles P. *America and the New Epoch*. (N. Y., etc., Harper, 1916.) See §117 below.
- Upton, Bt. Major General Emory. *The Military Policy of the United States*. (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1912.) See §132 below.
- Wood, Gen. Leonard. *Universal Military Training*. (National Service Library, I.) (N. Y., Collier, 1917.) See §132 below.

(g) [§38] Questions of Peace.

- Angell, Norman. *The Great Illusion*. (4th ed.; N. Y., Putnam, 1913.) See §143 below.
- Brailsford, Henry N. *A League of Nations*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.) See §155 below.
- Eliot, Charles W. *The Road Toward Peace: A Contribution to the Study of the Causes of the European War and of the Means of Preventing War in the Future*. (Boston, etc., Houghton Mifflin, 1915.) See §150 below.
- Fried, Alfred Herrmann. *The Restoration of Europe*. Trans. from the German by L. S. Gannett. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1916.) See §153 below.
- Goldsmith, Robert. *A League to Enforce Peace*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.) See §147 below.
- Jordan, David Starr. *War and the Breed. The Relation of War to the Downfall of Nations*. (Boston, Beacon Press, 1915.) See §144 below.
- Krehbiel, Edward B. *Nationalism, War and Society*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1916.) See §144 below.
- McClure, Samuel S. *Obstacles to Peace*. (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1916.) See §150 below.
- Scott, James Brown. *The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907. Accompanied by tables of signatures, ratifications and adhesions of the various powers, and texts of reservations*. (N. Y., Oxf. Univ. Press, 1915.) See §144 below.
- Veblen, Thorstein B. *An Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of Its Perpetuation*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.) See §143 below.
- Walling, William English. *The Socialists and the War*. (N. Y., Holt, 1915.) See §145 below.
- Wells, Herbert George. *The War That Will End War*. (London, Palmer, 1914.) See §146 below.
- Woods, Frederick Adams, and Baltzly, Alexander. *Is War Diminishing? A study of the prevalence of war in Europe from 1450 to the present day*. (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1915.) See §144 below.
- Zangwill, Israel. *The War for the World*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1916.) See §143 below.

CHAPTER III.

CLASSIFIED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WAR.

I. ULTIMATE CAUSES OF THE WAR.

A. THE WARRING NATIONS.

1. [§39] Brief Histories of Europe.

See §17 above and §50 below.

- Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. XI. *The Growth of Nationalities*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1909.)
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3. [§63] Rivalry for Sea Power.

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E. RIVALRIES IN THE ORIENT.

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(b) [§65] Turkey.

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(b) [§68] Japan.

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See §158 below.

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- Weale, B. L. Putnam, pseud. (Bertram Lenox Simpson). *Conflict of Color*. Being a detailed examination of racial problems throughout the world, with special reference to the English speaking people. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1910.)

4. [§72] Slav Questions.

See §§40, 47, 48 above, §266 below.

- Capek, Thomas. *The Slovaks of Hungary, Slavs and Pan Slavism*. (N. Y., 1906.)
- Krasinski, Count Valerian. *Pan Slavism and Germanism*. (London, Newley, 1848.)
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- Veblen, Thorstein. *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution*. (N. Y., etc., Macmillan, 1915.)

5. [§73] Austro-Serbian Relations to 1914.

- Barre, Andre. *La Bosnie Herzegovine, administration autrichienne de 1878 a 1903*. (Paris, Michaud, 1907.)
- Brailsford, Henry Noel. *Macedonia*. (London, Methuen, 1908.)
- Bonn, M. J. (Editor). *Die Balkan-frage*. (Munich, Duncker, 1914.) Ten essays by various writers.
- Bülow, H. von. *Deutschland, Oesterreich-Ungare und die Balkanstaaten*. (Hamburg, Sud-West-Verlag, 1914.)
- Henry, René. *Questions d'Autriche-Hongrie et question d'Orient*. (Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1903.)
- Sosnosky, Theodor von. *Die Balkanpolitik Osterreich-Ungarns seit 1866*, Vol. I. Stuttgart, etc., Deutsche Valogs-Anstalt, 1913.)

II. CONNECTIONS OF GERMANY WITH THE WAR.

G. GERMAN IDEALS.

See §§35, 53 above, §§172-177 below.

1. [§74] Collections of German Teachings.

See §19 above.

- Archer, William, compiler. *Gems (?) of German Thought*. (Garden City, Doubleday, Page, 1917.)
- Bang, Jacob Peter. *Hurrah and Hallelujah—the teaching of Germany's poets, prophets, professors and preachers*. Trans. from the Danish by Jesse Bröchner. (N. Y., Doran, 1917.)
- Chapman, John Ja. *Deutschland ueber alles or Germany Speaks*. (N. Y., Putnam, 1914.) A collection of utterances of representative German statesmen, military leaders, scholars, poets.
- Germany's War Mania. The Teutonic point of view as officially stated by her leaders*. (N. Y., Dodd, Mead, 1915.) A collection of utterances on Germany's doctrine of force by distinguished Germans, including William II, the Crown Prince, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, Prince von Bülow, General von Bernhardi, Field Marshal von der Goltz and Prof. Delbrück.
- Reich, Emil. *Germany's Swell Head*. (2d edn.; London, Methuen, 1914.) By a Hungarian; contains numerous citations from German writers.

2. [§75] German Philosophical Ideas.

- Chamberlain, Houston Stewart. *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*. Translation by John Lees. (N. Y., John Lane, 1912.) Superiority of the "Germanic race," as shown in history by an Englishman now a naturalized German subject. One of the principal texts of German race discussions.

- Cohen, Hermann. *Ueber das eigentümliche des deutschen geistes*. (Berlin, Reuther, 1914.)
- Francke, Kuno. *German Ideals of Today and Other Essays on German Culture*. (Boston, Houghton, 1907.)
- Macke. *Warum sind die deutschen so verhasst?* (Braunschweig, Westermann, 1915.)
- Rohrbach, Paul. *Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt*. (Düsseldorf, Lange-wiesche, 1912.)
- Santayana, George. *Egotism in German Philosophy*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1916.) Sharp criticism by a writer of Spanish extraction.
- Seiling, Max. *Das professorium, "der stolz der nation?"* (Leipzig, Mutze, 1915.)
- Wundt, Wilhelm. *Die nationen und ihre philosophie. Ein kapitel zum weltkrieg*. (Leipzig, Kröner, 1916.)

3. [§76] Doctrine of German Superiority.

- Chamberlain, Houston Stewart. *Deutsches Wesen. Ausgewählte aufsätze*. (München, Bruckmann, 1916.)
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- Durkheim, E. *Germany Above All*. The German mental attitude and the war. (Paris, Colin, 1915.)
- Engelmann, Max. *Das Germanentum und sein Verfall*. (Stuttgart, Funcke, 19—.)
- Lasson, Adolf. *Deutsche art und deutsche bildung*. (Berlin, Heymann, 1914.)
- Nötzler, Karl. *Der französische und der deutsche geist*. (Jena, Diederichs.)
- Seilliere, Ernst. *Le comte de Gobineau et l'organisme historique*. (Paris, Plon-Nourrit. 1903.)

4. [§77] German Theory of the State.

See §§163, 164 below.

- Burgess, John W. *The Reconciliation of Government with Liberty*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1915.) Defence of the German system by an American specialist in constitutional law.
- Dewey, John. *German Philosophy and Politics*. (N. Y., Holt, 1915.)
- Mühlestein, Hans. *Der vorrang der deutschen staatsidee und ihr sieg in Europa*. (München, Rosenlaur-Verlog, 1915.)
- Roscher, Wilhelm. *Politik: geschichtliche Naturlehre der Monarchie, Aristokratie und Demokratie*. (2d ed., Stuttgart, Cotta, 1893.)
- Schmoller, Gustav von. *Der deutsche Militär und Beamtenstaat*. (Berlin, Teubner, 1915.) The author holds that Germany owes its freedom from the dominance of a plutocracy, as in England, France and the United States, to the aristocracy.
- Standinger, Franz. *Kulturgrundlagen der Politik*. (Jena, Diederichs, 1914.)

5. [§78] German Prophets.

(a) Bernhardi.

- Bernhardi, Friedrich von. *Germany and the Next War*. Tr. by Allen H. Powles. (London, E. Arnold, 1912.)
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(b) Frederick the Great.

- Sladen, Douglas. *The Confessions of Frederick the Great and the Life of Frederick the Great by Heinrich Von Treitschke*. (N. Y., Putnam, 1915.) The "confessions" were written in French for his nephew, heir to the throne, and published in 1766, during his lifetime.

(c) Nietzsche.

- Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Beyond Good and Evil. Prelude to a philosophy of the future.* Authorized translation by Helen Zimmern. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1907.)
- Stewart, Herbert Leslie. *Nietzsche and the Ideals of Modern Germany.* (London, Arnold, 1915.) A judicious and scholarly examination of the question how far Nietzsche's philosophy is responsible for the temper of the Germany of 1914.
- Wright, Willard Huntington. *What Nietzsche Taught.* (N. Y., Huebsch, 1915.)

(d) Treitschke.

- Hausrath, Adolf. *Treitschke: His Doctrine of German Destiny and of International Relations.* (N. Y., Putnam, 1914.)
- McCabe, Joseph. *Treitschke and the Great War.* (N. Y., Stokes, 1914.) A study of Treitschke's influence on contemporary Germany, the historian being held largely responsible for the ideas and ideals which prevail in Germany to-day.
- Treitschke, H. von. *Germany, France, Russia and Islam.* (N. Y., Putnam, 1915.) The essays which compose this book were printed between 1871 and 1895. They deal with a wide range of topics, chiefly in relation to Germany.
- Treitschke, H. von. *Politics.* Translated by Blanche Dugdale and Torben de Bille, edited by A. J. Balfour, and American foreword by A. L. Lowell. (2 vols., N. Y., Macmillan, 1916.)
- Treitschke, H. von. *Politik.* (Leipzig, Hirzel, 1899-1900.)

6. [§79] Prussian Militarism.

See §§159-162 below.

- Bernhardi, Friedrich von. *On War of To-day.* Trans. by Karl von Donat. (N. Y., Dodd, Mead.)
- Clausewitz, Gen. Carl von. *On War: Translated by Col. J. J. Graham.* (3 vols., London, Paul, 1908.)
- Frobenius, H., Colonel. *The German Empire's Hour of Destiny.* (N. Y., McBride, Nast., 1914.)
- The German Army from Within.* By a British Officer who has served in it. (N. Y., Doran, 1914.)
- Goltz, Major-General Baron von der. *The Conduct of War. A short treatise on its most important branches and guiding rules.* Translated by Major G. F. Levenson. (London, Paul, 1899.)
- Hueffer, Ford Madox. *When Blood Is Their Argument: An analysis of Prussian Culture.* (N. Y., etc., Hodder, Stoughton, 1915.)
- Jerusalem, Wilhelm. *Der krieg im lichte der gesellschaftslehre.* (Stuttgart, Enke, 1915.)
- Johnson, W. Douglas. *The Peril of Prussianism.* (N. Y., Putnam, 1917.)
- Lamprecht, Karl. *Krieg und kultur; drei vaterländische vorträge.* (Leipzig, Hirzel, 1914.)
- Lanoir, P. *The German Spy System in France.* Translated from the French. (London, 1910.)
- Muirhead, John Henry. *German Philosophy in Relation to War.* (London, Murray, 1915.)

7. [§80] Criticisms of German Ideals.

- Baldwin, James Mark. *The Super State and the Eternal Values.* (N. Y., Oxford Univ. Press, 1916.) Lecture delivered at Oxford University.
- Bomfim, M. A. *A Obra do Germanismo.* (Rio, Bresnard Freres, 1915.) Critique of the German spirit.
- Durkheim, Emile. "Germany Above All." *The German mental attitude and the war.* (Paris, Colin, 1915.)
- Muret, Maurice. *L'orgueil allemand; psychologie d'une crise.* (Paris, Payot, 1915.)
- Repplier, Agnes, and White, J. William. *Germany and Democracy, the Real Issue. The views of two average Americans; a reply to Dr. Dernburg.* (Phila., Winston, 1914.)

H. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF GERMANY.

See §163 below.

1. [§81] Recent Germany.

- Barker, J. Ellis. *Modern Germany: Her political and economic problems, her foreign and domestic policy, her ambitions, and the causes of her successes and her failures.* (4th ed., London, Smith, Elder, 1912.)
- Bérard, Victor. *L'éternelle Allemagne.* (2d ed., Paris, Colin, 1914.)
- Eastman, Max. *Understanding Germany.* (N. Y., Kennerley, 1916.)
- Howard, B. E. *The German Empire.* (N. Y., Macmillan, 1906.) A careful résumé of the political system of Germany from studies on the ground.
- Rose, J. H., Herford, C. H., Gonner, E. C. R., and Sadler, M. E. *Germany in the Nineteenth Century.* (2d ed., Manchester, Eng., Univ. Press, 1912.)
- Wellman, Walter. *The German Republic.* (N. Y., Dutton, 1916.)

2. [§82] First-hand Views of Germany.

- Bourdon, Georges. *The German Enigma. Being an inquiry among Germans as to what they think, what they want, what they can do.* Trans. by Beatrice Marshall. (London, etc., Dent, 1914.)
- Bülow, Bernhard Heinrich Martin Karl, Graf von. *Imperial Germany.* Trans. by Marie A. Lewenz. (N. Y., Dodd, Mead, 1914.)
- Collier, Price. *Germany and the Germans from an American Point of View.* (N. Y., Scribner, 1913.)
- Dawson, Wm. H. *What is the Matter with Germany.* (London, Longmans, 1914.) By a writer who has long interested himself in German affairs.
- Francke, Kuno. *The German Spirit.* (N. Y., Holt, 1916.) By a German-American loyal to his adopted country.
- Fullerton, George Stuart. *Germany of To-day.* (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1915.) A defence of Germany, by an American philosopher.
- I Accuse.* (N. Y., Doran, 1915.) Indictment of German government by a German.
- Tower, Charlemagne. *Germany of To-day.* (N. Y., Holt, 1913.) By a former minister of the U. S. to Germany.
- Wylie, Ida A. R. *Eight Years in Germany.* (London, Mills & Boon, 1914.)

3. [§83] German Constitution.

- Krueger, Fritz Konrad. *Government and Politics of the German Empire.* (Yonkers, World Book Co., 1916.) Elementary treatise on the German political system, from a German point of view. Contains useful bibliographies.
- Laband, Paul. *Deutsches reichsstaatsrecht.* (6th ed., Tübingen, Mohr, 1912.) The standard work on German constitutional law.
- Schröter, A. *Die deutsche staatsbürger.* (Leipzig, 1912.) An account of the modern German political spirit and institutions from the German standpoint.
- Zorn, Philipp. *Das staatsrecht des deutschen reichs. I. Band. Das Verfassungsgucht.* (Berlin, Guttentag, 1895.) II. Band. *Das verwollingsrecht.* (Berlin, 1897.) Two valuable volumes, by a leading authority on constitutional law in Germany.

4. [§84] German Emperor.

- Francke, Kuno. "The Kaiser and His People," in *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 114. (Oct., 1914.)
- Gauss, Christian. *The German Emperor as Shown in his Public Utterances.* (N. Y., Scribner, 1915.) Official version in full of many of Emperor William's addresses and proclamations, with an explanation of the circumstances under which each was delivered or to which it refers.

- Kennedy, J. M. *The War Lord: A Character Study of Kaiser William II, by means of his speeches, letters and telegrams.* (Palmer.)
- Lindau, Paul. *Der Kaiser.* By a leading German political writer.
- Lucas, E. V. *Swollen-headed William. Painful stories and funny pictures after the German.* (N. Y., Dutton.)
- McCabe, Joseph. *The Kaiser: His Personality and Career.* (London, Unwin, 1913.)
- Perris, George Herbert. *Germany and the German Emperor.* (London, Melrose, 1912.)
- Saunders, George. *The Last of the Huns.* (London, Routledge, 1914.)
- Schwering, Count Axel von. *The Berlin Court under William II.* (N. Y., Funk & Wagnalls, 1915.)
- Topham, Anne. *Memories of the Kaiser's Court.* (N. Y., Dodd, Mead, 1914.)
- Wilhelm II, German Emperor. *The Kaiser's speeches, forming a character portrait of Emperor William II.* Trans. and edited with annotations by Wolf von Schierbrand. (N. Y., etc., Harper, 1903.)
- Wilhelm II, German Emperor. *Kaiserreden.* Ed. by A. O. E. Klausmann. (Leipzig, Weber, 1902.) The Emperor's speeches, letters and telegrams.
- Book of William.* With apologies to Edward Lear, author of "The Book of Nonsense." (London, Warne, 1914.)

5. [§85] Germany's Economic Development.

- Chantriot, Emile. *L'Allemagne et sa situation économique, avec une préface de M. Wilhelm Foerster.* (Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1910.)
- Dawson, William Harbutt. *Industrial Germany.* (London, Glasgow, Collins, 1913.)
- Helfferich, Karl. *Germany's Economic Progress and National Wealth, 1888-1913.* (N. Y., Germanistic Society, 1914.)
- Millioud, Maurice. *The Ruling Caste and Frenzied Trade in Germany.* With an introduction by the Right Hon. Sir Frederick Pollock, Bart. (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin, 1916.)
- Rohrbach, Paul. *Germany's Isolation.* An exposition of the economic causes of the war. (Chicago, McClurg, 1915.) Trans. of *Der Krieg und die deutsche Politik.*
- Schmoller, Gustav von. *Die wirtschaftliche Zukunft Deutschlands und die Flottenvorlage. Handels und Machtpolitik.* Stuttgart, Cotta, 1900.)

I. GERMAN INTERNATIONAL POLICY.

1. German Policy in Europe.

(a) [§86] Pan-Germanism.

- Alldeutscher Verband. *Flugschriften des Alldeutschen Verbandes.* (München, Lehmann, 1896—.) Publication of the Pan-Germanic organization.
- Andler, Charles. *Pan-Germanism, Its Plans for German Expansion in the World.* (Paris, Colin, 1915.) Studies and Documents on the war.
- Andler, Charles. *Le Pangermanisme Philosophique.* (Paris, Conard, 1915.) Andler's volumes (five in French and one in English) constitute the most comprehensive account of Pan-Germanism in its several phases, and give copious extracts from the principal Pan-Germanist writings.
- Blondel, Georges. *La guerre Européenne et la doctrine pangermaniste.* (3d ed., Paris, Chapelot, 1915.)
- Chéradame, Andre. *The Pan-German Plot Unmasked.* (N. Y., Scribner, 1917.) On Germany's war aims and the menace of a German peace.
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- The Pan-Germanic Doctrine.* Being a study of German political aims and aspirations. (N. Y., Harper, 1904.)

(b) [§87] German Imperial Policy.

- Andrillon, Capitaine Henri. *L'expansion de l'Allemagne, ses causes, ses formes, ses conséquences.* (Paris, Rivière, 1914.)
- Dampierre, Jacques de. *German Imperialism and International Law.* (London, Constable, 1917.)
- Grumbach, S. *Das annexionistische Deutschland.* (Lausanne, Pagot, 1917.)
- Lair, Maurice. *L'Imperialisme allemand.* (Paris, Colin, 1902.)

(c) [§88] Alsace-Lorraine.

- Engerand, Fernand. *Les frontières Lorraines et la force Allemande.* (Paris, Perrin, 1916.)
- Fischbach, O. *Elsass-Lothringen.* (Tubingen, 1914.) (Das öffentliche recht der gegenwart, vol. XXII.) An extensive bibliography may be found here.
- Jordan, David Starr. *Alsace-Lorraine. A Study in Conquest,* 1913. (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1916.)
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- Putnam, Ruth. *Alsace and Lorraine from Caesar to Kaiser,* 58 B. C.-1871 A. D. (N. Y., etc., Putnam, 1915.)

2. Policy Outside of Europe.**(a) [§89] Germany as a World Power.**

See §169 below.

- Bernstorff, Graf J. H. A. H. A. von. *The Development of Germany as a World Power.* (Phila., 1910.)
- Hettner, Alfred. *Die ziele unserer weltpolitik.* (Stuttgart, Deut. Verl.-Anst, 1915.)
- Beyens, Baron. *Germany Before the War.* Translation of *L'Allemagne avant la Guerre Les Causes et les Responsabilités.* (London, Nelson and Sons, 1916.)
- Naumann, Frederick. *Central Europe.* Translation of *Mitteleuropa* by Christabel M. Meredith. (London, King, 1916.)
- Reventlow, Graf Ernst zu. *Deutschlands auswärtige politik 1888-1914.* (Berlin, Mittler, 1916.)
- Rohrbach, Paul. *German World Policies.* Trans. by Dr. Edmund von Mach. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1915.)
- Rohrbach, Paul. *Zum weltvolk hindurch.* (Stuttgart, Engelhorn, 1914.)
- Weil, Georges. *Le Pangermanisme en Autriche.* (Paris, Fontemoigne, 1914.)
- Wirth, Albrecht H. *Volkstum und Weltmacht in der Geschichte.* (München, Bruckmann, 1901.)

(b) [§90] German Colonial Policy.

- Le Sueur, Gordon. *Germany's Vanishing Colonies.* (London, Everett, 1915.)
- Ohlinger, Gustavus. "Kiao-Chau" in *World's Work.* XXIX. (Nov., 1914.)
- Reventlow, Graf E. zu. *Deutschland zur see. Ein buch von der deutschen kriegsflotte.* (Leipzig, Spamer, 1914.)
- Solf, Wilhelm. *Die deutsche Kolonialpolitik.* (Berlin, Teubner, 1915.)
- Zimmermann, Alfred. *Geschichte der deutschen kolonialpolitik.* (Berlin, Mittler, 1914.)

(c) [§91] Germany in the Orient.

- Becker, Carl. *Deutschland und die Türkei.* (Berlin, Teubner, 1915.)
How Germany saved Turkey from decline and dismemberment. History of the relations of the two countries since 1888. Germany's object not territorial expansion but new markets.
- Mittwoch, Eugene. *Deutschland, die Türkei und der heilige krieg.* (Berlin, Kameradschaft, 1915.)

Namier, Lewis B. *Germany and Eastern Europe*. (London, Duckworth, 1915.)

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Véla, Wm. T. *Die zukunft der Türkei im bündnis mit Deutschland. Eine politische und wirtschaftliche studie*. (Leipzig, Koehler, 1915.)

(d) [§92] Germany and Islam.

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Diercks, Gustav. *Hie Allah! Das erwachen des Islams*. (Berlin, Curtius, 1914.)

Hurgronje, C. Snouck. *The Holy War (Made in Germany)*. (N. Y., Putnam, 1915.) Deals with the proclamation of a "Holy War" by the Sheik-ul-Islam. The author explains why the Mohammedans are unmoved by the "Holy War" appeal.

(e) [§93] Berlin to Bagdad.

Chéradame, Andre. *La question d'Orient. La Macedoine. Le chemin de fer de Bagdad*. (Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1903.)

Grothe, Hugo. *Die Bagdadbahn und das schwäbische bauernement in Transkaukasien und Palästina. Inaugural-dissertation*. (München, Lehmann, 1902.)

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III. COURSE OF THE EUROPEAN WAR.

J. OUTBREAK OF THE WAR.

See §1 and short list in §36 above. See §§156, 170 below.

1. [§94] Diplomatic Documents on the Outbreak.

See §18 above.

American Association for International Conciliation. *Documents Regarding the European War*. (N. Y., Am. Assoc. for Int. Concil.)

American Association for International Conciliation. *Pamphlets*. (N. Y.)

Beer, Max. *Das regenbogen-buch*. (Bern, Wyss, 1915.) German editions and translations of the seven principal official collections of diplomatic documents.

Das deutsche Weissbuch. (Berlin, Carl Heymann, 1914.) The German text differs in some particulars from the English. The latter may be found in the collections indicated.

The German White Book: The English translation issued by the German Government, August, 1914. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1914.)

Great Britain. *Collected diplomatic documents relating to the outbreak of the European war*. (London, Unwin, 1915.) "Printed under the authority of His Majesty's Stationery Office."

Mach, Edmund von. *Official diplomatic documents relating to the outbreak of the European war*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1916.) By an American pro-German. Withdrawn from sale by publishers because of inaccuracies. Half the book consists of photographic reproductions of the various "Books"; useful for those who desire to consult the original texts.

New York Times. *Current History of the European War*. (12 vols., N. Y., N. Y. Times, 1914—.) Especially vol. I,

- New York Times. *Why England, Germany and Russia Went to War.* The "White papers" of England and Germany, the "Orange paper" of Russia, and other diplomatic correspondence and documents; republished from the New York Times. (N. Y., Times, 1914.)
- Price, Morgan P. *The Diplomatic History of the War.* (N. Y., Scribner, 1914.) A record of events preceding the war, with the texts of official documents, and reports of public speeches by officials.
- Scott, James Brown, ed. *Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War.* (2 vols., N. Y., Oxford Univ. Press, 1916.) One of the best compilations of documents. Well indexed.
- Stowell, Ellery Cory. *The Diplomacy of the War of 1914.* (Vol. I only, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1915.)

2. [§95] British View of the Outbreak

See §51 above.

- Archer, William. *The Thirteen Days.* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1915.) Includes appendix on Price's *Diplomatic History of the War.*
- Asquith, Herbert H. *The War—Its Causes and Its Message.* (London, Methuen, 1914.) Speeches of the British Premier, Aug.-Oct., 1914.
- Harrison, Austin. *The Kaiser's War; with a foreword by Frederic Harrison.* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1914.)
- Herdram, J. W. *The History of Twelve Days, July 24 to August 4, 1914.* (London, Unwin, 1915.)
- Oxford University Faculty. *Why We Are at War: Great Britain's case, with an appendix of original documents, including the authorized English translation of the White Book issued by the German government. Seventh impression, containing the Russian orange book and extracts from the Belgian grey book.* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1914.)
- Picton, Harold. *Is It To Be Hate? An Essay in Wartime.* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1915.)
- Sladen, Douglas. *The Real "Truth About Germany," facts about the war, with an appendix, "Great Britain and the War," by A. Maurice Low.* (N. Y., etc., Putnam, 1914.)
- "Who Began War?" in *New York Times Current History*, I, 271-343. Case for Triple Entente. First warnings of Europe's peril. Great Britain's mobilization. Summons of nation to arms.

See §53 above.

3. [§96] German View of the Outbreak

- Dumba, Constantin Theodor. "Why Austria is at War with Russia," in *North Amer. Rev.*, vol. 200, pp. 346-352. (Sept., 1914.)
- Haeckel, Ernst H. P. A. *England's blutschuld am weltkriege.* (Eisenach, Jacobi, 1914.)
- Mach, Edmund von. *Germany's Point of View.* (Chicago, McClurg, 1915.)
- Modern Germany in Relation to the Great War* (English tr. of *Deutschland und der Weltkrieg*, 1915). (N. Y., Kennerley, 1916.) The most comprehensive and authoritative presentation of Germany's case, by a member of the best known German scholars and publicists.
- Reventlow, Graf Ernst zu. *Heucheleien englischer minister in ihren kriegsreden 1914-15; ein politisches stimmungsbild.* (Berlin, Mittler, 1915.)
- Rohrbach, Paul. *Warum es der deutsche krieg ist.* (Stuttgart, Deutsche verlags-anstalt, 1914.)
- Schiemann, Theodor. *Deutschland und die grosse politik anno 1914. Die letzten etappen zum weltkrieg.* (Berlin, Reimer, 1915.)
- Truth About Germany: Facts About the War.* (N. Y., Trow, 1914.) A semi-official statement prepared by a committee of eminent German men and women, including many in official relation to the government, stating arguments on behalf of Germany and making attacks upon her enemies. Highly prejudiced.
- "Who Began War?" in *N. Y. Times Current History European War*, I, 209-243. German case. Speeches of Kaiser; speeches of Bethmann-Hollweg; Austria-Hungary's version of war; German review of evidence.

- Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Ulrich von. *Zwei reden. Krieges anfang. Die geschichtlichen ursachen des krieges.* (Berlin, Weidemann, 1914.)
- Various German Writers. *Modern Germany in Relation to the Great War.* Translation of *Deutschland und der Weltkrieg*, by William Wallace Whitelock. (N. Y., Kennerley, 1916.)
- "Appeal of German Universities to the Civilized World by German professors (and) Reply to German Professors by British scholars," in *N. Y. Times Current History*, I, 185-192.

4. [§97] Allied View of the Outbreak.

See §52 above.

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See §191 below.

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2. [§123] Exercise of Neutrality by the United States.

See §226 below.

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(d) Mails.

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(e) Prize.

- American Year Book*, 1916, pp. 76-77.

4. [§125] German Complaints of British Practices.

- Gätecke, Max. *Der grosse raubkrieg und die interessender neutralen mächte*. (Karlsruhe, Braunsche Hofbuchder, 1916.)
- Pollen, Arthur. "Freedom and the Seas," in *Land and Water*, LXVIII. (March 22, 1917.)
- Steinuth, Hans. *England und der U-boat krieg*. (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1915.)
- See §§206-216 below.

5. [§126] Submarine Controversy and Lusitania.

See §§208-216 below; *Handbook*, §§27-31.

- American Year Book*, 1915, pp. 33-58; 1916, pp. 55-64.
- Beck, James M. *The Case of the Lusitania*. (27 pp., Boston, Citizens League for American, etc., 1916.)
- Hill, David J. "Protection of American Citizens," in *North American Review*, vol. 103, pp. 381-387. (Mar., 1916.)
- Lauriat, Charles E. *The Lusitania's Last Voyage*. By one of the passengers. (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin, 1915.)
- "Der Lusitania Fall," in *Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht*, IX, 135-237. (1915.)
- Steinuth, Hans. *Lusitania*. (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1915.)

6. [§127] Question of Armed Merchant Ships.

- American Year Book*, 1916, pp. 11 and 13.
 Hart, Albert Bushnell. "Unarmed Neutrality," in *Am. Academy of Pol. Sci., Annals*, LX, 213-221. (July, 1916.)
 Higgins, A. Pearce. *Defensively Armed Merchant Ships and Submarine Warfare*. (56 pp.; London, Stevens, 1917.)

7. [§128] Breaches of Neutrality by Belligerents in the United States.

See §227 below.

- Jones, John Price. *America Entangled*. The secret plotting of German spies in the United States and the inside story of the sinking of the *Lusitania*, with introduction by Roger B. Wood. (N. Y., Laut, 1917.)
 Oncken, Hermann. *Deutschlands weltkrieg und die Deutschamerikaner*. (Stuttgart, Deut. Verlag-Anstalt, 1914.)
 Wile, Frederic William. *The German-American Plot*. The record of a great failure, the campaign to capture the sympathy and support of the United States. (London, Pearson, 1915.)

P. PREPAREDNESS.

1. [§129] State of Unpreparedness.

See §237 below.

- Greene, Francis Vinton. *The Present Military Situation in the United States*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1915.)
 Huidekoper, Frederic L. *The Military Unpreparedness of the United States*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1915.) A well known writer on military topics who declares we are in a lamentable state to oppose an invasion.
 Shaeffer, Lieutenant Robert G. *Red, White and Blue*. (N. Y., Rankin, 1917.) Presents the facts of the military condition of the United States.
 Upton, Bt. Major General Emory. *The Military Policy of the United States*. (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1912.)
 Wood, General Leonard. *Efficiency and National Defense*. (N. Y., Nat'l Insti. of Efficiency in Preparation, 1917.)

2. [§130] Efficient Patriotism.

- Dewey, S. "Organizing Sentiment," in *Nation*, Vol. 103, pp. 103-104. (August 3, 1916.)
 Liebermann, E. "Why I Am a Patriot," in *Outlook*, Vol. 113, pp. 909-11. (August 16, 1916.)
 Kellor, Frances A. *Straight America: a Call to National Service*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.)

3. [§131] The National Guard.

- "National Guard—Its Status and Its Defects," in *Am. Rev. of Rev.*, LIV, 163-167. (August, 1916.)
 New York (City)—Mayor's Committee on National Defence. *The Mobilization of the National Guard, 1916, Its Economic and Military Aspects*. Reports of the executive committee of the Mayor's committee on national defence. 35 pp. (N. Y., 1917.)
 Washburn, H. C. *The American Blind Spot*. The failure of the volunteer system as shown in our military history. 42 pp. (N. Y., Doubleday, Page, 1917.)

4. [§132] Universal Military Training and Service.

See §§243, 278 below.

- Army War College. "On Training of Forces of Belligerent Nations of Europe," in *War Department Doc. No. 534*. (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1916.)

- Giddings, Franklin H. "The Democracy of Universal Military Service," in *Annals of the Am. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Sci.*, LXVI, 173-180. (July, 1916.)
- Johnston, R. M. *Arms and the Race, the Foundations of Army Reform.* (N. Y., Century, 1915.)
- Kuenzli, Fred A. *Right and Duty, or, Citizen and Soldier.* (N. Y., National Defense Institute, 1916.) This book covers the Swiss system thoroughly.
- McCoy, Major Frank R. *Principles of Military Training.* (National Service Library, III.) (N. Y., Collier, 1917.)
- Perry, Ralph Barton. *The Free Man and the Soldier.* (N. Y., Scribner, 1916.)
- Smith, Munroe, and Others. "Why Should We Have Universal Military Service?" *Columbia War Papers, No. 13.*
- Upton, Bt. Major General Emory. *The Military Policy of the United States.* (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1912.)
- Wood, Gen. Leonard. *Universal Military Training.* (National Service Library, I.) (N. Y., Collier, 1917.)

5. [§133] Efficient Military and Naval Organization.

See §§272-282 below.

- Ashburn, P. M. *The Elements of Military Hygiene.* (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin, 1909.)
- Carpenter, Captain William T. *Rudiments of Drill, Mobile Army Troops.* (National Service Library, IV.) (N. Y., Collier, 1917.)
- Fiske, Admiral Bradley A. *Efficiency and Naval Defense.* (N. Y., Nat'l Institute of Efficiency in Prep., 1917.)
- Hurd, Archibald S. *Our Navy.* (London, Warne, 1914.)
- Jervey, Lieut.-Col. Henry. *Warfare of the Future.* (National Service Library, V.) (N. Y., Collier, 1917.)
- Stirling, Commander Yates. *Fundamentals of Naval Service.* (N. Y., Scribner, 1917.)
- Moss, Capt. James A., and Stewart, Capt. M. B. *Self-Helps for the Citizen Soldier.* (Washington, U. S. Infantry Assoc., 1916.) A guide by which the civilian may inform himself concerning military matters, by two officers of the General Staff.
- Wood, Gen. Leonard. *The Military Obligations of Citizenship.* (Princeton, University Press, 1915.)

6. [§134] Civilian Preparedness.

See §270 below.

- Boston Public Library. *A Selected List of Books on Domestic Production and Preservation of Food.* (Boston, The Library, 1917.)
- Bullard, Arthur. *Mobilizing America.* (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.)
- Handy, Amy L. *Warned.* (Boston, etc., Houghton, Mifflin, 1917.)
- Kellor, Francis A. *Straight America: A Call to National Service.* (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.)
- Library of Congress, U. S. *Select List of References on Cost of Living and Prices.* (Washington, Govt. Print. Office, 1910.); *Supplementary List.* (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1912.)
- O'Brien, Charles. *Food Preparedness for the United States.* (Boston, Little, Brown, 1917.)
- Seager, H. R., and Chaddock, R. E. *Food Preparedness.* A survey of the basic facts in the food situation. (Columbia War Papers, No. 6. N. Y., 1917.)

7. [§135] Farm Preparedness.

See §257 below.

- Agriculture, Department of. *Drying Fruits and Vegetables in the Home.* (Farmers' Bulletin, No. 841, June, 1917.) (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1917.)
- Agriculture, Department of. *Weekly News Letter to Crop Correspondents.* Weekly information on food supply by conservation, etc. (Washington, Govt. Print. Office, 1913.)

- Anderson, B. M., Jr. *Farmers and Speculators*. A discussion of prices as a stimulant to production and of the uses of speculation in war finance. (Columbia War Papers, No. 8. N. Y., 1917.)
- Dewey, John. *Enlistment for the Farm*. A message to school boards, principals, and teachers on how school children can aid the nation. (Columbia War Papers, N. Y., 1917.) Pamphlet, 10 pp.
- French, Allen. *The Home Vegetable Garden*. (Boston, Mass., State Board of Agriculture, 1917.)
- Myrick, Herbert. *The Federal Farm Loan System, New Method of Farm Mortgage, under National Supervision*. A practical manual upon organizing and conducting national farm loan associations, also joint stock land banks. (N. Y., Orange Judd Co., 1916.)
- Wilson, Warren H. *Rural Education in War*. (Columbia War Papers, N. Y., 1917.)

8. [§136] Preparedness for Women and Children

- Franks, Thetta D. *Household Organization for War Service*. (N. Y., Putnam, 1917.) Motto of the book: "America expects every woman to do her duty."
- Hagedorn, Hermann. *You Are the Hope of the World*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.) To the children of America.
- Rinehart, Mary Roberts. *The Altar of Freedom*. (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin, 1917.) An appeal to American mothers, by one of them.

9. [§137] Economic Preparedness.

See §§249, 261 below.

- Bullock, C. J. "Financing the War," in *Quart. Jour. Econ.*, XXXI, 357-379. (May, 1917.)
- Jones, Grosvenor. *Government Aid to Merchant Shipping*. Study of subsidies sub-ventions, and other forms of state aid in principal countries of world. (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, 1916.)
- Memorial of American Economists to Congress Regarding Our Finances*. (Congressional Record, May 10, 1911; pp. 2136.)
- Seligman, E. R. A. *War Finance Primer*. (N. Y., Nat'l Bank of Commerce.)

Q. UNITED STATES IN WAR.

1. [§138] Reasons for War.

See §234 below.

- Beck, James M. *The War and Humanity*. A further discussion of the ethics of the world war and the attitude of the United States. Introduction by J. H. Choate. (2nd ed.; N. Y., Putnam, 1917.)
- Cobb, Irvin S. *Speaking of Prussians*. (N. Y., Doran, 1917.)
- Hagedorn, Herman. *You Are the Hope of the World*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.) An appeal to the boys and girls of America.
- Johnson, Willis Fletcher. *America and the Great War for Humanity and Freedom*. (Phila., Winston, 1917.)
- Murray, Gilbert. *The United States and the War*. (London, Speaight, 1916.)
- Palmer, Frederick. *With Our Faces to the Light*. (N. Y., Dodd, Mead, 1917.)
- Rinehart, Mary Roberts. *The Altar of Freedom*. (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin, 1917.)
- Roosevelt, Theodore. *America and the World War*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1915.)
- Roosevelt, Theodore. *Fear God and Take Your Own Part*. (N. Y., Doran, 1916.)

2. [§139] Declaration of War.

See §§232, 243, 278 below.

- Lane, Franklin D., and Baker, Newton D. *The Nation in Arms*. (13 pp., Wash. Govt. Printing Office, 1917. *War Information Series*, No. 2.)
- Reeves, Jesse S. "The Prussian American Treaties," in *Am. Journal of Int. Law*, XI, 475-510. (July, 1917.)
- Scott, James B. "The United States at War with the Imperial German Government," in *Am. Journal Int. Law*, XI, 617-626. (July, 1917.)
- Strauss, Oscar A. *Preparedness Against the Rebarbarization of the World*. (N. Y., The League to Enforce Peace.)
- Wilson, George Grafton. "The Kronprinzessen Cecilie and the Hague Convention," VI, in *Am. Journal of Int. Law*, XI, 642-645. (July, 1917.)
- Woolsey, Theodore S. "The Relations Between the United States and the Central Powers," in *Am. Journal Int. Law*, XI, 628-631. (July, 1917.)

3. [§140] Raising the Army.

See 246 below.

No significant books have appeared on the subject up to the publication of *America at War*.

- "America's Army in the Making," in *N. Y. Times Current History*, XII, 11-13. (July, 1917.)
- "Army Bill," in *Nation*, vol. 104, p. 422. (Apr. 12, 1917.)
- Baker, N. D. "Making Ready the Army," in *Independent*, XC, 109. (Apr. 14, 1917.)
- "Cantonments of Our National Army," in *Sci. American*, vol. 117, p. 4. (July 7, 1917.)
- "Conscription," in *Nation*, vol. 103, p. 600. (Dec. 28, 1916.)
- Dunn, A. W. "Raising an Army," in *Am. Review of Reviews*, LV, 523-525. (May, 1917.)
- Fish, C. R. "Raising Armies," in *New Republic*, X, 319-320. (Apr. 14, 1917.)
- "Forty-eight Cities Made to Order," in *Literary Digest*, LIV, 1591. (May 26, 1917.)
- Menkel, William. "Making Officers for Our New Army," in *Am. Review of Reviews*, LVI, 58-62. (July, 1917.)
- "Mobilizing the Army and Navy," in *N. Y. Times Current History*, XI, 231-234. (May, 1917.)
- "Next Steps in Our Army's Mobilization," in *Literary Digest*, LV, 19-21. (Aug. 4, 1917.)
- "Operating the Draft," in *Nation*, vol. 105, pp. 4-5. (July 5, 1917.)
- "Our Army Bluff: German Newspaper Comments," in *Literary Digest*, LV, 20. (July 21, 1917.)
- Reuter Dahl, H. "At War," in *Outlook*, vol. 115, p. 652. (Apr. 11, 1917.)
- Stewart, M. B. "First Half-Million Army," in *Scribner's*, LXII, 119-122. (July, 1917.)
- "Success of Selective Service," in *New Republic*, XI, 148-150. (June 4, 1917.)
- "To Get the Alien Slacker," in *Literary Digest*, LV, 22. (Aug. 4, 1917.)
- Wilson, Woodrow. "Proclamation of Conscription Law," in *N. Y. Times Current History*, VI, 381-384. (June, 1917.)
- Wood, Leonard. "Plattsburg and Citizenship," in *Century*, XCIV, 49-54. (May, 1917.)

4. [§141] Training of Men and Officers.

See §132 above. §§243, 278 below.

- Committee on Public Information. *National Service Handbook*. (Wash., Govt. Print. Office, Corrected to July 30, 1917.) Description and discussion of the army and the navy.
- Hetherington, C. W. "Shall Military Training Be Given Our Youth?" (*Senate Docs.*, 65 Cong., 1 sess., No. 22, 1917.)
- Howe, Lucien. *Universal Military Education and Service*. (N. Y., Putnam, 1916.)
- Wood, General Leonard. *The Military Obligation of Citizenship*. (Princeton, University Press, 1915.)
- Kilbourne, Maj. Charles E. (Ed. in Chief). *National Service Library*. (5 vols.; N. Y., Collier & Son, 1917.) All the volumes by military officers, on organization and methods of modern war.

Woodhouse, Henry. *The Eyes of Our Army and Navy*. (N. Y., Nat'l Institute of Efficiency; in preparation, 1917.)

5. [§142] Carrying on the War.

See §§271-287 below.

Few significant books on the subject appeared up to the publication of *America at War*.

Roosevelt, Theodore.

"Ally or a Hindrance?" in *No. Am. Review*, vol. 205, pp. 321-326. (March, 1917.)

"American Expeditionary Force," in *Living Age*, vol. 294, pp. 58-60. (July 7, 1917.)

"American Soldiers for France," in *New Republic*, XI, 97, 98. (May 26, 1917.)

Brooks, S. "How Can America Help?" in *Century*, XCIV, 209-213. (June, 1917.)

"First American Army in France," in *N. Y. Times Current History*, XII, 215-218. (Aug., 1917.)

Fisher, D. C. "Sammies in Paris," in *Everybody's*, XXXVII, 286-288. (Sept., 1917.)

Gibbons, H. A. "How We Can Help France," in *Century*, XCIV, 572-532. (Aug., 1917.)

R. DISCUSSIONS OF WORLD PEACE.

1. [§143] The Approach to Peace.

See §307 below.

Angell, Norman. *The Great Illusion*. A study of the relation of military power in nations to their economic and social advantage. 4th rev. and enlarged ed. (N. Y., Putnam, 1913.)

Brailsford, Henry Noel. *The War of Steel and Gold: A Study of the Armed Peace*. (London, Bell, 1914.) Published before the outbreak of the war, deals with the madness of the political situation of Europe with its balance of power and armed peace, from the pacifist viewpoint.

Bryce, James. "War and Human Progress," in *Atlantic*, vol. 118, pp. 301-315. (Sept., 1916.)

Jones, J. H. *The Economics of War and Conquest*. (London, King, 1915.)

Mead, Edwin D. (Editor). *International Library*. (Boston, World Peace Foundation.)

Veblen, Thorstein. *An Inquiry Into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of Its Perpetuation*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.)

2. [§144] Pleas for Peace.

See §308 below.

Brooks, S. "Dream of Universal Peace," in *Harper's*, vol. 133, pp. 862-869. (Nov., 1916.)

Gulick, Sidney L. *The Fight for Peace: An Aggressive Campaign for American Churches*. (N. Y., Revell, 1915.) An appeal to the churches to take part in promoting world-peace.

Howe, Frederic C. *Why War*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1916.)

Hudson, Jay William. *The New Internationalism*. 1. "What Is the New Internationalism?" 2. "The Arithmetic of War." 3. "Agencies for Promoting World Order." 4. "A Practical International Program." 5. "America's International Ideals." (Boston, Mass. Peace Society, 1915) pamphlets.

Jordan, David Starr. *War and the Breed, the Relation of War to the Downfall of Nations*. (Boston, Beacon Press, 1915.) The certainty that war leads toward racial decadence by the obliteration of the most virile elements, these being thereby left unrepresented in heredity.

Krehbiel, Edward B. *Nationalism, War and Society*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1916.) Each section accompanied by references to the best literature. The book is designed as an introduction to the study of the whole anti-war movement.

- Loti, Pierre. *War*. Trans. by Marjorie Laurie. (Phila., Lippincott, 1917.)
- Taft, W. H. *The United States and Peace*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1914.)
- Wehberg, Hans. *Das Papsttum und der Weltfriede: Untersuchungen über die weltpolitischen Aufgaben und die völkerrechtliche Stellung des Papsttums*. (M. Gladbach, Germany, Volksvereins-Verlag, 1915.) A study of the role of the Papacy in the cause of world peace.
- Woods, Frederick Adams, and Baltzly, Alexander. *Is War Diminishing?* A study of the prevalence of war in Europe from 1450 to the present day. (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1915.) Statistics and graphical charts.

3. [§145] Substitutes for War.

See §310 below.

- Babson, Roger W. *The Future of World Peace*. A book of charts and economic facts for Americans. (Boston, Babson's Statistical Organization, Inc., 1915.) Emphasizing the economic causes of war, and their removal as a factor in establishing peace.
- Benson, Allan L. *A Way to Prevent War*. (Girard, Kan., Appeal to Reason, 1915.) Statement of the case against war from the Socialist viewpoint.
- Dickinson, G. Lowes. *The European Anarchy*. (London, Unwin, 1916.)
- Lyon, D. Willard. *The Christian Equivalent of War*. (N. Y., Young Women's Christian Associations, U. S. of A., 1915.)
- MacKaye, Percy. *A Substitute for War*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1915.)
- MacLagan, O. F. *International Prohibition of War*. 5th ed. (London, Duke, 1915.)
- Mahan, Capt. Alfred Thayer. *Armaments and Arbitration*. (N. Y., Harper, 1912.)
- Mitchell, P. Chalmers. *Evolution and the War*. (N. Y., Dutton, 1915.) The "natural law of evolution" is frequently mentioned among the supposed fundamental causes of war. In this book a leading English biologist undertakes to show that this militaristic belief is wrong and that the laws governing human conduct are entirely different.
- Nasmyth, George W. *Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory: A Study of Force as a Factor in Human Relations*. (N. Y., Putnam, 1915.) A critical study of the philosophy of force which claims to find a scientific foundation in the application to human society of Darwin's theory of "the struggle for existence" and the "survival of the fittest." etc.
- Nijhoff, Martinus. *War Obviated by an International Police*. (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1915.) An interesting collection of essays and opinions on pacifism by various European and American authors.
- Russell, Bertrand. *Why Men Fight*. (N. Y., Century, 1917.)
- Walling, William English. *The Socialists and the War*. (N. Y., Holt, 1915.) A carefully selected documentary statement of the position toward the war of Socialists of all countries.

S. ORGANIZATION OF PEACE.

1. [§146] Peace Congresses.

See §§307-311 below.

- Hazen, C. D., Thayer, W. R., Lord, R., Coolidge, A. C. *Three Peace Congresses of the Nineteenth Century, and Claimants to Constantinople*. (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1917.) Essays read before the American Historical Association, dealing with the methods and results of the last three great peace conferences and with the question of Constantinople and the Straits.
- Ladd, William. *An Essay on a Congress of Nations for the Adjustment of International Disputes Without Resort to Arms*. (Scott's ed., N. Y., Oxford Univ. Press, 1916.)
- Ralston, Jackson H. *The Proper Attitude of the Hague Conference Toward the Laws of War*. (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1913.)

2. [§147] Peace Leagues.

- Ashbee, Charles Robert. *The American League to Enforce Peace*. An English interpretation, with an introduction by G. Lowes Dickinson. (London, Allen & Unwin, 1917.)
- Goldsmith, Robert. *A League to Enforce Peace*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.)
By the Secretary of the American League to Enforce Peace.

3. [§148] World Control.

- Crane, Frank. *War and World Government*. (N. Y., Lane, 1915.) A volume of peace editorials, advocating an International Peace Court commanding the armies and navies of the world.
- Scott, James Brown. *An International Court of Justice*. Letter and memorandum of January 12, 1914, to the Netherland Minister of foreign affairs. (N. Y., Oxford Univ. Press.)
- Scott, James Brown. *The Status of the International Court of Justice; with an appendix of addresses and official documents*. (N. Y., Oxford Univ. Pres., 1916.)

4. [§149] League to Enforce Peace.

See short list in §38 above; see §§313, 318 below.

- Brailsford, Henry N. *A League of Nations*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.)
- Chapman, Edward M. "Enforcing Peace," in *Hibbert Journal*, XV, 189-198. (Jan., 1917.)
- Chittenden, Gen. H. M. "Peace by Coercion," in *Forum*, LVII, 553-566. (May, 1917.)
- Collin, Christen. *The War Against War*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.)
- Fisher, Walter L. "A League to Enforce Peace," in *Am. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Sci., Annals*, LXXII, 185-99. (July, 1917.)
- Goldsmith, Robert. *A League to Enforce Peace*. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.)
- Historical Light on the League to Enforce Peace*. (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1916.)
- "Historical Reasons for Its Probable Failure," in *Spectator*, vol. 117, pp. 433-435. (Oct. 14, 1916.)
- Holt, Hamilton. "Why Peace Must Be Enforced," in *Independent*, LXXXIX, 212-213. (Feb. 5, 1917.)
- Houston, H. S. "Economic Pressure as a Means of Preserving Peace," in *Am. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Sci., Annals*, LXVI, 26-31. (July, 1916.)
- League to Enforce Peace. *Independence Hall Conference*. (N. Y., The League, 1915-—.)
- League to Enforce Peace. *Publications*. (N. Y., the League, 1915.)
- Macdonell, John. "Armed Pacificism," in *Contemporary Review*, vol. III, pp. 290-300. (March, 1917.)
- Marburg, Theodore. "Reply to Critics," in *Am. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Sci., Annals*, LXVI, 50-59. (July, 1916.)
- Pollock, Frederick. "American Plan for Enforcing Peace," in *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 119, pp. 650-655. (May, 1917.)
- Taft, William H. *The Proposal for a League to Enforce Peace*. (N. Y., Am. Assoc. for Internat. Conciliation, 1916.)

T. TERMS OF PEACE.

1. [§150] Difficulties of Peace.

- Angell, Norman. "Can Trade Be Captured?" in *War and Peace Pamphlets*, London, War News.)
- Bourne, Randolph (Editor). *Towards an Enduring Peace*. (N. Y., Am. Soc. for Int. Conciliation, 1916.)
- Eliot, Charles W. *The Road Toward Peace*. A contribution to the study of the causes of the European war and of the means of preventing war in the future. (Boston, etc., Houghton, Mifflin, 1915.) Addresses, letters, and reports.
- Gibbons, Herbert A. *The New Map of Europe (1911-1914): The Story of the Recent Diplomatic Crises and Wars and of Europe's Present Catastrophe*. (N. Y., Century, 1914.)

- McClure, S. S. *Obstacles to Peace*. (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1916.)
- Mlynarski, Felix. *The Problems of the Coming Peace*. (N. Y., Polish Book Importing Co., 1916.) Views of a Polish scholar.
- Pollock, Sir Frederick. "The Difficulties of a League of Peace," in *The New Europe*, II, 112-114. (Feb. 8, 1917.)
- Stein, R. *Peace Through a Disentangling Alliance*. (Wash., Judd & Detweiler, 1916.)
- Taft, W. H. *The United States and Peace*. (N. Y., Scribner, 1914.)
- Taylor, Charles Fremont. *A Conclusive Peace*. Presenting the historically logical, and a feasible, plan of action for the coming peace conference, which will co-ordinate and harmonize Europe and the world. (Phila., Winston, 1916.)
- Wells, H. G. *The Peace of the World: an Essay*. (London, Daily Chronicle, 1915.)

2. [§151] The War and Democracy.

- Battine, Cecil. "Conscription and Democracy" in *Fortnightly Review*, vol. 103, pp. 1043-1055. (June, 1915.)
- Dickinson, C. R. Buxton and others. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1917.)
- Daudet, Leon. *Hors du joug allemand, mesures d'apres-guerre*. (Paris, Nouvelle librairie nationale, 1915.)

3. [§152] American Mediation.

See §312 below.

U. EVENTUAL WORLD PEACE.

1. [§153] Problems After the War.

See §327 below.

- Blakeslee, George Hubbard. *The Problems and Lessons of the War*. (N. Y., etc., Putnam, 1916.)
- Butler, Nicholas Murray. *International Mind*. (N. Y., Scribner's, 1913.)
- Fuxton, Charles R. (Ed.) *Towards a Lasting Settlement*. By G. L. Lamprecht, K. "German People Not Blinded," *ibid.* II. 21-24. (April, 1915.)
- Wells, H. G. "Civilization at Breaking Point," *ibid.* II. 772-774. (July, 1915.)
- Kipling, R. "Human Beings and Germans," *ibid.* II. 775-776. (July, 1915.)
- Verhaeren, E. "Uncivilizable Nation," *ibid.* II. 777-779. (July, 1915.)
- Barker, J. E. "Germany's Long-Nourished Powers," *ibid.* II. 965-966. (Aug., 1915.)
- Church, W. E. "Germany Long Planned the War," *ibid.* IV. 868. (Aug., 1916.)
- Reventlow, Count E. zu. "Germany's Opinion of Wilson as a Mediator," *ibid.* V. 148. (Oct., 1916.)
- Willoughby, W. W. "The Individual and the State," in *Problems of Readjustment After the War*. (Appleton, 1915.)
- Dickinson, G. Lowes. *After the War*. (London, Fifeild, 1915.)
- Fried, Alfred Herrmann. *The Restoration of Europe*. Trans. from the German by L. S. Gannett. (N. Y., Macmillan, 1916.)
- Gray, Alexander. *The upright sheaf: Germany's intentions after the war*. (London, Methuen, 1915.) 76 p.
- Hart, Albert Bushnell, and others. *Problems of Readjustment After the War*. (N. Y., Appleton, 1915.) 1, The War and Democracy, by Albert B. Hart; 2, An Economic Interpretation of War, by Edwin R. A. Seligman; 3, The Crisis in Social Evolution, by Franklin H. Giddings; 4, The Relation of the Individual to the State, by Westel W. Willoughby; 5, The War and International Law, by George Grafton Wilson; 6, The War and International Commerce and Finance, by Emory R. Johnson; 7, The Conduct of Military and Naval Warfare, by Casper F. Goodrich.
- Key, Ellen K. S. *War, Peace and the Future*. (N. Y., Putnam, 1916.)

- Norman, Sir Henry. "Armageddon—the Forging of a Great Peace," in *Scribner*, LVI, 524-530. (Oct., 1914.)
- National Foreign Trade Council. *European Economic Alliance*. (N. Y., Nat. Foreign Trade Council.)
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5. [§154] European Federation.

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- See §§333-335.

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CHAPTER IV.

WHY IS THERE WAR IN EUROPE?

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- (b) Colonial expansions.
- (c) Schemes of World Empire.
- (d) Special question of future of India.

3. Commercial.

- (a) Internal production and wealth.
- (b) World commerce and shipping.
- (c) Sea power and naval stations.
- (d) Special question of German vs. British trade.

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- (b) Races.
- (c) Rising feeling of nationality based on race.

3. Enclosed Units.

- (a) Alsace-Lorraine.
- (b) Poles (three fragments, all subjects).
- (c) Balkan units.
- (d) Armenians.

4. Composite States.

- (a) Race situation in Russia.
- (b) Race issues in Austria-Hungary.
- (c) Race division in Turkey.

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- (a) Universal military service.
- (b) The officer class.
- (c) Education and literature.
- (d) Secret government and espionage.
- (e) Treatment of dependents—Zabern affair.

3. Effect on European Balance of Power.

- (a) Armaments of Germany's neighbors.
- (b) Germany's training for conquest.

4. Influence on European Governments.

- (a) Military influence—Dreyfus affair.
- (b) Concentration of power.
- (c) Heavy taxation and loan.

5. Effect on International Relations.

- (a) Secret diplomacy.
- (b) Alliances.

6. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§160] Ideal of a Proud Nation of Warriors.

BY GENERAL COLMAR VON DER GOLTZ. ¹

Then again, there are the false apostles of to-day who condemn the war as in itself reprehensible. A universal peace in which wolf and lamb shall dwell together in unity is proved possible by means of a multitude of misleading and seductive arguments. Thus do the shadows deepen over the ancient Germanic ideal of a proud nation of warriors, an ideal which is bound to lose its power to attract, particularly in a prolonged peace, when even the most martial-minded see that all chances of testing their prowess are fading gradually away. . . .

The warlike spirit must not be allowed to die out among people, neither must the love of peace get the upper hand, for all the greater would be the consternation at the moment of awakening. If the Fatherland is to remain victorious we must not let our old ideals of manly courage, fearless scorn of death, and knightly virtue be destroyed, but must cherish and uphold them to the utmost, both in this generation and in all that are to come.

(Gen. von der Goltz in *Germany's War Mania*, pp. 186-187.)

(b) [§161] Blessing to German Troops Starting for China.

BY KAISER WILHELM II. (July 27, 1900.)

In connection also with the trouble in China on July 27, 1900, the Emperor addressed troops in Bremerhaven immediately before their departure. In his speech he pointed out:

"The Chinese have trampled on international law, they have, in a manner unheard of in the history of the world hurled foul scorn at the sanctity of the Ambassador and the duties of hospitality. Such conduct is all the more revolting, because the crime was committed by a nation which is proud of its immemorial civilization. Maintain the old Prussian excellency: prove yourselves Christians in the cheerful endurance of suffering; may honor and glory attend your colors and your arms; set an example to all the world of discipline and obedience.

"Remember when you meet the foe, that quarter will not be given, and that prisoners will not be taken. Wield your weapons so that for a thousand years to come no Chinaman will dare to look askance at a German. Pave the way once for all for civilization. . . .

"May you all prove your German efficiency, devotion, and bravery, bear joyfully all discomfort, and uphold the honor and glory of our arms and colors. You must set an example of discipline, self-domination, self-control. You will fight against a well-armed and well-equipped foe, but you have to avenge not only the death of our Minister, but that of many Germans and Europeans. May the name of Germany make itself felt in China that for a thousand years to come China shall never dare even to look askance at a German.

"The blessing of the Lord be with you. The prayers of the whole people accompany you in all your ways. My best wishes for yourselves, for the success of your aims, will ever follow you. Give proofs of your courage, no matter where. May the blessing of God rest on your banners, and may He vouchsafe to you to find a path for Christianity in that far-off country. For this you have pledged yourselves to me with your oath to the colors. I wish you God-speed. Adieu, comrades!

(Reprinted in *Germany's War Mania*, pp. 75-6.)

"When you meet the foe you will defeat him. No quarter will be given; no prisoners will be taken. Let all who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Just as the Huns a thousand years ago, under the leadership of Etzel (Attila) gained a reputation in virtue of which they still live in historical tradition, so may the name of Germany become known in such a manner in China that no Chinaman will ever again dare to look askance at a German. . . . May the blessing of God attend your flags, and may this war have the blessed result that Christianity may make its way into China."

(Report in Bremen "Weser Zeitung." Translated in London "Times," July 30, 1900.)

(c) [§162] War as a Necessity.

BY FRIEDRICH BERNHARDI AND COLMAR VON DER GOLTZ.

It was always timely progress which has led us to victory, and has given us from the outset a certain amount of superiority over our adversaries. Such a superiority we must try to gain all the more in future as well, since it is only too likely that, with the present state of affairs in the world, we may be forced to fight against superior numbers, while, on the other hand, our most vital interest will be at stake. The political situation as it is to-day makes us look upon such a war even as a necessity, on which the future development of our people depends.

(Gen. von Bernhardi, *How Germany Makes War*.)

These were the results of cosmopolitanism, the love of peace, humanitarian twaddle, and the deteriorated pre-Jena methods of warfare. Then, if ever, did history furnish proof of the fact that a nation which desires happiness must also be powerful and skilled in arms. It must neither renounce its passionate love of the Fatherland nor lose its power to regard war as an earnest, bitter thing, and an historical necessity. As long as the process of reconstructing states proceeds with the changing seasons, as long as human development does not stand still, so long will there be war. But those who do not wish to be ruined by it must prepare in peace time to endure the stern armed contest with opponents and rivals. To this end we must spare no pains in educating the rising generation in the spirit of bravery, scorn of danger, and bodily vigor; and never again as of old before Jena must we set a higher value upon the art of war than upon the soldiery virtues.

(Gen. von der Goltz, "Jena to Eylau," in *Germany's War Mania*, pp. 189-190.)

E. [§163] AUTOCRATIC GOVERNMENT.

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2. Imperial Spirit.

- (a) Nobility and Court Life.
- (b) Land holding Junkers.
- (c) Arbitrary power.

3. Vassal Provinces and States.

- (a) Alsace-Lorraine.
- (b) Prussian Poland.
- (c) Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4. Subject Races.

- (a) Fins, Poles.
- (b) Austrian, Hungarian, Slavs.

5. World Empire.

- (a) German desire for Imperial control in other lands.

6. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§164] The Sin of National Weakness.

BY PROFESSOR HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE.

Thus we find it necessary to distinguish between public and private morality. The rank of the various duties must necessarily be very different for the state and the individual man. There is a whole series of these duties which are imposed upon the individual which are absolutely out of the question for the state. The state's highest law is that of self-assertion; that is for it the absolute morality. Therefore, one must assert that of all political sins, the worst and most contemptible is weakness; it is the sin against the holy ghost of politics. In private life certain weaknesses of the soul are excusable. But of these there is no question in the state; for the state is might, and if it should belie its very essence there would be no judgment severe enough for it.

It is indeed political idealism which fosters war, whereas materialism rejects it. What a perversion of morality to want to banish heroism from human life. The heroes of a people are the personalities who fill the youthful souls with delight and enthusiasm. Amongst authors, we as boys and youths admire most those whose words sound like a flourish of trumpets. He who cannot take pleasure therein is too cowardly to take up arms himself for his fatherland. All appeal to Christianity in this matter is perverted. The Bible states expressly that the man in authority shall wield the sword; it states likewise that: "Greater love hath no man than this that he giveth his life for his friend." Those who

preach the nonsense about everlasting peace do not understand the life of the Aryan race; the Aryans are before all brave. They have always been men enough to protect by the sword what they had won by the intellect. . . .

To the historian who lives in the realms of the will, it is quite clear that the furtherance of an everlasting peace is fundamentally reactionary. He sees that to banish war from history would be to banish all progress and becoming. It is only the periods of exhaustion, weariness and mental stagnation that have dallied with the dream of everlasting peace.

(Prof. H. von Treitschke, *Die Politik*, translated in *Germany's War Mania*, p. 221.)

F. [§165] SERBIAN AND BALKAN QUESTION.

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2. Balkan Situation to 1914.

- (a) Balkan wars, 1912, 1913.
- (b) Serbian ambition for a Slav kingdom.
- (c) Murder of the Austrian Archduke (June 25, 1914.)
- (d) Rivalry of Austria and Russia in the Balkans.

3. Outbreak of War.

- (a) Austrian ultimatum on Serbia (July 23).
- (b) Austrian declaration of war on Serbia (July 25).
- (c) German declaration on Russia (July 31).

4. Other Powers Into the Struggle.

- (a) Germany, France, Great Britain, Belgium, Montenegro.
- (b) Japan, Italy, Portugal.
- (c) Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania.
- (d) China, Siam, Latin-American Powers.
- (e) Effect of the Alliance and Entente on the war.

5. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§166] The Case of Serbia (1914).

BY CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER DAVID LLOYD GEORGE.

But Belgium was not the only little nation that has been attacked in this war, and I make no excuse for referring to the case of the other little nation—the case of Serbia. The history of Serbia is not unblotted. What history in the category of nations is unblotted? The first nation that is without sin, let her cast a stone at Serbia—a nation trained in a horrible school. But she won her freedom with her tenacious valor, and she has maintained it by the same courage. If any Serbians were mixed up in the assassination of the Grand Duke they ought to be punished. Serbia admits that. The Serbian Government had nothing to do with it. Not even Austria claimed that. The Serbian Prime Minister is one of the most capable and honored men in Europe. Serbia was willing to punish any one of her subjects who had been proved to have any complicity in that assassination. What more could you expect?

DEMANDS OF AUSTRIA.

What were the Austrian demands? She sympathized with her fellow-countrymen in Bosnia. That was one of her crimes. She must do so no more. Her newspapers were saying nasty things about Austria. They must do so no longer. That is the Austrian spirit. You had it in Zabern. How dare you criticize a Prussian official? And if you laugh, it is a capital offense. The colonel threatened to shoot them if they repeated it. Serbian newspapers must not criticize Austria. I wonder what would have happened had we taken up the same line about German newspapers.

Serbia said: "Very well, we will give orders to the newspapers that they must not criticize Austria in future, neither Austria, nor Hungary, nor anything that is theirs." (Laughter.) Who can doubt the valor of Serbia, when she undertook to tackle her newspaper editors? (Laughter.) She promised not to sympathize with Bosnia; promised to write no critical articles about Austria. She would have no public meetings at which anything unkind was said about Austria. That was not enough. She must dismiss from her army officers whom Austria should subsequently name. But these officers had just emerged from a war where they were adding lustre to the Serbian arms—gallant, brave, efficient. (Cheers.) I wonder whether it was their guilt or their efficiency that prompted Austria's action. Serbia was to undertake in advance to dismiss them from the army—the names to be sent in subsequently. Can you name a country in the world that would have stood that? Supposing Austria or Germany had issued an ultimatum of that kind to this country. (Laughter.) "You must dismiss from your army and from your navy all those officers whom we shall subsequently name." Well, I think I could name them now. Lord Kitchener (cheers) would go. Sir John French (cheers) would be sent about his business. General Smith-Dorrien (cheers) would be no more, and I am sure that Sir John Jellicoe (cheers) would go. (Laughter.) And there is another gallant old warrior who would go—Lord Roberts. (Cheers.)

It was a difficult situation for a small country. Here was a demand made upon her by a great military power who could put five or six men in the field for every one she could; and that power supported by the greatest military power in the world. How did Serbia behave? It is not what happens to you in life that matters; it is the way in which you face it. (Cheers.) And Serbia faced the situation with dignity. (Loud cheers.) She said to Austria: "If any officers of mine have been guilty and are proved to be guilty, I will dismiss them." Austria said, "That is not good enough for me." It was not guilt she was after, but capacity. (Laughter.)

INTERESTS OF RUSSIA.

Then came Russia's turn. Russia has a special regard for Serbia. She has a special interest in Serbia. Russians have shed their blood for Serbian independence many a time. Serbia is a member of her family and she cannot see Serbia maltreated. Austria knew that. Germany knew that, and Germany turned around to Russia and said: "I insist that you shall stand by with your arms folded whilst Austria is strangling your little brother to death." (Laughter.) What answer did the Russian Slav give? He gave the only answer that becomes a man. (Cheers.) He turned to Austria and said: "You lay hands on that little fellow and I will tear your ramshackle empire limb from limb. (Prolonged cheers.) And he is doing it. (Renewed cheers.)

(Stowell, *Diplomacy of the War of 1914*, I, 586.)

G. [§167] BELGIAN QUESTION.

1. Specific References to the Section.

See §79 above.

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2. Previous Neutralization.

(a) Treaties of 1814, 1839, 1870.

(b) Later accusations of bad faith by the Belgians before 1914.

(c) German railroad preparations.

3. Invasion by Germany (August, 1914).

(a) Germany's demand for passage.

(b) "Scrap of paper" episode.

(c) Later charges of bad faith by Belgians.

4. Treatment of Non-Combatant Belgians.

(a) Hostages and civilian prisoners.

(b) Destruction of villages.

(c) Louvain episode.

5. Effect on the World.

(a) Influence on Great Britain.

(b) Reception in the United States.

6. Question of Neutrals Defending a Guaranteed State.

7. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§168] **A Chinese View of Germany's Violation of Belgian Neutrality.**

BY RICHARD D. HARLAN.

"I am a Country; I am NOT a Road."

A few months after the outbreak of Germany's war against the world, *L'Eche de Chine*, a Shanghai journal representing French interests in China, contained a brief article on Germany's violation of Belgium's neutrality from the pen of a young Chinaman, whose knowledge of current events was

more accurate than his command of the English language. The following was his quaint summary of the chain of events that within a few weeks plunged seven European nations into the war that has finally set the world on fire:

"Now there is a great war in Europe. This began because the Prince of Austria went to Serbia with his wife. One man of Serbia killed him.

"Austria was angry, and write Serbia.

"Germany write to letter to Austria and said, 'I will help you.'

"Russia write a letter to Serbia and said, 'I will help you.'

"France did not want to fight, but they got ready their soldiers.

"Germany write a letter to France and said, 'You don't get ready, or I will fight you in nine hours.'

"Germany, to fight France, passed Belgium.

"Belgium said, 'I am a Country; I am not a Road.'

"And Belgium write a letter to England about Germany, to help them.

"So England helped Belgium."

The salient acts and mobilizations and counter-mobilizations which are described in the voluminous White and Red and Yellow and Blue Books of diplomatic correspondence issued by the foreign offices of the leading European belligerents were condensed by this young Chinaman into a dozen or more lines.

"I am a Country; I am NOT a Road." That epitome of Belgium's right to remain neutral in the war between Germany and France is as convincing as a whole treatise on the international law as to the "rights of neutrals."

In the defense of Germany's right to "cut across lots" through Belgium and to overcome her resistance by force of arms, Chancellor von Bethman-Hollweg contrasted what he was pleased to call "Luxemburg's neutrality with Belgium's unneutral course."

No one condemned helpless little Luxemburg because, in the face of Germany's colossal armies, she felt forced to say, "I am nothing but a road; I am NOT a Country." But the whole civilized world took its hat off to brave Belgium because she had the courage to say to Germany, "I am a Country; I am NOT a Road. I refuse to take sides with Germany and against my other neighbor, France, by allowing myself to be used as the shortest and quickest 'road' to Paris."

Belgium has, indeed, saved Europe and the whole world. She has saved liberty and free, representative government, as those great phrases are understood by the Anglo-Saxon and Latin races. Germany shamelessly broke the word she had solemnly plighted to Belgium and the other signatories to the Neutrality Treaty of 1837. And while Britain and France, as co-guarantors of Belgian neutrality, loyally kept their word to Belgium, it must not be forgotten that sheer self-interest and motives of self-defense compelled them to defend that neutrality.

Not so with Belgium. No nation could have blamed her very much if, like Luxemburg, she had declined to sacrifice herself. And yet Belgium not only kept her word, but, as Maeterlinck so finely put it, "*She nearly died in doing so.*" She lost nearly everything; but she has kept her soul.

(Written for this Handbook.)

H. [§169] SUBSEQUENT ENLARGEMENT OF GERMAN POLICY.

1. Specific References to the Section.

See §100 above.

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2. Expansion in Western Europe.

(a) Northern France with iron, coal and Calais.

(b) Belgium with Congo—annexation or commercial control.

3. Expansion in Eastern Europe.

(a) Annexation of Russian Baltic Provinces.

(b) Partial annexation or control of Poland.

(c) Russia to be a satellite to Germany.

4. Policy of Berlin to Bagdad.

(a) Austria-Hungary as a satellite.

(b) Paramount interest in Bulgaria and the Balkans.

(c) Turkey as a vassal state.

(d) Resulting new empire in Central Europe and Western Asia completely dominated by Germany.

5. World Commerce.

(a) Preferences to satellite powers and against United States and other powers.

(b) Flank positions on English and French communications to Asia.

(c) Ruin of commercial marine of other powers.

I. [§170] OUTBREAK OF GENERAL WAR.

1. Specific References to the Section.

See §§94-98 above.

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2. The Austro-Serbian Conflict.
3. Austro-Russian Discussions.
4. Efforts of Grey to Maintain Peace.
5. Germany's Declaration of War on Russia and France.
6. Western Powers.
 - (a) Montenegro.
 - (b) Italy.
 - (c) Portugal.
7. Eastern Powers.
 - (a) Japan.
 - (b) Turkey.

J. [§171] SUMMARY OF THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TO THESE CAUSES OF WAR.

1. Specific References to the Section.

See §98 above.

Bullard, Arthur. *Diplomacy of the Great War*, Book iv.

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2. Territorial.

- (a) Dependencies in Pacific and Caribbean.
- (b) Danger to the Monroe Doctrine.

3. Commercial.

- (a) Vast interest of U. S. A. in foreign trade.
- (b) Principle of Freedom of the Sea.
- (c) Danger to the Panama Canal.

4. Asiatic Questions.

- (a) Interest in Philippines.
- (b) Interest in Open Door in China.

5. World Empire.

- (a) Opposition to Imperial power.
- (b) Doctrine of equality of right of International trade and intercourse.
- (c) Opposition to the World Supremacy of any one power.

K. DOCUMENTS AND EXTRACTS ON THE CHAPTER.

1. [§172] Gems of German Thought.

BY VARIOUS GERMANS.

It has been said that it is un-German to wish to be only German. That again is a consequence of our spiritual wealth. We understand all foreign nations; none of them understand us, and none of them can understand us.—Prof. D. Sombart.

The German soul is the world's soul; God and Germany belong to one another.—Pastor W. Lehman, *On the German God*.

Let us bravely organize great forced migrations of inferior peoples. Posterity will be grateful to us. We must coerce them! This is one of the tasks of war: the means must be the superiority of armed force. Superficially such forced migrations, and the penning up of inconvenient peoples in narrow "reserves" may appear hard; but it is the only solution of the race question that is worthy of humanity. . . . Thus alone can the overpopulation of the earth be controlled: The efficient peoples must secure themselves elbow room by means of war, and the inefficient must be hemmed in, and at last driven into "reserves," where they have no room to grow . . . and where, discouraged and rendered indifferent to the future by the spectacle of the superior energy of their conquerors, they may crawl slowly toward the peaceful death of weary and hopeless senility.—K. Wagner.

He who does not believe in the divine mission of Germany had better hang himself, and rather to-day than to-morrow.—H. S. Chamberlain.

The war must last until we have forced disarmament upon our enemies. There is a nursery rhyme which runs thus:

Knife and scissors, fork and candle,
Little children must not handle.

Since the enemy states have behaved so childishly as to misuse their arms they must be placed under tutelage. Moreover, our enemies have acted so dishonorably that it is only just that rights of citizenship should be denied them. . . . When they can no longer bear arms they cannot make any new disturbances.—O. Siemens.

We are not only compelled to accept the war that is forced upon us . . . but are even compelled to carry on this war with a cruelty, a ruthlessness, an employment of every imaginable device, unknown in any previous war.—Pastor D. Baumgarten.

In the age of the most tremendous mobilization of physical and spiritual forces the world has ever seen, we proclaim—no, we do not proclaim it, but it reveals itself—the Religion of Strength.—Prof. A. Deissmann.

It is high time to shake off the illusion that there is any moral law, or any historical consideration, that imposes on us any sort of restraint with regard to England. Only absolute ruthlessness makes any impression on an Englishman; anything else he regards as weakness.—Prof. O. Flamm.

The German people must rise as a master-folk above the inferior peoples of Europe and the primitive peoples of the colonies.—Pan-German, *Great Germany and Middle Europe in 1950*.

The German people is always right because it is the German people.—O. R. Tannenberg.

We must win, because, if we were defeated, no one in the whole world could any longer cherish any remnant of belief in truth and right, in the good, or, indeed, in any higher power which wisely and justly guides the destinies of humanity.—W. Helm.

It is precisely our craving for expansion that drives us into the paths of conquest, and in view of which all chatter about peace and humanity can and must remain nothing but chatter.—J. L. Reimer.

Excessive modesty and humility, rather than excessive arrogance and ambition, is a feature of the German character. Therefore we shall know how to set a limit to our desire for expansion, and shall escape the dangers which have been fatal to all conquerors whose ambition was unbridled.—Prof. E. Hasse.

One single highly cultured German warrior, of those who are, alas! falling in thousands, represents a higher intellectual and moral life-value than hundreds of the raw children of nature (Naturmenschen) whom England and France, Russia and Italy, oppose to them.—Prof. Ernst Haeckel.

We must not look for permanent peace as a result of this war. Heaven defend Germany from that.—O. A. H. Schmitz.

We are indubitably the most martial nation in the world. . . . We are the most gifted of nations in all the domains of science and art. We are the best colonists, the best sailors, and even the best traders! And yet we have not up to now secured our due share in the heritage of the world. . . . That the German empire is not the end but the beginning of our national development is an obvious truth.—F. Bley.

War is an act of violence whose object is to constrain the enemy, to accomplish our will. . . . Insignificant limitations, hardly worthy of mention, which it imposes on itself, under the name of the law of nations, accompany this violence without notably enfeebling it.—Gen. C. von Clausewitz.

It is a gratuitous illusion to suppose that modern war does not demand far more brutality, far more violence, and an action far more general than was formerly the case.—Gen. von Hartmann.

Whoever enters upon war in future will do well to look to his own interests, and pay no heed to international law. He will do well to act without consideration and without scruple.—*Germany at the Beginning of the 20th Century*.

Whenever a national war breaks out, terrorism becomes a necessary military principle.—Gen. von Hartmann.

If the small nations in question have nothing Germanic in them, and are therefore foreign to our Kultur, the question at once arises: Do they stand in the way of our expansion or do they not? In the latter case, let them develop as their nature prescribes; in the former case, it would be folly to spare them, for they would be like a wedge in our flesh, which we refrained from extracting only for their own sake. If we found ourselves forced to break up the historical form of the nation, in order to separate its racial elements, taking what belongs to our race and rejecting what is foreign to it, we ought not therefore to have any moral scruples or to think ourselves inhuman.—J. L. Reimer.

Our troops are assured of their mission; and they recognize clearly, too, that the truest compassion lies in taking the sternest measures in order to bring the war itself to an early close.—Pastor G. Traub.

One thing alone can really profit the German people, the acquisition of new territory. That is the only solid and durable gain. . . . that alone can really promote the diffusion, the growth and the deepening of Germanism.—A. Wirth.

The territory open to future German expansion . . . must extend from the North Sea to the Baltic, to the Persian gulf, absorbing the Netherlands and Luxemburg, Switzerland, the whole basin of the Danube, the Balkan peninsula and Asia Minor.—Prof. E. Hasse.

The hostile arrogance of the western powers releases us from all our treaty obligations, throws open the doors of our verbal prison house and forces the German empire, resolutely defending her vital rights, to revive the ancient Prussian policy of conquest. All Morocco in the hands of Germany; German cannon on the routes to Egypt and India; German troops on the Algerian frontier; this would be a goal worthy of great sacrifices.—M. Harden, 1911.

This Germany of ours was once the greatest of sea powers, and, God willing, so she will be again.—H. von Treitschke.

Formerly German thought was shut up in her corner, but now the world shall have its coat cut according to German measure, and, as far as our swords flash and German blood flows, the circle of the earth shall come under the tutelage of German activity.—F. Phillippi.

We must establish ourselves firmly at Antwerp on the North Sea and at Riga on the Baltic. . . . At all events, we must, at the conclusion of peace, demand substantial expansions of the German empire.—Prof. E. Haeckel.

We are indeed entrusted here on earth with a doubly sacred mission: not only to protect Kultur . . . against the narrow-hearted huckster-spirit of a thoroughly corrupted and inwardly rotten commercialism, but also to impart Kultur in its most august purity, nobility and glory to the whole of humanity, and thereby contribute not a little to its salvation.—Ein Deutscher.

In the great German Confederation which will comprise most of Europe the Germans, being alone entitled to exercise political rights, to serve in the army and navy and to acquire landed property, will recover the feeling they had in the middle ages of being a people of masters. They will gladly tolerate the foreigners living among them, to whom inferior manual services will be entrusted.—Pan-German, *Great Germany and Middle Europe in 1950*.

Whoever cannot prevail upon himself to approve from the bottom of his heart the sinking of the Lusitania—whoever cannot conquer his sense of the gigantic cruelty of unnumbered perfectly innocent victims . . . and give himself up to honest delight at this victorious exploit of German defensive power—him we judge to be no true German.—Pastor D. Baumgarten, *Address on "The Sermon on the Mount."*

Germany is precisely—who would venture to deny it—the representative of the highest morality, of the purest humanity, of the most chastened Christianity. He, therefore, who fights for its maintenance, its victory, fights for the highest blessings of humanity itself and for human progress. Its defeat, its decline, would mean a falling back to the worst barbarism.—Pastor H. Francke, *War Sermons*.

(William Archer, in *Gems (?) of German Thought*. Copyright, Doubleday, Page, N. Y., 1917.)

2. [§173] Prediction of the Great War.

BY GENERAL FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI.

Even if we succeed in guarding our possessions in the East and West, and in preserving the German nationality in its present form throughout the world, we shall not be able to maintain our present position, powerful as it is, in the great competition with the other Powers, if we are contented to restrict ourselves to our present sphere of power, while the surrounding countries are busily extending their dominions. If we wish to compete further with them, a policy which our population and our civilization both entitle and compel us to adopt, we must not hold back in the hard struggle for the sovereignty of the world.

OPPOSITION OF ENGLAND.

We not only require for the full material development of our nation, on a scale corresponding to its intellectual importance, an extended political basis, but, we are compelled to obtain space for our increasing population and markets for our industries. At every step which we take in this direction England will resolutely oppose us. English policy may not yet have made the definite decision to attack us; but it doubtless wishes by all and every means, even the most extreme, to hinder every further expansion of German international influence and of German maritime power. The recognized political aims of England and the attitude of the English Government leave no doubt on this point. But if we were involved in a struggle with England, we can be quite sure that France would not neglect the opportunity of attacking our flank. Italy, with her extensive coast-line, even if still a member of the Triple Alliance, will have to devote large forces to the defence of the coast to keep off the attacks of the Anglo-French Mediterranean Fleet, and would thus be only able to employ weaker forces against France. Austria would be paralyzed by Russia; against the latter we should have to leave forces in the east. We should thus have to fight out the struggle against France and England practically alone with a part of our army, perhaps with some support from Italy. It is in this double menace by sea and on the mainland of Europe that the grave danger to our political position lies, since all freedom of action is taken from us and all expansion barred.

WAR OF COMPETITION.

Since the struggle is, as appears on a thorough investigation of the international question, necessary and inevitable, we must fight it out, cost what it may. Indeed, we are carrying it on at the present moment, though not with drawn swords, and only by peaceful means so far. On the one hand it is being waged by the competition in trade, industries and warlike preparations; on the other hand, by diplomatic methods with which the rival States are fighting each other in every region where their interests clash.

CRUSHING FRANCE.

Our political position would be considerably consolidated if we could finally get rid of the standing danger that France will attack us on a favorable occasion, so soon as we find ourselves involved in complications elsewhere. In one way or another we must square our account with France if we wish for a free hand in our international policy. This is the first and foremost condition of a sound German policy, and since the hostility of France once for all cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be settled by force of arms. France must be so completely crushed that she can never again come across our path.

STRENGTHENING GERMAN ALLIES.

Further, we must contrive every means of strengthening the political power of our allies. We have already followed such

a policy in the case of Austria when we declared our readiness to protect if necessary with armed intervention, the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by our ally on the Danube. Our policy towards Italy must follow the same lines, especially if in any Franco-German war an opportunity should be presented of doing her a really valuable service. It is equally good policy in every way to support Turkey.

UTILIZING EMIGRANTS.

A part of our surplus population, indeed—so far as present conditions point—will always be driven to seek a livelihood outside the borders of the German Empire. Measures must be taken to the extent at least of providing that the German element is not split up in the world, but remains united in compact blocks, and thus forms, even in foreign countries, political centres of gravity in our favor, markets for our exports, and centres for the diffusion of German culture.

We must rouse in our people the unanimous wish for power together with the determination to sacrifice on the altar of patriotism, not only life and property, but also private views and preferences in the interests of the common welfare. Then alone shall we discharge our great duties of the future, grow into a world power, and stamp a great part of humanity with the impress of the German spirit. If, on the contrary, we persist in that dissipation of energy which now marks our political life, there is imminent fear that in the great contest of the nations, which we must inevitably face, we shall be dishonorably beaten.

(Von Bernhardt, "Germany and the Next War," in "*Germany's War Mania*," 163.)

3. [§174] Germany's Place in the Sun.

BY FOREIGN MINISTER BERNHARD VON BUELOW (1900).

With regard to our oversea policy the position of the Government is by no means an easy one. On the one side we are being urged, and occasionally we are urged in a stormy fashion, to safeguard our oversea interests with greater zeal; on the other side we hear that we are already too heavily engaged and are entering upon adventurous paths. I will endeavor to demonstrate that we have not fallen into either extreme, nor do we intend to fall into either, but on the contrary, to confine ourselves to the peaceful middle line which is equidistant from the neglect and likewise from the overstraining of our oversea interests. Upon one point, indeed, there can be no doubt, namely, that matters have arisen in the world's affairs which could not have been predicted two years ago.

ENGLISH CONQUESTS.

It has been said that in every century a great distintegration, a great liquidation, takes place in order that influence, power,

and possessions may be divided up afresh. In the sixteenth century the Spaniards and Portuguese parcelled out the New World amongst themselves; in the seventeenth century the Dutch, the French, and the English entered into competition with them while we were at fisticuffs with one another; in the eighteenth century the Dutch and the French^s lost most of what they had won to the English. In our nineteenth century England has continued to extend farther and ever farther her Colonial empire, the greatest empire known in the world since the days of the Romans; the French have firmly settled down in North Africa and East Africa and have founded for themselves a new empire in Farther India; Russia has begun her powerful course of conquests, which has been carried on to the boundaries of the high tableland of the Pamirs and to the coast of the Pacific Ocean. Four years ago the Chinese and Japanese War, and hardly eighteen months ago the Spanish-American War, have set things rolling that have brought about great, far-reaching, decisive effects—ancient empires being shaken, and new and vigorous ferments of effervescence introduced into the world's development. No one can overlook the consequences which will follow the war which has only a few weeks ago set South Africa aflame.

STRONG STATES.

An English Prime Minister observed long ago that the strong States would grow ever stronger and the weak ones ever weaker. Everything that has happened since has proved the correctness of this saying. Are we once again at the threshold of a new partition of the world as the poet dreamed a hundred years ago? I do not believe it, and moreover, I would rather not believe it. But in any case we cannot allow any foreign Power, any foreign Jupiter, to say to us, "What is to be done?" The world has already been given away. We do not wish to give offence to any foreign Power to tread on our toes; we will not allow ourselves to be pushed aside by any foreign Power either in a political or in an economic sense.

WHAT SHALL WE DO?

It is high time that we should clearly determine what position we mean to take up in the face of the world-situation which has so materially altered during the last two years, with regard to the outlook for the future, which has become considerably modified, and with regard to the events taking place around us, which carry within them the germ of the future configuration of the relative importance of the Powers, perhaps for an immeasurable period of time. To stand aside, inactive, as we have so often done before, either out of modesty or because we were absorbed in our own internal dissensions or from doctrinaireism, dreaming while other people divide up the cakes amongst themselves, that we cannot and will not do.

(Official reports of the Reichstag translated in *Germany's War Mania*, 138-39.)

4. [§175] Aims and Obligations of the German Military (1913).

BY THE GERMAN STAFF.

STRENGTHENING THE SWORD.

Our new army law is only an extension of the military education of the German nation. Our ancestors of 1813 made greater sacrifices. It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword that has been put into our hands and to hold it ready for defence as well as for offence. We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French. We must a necessity, in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries, accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity. We must act with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid the crises which might injure our economic existence. We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak (*Losschlagen*) should be considered as a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is much to be done in this direction. We must not arouse the distrust of our financiers, but there are many things which cannot be concealed.

COLONIES AND SECRET ALLIES.

We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand, we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen organizations, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European war. Of course, in case of war, we should openly recognize these secret allies; and on the conclusion of peace we should secure to them the advantages which they had gained. These aims are capable of realization. The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it or not, it will be necessary to resort to preparations of this kind, in order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion.

Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication; they must have a controlling head to be found among the influential leaders, religious or political. The Egyptian School is particularly suited to this purpose; more and more it serves as a bond between the intellectuals of the Mohammedan World.

SMALL STEPS TO BE COVERED.

However this may be, we must be strong in order to annihilate at one powerful swoop our enemies in the east and west. But in the next European war it will also be necessary that the small states be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their strong positions can be rapidly conquered or neutralized; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Holland, so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or Scandinavia, especially as in any event we shall provide for the concentration of a strong northern army, capable of replying to any menace from this direction. In the most unfavorable case, Denmark might be forced by England to abandon her neutrality; but by this time the decision would already have been reached both on land and on sea. Our northern army, the strength of which could be largely increased by Dutch formations, would oppose a very active defence to any offensive measures from this quarter.

In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against France, and thus protecting our flank.

SCANDINAVIA.

As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small states on our northwestern frontier cannot be viewed in quite the same light. This will be a vital question for us, and our aim must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days. For this purpose it will be necessary to concentrate a large army, followed up by strong Landwehr formations, which will induce the small states to follow us or at least to remain inactive in the theatre of operations, and which would crush them in the event of armed resistance. If we could induce these states to organize their system of fortification in such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon the proposed invasion.

BELGIUM.

But for this, army reorganization, particularly in Belgium, would be necessary in order that it might really guarantee an effective resistance. If, on the contrary, their defensive organization was established against us, thus giving definite advantages to our adversary in the west, we could in no circumstances offer a Belgium a guarantee for the security of her neutrality. Accordingly, a vast field is open to our diplomacy to work in this country on the lines of our interests.

The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after the complete concentration of the army of the lower Rhine. An ultimatum with a short time-limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law.

CONQUESTS.

Such are the duties which devolve on our army and which demand a striking force of considerable numbers. If the enemy attacks us, or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a hundred years ago; the eagle thus provoked will soar in his flight, will seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him harmless. We will then remember the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County of Burgundy and a large part of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic provinces are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question of restoring to Germany her former possessions.

(J. R. H. O'Regan, *German War of 1914.*)

5. [§176] Defense of Great Britain's Policy.

BY PRIME MINISTER HERBERT H. ASQUITH (October 2, 1914).

I will not repeat, and I certainly cannot improve upon it, and indeed I am not here tonight to argue about propositions which British citizens in every part of the world today regard as beyond the reach of controversy. I do not suppose that in the history of mankind there has ever been, in such a vast and diverse community, agreement so unanimous in purpose, so concentrated, a corporate conscience so clear, so convinced, cooperation so spontaneous, so ardent, and so resolute. Just consider what it means, here in this United Kingdom—England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales—to hear one plain, harmonious, united voice, while over the seas from our great Dominions Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, our Crown Colonies, swell the chorus.

In India—where, whatever we won by the sword we hold and we retain by the more splendid title of just and disinterested rule, by the authority, not of a despot, but of a trustee—the response to our common appeal has moved all our feelings to their profoundest depths, and has been such as to shiver and to shatter the vain and ignorant imaginings of our enemies. That is a remarkable and indeed a unique spectacle.

FOUNDATION OF THE EMPIRE.

What is it that stirred the imagination, aroused the conscience, enlisted the manhood, welded into one compact and irresistible force the energies and the will of the greatest Imperial structure that the world has ever known? That is a question which, for a moment, it is well worth asking and answering. Let me say, then, first negatively, that we are not impelled, any of us, by some of the motives which have occasioned the bloody struggles of the past. In this case, so far as we are concerned, ambition and aggression play no part. What do we want? What do we aim at? What have we to gain?

We are a great, world-wide, peace-loving partnership. By the wisdom and the courage of our forefathers, by great deeds of heroism and adventure on land and sea, by the insight and corporate sagacity, the tried and tested experience of many

generations, we have built up a dominion which is buttressed by the two pillars of Liberty and Law. We are not vain enough or foolish enough to think that in the course of a long process there have not been blunders, or worse than blunders, and that today our Dominion does not fall short of what in our ideals it might and it ought, and, we believe, it is destined to be. But such as we have received it, and such as we hope to leave it, with it we are content.

NO DESIRE FOR CONQUEST.

We do not covet any people's territory. We have no desire to impose our rule upon alien populations. The British Empire is enough for us. All that we wished for, all that we wish for now, is to be allowed peaceably to consolidate our own resources, to raise within the Empire the level of common opportunity, to draw closer the bond of affection and confidence between its parts, and to make it everywhere the worthy home of the best traditions of British liberty. Does it not follow from that, that nowhere in the world is there a people who have stronger motives to avoid war and to seek and ensure peace? Why, then, are the British people throughout the length and breadth of our Empire everywhere turning their ploughshares into swords? Why are the best of our able-bodied men leaving the fields and the factory and the counting-house for the recruiting office and the training-camp?

If, as I have said, we have no desire to add to our Imperial burdens, either in area or in responsibility, it is equally true that in entering this war we had no ill-will to gratify, nor wrongs of our own to avenge. In regard to Germany in particular, our policy—repeatedly stated in Parliament, resolutely pursued year after year both in London and in Berlin—our policy has been to remove one by one the outstanding causes of possible friction, and so to establish a firm basis for cordial relations in the days to come.

POLICY TOWARD GERMANY.

We have said from the first—I have said it over and over again, and so has Sir Edward Grey—we have said from the first that our friendships with certain powers, with France, with Russia, and with Japan, were not to be construed as implying cold feelings, and still less hostile purposes, against any other power. But at the same time we have always made it clear, to quote his exact words—"One does not make new friendships worth having by deserting old ones. New friendships by all means let us have, but not at the expense of the ones we have." That has been, and I trust will always be, the attitude of those whom the Kaiser in his now notorious proclamation describes as the "treacherous English."

We laid down—and I wish to call not only your attention, but the attention of the whole world to this, when so many false legends are now being invented and circulated—in the following year—in the year 1912 we laid down in terms carefully approved by the Cabinet, and which I will textually quote, what our relations with Germany ought in our view to be.

We said, and we communicated this to the German Government, "Britain declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part, of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which Britain is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object." There is nothing ambiguous or equivocal about that.

But that was not enough for German statesmanship. They wanted us to go further. They asked us to pledge ourselves absolutely to neutrality in the event of Germany being engaged in war, and this, mind you, at a time when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and her defensive resources, especially upon the sea. They asked us, to put it quite plainly, for a free hand, so far as we are concerned, when they selected the opportunity to overbear, to dominate the European world.

DESIRE FOR PEACE.

To such a demand but one answer was possible, and that was the answer we gave. None the less we have continued during the whole of the last two years, and never more energetically and more successfully than during the Balkan crisis of last year, to work not only for the peace of Europe, but for the creation of a better international atmosphere and a more cordial co-operation between all the powers. From both points of view, that of our domestic interests as a kingdom and an empire, and that of our settled attitude and policy in the counsels of Europe, a war such as this, which injures the one and frustrates the other, was and could only be regarded as among the worst of catastrophes—among the worst of catastrophes, but not the worst.

(Extracts from *The War*, reprinted in Stowell, I, 569-571.)

6. [§177] Future World-Order Under Germany.

BY MEMBER OF THE REICHSTAG, GEORG KERSCHENSTEINER
(December 16, 1916).

The great lesson which the German people has had to learn is to think in terms of power and the present war has taught us more in this regard than all the four centuries of European diplomacy and development that preceded it. For all who have eyes to see and a mind alive to the world around them the Great War has made clear our true situation. We must insist on being a World-Power, or we cease to be a Great Power at all. There is no other alternative.

SMALL POWERS.

Let no one here say that small States, too, can have a national life of their own. True, so long as the great States around them allow them to exist. But any day may see the end of their existence, in spite of all treaties to the contrary, and every day brings us fresh evidence how little assured is the existence of small States. For *neither alliances nor treaties*

provide the least security for the existence of the Great Powers, still less of small States. Anyone who still retains belief in such things is past all argument. A man who has not learnt wisdom from the events of the last two years is incapable of learning anything. Of course every Great Power will always do its best to form alliances with other Powers, great and small, in order to assure its existence against hostile coalitions. But no one of them can feel any security that these alliances will be observed, Germany least of all. . . .

Let us sum up the argument. Germany needs, quite independently of her Allies, to be large, strong and powerfully organized; in order to secure herself against the possibility of *being deserted by the small Powers and being treacherously attacked by the Great.*

NO NATIONAL FRIENDSHIPS.

What does she need as a guarantee of this? The answer is: an extensive Empire, with highly developed agriculture and industry, the best possible strategic frontiers against sudden attacks and the best possible allies—alliances based not upon scraps of paper (*papierene Verträge*) but upon the elementary and vital needs of the allies as regards both defence and economic development. It is unnecessary, nay, harmful, to rely upon the affection and loyalty of *any* ally unless the material basis of the alliance has been soundly laid. If the war has done no more than awake the German people out of love's young dream—that is, out of its reliance on the goodwill and honest dealing of peoples and States—it will have done us a great service. *There are no ethical friendships between States in our day. There are only friendships of convenience.* And friendships of convenience last just so long as the convenience itself.

That is the sheet-anchor of all foreign policy. What we desire for our future therefore is a strong, self-dependent Germany, strong enough to secure that Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey shall find their greatest safety and prosperity through the German connection—and *only* through Germany.

(Kerschensteiner, *Die Zukunft Deutschlands*, in *Europäische Staat und Wirtschafts Zeitung*, December 16, 1916. Italics as in the original. Translated from *The Round Table*, March, 1917.)

CHAPTER V.

WHY THE UNITED STATES HAD TO ENTER THE CONFLICT.

A. [§178] GENERAL REFERENCES ON THE CHAPTER.

1. General.

See §§138-142, above.

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Angell, Norman. "If a German Attacked Your Wife," in *ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1917, pp. 261-263.

2. American Ideals and the War.

See §179 below.

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Fullerton, Wm. Morton. *Hesitations: The American Crisis and the War*. (N. Y., Doubleday, Page, 1916.) States the attitude of many Americans who favored a more vigorous anti-German attitude immediately upon the violation of Belgian neutrality. Believes that a broad view of the Monroe Doctrine necessitated such action.

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See §182 below.

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5. Violations of American Legal Rights.

See §182 below.

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B. [§179] VIOLATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEALS.

1. Specific References on the Section.

See §§115-120, 178(2) above.

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2. Central Powers Against Human Freedom.
3. Policy of Central Powers Contrary to Principle of American Democracy.
4. Conquests Contrary to Respect for Small Powers.
5. The Whole War Contrary to Our National Love for Peace.
6. Documents and Extracts.

(a) [§180] Why We Are at War.

BY HENRY DWIGHT SEDGWICK (1917).

We are a peaceable people. After the Civil War there was a universal hope that we should never go to war again; but Cuba lay at our doors, exploited, ill-treated, making her pathetic appeal to American chivalry and American justice, and we regarded war as a lesser evil than a heart hardened to the suffering of others. Against that war neither Pacifists nor German Americans made objection; they had no Spanish sympathies.

GROWTH OF GERMANY.

The Spanish war was soon ended, and once more we hoped that America would never go to war again. But our hopes were too sanguine. A great country in the centre of Europe had waxed wonderfully strong during forty years of peace. In 1870 Germany and France were equal in population and riches. In 1914 the German population was 70 millions, the French 38 millions; German commerce amounted to five billions of dollars, French commerce to three; the German merchant marine was double that of France; German agricultural produce, wheat, rye, potatoes, in spite of an inferior soil, was 25 per cent. to 50 per cent. greater than the French. By peaceful means Germany was rapidly acquiring a very great, even a guiding, influence in the world's affairs. The German government, however, remained a government of the warrior caste, bred upon the Prussian tradition that might makes right; at its head was an Emperor who declared that he ruled by divine right, and that *his* army was the rock on which *his* empire was built. This great nation, and especially its intellectual leaders, became drunk with success and self-love; boastful and truculent, it pressed upon its neighbors until the peace of Europe gave way at its weakest point. Germany thought she saw her way clear to dominate Europe, and, dragging Austria with her, dashed over Belgium, in order to deal knock-out blows first to France and then to Russia.

GERMAN METHODS OF WARFARE.

We were astounded. We admired Germany, her music, her science, her scholarship, her universities and schools, her munici-

pañities, her industry, skill and success. We could not believe that Germany was so utterly in the wrong as her enemies said. But little by little we were forced to believe it. First the Allies published the story of their diplomatic efforts to prevent the war, but Germany never published her correspondence with Austria; then came report after report of murders, devastation and pillage in Belgium and France; then followed, one after the other, lawless sinkings of American vessels, the torpedoing of the *Lusitania*, the drowing of American women and children, the intrigues and plots in this country, the insulting order that American ships should keep off a great part of the high seas, and finally the plan to involve us in war with Japan and Mexico.

Even these insults and injuries did not push us directly into war, but they opened our eyes, and we learned a lesson. That lesson was that a Prussian, feudal, military government, with a Kaiser by divine right at its head, will act in accordance with its nature; that, in order to fulfill its ambition, it will burn and pillage cities, devastate fields and orchards, that it will order priests shot, women raped, laborers deported, that it will tear up treaties, sink innocent travelers by sea, and seek to cow nations into submission by terror. With such an imperial government, supported by the mightiest army that has ever existed, no democracy in the world is safe.

WAR ON MILITARISM.

Slowly, reluctantly, we faced this alternative: either we must submit to the divine rights of an Emperor who bids his soldiers act like Huns, or we must fight for our own right to exist. So, slowly, reluctantly, we decided to fight.

If we cannot overthrow the Prussian military aristocracy and its Emperor now, not only England, France, Italy and Russia, but the United States also must keep armed to the teeth; and with national military preparedness moulding our national life, reshaping our honored institutions, breaking down our old ideas, our democracy, as we hoped to see it, will be impossible. We shall be obliged to economize and scrimp on schools, hospitals, asylums, playgrounds, institutions of research, to refrain from all activities which, sprung from a sense of human brotherhood, make the lives of the mass of men more worth while to themselves and to others. Armories and arsenals will be the school houses for young men; ammunition plants will be their laboratories; rifle and bayonet drill will take the place of ball and boating.

For the sake of our children we must stop all that wickedness and folly now. We must fight till the German government has passed out of the hands of the feudal aristocracy and their supporters, into the hands of the German people.

It was a clear understanding of the matters at issue and of the immense consequences to our future and to the future of the world, that has ranged us at last side by side with England, France, Russia, Italy, Belgium and Serbia. May God defend the right.

(Vigilantes Special Service.)

(b) [§181] Danger to American Political Ideals.

By ELIHU ROOT (January 25, 1917).

TWO THEORIES OF GOVERNMENT.

The present war which is raging in Europe was begun upon an avowal of principles of national action that no reasonable and thoughtful neutral ought to ignore. The central principle was that a state exigency, state interest, is superior to those rules of morality which control individuals. Now that was not an expedient, an excuse, seized upon to justify the beginning of the war; it is fundamental. The theory of the modern republic is that right begins with the individual. It was stated in the Declaration of Independence, that instrument which it was the fashion to sneer at a few years ago, but which states the fundamental principle upon which alone a free republic can live. It was that individual men have inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and that governments are instituted to secure those rights. The ancient republics upon which they went down to their ruin was that the state in the beginning was the foundation of right and that individuals derive their rights from the state, and therefore the exigencies of the state are superior to all individual rights. It was upon the continuance and assertion of that principle that this war in Europe was begun. And upon that principle it was declared that there was no obligation upon a nation to keep the faith of a treaty if it did not suit its interests. It was declared that there was no obligation upon a nation to observe the rules of that law of nations upon which all civilized states have agreed if it did not suit its interest. Now mark, I am not discussing the right or wrong. I am stating the principle of action upon which was followed and which was asserted to be right.

AMERICA AGAINST THE THEORY OF FORCE.

Upon that principle little Serbia was served with an ultimatum that demanded the surrender of her independence; and upon her failure to comply to the uttermost, she was overwhelmed. Upon that principle little Belgium, that had no quarrel with anybody, was served with a demand that she surrender her independent rights as a neutral and violate her solemn agreements to preserve her neutrality; and upon her refusal to surrender her rights and violate her faith, she was overwhelmed. And that principle is still maintained and asserted to be right. I repeat that I am not referring to this for the purpose of discussing it; I am referring to it because it bears directly upon our business here to-day. It doesn't matter much what you and I think about these things; it doesn't matter that I think they were immoral and criminal, as I do; it doesn't matter that I think that if that principle of national conduct is to be maintained and approved in this world, then liberty and civilization must die. What does matter is that approximately one-half the entire military power of this world supports that proposition. And I say to you, and I wish I could say it to every American, if that principle of national conduct be approved in the struggle that is pending, be approved by the free people

of America, be approved by the conscience of the civilized world, then our American freedom will surely die and die while we live.

My friends, so sure am I that liberty and security in this land of ours depends upon the destruction and abandonment of the hated principle of national aggrandizement and immorality, and the enthronement of the principles of national responsibility and morality, that for all the countless generations to come after us in our dear land, I am grateful with all my heart to those men who are fighting in the trenches in France and Belgium and Russia and Italy and the Balkans to-day for the liberty and peace of my children's children.

WHY THE UNITED STATES ENTERED THE CONFLICT.

This nation has publicly pledged itself and all its resources to the maintenance of certain doctrines and principles, designed not only for its own welfare and protection, but which are also in the nature of specific guarantees to other peoples of the world. The honor, integrity and future well-being of the United States, as well as of the many smaller nations over which it has extended the wing of its voluntary protection, inevitably require that this country shall at all times be prepared to sustain its principles and enforce its demands or decrees.

Either we are sincere or insincere. If we are to interpret the high standards of humanity and international law that are to guide other nations, at war or at peace; if we are to say how other nations may expand, and where they may colonize and where they may not; if we are to preserve at all times the integrity and the neutrality of the Americas; if we are to guarantee liberty and independence to other peoples and preserve the rights of all—then we must do it honestly and fearlessly, and in doing it realize that by the very principles and doctrines we expound we are likely to create the motives for war against us.

There is but one way for the United States to prove the honest courage of its convictions, and that is by being prepared to answer decisively and victoriously any challenge of those principles which it has pledged to the world upon its honor as a nation.

(Address before National Security League's Congress of Constructive Patriotism.)

C. [§182] DISTURBANCE OF OUR COMMERCE.

1. Specific References on the Section.

See §§123-127, 178(4) above.

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2. Prevention of Needed Imports.

3. Disturbance of Banking Relations.

4. Interference with the Movement and Safety of Persons.

5. Disadvantages to the United States.

D. [§183] GERMAN AND AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN AGGRESSIONS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES.

1. Specific References on the Section.

See §§128, 178(5) above.

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Bopp (Consul at San Francisco) Case, in *Am. Year Book*, 1916, pp. 22-23.

Werner Horn Case, *ibid.*, 1915, p. 68.

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Brooks, Sidney. "The German Spy System," *ibid.*, vol. 115, pp. 253-261. (Feb., 1915.)

2. Offensive Spy System and Maintenance of Subsidized Press

3. Interference with Legitimate American Business.

(a) Causing and subsidizing strikes in munition plants.

(b) Blowing up munition plants.

4. Hostile Action Inside Our Boundaries.

(a) Blowing up international bridges.

(b) Attempt to raise up enemies in Mexico and Japan.

(c) Internal destruction on German ships enjoying our hospitality.

5. Official Responsibilities for These Acts.

(a) Conviction of consular officials for violations of the law, e. g., Bopp, of San Francisco.

(b) Orders issued to officials and officers of steamers to destroy their ships.

(a) Offences causing dismissal of Austrian Minister Dumba.

(b) Activity of Boy-Ed, von Papen and von Igel in New York.

(c) Conviction of Rintelen and Werner Horn.

6. German Attempts Through Bernstorff to Stir Up Mexico.

7. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§184] Hostile Action Inside Our Boundaries (1915).

BY FRANCIS G. WICKWARE.

There was an attempt on the life of J. Pierpont Morgan by an insane instructor in German in Cornell University known as Frank Holt. . . . Holt placed a bomb in the Capitol in Washington on July 2 which wrecked the Senate reception room. . . .

Beginning with an incendiary fire causing \$1,500,000 loss at the works of the John A. Roebling's Sons Co., at Trenton, N. J., on January 18, disasters to industrial plants engaged in the manufacture of munitions were reported with increasing fre-

quency throughout the year. Within twenty-four hours, on November 10-11, for example, fire attacked the Roebing works a second time, with damage estimated at \$1,000,000, destroyed a shop of the Bethlehem Steel Company with equal loss, and caused smaller damages at the plants of the Midvale Steel & Ordnance Company at Midvale, Ohio, and the Baldwin Locomotive Works at Eddystone, Pa. Among numerous disasters to ammunition factories, an explosion at one of the plants of the du Pont Powder Company, near Wilmington, Del., on November 30, caused the loss of thirty-one lives, and on December 9 the du Pont factory town of Hopewell, near Richmond, Va., was practically destroyed by fire. Equally numerous were cases of attempted destruction of ocean steamers. Bombs were discovered on several vessels, and on many more fires attributed to the same agency broke out in port or at sea. So visited were the *Touraine* of the French Line in March, the *Minnehaha* of the Atlantic Transport Line in July, the *Sant' Anna* of the Italian Line in September, and the *Rochambeau* of the French Line in November, to mention only the disasters to large passenger steamers in the Atlantic. . . .

The third and last of the principal manifestations of the criminal campaign has been an effort to foment strikes among seamen and workers in munition plants. . . .

The labor conspiracy the government claims to have traced to a definite source. . . .

Late in December the Federal authorities uncovered a new phase of German activity, making American territory a base of military operations against Canada. . . .

Another annoying phase of German activity was the fraudulent use of American passports to facilitate the return of reservists to Germany.

(*American Year Book*, 1915, pp. 61, 65-68.)

(b) [§185] Legal Prosecutions of Germans.

1. The arrest of Paul Konig, chief of the German Secret Service in the United States, on the specific charge of conspiring to blow up the Welland Canal, but known to have been active in other German enterprises in this country and Mexico.

2. The conviction of Karl Buenz and other officials of the Hamburg-American Steamship Line for supplying false clearance papers to vessels conveying munitions and food supplies to German warships outside the three-mile limit. These men were sentenced to prison.

3. The arrest of Gustave Stahl, now serving a term in Atlanta Penitentiary for perjury in connection with the making of a false affidavit alleging the *Lusitania* carried masked guns when she sailed from New York.

4. The arrest of Baron George William von Brincken, Attache of the German Consulate at San Francisco; C. C. Crowley, his agent, and Mrs. Abbey Cornell, an employee, charged with inciting arson and murder through the use of the mails and violating the laws relating to the provisioning of German ships off the Pacific Coast. Von Kolberger, the Austrian Vice-Coun-

sel at San Francisco, has been summoned in this case as a material witness.

5. The present Grand Jury investigation of members of Labor's National Peace Conference, composed of David Lamar, Herman Shulteis, Henry B. Martin, Congressman Frank Buchanan of Illinois, and former Congressman Fowler of the same State, charged with violations of the neutrality laws of the country, for which \$170,000 is alleged to have been supplied by the German Government.

6. While these are the most important of the results so far accomplished in the way of bringing hyphenated offenders to book, there have been innumerable cases of minor importance at New York, Detroit, Chicago, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Columbus, St. Louis, Boston, Philadelphia, New Orleans, San Francisco and Seattle. More than 400 persons have been involved in cases of this sort, there being at the present time eighty-three under indictment.

Further to protect the neutrality of the United States, twelve British citizens were arrested at San Francisco and Seattle, charged with recruiting men for the British army for service in the European War."

(*Literary Digest*, LII, 2, Jan. 1, 1916.)

(c) [§186] **On German Representatives in the United States.**

BY GEORG VON SKAL (December 15, 1919).

My Dear Mr. Harden:

As I chance to have a unique and absolutely safe opportunity, I must tell you something which I have had on my mind for a long while, but which I could not entrust to the post, as many of my letters have been taken en route.

About a year ago I told you that you should not hold too high an opinion of Count B. (Bernstorff).

I must now tell you that he has done splendid work here. In the most difficult situation he has shown tact, skill, and energy beyond anything that we expected from him. Any one who knows the type of people who are in power here cannot fail unreservedly to admit and admire his activities. He well deserves a kind word once in a way, particularly as there are still influences at work over there, on your side, who wish to decry his services. One of the foremost of these is widow Speck von Sternburg. The fact that for a time B. could accomplish but little here was mainly due to the presence of your friend (?) B. D. (Bonthead Dernberg), who, I may remark in parenthesis, is very fond of speaking of "that Punchinello Harden." This man was regarded by the Americans, and even by many Germans, as the real Ambassador. His immense vanity, his desire to come to the front, his tactlessness, and the qualities which he himself, with a certain pride, described as "truthfulness and openness," did a very great deal of harm. At the same time he was accessible to every toady and flatterer, and no one with self-respect could possibly work with

him. Accordingly he surrounded himself with a crowd of favorites, who for the most part were quite incapable and unreliable, and have spoiled many chances. He not only came into collision with, and disturbed, the Count's patient labors, but more than once destroyed their results. It was a most unhappy thought to send him here, and the consequences were highly disastrous.

The people in Berlin seem still to believe that any one who has once been in America knows the country and the people, and understands how to handle them properly. Many mistakes would have been avoided if they had taken the advice of those who have long experience on this side. But ! ! ! ! any one who has ever been in government service, if only as consular interpreter or secretary, is always given the preference. At present, one naturally does not wish to stir up the dust; but later on I will tell you more about this—when I next visit Berlin, I hope.

Whether the Count has qualifications for the post for which you once described him as destined is, however, a question which I would prefer not to answer yet. I still think that a man like Falkenhayn should be employed in the peace negotiations. He is extraordinarily capable and possesses genius, a thing which up to now I have been unable to discover in any of our diplomats. . . .

With kindest regards, &c.,

SKAL.

(*Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous*, No. 6; 1916.)

(d) [§187] **Official Instructions to Destroy American Property and Lives (1914).**

BY HORST VON DER GOLTZ, ALIAS BRIDGEMAN TAYLOR.

RELATIONS WITH GERMAN DIPLOMATS.

The 3rd August, 1914, license was given to me by my commanding officer (Mexican army) to separate myself from the service of the brigade to which I was attached for the term of six months, said leave to be extended at my application. I left directly for El Paso, Texas, where I was told by Mr. Kuck, German Consul at Chihuahua, Mexico, who stayed there, to put myself at the disposition of Captain von Papen. I left there for Washington, D. C., the 18th August, and received there a letter informing me that Captain von Papen would like to meet me at New York in about ten—twelve days. I left, consequently, Washington, and went to stay for some days at Asbury Park (10th August), and arrived at New York after about five—six days (date of arrival to be found in the book of the Holland House). I then paid a visit to Dr. Kraske, vice-consul at the German General Consulate, and was told by him that he would inform me by letter when von Papen would see me, in order to enable me to avoid being seen too much at the consulate. Two to three days afterward I received a letter, written by Dr. Kraske on private paper, telling me that a gentleman who was interested in me wished to see me at the con-

sulate at a certain hour. The letter was written in this manner by agreements.

Attending to the request, I had at first some conversation with Captain von Papen about recent events in Mexico, and afterwards was asked to give my opinion about a proposal made to the German Embassy, the writer of which, a certain Schuhmacher, asked for financial support in order to carry out a scheme by which he wrote he would be able to make raids on towns situated on the coast of the Great Lakes. He proposed to use motorboats armed with machine guns. The proposal being rejected on account of the Embassy receiving unfavorable information about the writer, I was at first requested to give my assistance to a scheme of invasion intended to be put in execution by entering Canada with armed forces recruited from the reservists in the United States of America, and aided by German warships at that time in the Pacific. The scheme, which was proposed by Captain von Papen and Boy-Ed was abandoned, objections having been made by Count Bernstorff. I was told so by Captain von Papen.

PLANS TO RAID CANADA.

Then Captain von Papen asked me to see at my hotel two Irishmen, prominent members of Irish associations, who had both fought during the Irish rebellion, who had proposed to Captain von Papen to blow up the locks of the canals connecting the Great Lakes, the main railway junctions, and grain elevators. It was alleged that by those means, as well as by wholesale distribution of proclamations intended to terrify the populace, combined with rumors of invasion judiciously circulated in the press, a panic would be created in Canada, which would prevent the Dominion from giving any aid to England. I received the gentlemen at my hotel, the men bringing with them a letter of introduction written by Captain von Papen, and received, after having taken them to my room, further details about the matter, in addition to maps and diagrams showing the most vulnerable points of the different canals. These maps had been evidently cut out of books; and I returned them afterwards to one of the gentlemen, who said that he had to put the maps into the books again, he having made use of those books at the insurance office at which he was employed.

I then had to get some men to help me to put the scheme into execution, but engaged, before I went to Baltimore, only one man, Charles Tucker, alias Tucsheimer, who had also some conversation with one of the men who proposed the scheme.

RELATIONS WITH GERMAN CONSULS.

Receiving a letter of introduction to Mr. Luederitz, consul at Baltimore, who was to aid me by his counsel, I went there, taking Tucker with me, and was received by Mr. Luederitz at the consulate in Baltimore. He evidently had been informed about the matter beforehand, for he addressed me as Major von der Goltz, although my letter of introduction was written in favor of Mr. Bridgeman H. Taylor. He showed very much

interest, and, besides supplying me with a revolver, my own being out of order temporarily, suggested to furnish me with a passport to be obtained through the State Department, Washington, D. C., proving me to be B. H. Taylor, in order that I should be able to travel safely. He also proposed to me to make use of part of the crew and one officer of a G. ship at that time in the harbor, and furnished me with his visit card at the back of which he wrote recommending Major von der Goltz, or something to that effect, which I should give to the captain of the ship. While I was still conversing with Mr. Luederitz, the captain of the ship, was announced by a clerk, and Mr. Luederitz, telling the clerk to bring the gentleman in, introduced me to the captain personally. One of the clerks, a notary, made out an application to the State Department, Washington, D. C., for a passport purporting to be desired by a certain B. H. Taylor. All information given in this passport was fictitious. It was arranged that this passport was to be sent to Mr. Buck, New York, who was to deliver it to me. The following day, a Sunday, I paid, accompanied by Tucker, a visit to the ship, dined there and selected the men intended to be used in the enterprise personally. The men were acquainted with the duties demanded from them. I also listened for some time to wireless news received on board, read to me by the operator, the captain informing me that he had been forbidden by the harbor authorities to use his apparatus for sending purposes. The captain promised me to pay off the men selected at the consulate in a few days and to send them to New York under the supervision of an officer. Everything necessary having been agreed upon, I left for New York to report there to Captain von Papen. Arrived at New York, I selected three men recommended to me, acquainted them with the main object of the scheme, and agreed to pay them daily while in New York, their employment to cease when the object of our enterprise should have been achieved; in that case the men should also receive a bonus. Expecting the arrival of the sailors from Baltimore, I spent several days waiting, meanwhile meeting von Papen frequently at the German Club or at the Consulate.

MONEY.

As I needed money to furnish these sailors with necessaries, Captain von Papen gave me a cheque payable to Bridgeman Taylor, which cheque I had cashed through the agency of an acquaintance, Mr. Stallford, member of the German Club.

The men arrived, were quartered in several hotels, but on my noticing that my movements were being watched, I sent them back to make the detectives think the enterprise abandoned.

I told Captain von Papen that it would be more easy for him to supply me with materials, dynamite, and arms cheaply, on account of his connections, informing him that I could not get those materials except at a prohibitive price.

Von Papen then informed me that Captain Tauscher, of Krupp's agency, had to furnish me with those things, and told me to see him at his office.

(Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous, No. 13, 1916.)

(e) [§188] Dismissal of Boy-Ed and Von Papen.
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS (December, 1915).

EXPULSION OF THE PLOTTERS.

Department of State,
Washington, Dec. 4, 1915.

Excellency—Confirming my conversation with you on December 1, I have the honor to state that various facts and circumstances having come to the knowledge of the Government of the United States, as to connection of Captain Boy-Ed, Naval Attaché, and Captain von Papen, Military Attaché, of the Imperial German Embassy, with the illegal and questionable acts of certain persons within the United States, the President reached the conviction that the continued presence of these gentlemen as attachés of the Embassy would no longer serve the purpose of their mission, and would be unacceptable to this Government.

The President, therefore, directed me to notify your Excellency, as I did orally, that Captain Boy-Ed and Captain von Papen are no longer acceptable to the Government of the United States as attachés of his Imperial Majesty's Embassy at Washington, and to request that your Excellency's Government withdraw them immediately from their official connection with the Imperial German Embassy.

As I informed you at the time of our interview, the Government of the United States deeply regrets that this action has become necessary and believes that the Imperial Government will realize that this Government has, in view of all the circumstances, no alternative course consistent with the interests of the two Governments in their relations with each other.

Accept, etc.

ROBERT LANSING.

RENEWED EXPULSION.

Department of State,
Washington, D. C., Dec. 10, 1915.

My Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On December 1, I informed Your Excellency that Captain Boy-Ed, the Naval Attaché of your Embassy, and Captain von Papen, the Military Attaché, were no longer personæ gratæ to my Government and requested that the Imperial Government immediately recall the two Attachés.

As ten days have passed without the request of this Government being complied with and without communication from you on the subject, other than your personal letter of the 5th inst., which in no way affected the fact that the two Attachés were unacceptable or presented a ground for delay, I feel compelled to direct your attention to the expectation of this Government that its request would be immediately granted.

I trust, my dear Ambassador, that you appreciate the situation and will urge upon your Government a prompt compliance with the request in order that this Government may not be com-

pelled to take action without awaiting the recall of the Attachés, an action which this Government does not desire to take, but will be forced to take unless the Imperial Government meets the express wish of this Government without further delay. I need not impress upon your Excellency the desirability of avoiding a circumstance which would increase the embarrassment of the present situation.

I am, etc.

ROBERT LANSING.

RELUCTANT RECALL BY GERMANY.

German Embassy,..
Washington, D. C., Dec. 10, 1915.

Mr. Secretary of State: In reply to your note No. 1,686 of the 4th of this month, I have the honor to inform your Excellency that his Majesty the Emperor and King has been most graciously pleased to recall the Naval Attaché of the Imperial Embassy, Captain Boy-Ed, and the Military Attaché, Captain von Papen.

I am instructed to beg your Excellency to obtain for the above-named gentlemen and their servavnts, Gustav Winkow and Otto Mahlow, a safe conduct for the return trip to Germany from the powers at war with the German Empire, and also to insure the trip of the successors of those gentlemen to the United States in the event of their being supplanted by his Majesty.

Accept, etc.

J. BERNSTORFF.

(*New York Times*, Aug. 17, 1916.)

(f) [§189] Activity of the Austrian Ambassador.

BY AMBASSADOR CONSTANTIN DUMBA and SECRETARY OF STATE

ROBERT LANSING (September, 1916).

The letter was entirely in Dr. Dumba's handwriting. The following is a translation of Dr. Dumba's letter to Burian, envelope was addressed "Through good opportunity to his Excellency von Burian, etc., etc., etc., Vienna":

OFFICIAL REPORT ON CAUSING STRIKES.

Noble Lord:

Yesterday evening Consul General von Nuber received the inclosed pro memoria (aide memoire, as it has been called, or simply "memorandum") from the chief editor of the local influential newspaper Szabadsag after a previous conversation with me and in pursuance of his oral proposals with respect to the preparation of disturbances in the Bethlehem Schwab's steel and munitions factories as well as in the Middle West.

To-day at 12 o'clock Mr. Archibald, who is well known to Your Excellency, leaves on the Rotterdam for Berlin and Vienna. I would like to use this rare, safe opportunity to recommend the proposals most warmly to your Excellency's favorable consideration.

I am under the impression that we could, if not entirely prevent the production of war material in Bethlehem and in the

Middle West, at any rate strongly disorganize it and hold it up for months, which, according to the statement of the German Military Attache, is of great importance, and which amply outweighs the relatively small sacrifice of money.

RELIEF OF WORKINGMEN.

But even if the disturbances do not succeed, there is a probability at hand that we shall compel, under pressure of the crisis, favorable working conditions for our poor oppressed fellow-countrymen. In Bethlehem these white slaves at present work twelve hours a day in seven days in the week!!! Alas, weak persons succumb, become consumptive. As far as German workingmen are found among the skilled elements, provision will be made forthwith for their exit. There has, besides this, been created a German private (underlined) registry office for providing employment, and which already works voluntarily and well for such persons. We, too, shall join, and the widest support is contemplated for us.

I beg Your Excellency kindly to inform me through wireless reply with respect to this letter, whether you approve of same.

In greatest haste and respectful devotion,

C. DUMBA.

DISMISSAL OF THE AMBASSADOR.

Mr. Constantin Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Washington, has admitted that he proposed to his Government plans to instigate strikes in American manufacturing plants engaged in the production of munitions of war. The information reached this Government through a copy of a letter of the Ambassador to his Government. The bearer was an American citizen named Archibald, who was traveling under an American passport. The Ambassador has admitted that he employed Archibald to bear official despatches from him to his Government.

By reason of the admitted purpose and intent of Mr. Dumba to conspire to cripple legitimate industries of the people of the United States and to interrupt their legitimate trade and by reason of the flagrant violation of diplomatic propriety in employing an American citizen protected by an American passport as a secret bearer of official dispatches through the lines of the enemy of Austria-Hungary, the President directs me to inform your Excellency that Mr. Dumba is no longer acceptable to the Government of the United States as the Ambassador of his Imperial Majesty at Washington.

Believing that the Imperial and Royal Government will realize that the Government of the United States has no alternative but to request the recall of Mr. Dumba on account of his improper conduct, the Government of the United States expresses its deep regret that this course has become necessary and assures the Imperial and Royal Government that it sincerely desires to continue the cordial and friendly relations which exist between the United States and Austria-Hungary.

LANSING.

(September 10, 1916.)

COMPLAINT OF DUMBA.

The main proposal that seemed practicable and upon which the opinion of our Minister for Foreign Affairs was asked was for the expenditure of sums for entirely legitimate purposes and which should not in the aggregate exceed \$15,000, to be used in bringing the proclamation to the attention of our citizens in the munitions factories here and through a campaign in the newspapers published here in their own languages, appealing to their patriotism to induce my countrymen to quit taking part in the manufacture of arms and ammunitions for the enemy and at the same time to establish employment agencies to secure work elsewhere for such of them as should comply with the proclamation.

As the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador is and has been for many months past in the phenomenal position of being unable to communicate privately with his Government, although our enemies are and have been permitted freely to use the cables for their secret code dispatches without censorship, I have, by the grace of your department, now been permitted to communicate with my Government through the German Embassy, but to the extent only of asking for leave of absence to the end that I may in person explain my position, and meantime to suspend judgment upon the charges contained in your Excellency's message and am now awaiting a reply. I have not even been allowed to advise my Government that I do not admit having conspired to do any act in violation of the laws of the country to which I am accredited and whose hospitality I have enjoyed and have in no way abused. The message that I sought to have transmitted to that effect was rejected by your censor, as hereafter explained. In some unaccountable way this confidential message was communicated to the press and has been published.

. . .

I ask you in all fairness, was ever an Ambassador in a neutral country confronted with such a situation, created and enforced by the Government to which he is accredited, whilst the Ambassadors representing enemies of his country have unlimited means of secret communication. It has been made literally impossible for me to communicate privately with my Government. Under such conditions I have no apologies to offer for having intrusted my letter to Mr. Archibald. If the conveying of letters to Europe by Americans traveling abroad during this war is an offense, it is one of which most Americans are apparently ignorant, as the courtesy has frequently been volunteered by my friends and is habitually practiced. It did not for a moment occur to me that it was improper, nor am I yet able to see it in that light, having regard to the entirely legitimate purposes I had in mind in the line of the performance of my duty.

C. DUMBA.

(*New York Times*, Sept. 15, 1917.)

(g) [§190] German Intrigues in Mexico.

BY FOREIGN SECRETARY ZIMMERMANN.

Berlin, Jan. 19, 1917.

On the 1st of February we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to endeavor to keep neutral the United States of America.

If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico:

That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement.

You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan; at the same time offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.

Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.

(Signed) ZIMMERMANN.

(Boston Herald, March 1, 1917.)

E. [§191] VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF THE SEAS.

1. Specific References on the Section.

(a) General discussion.

See §§11, 121-125 above.

Sidebotham, H. "Discussion of Freedom of the Seas," in *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 118, pp. 261-271. (Aug., 1916.)

Hurd, A. "Germany's New Policy," in *Fortnightly Review*, vol. 104, pp. 439-453. (Sept., 1915.)

Stockton, C. H. "International Law on the Sea," in *World's Work*, XXIX, 706-712. (April, 1915.)

Garner, James W. "Questions of International Law in the European War," in *Journal of Internat. Law*, IX, 594. (July, 1915.)

Garner, J. W. "Destruction of Neutral Merchant Vessels," *ibid.*, X, 12. (Jan., 1916.)

Renault, Louis. "War and the Law of Nations in the 20th Century," *ibid.*, IX, pp. 1-16. (Jan., 1915.)

(b) Contraband Lists:

Oppenheim. *International Law* (1st ed., 1906), II, §§ 393-394.

Lawrence. *Principles of Internat. Law*, §278. (1895.)

Bonfils. *Manuel de Droit Internat. Public*, §§1559-1565.

Perels. *Manuel de Droit Maritime Internat.* (Transl. by Arendt, 1884.) §45.

Declaration of London, Arts. 22 seq.

(c) Blockade, Legality and Justification.

Perels. *Manuel de Droit Maritime Internat.*, §48.

Bluntschli. *Droit Internat. Codifié*, §§827-840.

Lawrence. *Principles of Internat. Law*, §271.

Woolsey. *Internat. Law*, 343.

Hall. *Internat. Law* (6th ed. 1909), 628 seq.

- Holtzoff, Alexander. "Some Phases of the Law of Blockade," in *Am. Jour. Internat. Law*, X, 53 seq. (June, 1916.) Discusses the Anglo-American doctrine.
- Bryan, W. J. "America's Reply to British Blockade Order" (Mar. 30, 1915), in *N. Y. Times Current History*, II, 275-278. (May, 1915.)
- Grey, Sir Edward. Official correspondence with U. S.—Neches Cargo "Seizures," *ibid.*, II, 1057-1063. (Sept., 1915.)

(d) Continuous Voyage.

- Bluntschli. *Droit Internat. Codifié*, §813.
- Bonfils. *Manuel de Droit Internat. Public*, §1569.
- Perels. *Manuel de Droit Maritime*, pp. 278-279.
- Garner, Jas. W. "Some Questions of Internat. Law in the European War," in *Am. Jour. Internat. Law*, IX, 372 (April, 1915), IX, 818 (Oct., 1915).
- Baldwin, S. E. "The 'Continuous Voyage' Doctrine during the Civil War and Now," *ibid.*, IX, 793 seq. (Oct., 1915.)
- Arias, Harmodio. "The Doctrine of 'Continuous Voyage' in the Eighteenth Century," *ibid.*, 583 seq. (July, 1915.)
- Oppenheim. "British Acquiescence in Civil War Decisions," in *Internat. Law* (2d ed.), II, §385.

(e) Need Effectiveness to Make Blockade Legal.

- Declaration of Paris, Art. 4; Declaration of London, Art. 2.
- Case of Olinde Rodrigues (1898) in Scott, *Cases*, p. 835 ff. (174 U. S. 510.)
- Perels. *Manuel de Droit Maritime International*, §49.
- Bluntschli. *Le Droit Internat. Codifié*, §829.
- Oppenheim. *Internat. Law* (2nd ed.), II, §§379-382.

(f) Manner of Visit and Search.

- Bonfils. *Manuel de Droit Internat.*, §§1402-1407.
- Bluntschli. *Droit Internat. Codifié*, §§819-823.
- Hall. *Internat. Law*, 730 seq.
- Lawrence. *Principles* (1895), §210, p. 394 ff.
- Oppenheim. *Internat. Law* (2nd ed.), II, §§419-421.

2. International Law Principles.

(a) Effect of American Legal Decisions.

- "Stephen Hart," Scott, *Cases*, p. 852 ff.
- "Springbok," 3 Wallace 1.
- "Bermuda," 3 Wallace 514.
- "Peterhoff," 5 Wallace 28.
- "Bundesrath," Stowell and Munro, *Cases*, II, p. 409.

3. Zone System, Inaugurated by Germany.

4. Illegal Destruction of Our Commerce.

(a) Ship Frye and other specific cases.

5. Attempt to Use Our Ports for Belligerent Purposes.

- (a) Illegally provisioning and aiding ships of war.
- (b) Attempt to bring prizes into our ports, e. g., Steamer Appam, and other specific cases.

6. Acknowledged Limitations on Our Trade with Belligerents.

- (a) Blockade.
- (b) Contraband.
- (c) Continuous voyages.

7. Submarine Warfare Prior to February, 1917.

- (a) Acknowledged limitations on trade with belligerents.
- (b) Blockade, contraband and continuous voyages.
- (c) Deprivation of opportunity to save life of the personnel.
- (d) List of American ships destroyed without warning.
- (e) Number of persons who thus lost their lives.
- (f) List of neutral ships sunk involving the loss of American lives.
- (g) Number of persons thus murdered.
- (h) Aggravated case of the *Lusitania*, May 21, 1915.

8. Attempt to Bring the German Government to Reason.
 - (a) Diplomatic notes on the Lusitania.
 - (b) Diplomatic notes on the Arabic.
 - (c) Diplomatic notes on the Sussex.
 - (d) Expectation of indemnity.
9. Extreme Submarine Policy of February, 1917.
 - (a) Remonstrances of the United States.
 - (b) Renewed destruction of American lives.
 - (c) Renewed destruction of American ships.
 - (d) In effect a war on neutrals.
10. A Declaration of War the Only Remedy.
11. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§192] American Ships Attacked.

BY CONGRESSMAN JOHN JACOB ROGERS.

Name of Vessel	Date	Particulars
GulflightMay 2, 1915..	Torpedoed
NebraskanMay 25, 1915..	Torpedoed
LeelanawJuly 25, 1915..	Torpedoed and shelled
SeaconnetJune 16, 1916..	Damaged by mine or torpedo
OswegoAug. 14, 1916..	Fired on 10 times by submarine
Lano (Philippine)	..Oct. 28, 1916..	Sunk by submarine
ColumbianNov. 7, 1916..	Sunk by submarine
ColenaNov. 26, 1916..	Fired on
St. Helen'sDec. 10, 1916..	Attacked by submarine
Rebecca Palmer	...Dec. 14, 1916..	Fired on; slight damage
SacramentoJan. 9, 1917..	Fired on
HousatonicFeb. 3, 1917..	Sunk
Lyman M. LawFeb. 13, 1917..	Burned by submarine
VigilanciaMar. 16, 1917..	Torpedoed
City of Memphis	..Mar. 17, 1917..	Sunk by gunfire
IllinoisMar. 17, 1917..	Torpedoed
AztecApr. 1, 1917..	Torpedoed

SHIPS SUNK WITH LOSS OF AMERICAN LIVES.

British ship Falaba, torpedoed March 28, 1915 (warned); 1 American lost.

British ship Lusitania, torpedoed May 7, 1915 (no warning); 114 Americans lost.

American ship Gulflight, torpedoed May 1, 1915 (no warning); 2 Americans lost.

British ship Armenian, torpedoed June 28, 1915 (ordered to stop; tried to escape); 23 Americans lost.

British ship Iberian, sunk July 31, 1915 (tried to escape; stopped by shell fire); 3 Americans lost.

British ship Anglo-California, sunk July 4, 1915; 2 Americans lost.

British ship Hesperian, torpedoed September 4, 1915 (no warning); 1 American lost.

British ship Arabic, torpedoed August 19, 1915 (no warning); 3 Americans lost.

British ship Persia, believed to have been torpedoed; sunk December 30, 1915 (no warning); 2 Americans lost.

Italian ship Ancona, torpedoed November 9, 1915 (no warning); 7 Americans lost.

British ship *Englishman*, torpedoed March 27, 1916; 6 Americans lost (1 more whose nationality is doubtful).

British ship *Sabota*, sunk by gunfire October 20, 1916; 1 American lost.

British ship *Marina*, sunk by gunfire October 28, 1916 (warned); 8 Americans lost.

British ship *Russian*, torpedoed December 14, 1916 (no warning); 17 Americans lost.

British ship *Eaveston*, sunk by shell fire February 5, 1917; 1 American lost (1 other whose nationality is doubtful).

British ship *Vedamore*, torpedoed February 7, 1917 (no warning); 10 Americans lost.

British ship *Turino*, torpedoed February 7, 1917 (no warning); 1 American (?) lost.

French ship *Athos*, torpedoed February 22, 1917 (no warning); 1 American lost.

British ship *Laconia*, torpedoed February 26, 1917 (no warning); 8 Americans lost.

Norwegian ship *Sjostad*, believed torpedoed March 2, 1917 (no warning); 1 American lost.

American ship *Vigilancia*, torpedoed March 16, 1917 (no warning); 5 Americans lost.

American ship *Healdton*, torpedoed March 21, 1917 (no warning); 7 Americans lost.

British ship *Crispin*, torpedoed March 29, 1917 (no warning); 68 Americans on board, 1 killed, 18 missing.

Total, 226 American lives lost.

On the *Lusitania* there were also 24 children born of foreign parents on American soil.

(*Congressional Record*, April 5, 1917.)

(b) [§193] Summary of Correspondence Regarding Submarines (August, 1914, to April, 1916).

BY ALBERT BUSHNELL HART.

August 6—Note of United States as to the Declaration of London.

August 22, 1914—The German Government undertakes to apply the Declaration of London as it stands. The British Government undertakes to apply it "subject to certain modifications and additions."

MILITARY AREAS AND WAR ZONES.

November 2, 1914—Announcement by the British Admiralty that the "whole of the North Sea must be considered a military area. Within this area merchant shipping of all kinds . . . will be exposed to the gravest dangers from mines it has been necessary to lay, and from warships searching diligently . . . for suspicious craft").

November 23, 1914—German note protesting at the Allied modification of the Declaration of London which therefore will not be observed by Germany.

February 4, 1915—German declaration that ("the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole English

Channel, are hereby declared to be war zone. . . . Every enemy merchant ship found in the said war zone will be destroyed without its being always possible to avert the dangers threatening the crews and passengers. . . . It cannot always be avoided to strike even neutral ships in attacks that are directed at enemy ships").

FOOD SHIPS.

January 26, 1915—German order for control of the supply of corn, wheat and flour in Germany, by the German Government.

February 9, 1915—Capture by Great Britain of the American steamer *Wilhelmina* bound from New York to Hamburg with foodstuffs.

STRICT ACCOUNTABILITY.

February 10, 1915—Note by Secretary Bryan declaring that ("if the commanders of German vessels of war . . . should destroy on the high seas, an American vessel or the lives of American citizens . . . the United States would be constrained to hold the Imperial Government of Germany to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities").

ATTEMPT AT A GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH NEUTRALS.

February 16, 1915—Germany's protest against the munitions trade and complaint that "neutrals in safeguarding their rights in legitimate commerce with Germany according to international law, have up to the present, achieved no, or only insignificant results, while they are making unlimited use of their right by carrying on contraband traffic with Great Britain and our enemies." ("Neutral vessels which, despite this ample notice, which greatly affects the achievement of our aims in our war against Great Britain, enter these closed waters, will themselves bear the responsibility for any unfortunate accidents that may occur. Germany disclaims all responsibility for such accidents and their consequences.")

British memorandum to the effect that if "His Majesty's Government should hereafter feel constrained to declare foodstuffs absolute contraband, or to take other measures for interfering with German trade, by way of reprisals, they confidently expect that such action will not be challenged on the part of neutral states by appeals to laws and usages of war whose validity rests on their forming an integral part of that system of international doctrine which as a whole their enemy frankly boasts the liberty and intention to disregard."

February 20, 1915—Proposal of the United States that the belligerents agree not to make breadstuffs contraband and not "to use submarines to attack merchant vessels of any nationality except to enforce the right to visit and search."

February 28, 1915—German note accepting the American proposals if the British Government will not prevent "legitimate importations of food into Germany."

March 1, 1915—British and French notice that those powers will use ("retaliatory measures in order in their turn to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany"). "They will, therefore, hold themselves free to detain and carry

into port ships of presumed enemy destination, ownership or origin."

March 5, 1915—Protest of the United States against the proposed Allied methods as contrary to international law.

March 11, 1915—British order in Council forbidding any merchant vessel to sail to or from a German port or to sail to or from a neutral "carrying goods of enemy ownership or destination."

March 18, 1915—British order that ("the British fleet has instituted a blockade, effectively controlling by cruiser 'cordon' all passages to and from Germany by sea").

FALABA AND GULFLIGHT CASES.

March 28, 1915—Sinking of the British merchantman *Falaba* by a German submarine with a loss of one American life. (First case.)

March 30, 1915—American note protesting against the British communications as containing "matters of grave importance to neutral nations. . . . A practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral commerce within the whole European area, and an almost unqualified denial of the sovereign rights of the nations now at peace."

April 4, 1915—German demand that the United States cease to allow shipments of munitions to the Allies.

April 6, 1915—German note defending the sinking of the *Falaba* on the ground that "the German Government regrets sacrifices of human lives, but both British ships and neutral passengers on board such ships were warned urgently and in time not to cross the war zone. Responsibility rests, therefore, with the British Government, which, contrary to international law, inaugurated commercial war against Germany, and, contrary to international law, has caused merchant ships to offer armed resistance."

April 21, 1915—Note of Secretary Bryan insisting on the right to ship munitions.

May 1, 1915—Sinking of the American vessel *Gulflight* by a German submarine. (Second case.)

LUSITANIA CORRESPONDENCE.

May 7, 1915—Sinking of the British merchant steamer *Lusitania* by a German submarine, with a loss of 114 lives of Americans. (Third case.)

May 13, 1915—Protest of Secretary Bryan against the sinking of the *Lusitania*, urging "the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice and humanity, which all modern opinion regards as imperative"; adding that "no warning that an unlawful and inhumane act will be committed can possibly be accepted as an excuse or palliation for that act or as an abatement of the responsibility for its commission."

May 28, 1915—First German note, justifying the capture of the *Lusitania* on the following grounds: (a) That the *Lusitania* was listed as a British auxiliary cruiser and "undoubtedly had

guns on board, which were mounted under decks and mast." (b) British merchant vessels were instructed to ram and destroy submarines and hence could not be considered "any longer as 'undefended territory' in the zone of maritime war." (c) That the ship was carrying Canadian troops and munitions. (d) That American citizens on board were not entitled to protection because the company violated American law as passengers on ships which had explosives on board. "The company thereby wantonly caused the death of so many passengers." (e) The sinking of the *Lusitania* was not due to the torpedo, but to the explosion of the ammunition on board.

June 1, 1915—German note apologizing for the sinking of the *Gulflight*.

June 8, 1915—Resignation of Secretary Bryan from the State Department because of the President's note, "in which I cannot join without violating what I deem to be an obligation to my country."

June 9, 1915—Second American note on the *Lusitania* calling "the attention of the Imperial German Government to the grave responsibility which the Government of the United States conceives that it has incurred in this tragic occurrence." "The Government of the United States deems it reasonable to expect that the Imperial Government will adopt the measures necessary to put these principles into practice in respect of the safeguarding of American lives and American ships, and asks for assurances that this will be done."

June 17, 1915—British memorandum defending their interference with the neutral commerce with the United States with Germany, and with other neutral powers.

June 28, 1915—Sinking of British merchantman *Armenian* by a German submarine. (Fourth case, 11 Americans killed.)

July 8, 1915—Second German note, defending the sinking of the *Lusitania*, on the grounds: (a) That "we have been obliged to adopt a submarine warfare to meet the declared intentions of our enemies and the method of warfare adopted by them and the contravention of international law." (b) The British have obliterated all distinctions between merchantmen and war vessels. (c) If the commander of the German submarine which destroyed the *Lusitania* had caused the crew and passengers to take to the boats before firing the torpedo, this would have meant the sure destruction of his own vessel. (d) If the *Lusitania* has been spared, thousands of cases of munitions would have been sent to Germany's enemies. (e) The German Government proposes that passengers from the United States to Europe shall travel only on certain designated vessels which shall have a safe conduct from Germany.

July 17, 1915—Attack on the British merchantman *Orduna* by a German submarine. (Fifth case, ship escaped.)

July 21, 1915—Third American note, reasserting the freedom of the seas to American vessels and citizens, and declaring that "If a belligerent cannot retaliate against an enemy without injuring the lives of neutrals, as well as their property, humanity, as well as justice and a due regard for the dignity of neutral powers, should dictate that the practice be discontinued. If per-

sisted in it would in such circumstances constitute an unpardonable offense against the sovereignty of the neutral nation affected."

July 24, 1915—British defense of and insistence upon its system of so-called "blockade," including the stoppage of cargoes bound from the United States to neutral ports.

August 19, 1915—Sinking of the British merchantman *Arabic* by a German submarine. (Sixth case, 2 Americans killed.)

GERMAN ARGUMENT AS TO SUBMARINES.

August 24, 1915—Communication by the German Ambassador Von Bernstorff: "If Americans should actually have lost their lives, this would naturally be contrary to our intentions. The German Government would deeply regret the fact and begs to tender its sincerest sympathies to the American Government."

September 1, 1915—Memorandum by German Ambassador: "My instructions concerning our answer to your last *Lusitania* note contains the following passage: ('Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance.')

September 7, 1915—German note on the *Arabic* in which it ("most deeply regrets that lives were lost through the action of the commander. It particularly expresses this regret to the Government of the United States on account of the death of American citizens. The German Government is unable, however, to acknowledge any obligation to grant indemnity in the matter, even if the commander should have been mistaken as to the aggressive intentions of the *Arabic*").

October 5, 1915—Apology of the German Government for the *Arabic*, including the phrase: "The attack of the submarine, therefore, was undertaken against the instructions issued to the commander. The Imperial Government regrets and disavows this act and has notified Commander Schneider accordingly.

"Under these circumstances my Government is prepared to pay an indemnity for the American lives which to its deep regret have been lost on the *Arabic*. I am authorized to negotiate with you about the amount of this indemnity."

ANCONA CASE.

November 7, 1915—Sinking of the Italian merchantman *Ancona* by an Austrian submarine. (Seventh case, 9 American lives lost.)

December 6, 1915—American note protesting against the sinking of the *Ancona* and demanding an indemnity. "The Government of the United States expects that the Austro-Hungarian Government, appreciating the gravity of the case, will accede to its demand promptly; and it rests this expectation on the belief that the Austro-Hungarian Government will not sanction or defend an act which is condemned by the world as inhumane and barbarous, which is abhorrent to all civilized nations and which has caused the death of innocent American citizens."

December 15, 1915—Austro-Hungarian note denying that it had any official information that the United States had protested against the sinking of submarines.

December 29, 1915—Austro-Hungarian note announcing that the officer of the submarine had been punished "for exceeding his instructions," and intimating the willingness to pay an indemnity.

December 30, 1916—Sinking of the British merchantman *Persia* in the Mediterranean, probably by a submarine. (Eighth case, loss of an American Consul.)

SUSSEX CASE.

March 24, 1916—Sinking of the British merchantman *Sussex* in the British Channel by a German submarine. (Ninth case, several Americans injured.)

April 18, 1916—Note of Secretary Lansing protesting against the sinking of the *Sussex*, which the United States Government considered "only an instance, even though one of the most extreme and most distressing instances, of the deliberate method and spirit of indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels of all sorts, nationalities and destinations which have become more and more unmistakable as the activity of German undersea vessels of war has in recent months been quickened and extended.

"The use of submarines for the destruction of an enemy's commerce is, of necessity, because of the very character of the vessels employed and the very methods of attack which their employment of course involves, utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity, the long-established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals, and the sacred immunities of non-combatants.

"Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether."

(*New York Times Magazine*.)

(c) [§194] German Position as to Armed Ships.

BY GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE. (October 15, 1914.)

An official notice appearing in the *Westminster Gazette* of September 21, 1914, states that the Department of State at Washington has ruled that ships of belligerent nations when equipped with ammunition and armament shall be treated nevertheless, while in American ports, as merchant ships, provided the armament serves for defensive purposes only. This ruling wholly fails to comply with the principles of neutrality. The equipment of British merchant vessels with artillery is for the purpose of making armed resistance against German cruisers. Resistance of this sort is contrary to international law, because in a military sense a merchant vessel is not permitted to defend itself against a war vessel, an act of resistance giving the warship . . . with crew and passengers. It is a question whether or not ships thus armed should be admitted into ports of a neutral country at all. Such ships, in any event, should not receive any better treatment in neutral ports than a regular warship, and

should be subject at least to the rules issued by neutral nations restricting the stay of a warship. If the Government of the United States considers that it fulfills its duty as a neutral nation by confining the admission of armed merchant ships to such ships as are equipped for defensive purposes only, it is pointed out that so far as determining the warlike character of a ship is concerned, the distinction between the defensive and offensive is irrelevant. The destination of a ship for use of any kind in war is conclusive, and restrictions as to the extent of armament afford no guarantee that ships armed for defensive purposes only will not be used for offensive purposes under certain circumstances.

(*Am. Journal of International Law*, Suppl. 238.)

(d) [§195] **American Position on Armed Ships.**

BY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT LANSING

(November 7, 1914.)

The Government of the United States is obliged to dissent from the views of the German Government as expressed in your telegram in regard to the treatment to be accorded armed merchant vessels of belligerent nationality in neutral ports. The practice of a majority of nations and the consensus of opinion by the leading authorities on international law, including many German writers, support the proposition that merchant vessels may arm for defense without losing their private character and that they may employ such armament against hostile attack without contravening the principles of international law.

The purpose of an armament on a merchant vessel is to be determined by various circumstances, among which are the number and position of the guns on the vessel, the quantity of ammunition and fuel, the number and sex of the passengers, the nature of the cargo, etc. Tested by evidence of this character, the question as to whether an armament on a merchant vessel is intended solely for defensive purposes may be readily answered and the neutral government should regulate its treatment of the vessel in accordance with the intended use of the armament.

This Government considers that in permitting a private vessel having a general cargo, a customary amount of fuel, an average crew, and passengers of both sexes on board, and carrying a small armament and a small amount of ammunition, to enjoy the hospitality of an American port as a merchant vessel, it is in no way violating its duty as a neutral. Nevertheless it is not unmindful of the fact that the circumstances of a particular case may be such as to cause embarrassment and possible controversy as to the character of an armed private vessel visiting its ports. Recognizing, therefore, the desirability of avoiding a ground of complaint this Government, as soon as a case arose, while frankly admitting the right of a merchant vessel to carry a defensive armament, expressed its disapprobation of a practice which compelled it to pass upon a vessel's intended use, which opinion if proven subsequently to be erroneous might constitute a ground for a charge of unneutral conduct.

As a result of these representations no merchant vessels with armaments have visited the ports of the United States since the 10th of September. In fact from the beginning of the European war but two armed private vessels have entered or cleared from ports of this country, and as to these vessels their character as merchant vessels was conclusively established.

Please bring the foregoing to the attention of the German Government and in doing so express the hope that they will also prevent their merchant vessels from entering the ports of the United States carrying armaments even for defensive purposes, though they may possess the right to do so by the rules of international law.

LANSING.

(*Am. Journal of International Law*, IX, Spec. Suppl. 238-240.)

(e) [§196] German War Zone Order.

BY CHIEF OF ADMIRAL STAFF VON POHL (February 4, 1915).

PROCLAMATION.

1. The waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole English Channel, are hereby declared to be war zone. On and after 18th of February, 1915, every enemy merchant ship found in the said war zone will be destroyed without its being always possible to avert the dangers threatening the crews and passengers on that account.

2. Even neutral ships are exposed to danger in the war zone, as in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered on January 31 by the British Government and of the accidents of naval war, it cannot always be avoided to strike even neutral ships in attacks that are directed at enemy ships.

3. Northward navigation around the Shetland Islands, in the eastern waters of the North Sea and in a strip of not less than 30 miles width along the Netherlands coast is in no danger.

NOTE.

The time has come for Germany also to invoke such vital interests. It therefore finds itself under the necessity, to its regret, of taking military measures against England in retaliation of the practice followed by England. Just as England declared the whole North Sea between Scotland and Norway to be comprised within the seat of war, so does Germany now declare the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole English Channel, to be comprised within the seat of war, and will prevent by all the military means at its disposal all navigation by the enemy in those waters. To this end it will endeavor to destroy, after February 18 next, any merchant vessels of the enemy which present themselves at the seat of war above indicated, although it may not always be possible to avert the dangers which may menace persons and merchandise. Neutral powers are accordingly forewarned not to continue to entrust their crews, passengers or merchandise to such vessels. Their attention is furthermore called to the fact that it is of

urgency to recommend to their own vessels to steer clear of these waters. It is true that the German Navy has received instructions to abstain from all violence against neutral vessels recognizable as such; but in view of the hazards of war, and of the misuse of the neutral flags ordered by the British Government, it will not always be possible to prevent a neutral vessel from becoming the victim of an attack intended to be directed against a vessel of the enemy. It is expressly declared that navigation in the waters north of the Shetland Islands is outside the danger zone, as well as navigation in the eastern part of the North Sea and in a zone thirty marine miles wide along the Dutch coast.

(Department of State, "*Diplomatic Correspondence, European War*," No. 1, pp. 52-53.)

(f) [§197] **American Protest.**

BY SECRETARY W. J. BRYAN (February 10, 1915).

It is of course not necessary to remind the German Government that the sole right of a belligerent in dealing with neutral vessels on the high seas is limited to visit and search, unless a blockade is proclaimed and effectively maintained, which this Government does not understand to be proposed in this case. To declare or exercise a right to attack and destroy any vessel entering a prescribed area of the high seas without first certainly determining its belligerent nationality and the contraband character of its cargo would be an act so unprecedented in naval warfare that this Government is reluctant to believe that the Imperial Government of Germany in this case contemplates it as possible. The suspicion that enemy ships are using neutral flags improperly can create no just presumption that all ships traversing a prescribed area are subject to the same suspicion. It is to determine exactly such questions that this Government understands the right of visit and search to have been recognized.

If the commanders of German vessels of war should act upon the presumption that the flag of the United States was not being used in good faith and should destroy on the high seas an American vessel or the lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for the Government of the United States to view the act in any other light than as an indefensible violation of neutral rights, which it would be very hard indeed to reconcile with the friendly relations now so happily subsisting between the two governments.

If such a deplorable situation should arise, the Imperial German Government can readily appreciate that the Government of the United States would be constrained to hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas.

(*Am. Journal of International Law*, IX, Spec. Suppl. 86-87.)

(g) [§198] German Defense of the War Zone Policy

BY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HANS VON JAGOW
(February 16, 1915.)

The Imperial German Government have examined the communication of the Government of the United States in the same spirit of good will and friendship which seems to have prompted this communication.

The Imperial German Government are in entire accord with the Government of the United States that it is in the highest degree desirable for all parties to avoid the misunderstanding which might arise from the measures announced by the German Admiralty and to avert the intrusion of events calculated to interrupt the most friendly relations which have so happily existed between the two Governments up to this time.

PLEA OF SELF-DEFENSE.

On this assurance the German Government believe that they may depend on full understanding on the part of the United States, all the more because the action announced by the German Admiralty, as was dwelt upon at length in the note of the fourth instant, is in no wise directed against the legitimate trade and navigation of neutral states, but merely represents an act of self-defense which Germany's vital interests force her to take against England's method of conducting maritime war in defiance of international law, which no protest on the part of neutrals has availed to bring into accordance with the legal status generally recognized before the outbreak of hostilities.

In order to exclude all possible doubt on this cardinal point, the German Government beg to set forth once more the actual situation.

Up to now Germany has scrupulously observed the existing provisions of international law relative to maritime war. In particular she assented without delay to the proposal made by the American Government directly after the war began to ratify the Declaration of London and embodied the contents thereof without change in her prize law, even without formally binding herself in this direction. The German Government have adhered to these provisions, even where they conflicted with military interests. Our Government at the same time have permitted the supply of food by Denmark to England until the present, although they could well have prevented this traffic by means of their naval forces.

ENGLISH ATTEMPT TO STARVE GERMANY.

In direct opposition to this, England has not shrunk from grave violations of international law wherever she could thereby cripple Germany's peaceable trade with neutral countries. . . .

It is conceded that the intention of all these aggressions is to cut off Germany from all supplies and thereby to deliver up to death by famine a peaceful civilian population, a procedure contrary to law of war and every dictate of humanity.

The neutrals have not been able to prevent this interception of different kinds of trade with Germany contrary to interna-

tional law. It is true that the American Government have protested against England's procedure, and Germany is glad to acknowledge this, but in spite of this protest and the protests of the other neutral governments, England has not allowed herself to be dissuaded from the course originally adopted. Thus, the American ship *Wilhelmina* was recently brought into port by England, although her cargo was destined solely for the civil population of Germany and was to be used only for this purpose according to an express declaration of the German Government.

AMERICAN SHIPMENTS OF MUNITIONS.

In this way the following has been created: Germany is to all intents and purposes cut off from oversea supplies with the toleration, tacit or protesting, of the neutrals regardless of whether it is a question of goods which are absolute contraband or only conditional contraband or not contraband at all, following the law generally recognized before the outbreak of the war. On the other hand, England, with the indulgence of neutral governments, is not only being provided with such goods as are not contraband or merely conditional contraband, namely, food-stuffs, raw material, et cetera, although these are treated by England when Germany is in question as absolute contraband, but also with goods which have been regularly and unquestionably acknowledged to be absolute contraband. The German Government believe that they are obliged to point out very particularly and with the greatest emphasis, that a trade in arms exists between America manufacturers and Germany's enemies which is estimated at many hundred million marks.

The German Government have given due recognition to the fact that as a matter of form the exercise of rights and the toleration of wrong on the part of neutrals is limited by their pleasure alone and involves no formal breach of neutrality. The German Government have not in consequence made any charge of formal breach of neutrality. . . .

In view of this situation, the German Government see themselves compelled, after six months of patience and watchful waiting, to meet England's murderous method of conducting maritime war with drastic counter measures. If England invokes the powers of famine as an ally in its struggle against Germany with the intention of leaving a civilized people the alternative of perishing in misery or submitting to the yoke of England's political and commercial will, the German Government are to-day determined to take up the gauntlet and to appeal to the same grim ally. They rely on the neutrals who have hitherto tacitly or under protest submitted to the consequences, detrimental to themselves, of England's war of famine to display not less tolerance toward Germany, even if the German measures constitute new forms of maritime war, as has hitherto been the case with the English measures. . . .

DESTROYING MERCHANT VESSELS.

Proceeding from these points of view, the German Admiralty has declared the zone prescribed by it the seat of war; it will

obstruct this area of maritime war by mines wherever possible and also endeavor to destroy the merchant vessels of the enemy in any other way.

It is very far indeed from the intention of the German Government, acting in obedience to these compelling circumstances, ever to destroy neutral lives and neutral property, but on the other hand, they cannot be blind to the fact that dangers arise through the action to be carried out against England which menace without discrimination all trade within the area of maritime war. This applies as a matter of course to war mines which place any ship approaching a mined area in danger, even if the limits of international law are adhered to most strictly.

The German Government believe that they are all the more justified in the hope that the neutral powers will become reconciled with this, just as they have with the serious injury caused them thus far by England's measures, because it is their will to do everything in any way compatible with the accomplishment of their purpose for the protection of neutral shipping even within the area of maritime war.

. . . The safest method of doing this is to stay away from the area of maritime war. Neutral ships entering the closed waters in spite of this announcement, given so far in advance, and which seriously impairs the accomplishment of the military purpose against England, bear their own responsibility for any unfortunate accidents. The German Government on their side expressly decline all responsibility for such accidents and their consequences.

Furthermore, the German Government announced merely the destruction of enemy merchant vessels found within the area of maritime war, and not the destruction of all merchant vessels, as the American Government appear to have erroneously understood. This limitation which the German Government have imposed upon themselves impairs the military purpose, especially since the presumption will prevail, even in the case of neutral ships, that they have contraband on board, in view of the interpretation of the idea of contraband in which the English Government have indulged as regards Germany and, which the German Government will accordingly apply against England. . . .

POSSIBILITY OF AN ADJUSTMENT.

Germany must, in the exigency into which she has unlawfully been forced, make her measures effective at all events in order thereby to compel her adversary to conduct maritime warfare in accordance with international law and thus to re-establish the freedom of the seas, which she has ever advocated and for which she is fighting likewise to-day. . . .

The German Government resign themselves to the confident hope that the American Government will recognize the full meaning of the severe struggle which Germany is conducting for her very existence and will gain full understanding of the reasons which prompt Germany and the aims of the measures announced by her from the above explanations and promises.

The German Government repeat that in the scrupulous consideration for neutrals hitherto practiced by them, they have de-

terminated upon the measures planned only under the strongest compulsion of national self-preservation. Should the American Government at the eleventh hour succeed in removing, by virtue of the weight which they have the right and ability to throw into the scales of the fate of peoples, the reasons which have made it the imperative duty of the German Government to take the action indicated should the American Government in particular find a way to bring about the observation of the Declaration of London on the part of the Powers at war with Germany and thereby to render possible for Germany the legitimate supply of foodstuffs and industrial raw materials, the German Government would recognize this as a service which could not be too highly estimated in favor of more humane conduct of war and would gladly draw the necessary conclusions from the new situation thus created.

(*Am. Journal of International Law*, IX, Spec. Suppl. 90-96.)

F. [§199] MURDERS ON THE LUSITANIA.

1. Specific References on the Section.

See §§126, 193 above.

Lusitania Correspondence. *Am. Jour. Internat. Law*, IX, Spec. Suppl., 129 seq. (note of May 13, 1915), 133, 138, 149, 155; X, 166.

Stowell and Munro. *Cases*, II, 571-584.

Collier's. *Story of the War*, III, 570; IV, 558.

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2. Advertisement of German Government, April 22, 1915.

3. Sinking of the Ship, May 7, 1915.

(a) Character of vessel.

(b) Nature of the cargo.

(c) Was the Lusitania armed?

(d) Had she carried troops?

(e) Was there warning?

(f) Was there any attempt by the Germans to rescue people?

4. Protest of the United States.

5. Excuse of the Germans.

6. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§200] Warning Advertisement by the Imperial German Embassy (April 22, 1915).

NOTICE.

Travelers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies; that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain, or of any

of her allies, are liable to destruction in those waters and that travelers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk.

Imperial German Embassy.

(*World Peace Foundation*, Oct., 1915.)

(b) [§201] Official Report on the Loss of the Lusitania
(May 7, 1915).

BY WRECK COMMISSIONER LORD MERSEY.

The Court, having carefully inquired into the circumstances of the above-mentioned disaster, finds, for the reasons appearing in the annex hereto, that the loss of the said ship and lives was due to damage caused to the said ship by torpedoes fired by a submarine of German nationality whereby the ship sank.

In the opinion of the Court the act was done not merely with the intention of sinking the ship, but also with the intention of destroying the lives of the people on board. . . .

THE SHIP.

The Lusitania was a turbine steamship built by John Brown & Co., of Clydebank, in 1907, for the Cunard Steamship Company. She was built under Admiralty survey and in accordance with Admiralty requirements, and was classed 100 A.1. at Lloyd's. Her length was 755 feet, her beam 88 feet, and her depth 60 feet 4 in. Her tonnage was 30,395 gross and 12,611 net. Her engines were of 68,000 h.p. and her speed 24½ to 25 knots. She had 23 double-ended and two single-ended boilers situated in four boiler-rooms. . . .

THE CAPTAIN, THE OFFICERS AND THE CREW.

The captain of the ship, Mr. William Thomas Turner, had been in the service of the Cunard Company since 1883. He had occupied the position of commander since 1903, and had held an extra master's certificate since 1907. He was called before me and gave his evidence truthfully and well. The Lusitania carried an additional captain named Anderson. . . . The two captains and the officers were competent men, and . . . they did their duty. Captain Turner remained on the bridge till he was swept into the sea and Captain Anderson was working on the deck until he went overboard and was drowned.

Mr. Arthur Jones, the first officer, described the crew on this voyage as well able to handle the boats, and testified to their carrying out the orders given to them in a capable manner. One of the crew, Leslie N. Morton, who, at the time the ship was torpedoed was an extra look-out on the starboard side of the fore-castle head, deserves a special word of commendation. . . . He and Parry rowed the life-boat some miles to a fishing smack, and, having put the rescued passengers on board the smack, they re-entered the life-boat and succeeded in rescuing twenty or thirty more people. This boy, with his mate Parry, was instrumental in saving nearly one hundred lives. . . . He

heard the officers giving orders and he observed that the crew were obeying the orders properly.

Some of the passengers were called, and they confirm this evidence. They speak in terms of the highest praise of the exertions made by the crew.

No doubt there were mishaps in handling the ropes of the boats and in other such matters, but there was, in my opinion, no incompetence or neglect, and I am satisfied that the crew behaved well throughout, and worked with skill and judgment. Many more than half their number lost their lives.

The total crew consisted of 702. . . . Of the males, 397 were lost, and of the females, sixteen, making the total number lost 413. . . . The total number saved 289.

I find that the conduct of the masters, the officers and the crew was satisfactory. They did their best in difficult and perilous circumstances and their best was good.

THE PASSENGERS.

The number of passengers on board the *Lusitania* when she sailed was 1,257, consisting of 290 saloon, 600 second-cabin and 367 third-cabin passengers.

Of these, 944 were British and Canadian, 159 were American, and the remainder were of seventeen other nationalities. Of the British and Canadian, 584 perished. Of the American, 124 perished, and of the remainder, seventy-seven perished. The total number lost was 785, and the total number saved was 472.

The 1,257 passengers were made up of 688 adult males, 440 adult females, fifty-one male children, thirty-nine female children, and thirty-nine infants. Of the 688 adult males, 421 were lost and 267 saved. Of the 440 adult females, 270 were lost and 170 were saved. Of the fifty-one male children, thirty-three were lost and eighteen were saved. Of the thirty-nine female children, twenty-six were lost and thirteen were saved. Of the thirty-nine infants, thirty-five were lost and four were saved.

Many of the women and children among those lost died from exhaustion after immersion in the water.

I can speak very well of the conduct of the passengers after the striking of the ship. There was little or no panic at first, although later on, when the steerage passengers came on to the boat deck in what one witness described as "a swarm," there appears to have been something approaching a panic.

Some of the passengers attempted to assist in launching the boats and, in my opinion, did more harm than good. It is, however, quite impossible to impute any blame to them. They were all working for the best.

THE CARGO.

The cargo was a general cargo of the ordinary kind, but part of it consisted of a number of cases of cartridges (about 5,000). This ammunition was entered in the manifest. It was stowed well forward in the ship on the orlop and lower decks, and about 50 yards away from where the torpedoes struck the ship. There was no other explosive on board.

THE SHIP UNARMED.

It has been said by the German Government that the *Lusitania* was equipped with masked guns, that she was supplied with trained gunners, with special ammunition, that she was transporting Canadian troops, and that she was violating the laws of the United States. These statements are untrue: they are nothing but baseless inventions, and they serve only to condemn the persons who make use of them. The steamer carried no masked guns nor trained gunners, or special ammunition, nor was she transporting troops, or violating any laws of the United States. . . .

THE TORPEDOING OF THE SHIP.

By the 7th of May the *Lusitania* had entered what is called the "Danger Zone," that is to say, she had reached the waters in which enemy submarines might be expected. The captain had therefore taken precautions. He had ordered all the life-boats under davits to be swung out. He had ordered all bulk-head doors to be closed except such as were required to be kept open in order to work the ship. These orders had been carried out. The portholes were also closed. The lookout on the ship was doubled—two men being sent to the crow's nest and two men to the eyes of the ship. Two officers were on the bridge and a quartermaster was on either side with instructions to look out for submarines. Orders were also sent to the engine-room between noon and two p. m. of the 7th to keep the steam pressure very high in case of emergency and to give the vessel all possible speed if the telephone from the bridge should ring. . . .

At 2:15 p. m., when ten to fifteen miles off the Old Head of Kinsale, the weather being then clear and the sea smooth, the captain, who was on the port side of the lower bridge, heard the call, "There is a torpedo coming, sir," given by the second officer. He looked to starboard and then saw a streak of foam in the wake of a torpedo traveling towards his ship. Immediately afterwards the *Lusitania* was struck on the starboard side somewhere between the third and fourth funnels. The blow broke number 5 life-boat to splinters. A second torpedo was fired immediately afterwards, which also struck the ship on the starboard side. The two torpedoes struck the ship almost simultaneously.

Both these torpedoes were discharged by a German submarine from a distance variously estimated at from two to five hundred yards. No warning of any kind was given. It is also in evidence that shortly afterwards a torpedo from another submarine was fired on the port side of the *Lusitania*. This torpedo did not strike the ship; and the circumstance is only mentioned for the purpose of showing that perhaps more than one submarine was taking part in the attack.

The *Lusitania* on being struck took a heavy list to starboard and in less than twenty minutes she sank in deep water. Eleven hundred and ninety-eight men, women and children were drowned.

Sir Edward Carson, when opening the case, described the course adopted by the German Government in directing this attack as "contrary to International Law and the usages of war," and as constituting, according to the law of all civilized countries, "a deliberate attempt to murder the passengers on board the ship." This statement is, in my opinion, true, and it is made in language not a whit too strong for the occasion. The defenseless creatures on board, made up of harmless men and women, and of helpless children, were done to death by the crew of the German submarine acting under the directions of the officials of the German Government. In the questions submitted to me by the Board of Trade I am asked, "What was the cause of the loss of life?" The answer is plain. The effective cause of the loss of life was the attack made against the ship by those on board the submarine. It was a murderous attack because made with a deliberate and wholly unjustifiable intention of killing the people on board. German authorities on the laws of war at sea themselves establish beyond all doubt that though in some cases the destruction of an enemy trader may be permissible there is always an obligation first to secure the safety of the lives of those on board. The guilt of the persons concerned in the present case is confirmed by the vain excuses which have been put forward on their behalf by the German Government as before mentioned. . . .

It may be worth while noting that Leith, the Marconi operator, was also in the second-class dining-saloon at the time of the explosion. He speaks of but one explosion. In my opinion there was no explosion of any part of the cargo.

ORDERS GIVEN AND WORK DONE AFTER THE TORPEDOING.

The captain was on the bridge at the time his ship was struck, and he remained there giving orders until his ship foundered. His first order was to lower all boats to the rail. This order was obeyed as far as it possibly could be. He then called out, "Women and children first." The order was then given to hard-a-starboard the helm with a view to heading towards the land, and orders were telegraphed to the engine-room. The orders given to the engine-room are difficult to follow and there is obvious confusion about them. It is not, however, important to consider them, for the engines were put out of commission almost at once by the inrush of water and ceased working, and the lights in the engine-room were blown out.

Leith, the Marconi operator, immediately sent out an S. O. S. signal, and, later on, another message, "Come at once, big list, 10 miles south Head Old Kinsale." These messages were repeated continuously and were acknowledged. At first, the messages were sent out by the power supplied from the ship's dynamo; but in three or four minutes this power gave out and the messages were sent out by means of the emergency apparatus in the wireless cabin.

All the collapsible boats were loosened from their lashings and freed so that they could float when the ship sank.

THE LAUNCHING OF THE LIFE-BOATS.

Complaints were made by some of the witnesses about the manner in which the boats were launched and about their leaky condition when in the water. I do not question the good faith of these witnesses, but I think their complaints were ill-founded. . . .

The conclusion at which I arrive is that the boats were in good order at the moment of the explosion and that the launching was carried out as well as the short time, the moving ship and the serious list would allow.

THE NAVIGATION OF THE SHIP.

At the request of the Attorney-General part of the evidence in the enquiry was taken in camera. This course was adopted in the public interest. The evidence in question dealt, firstly, with certain advice given by the Admiralty to navigators generally with reference to precautions to be taken for the purpose of avoiding submarine attacks; and secondly, with information furnished by the Admiralty to Captain Turner individually of submarine dangers likely to be encountered by him in the voyage of the *Lusitania*. It would defeat the object which the Attorney-General had in view if I were to discuss these matters in detail in my report; and I do not propose to do so. But it was made abundantly plain to me that the Admiralty had devoted the most anxious care and thought to the questions arising out of the submarine peril, and that they had diligently collected all available information likely to affect the voyage of the *Lusitania* in this connection. . . .

It is certain that in some respects Captain Turner did not follow the advice given to him. It may be (though I seriously doubt it) that had he done so his ship would have reached Liverpool in safety. But the question remains, was his conduct the conduct of a negligent or of an incompetent man. On this question I have sought the guidance of my assessors, who have rendered me invaluable assistance, and the conclusion at which I have arrived is that blame ought not to be imputed to the captain. The advice given to him, although meant for his most serious and careful consideration, was not intended to deprive him of the right to exercise his skilled judgment in the difficult questions that might arise from time to time in the navigation of his ship. His omission to follow the advice in all respects cannot fairly be attributed either to negligence or incompetence.

He exercised his judgment for the best. It was the judgment of a skilled and experienced man, and although others might have acted differently and perhaps more successfully he ought not, in my opinion, to be blamed.

THE WHOLE BLAME.

The whole blame for the cruel destruction of life in this catastrophe must rest solely with those who plotted and with those who committed the crime.

(Mersey, Wreck Commissioner, *Loss of the Steamship Lusitania*.)

(c) [§202] German Excuses.

BY THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE. (May 10, 1915.)

Berlin (via London), May 10—The following dispatch has been sent by the German Foreign Office to the German Embassy at Washington:

"Please communicate the following to the State Department:

"The German Government desires to express its deepest sympathy at the loss of lives on board the *Lusitania*. The responsibility rests, however, with the British Government, which, through its plan of starving the civilian population of Germany, has forced Germany to resort to retaliatory measures.

"In spite of the German offer to stop the submarine war, in case the starvation plan was given up, British merchant vessels are being generally armed with guns and have repeatedly tried to ram submarines, so that a previous search was impossible.

"They cannot, therefore, be treated as ordinary merchant vessels. A recent declaration made to the British Parliament by the Parliamentary Secretary, in answer to a question by Lord Charles Beresford, said that at the present time practically all British merchant vessels were armed and provided with hand grenades.

"Besides, it has been openly admitted by the English press that the *Lusitania* on previous voyages repeatedly carried large quantities of war material. On the present voyage the *Lusitania* carried 5,400 cases of ammunition, while the rest of her cargo consisted chiefly of contraband.

"If England, after repeated official and unofficial warnings, considered herself able to declare that that boat ran no risk and thus light-heartedly assumed responsibility for the human life on board a steamer which, owing to its armament and cargo, was liable to destruction, the German Government, in spite of its heartfelt sympathy for the loss of American lives, cannot but regret that Americans felt more inclined to trust to English promises than to pay attention to the warnings from the German side."

(*Boston Herald*, May 11, 1915.)

(d) [§203] American Note to Germany.

WRITTEN BY PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON (May 13, 1917).

. . . The sinking of the British passenger steamer *Falaba* by a German submarine on March 28, through which Leon C. Thrasher, an American citizen, was drowned; the attack on April 28 on the American vessel *Cushing* by a German aeroplane; the torpedoing on May 1 of the American vessel *Gulflight* by a German submarine, as a result of which two or more American citizens met their death; and, finally, the torpedoing and sinking of the steamship *Lusitania*, constitute a series of events which the government of the United States has observed with growing concern, distress and amazement.

AMERICAN POSITION ON RETALIATION.

Recalling the humane and enlightened attitude hitherto assumed by the Imperial German Government in matters of interna-

tional right, and particularly with regard to the freedom of the seas; having learned to recognize the German views and the German influence in the field of international obligations as always engaged upon the side of justice and humanity; and having understood the instructions of the Imperial German Government to its naval commanders to be upon the same plane of humane action prescribed by the naval codes of other nations, the Government of the United States was loath to believe—it cannot now bring itself to believe—that these acts, so absolutely contrary to the rules, the practices, and the spirit of modern warfare, could have the countenance or sanction of that great government. . . .

The Government of the United States has been apprised that the Imperial German Government considered themselves to be obliged by the extraordinary circumstances of the present war and the measures adopted by their adversaries in seeking to cut Germany off from all commerce, to adopt methods of retaliation which go much beyond the ordinary methods of warfare at sea, in the proclamation of a war zone from which they have warned neutral ships to keep away. This Government has already taken occasion to inform the Imperial German Government that it cannot admit the adoption of such measures or such a warning of danger to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the rights of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands, as passengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality; and that it must hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for any infringement of those rights, intentional or incidental. It does not understand the Imperial German Government to question those rights. It assumes, on the contrary, that the Imperial Government accept, as of course, the rule that the lives of non-combatants, whether they be of neutral citizenship or citizens of one of the nations at war, cannot lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unarmed merchantman, and recognize also, as all other nations do, the obligation to take the usual precaution of visit and search to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent nationality, or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral flag.

SUBMARINE WARFARE ON COMMERCE.

The Government of the United States, therefore, desires to call the attention of the Imperial German Government with the utmost earnestness to the fact that the objection to their present method of attack against the trade of their enemies lies in the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice and humanity, which all modern opinion regards as imperative. It is practically impossible for the officers of a submarine to visit a merchantman at sea and examine her papers and cargo. It is practically impossible for them to make a prize of her; and, if they cannot put a prize crew on board of her they cannot sink her without leaving her crew and all on board of her to the mercy of the sea in her small boats. These facts, it is understood, the Imperial German Government frankly

admit. We are informed that in the instances of which we have spoken time enough for even that poor measure of safety was not given, and in at least two of the cases cited not so much as a warning was received. Manifestly submarines cannot be used against merchantmen, as the last few weeks have shown, without an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity.

American citizens act within their indisputable rights in taking their ships and in traveling wherever their legitimate business calls them upon the high seas, and exercise those rights in what should be the well-justified confidence that their lives will not be endangered by acts done in clear violation of universally acknowledged international obligations, and certainly in the confidence that their own government will sustain them in the exercise of their rights.

EFFECT OF THE WARNING TO THE LUSITANIA.

There was recently published in the newspapers of the United States, I regret to inform the Imperial German Government, a formal warning, purporting to come from the Imperial German Embassy at Washington, addressed to the people of the United States and stating, in effect, that any citizen of the United States who exercised his right of free travel upon the seas would do so at his peril if his journey should take him within the zone of waters within which the Imperial German Navy was using submarines against the commerce of Great Britain and France, notwithstanding the respectful but very earnest protest of their Government, the Government of the United States. I do not refer to this for the purpose of calling the attention of the Imperial German Government at this time to the surprising irregularity of a communication from the Imperial German Embassy at Washington addressed to the people of the United States through the newspapers, but only for the purpose of pointing out that no warning that an unlawful and inhumane act will be committed can possibly be accepted as an excuse or palliation for that act or as an abatement of the responsibility for its commission.

DISAVOWAL EXPECTED.

Long acquainted as this Government has been with the character of the Imperial German Government and with the high principles of equity by which they have in the past been actuated and guided, the Government of the United States cannot believe that the commanders of the vessels which committed these acts of lawlessness did so except under a misapprehension of the orders issued by the Imperial German Naval authorities. It takes it for granted that, at least, within the practical possibilities of every such case, the commanders even of submarines were expected to do nothing that would involve the lives of non-combatants or the safety of neutral ships, even at the cost of failing of their object of capture or destruction. It confidently expects, therefore, that the Imperial German Government will disavow the acts of which the Government of the United States complains, that they will make reparation so far as reparation

is possible for injuries which are without measure, and that they will take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles of warfare for which the Imperial German Government have in the past so wisely and so firmly contended.

The Government and people of the United States look to the Imperial German Government for just, prompt and enlightened action in this vital matter with the greater confidence because the United States and Germany are bound together not only by special ties of friendship, but also by the explicit stipulations of the treaty of 1828, between the United States and the Kingdom of Prussia.

Expressions of regret and offers of reparation in case of the destruction of neutral ships sunk by mistake, while they may satisfy international obligations, if no loss of life results, can not justify or excuse a practice, the natural and necessary effect of which is to subject neutral nations and neutral persons to new and immeasurable risks.

OMIT NO ACT OR DEED.

The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment.

BRYAN.

(*Am. Journal of International Law*, IX, Spec. Suppl., 130-133.)

(f) [§204] Declaration of Rights of Americans at Sea.

BY SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT LANSING. (July 21, 1915.)

The Government of the United States notes with satisfaction that the Imperial German Government recognizes without reservation the validity of the principles insisted on in the several communications which this Government has addressed to the Imperial German Government with regard to its announcement of a war zone and the use of submarines against merchantmen on the high seas—the principle that the high seas are free, that the character and cargo of a merchantman must first be ascertained before she can lawfully be seized or destroyed, and that the lives of non-combatants may in no case be put in jeopardy unless the vessel resists or seeks to escape after being summoned to submit to examination; for a belligerent act of retaliation is per se an act beyond the law, and the defense of an act as retaliatory is an admission that it is illegal.

RELATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO GREAT BRITAIN.

The Government of the United States is, however, keenly disappointed to find that the Imperial German Government regards itself as in large degree exempt from the obligation to observe these principles, even where neutral vessels are concerned, by what it believes the policy and practice of the Government of Great Britain to be in the present war with regard to neutral commerce. The Imperial German Government will readily understand that the Government of the United States cannot dis-

cuss the policy of the Government of Great Britain with regard to neutral trade except with that Government itself, and that it must regard the conduct of other belligerent Governments as irrelevant to any discussion with the Imperial German Government of what this Government regards as grave and justifiable violations of the rights of American citizens by German naval commanders.

EFFECT OF CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE.

Illegal and inhuman acts, however justifiable they may be thought to be against an enemy who is believed to have acted in contravention of law and humanity, are manifestly indefensible when they deprive neutrals of their acknowledged rights, particularly when they violate the right of life itself.

If a belligerent cannot retaliate against an enemy without injuring the lives of neutrals, as well as their property, humanity, as well as justice and a due regard for the dignity of neutral powers, should dictate that the practice be discontinued.

If persisted in it would in such circumstances constitute an unpardonable offense against the sovereignty of the neutral nation affected. The Government of the United States is not unmindful of the extraordinary conditions created by this war or of the radical alterations of circumstances and method of attack produced by the use of instrumentalities of naval warfare which the nations of the world cannot have had in view when the existing rules of international law were formulated, and it is ready to make every reasonable allowance for these novel and unexpected aspects of war at sea; but it cannot consent to abate any essential or fundamental right of its people because of a mere alteration of circumstance. The rights of neutrals in time of war are based upon principle, not upon expediency, and the principles are immutable. It is the duty and obligation of belligerents to find a way to adapt the new circumstances to them.

REPETITION WOULD BE UNFRIENDLY.

In the meantime the very value which this Government sets upon the long and unbroken friendship between the people and Government of the United States and the people and Government of the German nation impels it to press very solemnly upon the Imperial German Government the necessity for a scrupulous observance of neutral rights in this critical matter. Friendship itself prompts it to say to the Imperial Government that repetition by the commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded by the Government of the United States, when they affect American citizens, as deliberately unfriendly.

(*Am. Journal of International Law*, IX, Spec. Suppl., 155-157.)

(e) [§205] Germany Weakens on Lusitania Question.

BY MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS HANS VON JAGOW.

(July 8, 1915.)

The Imperial Government has learned with satisfaction from the note how earnestly the Government of the United States is

concerned in seeing the principles of humanity realized in the present war. Also, this appeal meets with full sympathy in Germany, and the Imperial Government is quite willing to permit its statements and decisions in the case under consideration to be governed by the principles of humanity just as it has done always.

MAGNANIMITY OF GERMANY.

The Imperial Government welcomed it with gratitude when the American Government in its note of May 15 itself recalled that Germany had always permitted itself to be governed by the principles of progress and humanity in dealing with the law of maritime war.

Germany has likewise been always tenacious of the principle that war should be conducted against the armed and organized forces of the enemy country, but that the civilian population of the enemy must be spared as far as possible from the measures of war. The Imperial Government cherishes the definite hope that some way will be found when peace is concluded, or perhaps earlier, to regulate the law of maritime war in a manner guaranteeing the freedom of the seas, and will welcome it with gratitude and satisfaction if it can work hand in hand with the American Government on that occasion.

SACRED DUTY OF SELF-DEFENSE.

In the present war the principles which should be the ideal of the future have been traversed more and more the longer its duration, the German Government has no guilt therein. It is known to the American Government how Germany's adversaries, by completely paralyzing peaceable traffic between Germany and the neutral countries, have aimed from the very beginning, and with increasing lack of consideration, at the destruction not so much of the armed forces as the life of the German nation, repudiating in so doing all the rules of international law and disregarding all the rights of neutrals. . . .

While our enemies thus loudly and openly have proclaimed war without mercy until our utter destruction, we are conducting a war in self-defense for our national existence and for the sake of peace as assured permanency. We have been obliged to adopt submarine warfare to meet the declared intentions of our enemies and methods of warfare adopted by them in contravention of international law.

DUTY TO SAVE GERMANS.

With all its efforts in principle to protect neutral life and property from damage as much as possible, the German Government has recognized unreservedly in its memorandum of February 4 that the interest of neutrals might suffer from submarine warfare. However, the American Government will also understand and appreciate that, in the fight for existence which has been forced upon Germany by its adversaries and announced by them, it is the sacred duty of the Imperial Government to do all within its power to protect and to save the lives of German subjects. If the Imperial Government were derelict in these,

its duties, it would be guilty before God and history of violation of those principles of highest humanity which are the foundation of every national existence.

BLAME ON THE BRITISH.

The case of the *Lusitania* shows with horrible clearness to what jeopardizing of human lives the manner of conducting the war employed by our adversaries leads. In most direct contradiction of international law, all distinctions between merchantmen and war vessels have been obliterated by the order to British merchantmen to arm themselves and to ram submarines and promise of rewards therefor; and neutrals who use merchantmen as travelers have thereby been exposed in an increasing degree to all the dangers of war.

If the commander of the German submarine which destroyed the *Lusitania* had caused the crew and travelers to put out in boats before firing the torpedo this would have meant the sure destruction of his own vessel. After the experiences in the sinking of much smaller and less seaworthy vessels, it was to be expected that a mighty ship like the *Lusitania* would remain above water long enough, even after the torpedoing, to permit the passengers to enter the ship's boats. Circumstances of a very peculiar kind, especially the presence on board of large quantities of highly explosive materials, defeated this expectation.

In addition it may be pointed out that if the *Lusitania* had been spared thousands of cases of ammunition would have been sent to Germany's enemies, and thereby thousands of German mothers and children robbed of their supporters.

PROTECTION OF AMERICAN LIVES.

In the spirit of friendship with which the German nation has been imbued toward the Union (United States) and its inhabitants since the earliest days of its existence, the Imperial Government will always be ready to do all it can during the present war also to prevent the jeopardizing of the lives of American citizens.

The Imperial Government, therefore, repeats the assurances that American ships will not be hindered in the prosecution of legitimate shipping and the lives of American citizens on neutral vessels shall not be placed in jeopardy.

In order to exclude any unforeseen dangers to American passenger steamers, made possible in view of the conduct of maritime war on the part of Germany's adversaries, the German submarines will be instructed to permit the free and safe passage of such passenger steamers, when made recognizable by special markings and notified a reasonable time in advance. The Imperial Government, however, confidently hopes that the American Government will assume the guarantee that these vessels have no contraband on board. . . .

The Imperial Government believes that it can assume that in this manner adequate facilities for travel across the Atlantic Ocean can be afforded American citizens. There would, therefore, appear to be no compelling necessity for American citizens

to travel to Europe in time of war on ships carrying an enemy flag. In particular, the Imperial Government is unable to admit that American citizens can protect an enemy ship through the mere fact of their presence on board.

Germany merely followed England's example when it declared part of the high seas an area of war. Consequently accidents suffered by neutrals on enemy ships in this area of war cannot well be judged differently from accidents to which neutrals are at all times exposed at the seat of war on land, when they betake themselves into dangerous localities in spite of previous warning.

(*Am. Journal of International Law*, IX, Spec. Suppl., 149-153.)

G. [§206] SUBMARINE WARFARE, JUNE, 1915, TO FEBRUARY, 1917.

1. Special References on the Section.

(a) Special episodes.

See §126 above.

Collier's. *Story of the War*, IV, 542.

"Arabic Episode," in *Am. Jour. Internat. Law*, IX, Spec. Suppl., pp. 165, 203.

"Ancona Episode," *ibid.*, pp. 297-305; Spec. Suppl. X, pp. 297-305.

Anon. "Sinking of the Ancona," in *N. Y. Times Current History*, III, 653. (Jan., 1916.)

Anon. "The Submarine Crisis," *ibid.*, IV, 444 (June, 1916).

"Sussex Episode," *Am. Jour. Internat. Law*, IX, Spec. Suppl. 166, 181, 230.

(b) Last warnings of the United States.

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2. Negotiations with Germany.

(a) Arabic episode.

(b) Sussex episode.

(c) Final German note.

3. Revival of Policy of Frightfulness.

(a) German zone order of February, 1917.

(b) Renewed destruction of American lives and ships.

(c) Outrages on other neutrals.

4. Last Warnings of the United States.

5. Declaration of War the Only Remedy.

6. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§207] Germany's Promise as to Liners.

BY AMBASSADOR J. VON BERNSTORFF. (September 1, 1915.)

My Dear Secretary:

With reference to our conversation of this morning, I beg to inform you that my instructions concerning our answer to your last Lusitania note contains the following passage:

"Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of noncombatants provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance."

Although I know you do not wish to discuss the Lusitania question till the Arabic incident has been definitely and satisfactorily settled, I desire to inform you of the above because this policy of my Government was decided on before the Arabic incident occurred.

(*Am. Journal of International Law*, X, Spec. Suppl. 166.)

(b) [§208] **Apology for the Sinking of the Arabic.**

BY AMBASSADOR J. VON BERNSTORFF. (October 5, 1915.)

Prompted by the desire to reach a satisfactory agreement with regard to the Arabic incident, my Government has given me the following instructions:

The orders issued by His Majesty the Emperor to the commanders of the German submarines of which I notified you on the previous occasions have been made so stringent that the recurrence of incidents similar to the Arabic case is considered out of the question.

According to the report of Commander Schneider of the submarine which sank the Arabic and his affidavit, as well as those of his men, Commander Schneider was convinced that the Arabic intended to ram the submarine. On the other hand the Imperial Government does not doubt the good faith of the affidavit of the British officers of the Arabic, according to which the Arabic did not intend to ram the submarine.

The attack of the submarine was undertaken against the instructions issued to the commander. The Imperial Government regrets and disavows this act and has notified Commander Schneider accordingly.

Under these circumstances my Government is prepared to pay an indemnity for American lives which, to its deep regret, have been lost on the Arabic.

I am authorized to negotiate with you about the amount of this indemnity.

(*New York Times*, Oct. 6, 1915.)

(c) [§209] **Protection of American Rights.**

BY PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON. (February 24, 1916.)

I very warmly appreciate your kind and frank letter of to-day and feel that it calls for an equally frank reply.

Your are right in assuming that I shall do everything in my power to keep the United States out of war. I think the country will feel no uneasiness about my course in that respect. Through many anxious months I have striven for that object, amidst difficulties more manifold than can have been apparent upon the surface, and so far I have succeeded. I do not doubt that I shall continue to succeed. The course which the Central European Powers have announced their intention of following in the future with regard to undersea warfare seems for the moment to threaten insuperable obstacles, but its apparent meaning is so manifestly inconsistent with explicit assurances recently given us by those Powers with regard to their treatment of the

merchant vessels on the high seas that I must believe that explanations will presently ensue which will put a different aspect upon it. We have had no reason to question their good faith or their fidelity to their promises in the past, and I for one feel confident that we shall have none in the future.

AMERICAN RIGHTS.

But in any event our duty is clear. No nation, no group of nations, has the right while war is in progress to alter or disregard the principles which all nations have agreed upon in mitigation of the horrors and sufferings of war; and if the clear rights of American citizens should ever unhappily be abridged or denied by any such action we should, it seems to me, have in honor no choice as to what our own course should be.

For my own part, I cannot consent to any abridgement of the rights of American citizens in any respect. The honor and self-respect of the nation are involved. We covet peace, and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss of honor. To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we might be called upon to vindicate them would be a deep humiliation indeed. It would be an implicit, all but an explicit, acquiescence in the violation of the rights of mankind everywhere, and of whatever nation or allegiance. It would be a deliberate abdication of our hitherto proud position as spokesmen, even amidst the turmoil of war, for the law and the right. It would make everything this Government has attempted, and everything that it has achieved during this terrible struggle of nations, meaningless and futile.

EXPEDIENCY AND PRINCIPLE.

It is important to reflect that if in this instance we allow expediency to take the place of principle the door would inevitably be opened to still further concessions. Once accept a single abatement of right, and many other humiliations would certainly follow, and the whole fine fabric of international law might crumble under our hands piece by piece. What we are contending for in this matter is of the very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign nation. She cannot yield them without conceding her own impotency as a nation, and making virtual surrender of her independent position among the nations of the world.

I am speaking, my dear Senator, in deep solemnity, without heat, with a clear consciousness of the high responsibilities of my office, and as your sincere and devoted friend. If we should unhappily differ, we shall differ as friends; but where issues so momentous as these are involved we must, just because we are friends, speak our minds without reservation.

(Letter to Hon. William J. Stone.)

(d) [§210] America Relies on Scrupulous Execution of Germany's Pledges (May 8, 1916).

BY SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT LANSING.

The note of the Imperial German Government under date of May 4, 1916, has received careful consideration by the Gov-

ernment of the United States. It is especially noted as indicating the purpose of the Imperial Government as to the future that it "is prepared to do its utmost to confine the operation of the war for the rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents" and that it is determined to impose upon all its commanders at sea the limitations of the recognized rules of international law upon which the Government of the United States has insisted.

FRIENDSHIP UNDER ALTERED POLICY.

Throughout the months which have elapsed since the Imperial Government announced on February 4, 1915, its submarine policy, now happily abandoned, the Government of the United States has been constantly guided and restrained by motives of friendship in its patient efforts to bring to an amicable settlement the critical questions arising from that policy. Accepting the Imperial Government's declaration of its abandonment of the policy which has so seriously menaced the good relations between the two countries, the Government of the United States will rely upon a scrupulous execution henceforth of the now altered policy of the Imperial Government such as will remove the principal danger to an interruption of the good relations existing between the United States and Germany.

CONTINGENT PROMISE NOT ACCEPTED.

The Government of the United States feels it necessary to state that it takes it for granted that the Imperial Government does not intend to imply that the maintenance of its newly announced policy is in any way contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic negotiations between the United States and any other belligerent Government, notwithstanding the fact that certain passages in the Imperial Government's note of the 4th instant might appear to be susceptible of that construction. In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding the Government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other Government affecting the rights of neutrals and noncombatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative.

(*New York Times*, May 7, 1915.)

(e) [§211] German Apology for the Sinking of the *Sussex*.

BY FOREIGN MINISTER HANS VON JAGOW. (May 8, 1916.)

In view of the general impression of all the facts at hand the German Government considers it beyond doubt that the commander of the submarine acted in the bona fide belief that he was facing an enemy warship. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that, misled by the appearance of the vessel, under the pressure of the circumstances, he formed his judgment too hurriedly in establishing her character and did not therefore act fully in accordance with the strict instruction which called upon him to exercise particular care.

In view of these circumstances the German Government frankly admits that the assurance given to the American Government, in accordance with which passenger vessels were not to be attacked without warning, has not been adhered to in the present case. As was intimated by the undersigned in the note of the 4th instant, the German Government does not hesitate to draw from this resultant consequences. It therefore expresses to the American Government its sincere regret regarding the deplorable incident and declares its readiness to pay an adequate indemnity to the injured American citizens. It also disapproved of the conduct of the commander, who has been appropriately punished.

Expressing the hope that the American Government will consider the case of the *Sussex* as settled by these statements, the undersigned avails himself of this occasion to renew to the Ambassador the assurance of his highest consideration.

(*N. Y. Times*, May 11, 1916.)

(f) [§212] **German Claim of Freedom of Action (December, 1916).**

BY AMBASSADOR J. VON BERNSTORFF. (December 1, 1916.)

After bluntly refusing Germany's peace offer, the Entente Powers stated in their note addressed to the American Government that they are determined to continue the war in order to deprive Germany of German provinces in the West and East, to destroy Austria-Hungary, and to annihilate Turkey. In waging war with such aims, the Entente Allies are violating all rules of international law, as they prevent the legitimate trade of neutrals with the Central Powers, and of the neutrals among themselves. Germany has so far not made unrestricted use of the weapon which she possesses in her submarines. Since the Entente Powers, however, have made it impossible to come to an understanding based upon equality of rights of all nations, as proposed by the Central Powers, and have instead declared only such a peace to be possible which shall be dictated by the Entente Allies, and shall result in the destruction and the humiliation of the Central Powers, Germany is unable further to forego the full use of her submarines.

The Imperial Government, therefore, does not doubt that the Government of the United States will understand the situation thus forced upon Germany by the Entente Allies' brutal methods of war, and by their determination to destroy the Central Powers, and that the Government of the United States will further realize that the now openly disclosed intention of the Entente Allies gives back to Germany the freedom of action which she reserved in her note addressed to the Government of the United States on May 4, 1916.

Under these circumstances Germany will meet the illegal measures of her enemies by forcibly preventing after Feb. 1, 1917, in a zone around Great Britain, France, Italy, and in the Eastern Mediterranean all navigation, that of neutrals included, from and to England and from and to France, etc. All ships met within that zone will be sunk.

The Imperial Government is confident that this measure will result in a speedy termination of the war and in the restoration

of peace, which the Government of the United States has so much at heart. Like the Government of the United States, Germany and her allies had hoped to reach this goal by negotiations. Now that the war, through the fault of Germany's enemies, has to be continued, the Imperial Government feels sure that the Government of the United States will understand the necessity of adopting such measures as are destined to bring about a speedy end of the horrible and useless bloodshed. The Imperial Government hopes all the more for such an understanding of her position, as the neutrals have under the pressure of the Entente Powers suffered great losses, being forced by them either to give up their entire trade or to limit it according to conditions, arbitrarily determined by Germany's enemies in violation of international law.

(*Boston Daily Advertiser*, Dec. 2, 1916.)

(g) [§213] German Note on Renewal of Submarine Warfare (January 31, 1917).

BY GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE (January 13, 1917).

Your excellency was good enough to transmit to the Imperial Government a copy of the message which the President of the United States of America addressed to the Senate on the 22d inst. The Imperial Government has given it the earnest consideration which the President's statements deserve, inspired as they are, by a deep sentiment of responsibility.

It is highly gratifying to the Imperial Government to ascertain that the main tendencies of this important statement correspond largely to the desires and principles professed by Germany. These principles especially include self-government and equality of rights for all nations. Germany would be sincerely glad if, in recognition of this principle, countries like Ireland and India, which do not enjoy the benefits of political independence, should now obtain their freedom. The German people also repudiate all alliances which serve to force the countries into a competition for might and to involve them in a net of selfish intrigues. On the other hand Germany will gladly co-operate in all efforts to prevent future wars.

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS.

The freedom of the seas, being a preliminary condition of the free existence of nations and the peaceful intercourse between them, as well as the open door for the commerce of all nations, has always formed part of the leading principles of Germany's political program. All the more the Imperial Government regrets that the attitude of her enemies who are so entirely opposed to peace makes it impossible for the world at present to bring about the realization of these lofty ideals.

Germany and her allies were ready to enter into a discussion of peace and had set down as basis the guaranty of existence, honor and free development of their peoples. Their aims, as has been expressly stated in the note of Dec. 12, 1916,

were not directed towards the destruction or annihilation of their enemies, and were, according to their conviction, perfectly compatible with the rights of the other nations.

BELGIUM.

As to Belgium, for which such warm and cordial sympathy is felt in the United States, the chancellor had declared only a few weeks previously that its annexation had never formed part of Germany's intentions. The peace to be signed with Belgium was to provide for such conditions in that country, with which Germany desires to maintain friendly, neighborly relations, that Belgium should not be used again by Germany's enemies for the purpose of instigating continuous hostile intrigues. Such precautionary measures are all the more necessary, as Germany's enemies have repeatedly stated not only in speeches delivered by their leading men, but also in the statutes of the economical conference in Paris, that it is their intention not to treat Germany as an equal, even after peace has been restored, but to continue their hostile attitude and especially to wage a systematical economic war against her.

FAILURE OF PEACE EFFORTS.

The attempt of the four allied powers to bring about peace has failed owing to the lust of conquest of their enemies who desire to dictate the conditions of peace. Under the pretense of following the principle of nationality our enemies have disclosed their real aims in this way, viz.: To dismember and dishonor Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. To the wish of reconciliation they oppose the will of destruction. They desire a fight to the bitter end.

A new situation has thus been created which forces Germany to new decisions. Since two years and a half, England is using her naval power for a criminal attempt to force Germany into submission by starvation. In brutal contempt of international law the group of powers led by England does not only curtail the legitimate trade of their opponents but they also by ruthless pressure compel neutral countries either to altogether forego every trade not agreeable to the entente powers or to limit it according to their arbitrary decrees. The American Government knows the steps which have been taken to cause England and her allies to return to the rules of international law and to respect the freedom of the seas.

BRITISH CRUELTY.

The English government, however, insists upon continuing its war of starvation, which does not at all affect the military power of its opponents, but compels women and children, the sick and the aged to suffer, for their country, pains and privations which endanger the vitality of the nation.

Thus British tyranny mercilessly increases the sufferings of the world, indifferent to the laws of humanity, indifferent to the protests of the neutrals whom they severely harm, indifferent even to the silent longing for peace among Eng-

land's own allies. Each day of the terrible struggle causes new destruction, new sufferings. Each day shortening the war will, on both sides, preserve the life of thousands of brave soldiers and be a benefit to mankind.

INTENSIFIED CONTINUATION OF WAR.

The Imperial Government could not justify before its own conscience, before the German people and before history the neglect of any means destined to bring about the end of the war. Like the President of the United States the Imperial government had hoped to reach this goal by negotiations. After the attempts to come to an understanding with the entente powers have been answered by the latter with the announcement of an intensified continuation of the war, the Imperial government—in order to serve the welfare of mankind in a higher sense and not to wrong its own people—is now compelled to continue the fight for existence again forced upon it, with the full employment of all the weapons which are at its disposal.

Sincerely trusting that the people and the government of the United States will understand the motives for this decision and its necessity, the Imperial Government hopes that the United States may view the new situation from the lofty heights of impartiality and assist, on their part, to prevent misery and unavoidable sacrifice of human life.

Referring as to details of the planned war measures at sea to the annexed memorandum the government at the same time begs to express its confidence that the American Government will warn American ships against entering the barred zone described in the annex and also will warn its citizens against taking passage on or confiding goods to ships plying to ports in the barred zone.

Similar notes have been handed to the representatives of all neutral governments.

MEMORANDUM OF BARRED ZONES.

The following is the memorandum annexed to the foregoing note:

From Feb. 1, 1917, within barred zones around Great Britain, France, Italy and in the eastern Mediterranean as outlined in the following, all sea traffic forthwith will be opposed. Such barred zones are:

In the North Sea, the district around England and France which is limited by a line of 20 nautical miles; the district along the Dutch coast as far as the Terschelling lightship, the degree of longitude of the Terschelling lightship to Udir; a line from there across the point 62 degrees north latitude, 5 longitude, westward along 62 degrees to a point three nautical miles south of the south point of Farover (Faroe Islands?); from there across the point 62 degrees north 60 degrees west to 61 degrees north, 15 degrees west; then 57 degrees north, 20 degrees west, to 47 degrees north, 20 degrees west; further, to 43 degrees north, to 15 degrees west; then on degree of latitude 45 degrees north to the point 20

nautical miles from Cape Finisterre and 20 nautical miles distance along the Spanish north coast as far as the French frontier.

Concerning the South, in the Mediterranean: For neutral shipping there remains open the sea district west of a line from Pt. de la Paquette to 38 degrees 20 minutes north and 6 degrees east, as well as north and west, of a zone 60 sea miles along the North African coast, beginning on (?) degrees west longitude. . . .

Neutral ships plying within the barred zones do so at their own risk. Although precautions are being taken to spare neutral ships which on Feb. 1 are on the way to ports in the barred zone, during an appropriate delay, yet it is urgently to be advised that they should be warned and directed to other routes by all means available.

Neutral ships lying in ports of the barred zones can with the same safety abandon the barred zones if they sail before Feb. 5 and take the shortest route to the open district.

AMERICAN STEAMER TRAFFIC REGULATED.

Traffic of regular American passenger steamers can go on unmolested if:

A—Falmouth is taken as the port of destination, and if,

B—On the going and return journey the Scilly Islands, as well as the point 50 degrees north, 20 degrees west, be steered on. Along this route no German mines will be laid;

C—If steamers on this journey bear the following special signals which only they will be permitted to display in American ports: A coating of paint on the ship's hull and the superstructure in vertical stripes three metres broad, alternating white and red; on every mast a large flag of checkered white and red, on the stern the American national flag; during darkness the national flag and the coat of paint to be as easily recognizable as possible from a distance; and the ships must be completely and brightly illuminated;

D—If only one steamer runs each week in each direction, arriving at Falmouth on Sundays, leaving Falmouth on Wednesdays.

E—If guarantees and assurances are given by the American Government that these steamers carry no contraband according to the German list of contraband.

Two copies of maps on which the barred zones are outlined are added.

(*Boston Herald*, February 1, 1917.)

(h) [§214] America's Ultimatum to Germany.

BY PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON. (April 18, 1916.)

GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION.

The Government of the United States, after having given careful consideration to the note of the Imperial Government of the tenth of April, regrets to state that the impression made upon it by the statements and proposals contained in that note is that the Imperial Government has failed to appreciate the

gravity of the situation which has resulted, not alone from the attack on the *Sussex*, but from the whole method and character of submarine warfare as disclosed by the unrestrained practice of the commanders of German undersea craft during the past twelve months and more in the indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels of all sorts, nationalities and destinations. If the sinking of the *Sussex* had been an isolated case the Government of the United States might find it possible to hope that the officer who was responsible for that act had wilfully violated his orders or had been criminally negligent in taking none of the precautions they prescribed, and that the ends of justice might be satisfied by imposing upon him an adequate punishment, coupled with a formal disavowal of the act and payment of a suitable indemnity by the Imperial Government. But, though the attack upon the *Sussex* was manifestly indefensible and caused a loss of life so tragical as to make it stand forth as one of the most terrible examples of the inhumanity of submarine warfare as the commanders of German vessels are conducting it, it unhappily does not stand alone.

On the contrary, the Government of the United States is forced by recent events to conclude that it is only one instance, even though one of the most extreme and most distressing instances, of the deliberate method and spirit of indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels of all sorts, nationalities and destinations which have become more and more unmistakable as the activity of German undersea vessels of war has in recent months been quickened and extended.

CANNOT ACCEPT ZONE POLICY.

The Imperial Government will recall that when, in February, 1915, it announced its intention of treating the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland as embraced within the seat of war and of destroying all merchant ships owned by its enemies that might be found within that zone of danger, and warned all vessels, neutral as well as belligerent, to keep out of the waters thus prescribed or to enter them at their peril, the Government of the United States earnestly protested. It took the position that such a policy could not be pursued without constant gross and palpable violations of the accepted law of nations, particularly if submarine craft were to be employed as its instruments, inasmuch as the rules prescribed by that law, rules founded on the principles of humanity and established for the protection of the lives of non-combatants at sea, could not in the nature of the case be observed by such vessels. It based its protest on the ground that persons of neutral nationality and vessels of neutral ownership would be exposed to extreme and intolerable risks; and that no right to close any part of the high seas could lawfully be asserted by the Imperial Government in the circumstances then existing. The law of nations in these matters, upon which the Government of the United States based that protest, is not of recent origin or founded upon merely arbitrary principles set up by convention. It is based, on the contrary, upon manifest principles of humanity and has long

been established with the approval and by the express assent of all civilized nations. . . .

DISREGARD OF GERMAN ASSURANCES.

In pursuance of this policy of submarine warfare against the commerce of its adversaries, thus announced and thus entered upon in despite of the solemn protest of the Government of the United States, the commanders of the Imperial Government's undersea vessels have carried on practices of such ruthless destruction which have made it more and more evident as the months have gone by that the Imperial Government has found it impracticable to put any such restraint upon them as it had hoped and promised to put. Again and again the Imperial Government has given its solemn assurances to the Government of the United States that at least passenger ships would not be thus dealt with, and yet it has repeatedly permitted its undersea commanders to disregard those assurances with entire impunity. As recently as February last it gave notice that it would regard all armed merchantmen owned by its enemies as part of the armed naval forces of its adversaries and deal with them as with men-of-war, thus, at least by implication, pledging itself to give warning to vessels which were not armed, and to accord security of life to their passengers and crews; but even this limitation their submarine commanders have recklessly ignored.

DESTRUCTION.

Vessels of neutral ownership, even vessels of neutral ownership bound from neutral port to neutral port, have been destroyed along with vessels of belligerent ownership in constantly increasing numbers. Sometimes the merchantmen attacked have been warned, and summoned to surrender before being fired on or torpedoed; sometimes their passengers and crews have been vouchsafed the poor security of being allowed to take to the ship's boats before the ship was sent to the bottom. But again and again no warning has been given, no escape even to the ship's boats allowed to those on board. Great liners like the *Lusitania* and *Arabic* and merchant boats like the *Sussex* have been attacked without a woman's warning, often before they have even become aware that they were in the presence of an armed ship of the enemy, and the lives of non-combatants, passengers and crew have been destroyed wholesale and in a manner which the Government of the United States can but regard as wanton and without the slightest color of justification. No limit of any kind has, in fact, been set to their indiscriminate pursuit and destruction of merchantmen of all kinds and nationalities within the waters which the Imperial Government has chosen to designate as lying within the seat of war. The roll of Americans who have lost their lives upon ships thus attacked and destroyed has grown month by month until the ominous toll has mounted into the hundreds.

PATIENCE.

The Government of the United States has been very patient.

At every stage of this distressing experience of tragedy after tragedy it has sought to be governed by the most thoughtful consideration of the extraordinary circumstances of an unprecedented war and to be guided by sentiments of very genuine friendship for the people and government of Germany. It has accepted the successive explanations and assurances of the Imperial Government, as of course, given with entire sincerity and good faith, and has hoped, even against hope, that it would prove to be possible for the Imperial Government so to order and control the acts of its naval commanders as to square its policy with the recognized principles of humanity as embodied in the law of nations. It has made every allowance for unprecedented conditions and has been willing to wait until the facts became unmistakable, and were susceptible of only one interpretation.

SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

It now owes it to its own rights to say to the Imperial Government that that time has come. It has become painfully evident to it that the position which it took at the very outset is inevitable, namely, the use of submarines for the destruction of an enemy's commerce is of necessity because of the very character of the vessels employed, and the very methods of attack which their employment of course involves, utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity, the long established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals, and the sacred immunities of non-combatants.

If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines without regard to what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law, and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether. This action the Government of the United States contemplates with the greatest reluctance but feels constrained to take in behalf of humanity and the rights of neutral nations.

(Department of State, *Diplomatic Correspondence, European War*, No 3, pp. 242-245.)

(i) [§215] President's Refusal to Negotiate With Berlin Unless Blockade Order is Withdrawn.

BY SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT LANSING. (February 12, 1917.)

In view of the appearance in the newspapers of Feb. 11 of a report that Germany was initiating negotiations with the United States in regard to submarine warfare, the Department of State makes the following statement:

A suggestion was made orally to the Department of State late

Saturday afternoon by the Minister of Switzerland that the German Government is willing to negotiate with the United States, provided that the commercial blockade against England would not be interfered with. At the request of the Secretary of State, this suggestion was made in writing and presented to him by the Swiss Minister Sunday night. The communication is as follows:

MEMORANDUM.

The Swiss Government has been requested by the German Government to say that the latter is now, as before, willing to negotiate, formally or informally, with the United States, provided that the commercial blockade against England will not be broken thereby.

(Signed) P. RITTER.

The memorandum received immediate consideration, and the the following reply was dispatched:

"My Dear Mr. Minister:

"I am requested by the President to say to you, in acknowledging the memorandum which you were kind enough to send me on the 11th inst., that the Government of the United States would gladly discuss with the German Government any questions it might propose for discussion were it to withdraw its proclamation of the 31st of January, in which, suddenly and without previous intimation of any kind, it cancelled the assurances which it had given this Government on the 4th of May last, but that it does not feel that it can enter into any discussion with the German Government concerning the policy of submarine warfare against neutrals which it is now pursuing unless and until the German Government renews its assurances of the 4th of May and acts upon the assurance. I am, my dear Mr. Minister, &c.,

"ROBERT LANSING."

(*New York Times*, February 13, 1917.)

(j) [§216] **American Passengers on the Laconia (February, 1917).**

There are three bits of literature in connection with the sinking of the *Laconia* that patriotic Americans should preserve. One is the story of the tragedy as written by Floyd P. Gibbons, of the Chicago "Tribune." The second is the message cabled by Austin Y. Hoy to President Wilson. The third is the simple narrative of that heroic priest, Father Sargeant.

The Gibbons article is too long to reproduce here, but the others follow:

Here is the Hoy cablegram:

"The President of the United States,
"Washington, D. C.

"I am an American citizen, representing the Sullivan Machinery Company of Chicago, living abroad not as an expatriate but for the promotion of American trade.

"I love the flag, believing in its significance.

"My beloved mother and sister, passengers on the *Laconia*, have been foully murdered on the high seas.

"As an American citizen outraged—and as such fully within my rights—as an American son and brother, bereaved, I call upon my Government to preserve its citizens' self-respect and save others of my countrymen from such deep grief as I now feel.

"I am of military age, able to fight.

"If my country can use me against these brutal assassins I am at its call.

"If it stultifies my manhood and my nation's by remaining passive under outrage, I shall seek a man's chance under another flag.

"London, Feb. 27.

AUSTIN Y. HOY."

And here is the Sargeant story:

"The first to die in our boat was W. Irvine Robinson of Toronto. After his body had been consigned to the sea we tossed about for an hour, getting more and more water, until the gunwales were almost level with the sea. Then Mr. Ivatt, who was not physically strong, succumbed in the arms of his fiancée, who was close beside him, trying in vain to keep him warm by throwing her wealth of hair about his neck. Even after he died she refused to give him up, and although the additional weight made the situation more dangerous for us all, we yielded to her pitiful pleading and allowed her to keep the body.

"Mrs. Hoy died in the arms of her daughter. Her body slipped off into the sea out of her daughter's weakened arms. The heartbroken daughter succumbed a few minutes afterward and her body fell over the side of the boat as we were tossed by the huge waves.

"In icy water up to her knees for two hours, the daughter all the time bravely supported her aged mother, uttering words of encouragement to her. From the start both were violently seasick, which, coupled with the cold and exposure, gradually wore down their courage."

(*Commerce and Finance*, Mar. 7, 1917.)

H. [§217] GENERAL VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMANITY.

1. Specific References to the Section.

See §§98, 115-117, 121-128 above.

Stowell and Munroe. *Cases*, II, 117-126.

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2. Unauthorized Methods of Warfare.

- (a) Zeppelins and wholesale destruction of noncombatants.
- (b) Gas and liquid fire.
- (c) No quarter in the field.
- (d) Treatment of prisoners.
- (e) Submarine warfare.

3. Frightfulness in Occupied Territory.

- (a) Cruelties: Belgium, Northern France, Poland, Serbia and Montenegro, Armenians.
- (b) Ravaging a country before retreating from it.

4. Specially Barbarous and Illegal Practices.

- (a) Taking and shooting hostages.
- (b) Destroying towns for acts of irresponsible persons.
- (c) Injuries to women and children.
- (d) Forces labor against compatriots of the laborers.
- (e) Deportation and slavery of men.
- (f) Seizure and deportation of women.
- (g) Fryatt and Cavell cases.

5. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§218] The Law and Usage of War.

BY THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF.

A war conducted with energy cannot be directed merely against the combatants of the Enemy State and the position they occupy, but it will and must in like manner seek to destroy the total intellectual and material resources of the latter. Humanitarian claims such as the protection of men and their goods can only be taken into consideration in so far as the nature and object of the war permit.

Consequently the "argument of war" permits every belligerent state to have recourse to all means which enable it to attain the object of the war; still practice has taught the advisability of allowing in one's own interest the introduction of a limitation in the use of certain methods of war and a total renunciation of the use of others. Chivalrous feelings, Christian thoughts, higher civilization and, by no means least of all, the recognition of one's own advantage, have led to a voluntary and self-imposed limitation, the necessity of which is to-day tacitly recognized by all states and their armies. . . .

But since the tendency of thought of the last century was dominated essentially by humanitarian considerations which not infrequently degenerated into sentimentality and flabby emotion there have not been wanting attempts to influence the development of the usages of war in a way which was in fundamental contradiction with the nature of war and its object. Attempts of this kind will also not be wanting in the future, the more so as these agitations have found a kind of moral recognition in some provisions of the Geneva Constitution and the Brussels and Hague Conferences.

Moreover, the officer is a child of his time. He is subject to the intellectual tendencies which influence his own nation; the more educated he is the more will this be the case. The danger that, in this way, he will arrive at false views about the essential character of war must not be lost sight of. The danger can only be met by a thorough study of war itself. By steeping himself in military history an officer will be able to guard himself against excessive humanitarian notions, it will teach him that certain severities are indispensable to war, nay more, the only true humanity very often lies in a ruthless application of them. It will also teach him how the rules of belligerent intercourse in war have developed, how in the course of time they have solidified into general usages of war, and finally it will teach him whether the governing usages of war are justified or not, whether they are to be modified or whether they are to be observed. . . .

Bribery of the enemy's subjects with the object of obtaining military advantages, acceptance of offers of treachery, reception of deserters, utilization of the discontented elements in the population, support of pretenders and the like, are permissible, indeed international law is in no way opposed to the exploitation of the crimes of third parties (assassination, incendiarism, robbery, and the like), to the prejudice of the enemy.

Considerations of chivalry, generosity, and honor may de-

nounce in such cases a hasty and unsparing exploitation of such advantages as indecent and dishonorable, but law which is less touchy allows it. "The ugly and inherently immoral aspect of such methods cannot affect the recognition of their lawfulness. The necessary aim of war gives the belligerent the right and imposes upon him, according to circumstances, the duty not to let slip the important, it may be the decisive, advantages to be gained by such means. . . .

The view that no inhabitant of occupied territory can be compelled to participate directly in the struggle against his own country is subject to an exception by the general usages of war which must be recorded here: the calling up and employment of the inhabitants as guides on unfamiliar ground. However much it may ruffle human feeling, to compel a man to do harm to his own Fatherland, and indirectly to fight his own troops, none the less no army operating in an enemy's country will altogether renounce this expedient.

But a still more severe measure is the compulsion of the inhabitants to furnish information about their own army, its strategy, its resources, and its military secrets. The majority of writers of all nations are unanimous in their condemnation of this measure. Nevertheless it cannot be entirely dispensed with; doubtless it will be applied with regret, but the argument of war will frequently make it necessary. . . .

A new application of "hostage-right" was practised by the German Staff in the war of 1870, when it compelled leading citizens from French towns and villages to accompany trains and locomotives in order to protect the railway communications which were threatened by the people. Since the lives of peaceable inhabitants were without any fault on their part thereby exposed to grave danger, every writer outside Germany has stigmatized this measure as contrary to the law of nations and as unjustified towards the inhabitants of the country. As against this unfavorable criticism it must be pointed out that this measure, which was also recognized on the German side as harsh and cruel, was only resorted to after declarations and instructions of the occupying authorities had proved ineffective, and that in the particular circumstance it was the only method which promised to be effective against the doubtless unauthorized, indeed the criminal, behavior of a fanatical population.

Herein lies its justification under the laws of war, but still more in the fact that it proved completely successful, and that wherever citizens were thus carried on the trains (whether result was due to the increased watchfulness of the communes or to the immediate influence on the population), the security of traffic was restored.

(*Some Extracts from War Book of German General Staff, 68-157 passim.*)

(b) [§219] Object of the German Atrocities.

BY WALTER BLOEM (Feb. 10, 1915).

We have adopted it as a principle that the wrong-doing of an individual must be expiated by the entire community to which he belongs. The village in which our troops are fired

upon will be burned. If the guilty one is not found, substitutes will be chosen from the population at large, and will be executed under martial law. . . . The innocent must suffer with the guilty, and, if the latter are not caught, must receive punishment in their place, not because a crime has been committed, but to prevent the commission of a future crime. Every case in which a village is burned down, or hostages are executed, or the inhabitants of a village which has taken arms against our invading forces are killed, is a warning to the inhabitants of the territory not yet occupied. There can be no doubt that the destruction of Battice, Herve, Lourain and Dinant has served as warning. The devastation and bloodshed of the opening days of the war have prevented the larger Belgian cities from attempting any attacks upon the weak contingents with which it was necessary for us to hold them.

(*Kölnische Zeitung*, Feb. 10, 1915.)

(c) [§220] **Forced Labor and Deportation Imposed on the Belgian Population.**

BY THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT.

The Belgian Government have already on several occasions denounced to neutral powers the violations of international law and of the principles of humanity, of which the German authorities in Belgium have been guilty.

The latest information from the occupied districts of Belgium confirms certain fresh facts which the Belgian Government had been unwilling to credit. These facts will revolt public conscience in all countries where the principles of justice are held in esteem.

DEPORTATION.

A decree from German general headquarters dated the 3d October imposes forced labor upon all Belgians capable of work, who, in consequence of lack of employment or other causes, have become dependent upon outside assistance. Individuals to whom this order applies can be forced to work away from their place of residence—in other words, deported to Germany in a condition of semi-slavery.

The great difficulty of communication with the occupied portion of Belgium has prevented the Belgian Government from receiving all the information which they were anxious to obtain as to the manner in which the decree of 3d October is being carried out.

They learn, however, from a reliable source that the wholesale deportation of the able-bodied population is proceeding. Rich and poor, if unoccupied or without work, are taken without mercy. On the 24th October last more than 15,000 men had already been removed from Flanders alone. Trains entirely filled with these unfortunate people were seen proceeding to Germany. Others were sent to the invaded departments of France. The men were crowded into open trucks exposed to all weathers, in the most miserable conditions. Their spirit, in spite of cold and privation, was in no way daunted, and they

sang patriotic songs while enduring this new form of oppression.

Raids took place at Courtrai, Alost, Termonde, Bruges, Ghent, Mons, and in numerous rural and industrial communes. The men were collected and examined as if they were cattle; the able-bodied were despatched to unknown destinations.

At Bruges, the burgomaster, an old man of 80 years of age, who since the beginning of the occupation had given an example of noble patriotism, was deprived of his office for refusing to assist the German military authorities in their horrible task; the town was condemned to a fine of 100,000 marks for every day's delay in the enrolment of victims.

VIOLATION OF PROMISES.

Up to the 24th October, this deportation had taken place principally in the military zone (i. e., East and West Flanders). In the rest of the country, the civil authorities had no doubt hesitated to employ measures which not only violate the spirit and the text of the Hague Convention, but also the solemn promise made to the population in a proclamation of the 25th July, 1915, that no forced labor would be exacted from them which did violence to their sentiments of patriotism.

The Belgian Government, however, have learned that a census of unemployed is going on in the whole of the occupied territory, and have reason to fear that the horrors of deportation may soon be extended to all the provinces.

QUESTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT.

The "Cologne Gazette," in an article the translation of which the newspapers published in Belgium have been ordered to reproduce, endeavors to justify the iniquitous measures taken with regard to the Belgians; it dwells with complacency on the dangers of idleness to which many workmen are exposed, and throws the responsibility for unemployment on England, which is preventing the importation of raw materials into Belgium. The German Government's organ also attempts to justify forced labor by the statement that the Belgians will only be employed in quarries, lime-kilns, and similar industries unconnected with the war.

The latter argument is worthless, for it is well known that concrete and other products of lime-kilns and quarries play an important part in the consolidation of modern trenches and fortifications.

When Germany endeavors to repudiate all responsibility for the lamentable condition of the Belgian working class, we reply that there would be no lack of work if the invaders, who are in any case responsible for this condition of things through the very fact of their aggression, had not disorganized industry, seized the raw materials, oils, and metals employed in it, and requisitioned all kinds of machinery and implements. They have exacted a detailed declaration of all stocks of driving belts, perhaps with the intention of seizing them later. The invaders have even resolved to complete the ruin of the metal and glass industries of Belgium for the benefit of German competition by

means of prohibitive duties on products exported to Holland, the only market still remaining open to them.

The Belgian workman has always been remarkable for his industriousness. If, during the last two years he has been often unemployed, it is because he had no work in prospect but that offered him by the enemy. His patriotism forbade him to accept it, because by so doing he would indirectly have helped in making war against his country.

PURPOSE OF THE GERMANS.

The invader, by means of the barbarous system of wholesale deportations, pursues a double object:

Firstly, the terrorization of the population by driving families to despair, and thus forcing the workers to assist the German occupation.

This scheme is assisted by the announcement that all those who may receive relief for their maintenance will be put to forced labor. The workman who, from devotion to his country, refuses to serve the enemy, knows that he is exposing himself to exile and to real slavery.

This deportation is thus a coercive measure to force the workman to accept, against his conscience, the offer of work which is abhorrent to him.

The second object of the German authorities is to substitute Belgians for the German workmen, who thus become available and are sent to the front to fill up the gaps in the German Army; for Germany needs men at any price. If it were otherwise, if she only proposed to combat the idleness of our workmen, why could she not employ their energies on the spot in works of public utility, near their families and their homes? Not only has she not done this, but we learn from a reliable source that she has several times deported men at work, or even designedly put workmen out of employment who had never before ceased to work, in order to have a pretext to use their work for her own purposes.

According to the German papers, a fairly high salary is offered them as a bait if they agree to become voluntary workmen, and in that case every kind of work is liable to be imposed upon them. The Germans thus wish to induce these unfortunate people to do work of direct assistance to the war by the hope that their lot will be improved. The deported Belgian can thus choose between starvation and treason.

The Belgian Government denounce to all civilized nations these infamous proceedings, which trample upon all the laws of humanity as well as upon those provisions of the conventional rules of war relating to the power of the occupant.

They protest with the utmost energy against the application of a system which the empty explanations of the enemy will not save from the name and the stigma of slave-trade, an infamy which completes the dishonor of the German occupation, in spite of its pretended anxiety to protect the legitimate rights of the population of Flanders!

(Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous, No. 37; 1916.)

(d) [§221] War Diaries.

BY GERMAN SOLDIERS IN THE FIELD.

This disregard for the lives of civilians is strikingly shown in extracts from German soldiers' diaries, of which the following are representative examples:

Barthel, who was a sergeant and standard bearer of the 2nd Company of the 1st Guards Regiment on Foot, and who during the campaign received the Iron Cross, says, under date 10th August, 1914: "A transport of 300 Belgians came through Duisburg in the morning. Of these, 80 including the Oberburgomaster were shot according to martial law."

Mathern, of the 4th Company of Jägers, No. 11, from Marburg, states that at a village between Birnal and Dinant on Sunday, August 23rd, the Pioneers and Infantry Regiment 178 were fired upon by the inhabitants. He gives no particulars beyond this. He continues: "About 220 inhabitants were shot, and the village was burnt. Artillery is continuously shooting—the village lies in a large ravine. Just now, 6 o'clock in the afternoon, the crossing of the Meuse begins near Dinant. All villages, chateaux and houses are burnt down during the night. It is a beautiful sight to see the fires all round us in the distance."

Bombardier Wetzel, of the 2nd Mounted Battery, 1st Kurhessian Field Artillery Regiment, No. 11, records an incident which happened in French territory near Lille on the 11th October: "We have no fight, but we caught about 20 men and shot them." By this time killing not in a fight would seem to have passed into a habit.

Diary No. 32 gives an accurate picture of what took place in Louvain: "What a sad scene—all the houses surrounding the railway station completely destroyed—only some foundation walls still standing. On the station square captured guns. At the end of a main street there is the Council Hall which has been completely preserved with all its beautiful turrets; a sharp contrast: 180 inhabitants are stated to have been shot after they had dug their own graves."

The last and most important entry is that contained in Diary No. 19. This is a blue book interleaved with blotting paper, and contains no name and address; there is, however, one circumstance which makes it possible to speak with certainty as to the regiment of the writer. He gives the names of First Lieutenant von Oppen, Count Eulenburg, Captain von Roeder, First Lieutenant von Bock und Polach, Second Lieutenant Count Hardenberg, and Lieutenant Engelbrecht. A perusal of the Prussian Army List of June, 1914, shows that all these officers, with the exception of Lieutenant Engelbrecht, belonged to the First Regiment of Foot Guards. On the 24th of August, 1914, the writer was in Ermeton. The exact translation of the extract, grim in its brevity, is as follows: "24-8-14. We took about 1,000 prisoners; at least 500 were shot. The village was burnt because inhabitants had also shot. Two civilians were shot at once."

(Viscount Bryce, *Reports on Alleged German Outrages*, 38-39.)

(e) [§222] Case of Edith Cavell.

BY MINISTER BRAND WHITLOCK (October 11, 1915).

PROTEST TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT.

Brussels, October 11, 1915.

Your Excellency:

I have just heard that Miss Cavell, a British subject, and consequently under the protection of my Legation, was this morning condemned to death by courtmartial.

If my information is correct, the sentence in the present case is more severe than all the others that have been passed in similar cases which have been tried by the same court, and, without going into the reasons for such a drastic sentence, I feel that I have the right to appeal to your Excellency's feelings of humanity and generosity in Miss Cavell's favor, and to ask that the death penalty passed on Miss Cavell may be commuted and that this unfortunate woman shall not be executed.

Miss Cavell is the head of the Brussels Surgical Institute. She has spent her life in alleviating the sufferings of others, and her school has turned out many nurses who have watched at the bedside of the sick all the world over, in Germany as in Belgium. At the beginning of the war Miss Cavell bestowed her care as freely on the German soldiers as on others. Even in default of all other reasons, her career as a servant of humanity is such as to inspire the greatest sympathy and to call for pardon. If the information in my possession is correct, Miss Cavell, far from shielding herself, has, with commendable straightforwardness, admitted the truth of all the charges against her, and it is the very information which she herself has furnished, and which she alone was in a position to furnish, which has aggravated the severity of the sentence passed on her.

It is then with confidence, and in the hope of its favorable reception, that I have the honor to present to Your Excellency my request for pardon on Miss Cavell's behalf.

(Report by the British Chaplain in Brussels.)

On Monday evening, the 11th October, I was admitted by special passport from the German authorities to the prison of St. Gilles, where Miss Edith Cavell had been confined for ten weeks. The final sentence had been given early that afternoon.

To my astonishment and relief I found my friend perfectly calm and resigned. But this could not lessen the tenderness and intensity of feeling on either part during that last interview of almost an hour.

Her first words to me were upon a matter concerning herself personally, but the solemn asseveration which accompanied them was made expressedly in the light of God and eternity. She then added that she wished all her friends to know that she willingly gave her life for her country, and said: "I have no fear nor shrinking; I have seen death so often that it is not strange or fearful to me." She further said: "I thank

God for this ten weeks' quiet before the end." "Life has always been hurried and full of difficulty." "This time of rest has been a great mercy." "They have all been very kind to me here. But this I would say standing as I do in view of God and eternity, I realize that patriotism is not enough. I must have no hatred or bitterness towards anyone."

We partook of the Holy Communion together, and she received the Gospel message of consolation with all her heart. At the close of the little service I began to repeat the words "Abide with me," and she joined softly in the end.

We sat quietly talking until it was time for me to go. She gave me parting messages for relations and friends. She spoke of her soul's needs at the moment and she received the assurance of God's Word as only the Christian can do.

Then I said "Good-bye," and she smiled and said, "We shall meet again."

The German military chaplain was with her at the end and afterwards gave her Christian burial.

He told me: "She was brave and bright to the last. She professed her Christian faith and that she was glad to die for her country." "She died like a heroine."

(*Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous*, No. 17; 1915.)

(f) [§223] Case of Captain Fryatt.

BY PROFESSOR MUNROE SMITH.

In executing the captain of a British merchant vessel for an alleged attempt to ram a German submarine, and in seeking to justify this execution, the Germany authorities assume:

(1) That submarines may legitimately be used to visit, search and capture merchant vessels; and

(2) That a merchant vessel menaced with capture by a war vessel has no right to defend itself.

Neither of these assumptions is justified by the rules of existing international law.

SUBMARINE WARFARE LEGAL.

(1) For the use of submarines against merchant vessels, whether to prevent carriage of contraband goods or blockade-running by neutral vessels, or to capture enemy vessels, there was at the outbreak of the present world war no precedent. This is frankly recognized by German diplomacy. In a memorandum submitted to our Department of State by the Germany Ambassador at Washington, March 8, 1916, it is said that the submarine was "a new weapon, the use of which had not been regulated by international law." From this premise, Count Bernstorff draws the amazing conclusion that in choosing this weapon to prey upon the enemy's commerce, Germany "could not and did not violate any existing rule." As a matter of fact, in using this new weapon against merchant vessels, Germany has continuously disregarded established usage and violated existing rules. Leaving out of account its claim that its submarines were entitled to sink enemy merchantmen without warning—a claim which was based

in part on the risk which the submarine must run in giving warning, but mainly on the right of reprisal—it has violated international usage and law in every case in which a German submarine has captured an enemy merchantman. According to established international practice, a captured vessel is to be put in charge of a prize crew, and is to be taken into one of the captor's home ports, there to be condemned or released by a prize court. Exceptionally, indeed, where this procedure is impossible, the captor is entitled to destroy the captured vessel, but in such case he is bound to make adequate provision for the safety of its crew and of any passengers. In using the submarine for the capture of merchantmen, the exception, which formerly confirmed the rule, displaces it and becomes the rule. Because of its small size and its extreme vulnerability, the submarine is obliged to destroy every vessel it captures. Even if the captor's home ports be open, a submarine can not furnish a prize crew, nor can it convoy its prize to a home port, because it can not safely resist a recapture. Whether the vessel seized is legally subject to capture must be determined by the commander of the submarine; only after the vessel has been sunk can a prize court review his action. What is more serious, in destroying its prize the submarine can not make proper provision for the safety of the captured non-combatants. The best it can do for them is to leave them on the high sea in open boats, without regard to the distance from land or the state of the weather. In its use of the submarine against merchant vessels, Germany, as Count Bernstorff remarks, "only took into account the peculiarity of the new weapon." It left wholly out of account the limitations imposed upon the use of the older weapon, the cruiser, because it could not use the new weapon under those limitations.

The new weapon can not do the work to which it has been put without disregard of humanity and violation of law. For this reason, the use of the submarine against merchant vessels is inadmissible; and the attempt of a submarine to capture a merchantman is not a legitimate act of war.

SELF-DEFENSE OF A MERCHANTMAN LEGAL.

(2) In denying the right of a merchantman to defend itself against a submarine, the German authorities not only assume that submarine war vessels are entitled to do everything that supermarine war vessels may do, but they flatly disregard the existing rules of international law applicable to merchant vessels. It is well settled that a merchantman has the right to defend itself against threatened capture. In so doing, it of course takes certain risks. It becomes a combatant, and it may be sunk in the combat. If captured, however, its officers and men are to be treated as prisoners of war.

DISCUSSION OF THESE RULES.

It is contended by the German authorities that these rules grew up under conditions which no longer exist; that they have become unreasonable and should be regarded as obsolete. They were established when piracy was rife; they were

perpetuated during the period when privateering was admissible; in recent times, when merchantmen have been threatened with capture only by regular warships, these rules have not been invoked or applied. The merchantman's right of resistance has been lost by non-user. In the place of these obsolete rules of sea warfare, the Germans would set the opposite rules long established in land warfare. On land civilians may not defend themselves against regular military forces. Franc-tireurs, guerillas, bushwackers, snipers are not entitled to be treated as soldiers. They may lawfully be shot, not only in combat, but after capture.

From the purely military point of view, the German reasoning is undeniably logical. The arguments advanced might well be addressed to an international conference for the revision of the laws of maritime warfare. Even there, however, the German arguments might not prove convincing. In such a conference it would, of course, be pointed out that, if sea warfare is to be assimilated to land warfare, privately owned ships should be exempt from capture and destruction, unless they carry contraband or seek to break through a blockade. It would also be maintained that the use of submarines against merchant vessels is not to be recognized or tolerated. And it might well be argued that the abandonment in modern times of the right of the merchant vessel to resist capture by a supermarine warship has been due to the hopelessness of resistance; that "the peculiarity" of the submarine, namely its fragility, has again changed the situation; and that the ancient right of defense may well be maintained when a merchant vessel is threatened with destruction by this new weapon.

In using submarines against merchantmen and in treating resistance by merchantmen as guerilla warfare, Germany is endeavoring to remodel the existing code of naval warfare in its own immediate interest and by its own sole authority. In the society of nations, the state which assumes to be a law unto itself puts itself out of the law.

(The American Rights League.)

(g) [§224] On Retaining Belgium (1917).

BY GOVERNOR BARON VON BISSING.

Copenhagen, May 23.—(Correspondence of The Associated Press.)—The memorandum of the late Governor General von Bissing of Belgium, in which he advocated the annexation of the little kingdom as the sole possible policy for Germany, is published in full in Greater Germany, a review issued by Deputy Bacmeister of the Prussian Diety, a National Liberal and annexationist. The unashamed nakedness with which the memorandum calls for the dethronement of the Belgian royal house, the exploitation of Belgian resources and preparation for a new war to follow the present struggle, shows that the document was never intended for public view.

Von Bissing recognizes that Germany can have little hope of making friends of Belgians after this war, warns against "illusions of possible reconciliation" and calmly counts up the value of booty from Belgium and the advantages of pocketing

the country from a military, naval, and economic point of view. He points out that the offensive prosecution of the present war was possible only through the invasion of Belgium, and speaks regretfully of the fact that the German right wing had to squeeze laboriously past the Dutch province of Limburg.

The memorandum says that the strategic aim of the present war is to gain room for the concentration and advance of German armies in a new war against England and France, and that, without the possession of Belgium, it is doubtful if the new war could be prosecuted on an offensive basis. Discussing the subject of the policy of the "iron hand," von Bissing laments the mistakes of a vacillating policy of conciliation, as attempted in Alsace-Lorraine and German Poland, and says they must never be repeated in Belgium. He warns against the idea that the establishment of a Flemish State would be adequate to secure German interests, these absolutely requiring the absorption of all present Belgium.

According to von Bissing, the absorption of Belgium must not be discussed at any peace conference. "Let only the right of conquest speak," are his words. In the Bissing Belgium there would be no room for King Albert and his dynasty, and the memorandum quotes approvingly the advice of Machiavelli that, under such circumstances, a King or regent should be put out of the way, if necessary by death.

Under the von Bissing scheme Belgian industry is not to be killed entirely, but is to be subjected to such conditions as will permit Germany to use it as a lever for fixing prices in the world market in German interests. In the same way Belgium's coal supply is to give Germany an economic monopoly on the Continent.

Von Bissing foresees the necessity for a continuance of his style of dictatorship for many years, and says that "reforms introduced must be based on military might."

(*New York Times*, June 13, 1917.)

I. [§225] IMPOSSIBILITY OF MAINTAINING OUR NEUTRALITY.

1. Specific References.

(a) General topic.

"President's War Message" of Apr. 2, 1917.

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(b) Special phases.

Attempt to use our ports for belligerent purposes.

"Proclamation of Neutrality by United States," *Am. Jour. Internat. Law*, IX, Spec. Suppl., 194-198 (July, 1915).

- Memorandum of Sept. 19, 1914, on "Merchant Vessels Suspected of Carrying Supplies to Belligerent Vessels," *ibid*, 235-236 (July, 1915).
- Correspondence, *ibid*, 215-219.
- "Steamship Appam," *ibid*, X, Spec. Suppl., 387.
- Reynolds, F. J. *Story of the War*, V, 618, 551.
- Stowell and Munro, *Cases*, II, 300 seq.
- Supreme Court Decision in *N. Y. Times* (Mar. 7, 1917).
- Oppenheim. *International Law* (2d ed.), §328.
- Hall. *International Law* (6th ed.), 614.
- Bonfils. *Manuel de Droit International Public*, §1469.
- (Note refusal of the United States and Great Britain to accede to article 22 of Convention XIII of Conference of 1907.)

2. Dragging on of the War.

- (a) Germany's so-called peace terms.
- (b) Involving the continued combination of Germany, Austro-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, into one dominant world power of 160 millions in centre of Europe.

3. Efforts of the United States to Bring About a General Peace.

- (a) Pres. Wilson's peace speech—evidence of our opposition to war.
- (b) Hopelessness of any proper end to the war without the participation of the United States.

4. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§226] Who Led Us Into War?

BY GEORGE ADE.

In Germany it is commonly believed that the pro-ally sentiment over here is a poisonous product, encouraged and fostered by British falsehoods. We are a simple and credulous people, avaricious and lacking the long vision of those who would build empires and control large destinies.

Is there any measure of truth in their belief that we have been misled and hoodwinked by Britain? Now that we are in the war, can any man convince himself that we might have kept out of it? Should we have refused to sell munitions to the Allies? Could we have repressed and held in check our feeling of gratitude to France for services rendered long ago?

If we can give straight answers to these questions we are doubly fortified for the war.

And, if these questions suggest themselves to us, time and time again, it is not because we have our doubts, but because the more judicially and cold-bloodedly and impartially we cross-examine ourselves, the more evident it becomes that we either had to go into this war or surrender our charter as a free people.

Two prodigious facts stood out before us at the beginning of the struggle. All the sophistries and indirections of the diplomats, all the green books and blue books and white books flooding the world, all of the libraries that will be written in explanation and defense never can remove or even alter these two mountain-peaks of truth.

One fact was that Germany deliberately forced the war because it seemed that the fortunate Day had arrived when the continent of Europe could be pounded into submission.

The other fact was that Germany deliberately broke her word of honor and outlawed herself by the brutal invasion of Belgium.

With these two facts looming in front of them, the American people immediately and instinctively turned against Germany. Our sympathies were given whole-heartedly to the Allies because they couldn't go anywhere else. The issues were too plain. The evidence was too unmistakable. Great Britain and France did not lead us. We were led by an old-fashioned and elemental preference for decency and fair play.

After that we sold food and munitions to the enemies of Germany.

The Germans have always insisted upon their rights to sell guns and shells anywhere in the world at any time. Our soldiers in the Spanish-American war were killed by German bullets fired from German guns. Every Filipino insurrecto hiding in ambush to get one of our men carried a German weapon that had been smuggled to him.

We had a right to sell our products to Great Britain and France. And now, thank goodness, we can say openly what we have felt all the time, that it was our duty to supply them.

With half of the world on fire, a good many dark places are being illuminated. This war has vindicated British policies and crowned France with a glory that never can perish.

(*The Vigilantes Service.*)

J. [§227] GERMAN POWER A DANGER TO OUR NATIONAL EXISTENCE.

1. Specific References on the Section.

See §89 above.

Fullerton, W. M. "Monroe Doctrine and the War," in *World's Work*, XXXII, 315-320 (July, 1916).

Gardner, W. H. *Our Peril from Germany's Growth* (16 pp. N. Y., Nat. Sec. League, 1917.) With maps.

MacHugh, R. J. "The Monroe Doctrine and the Latin American Republics," in *Fortnightly Review*, vol. 101, pp. 671-681 (April, 1914).

Eliot, C. W. "America and the Issues of the War," in *N. Y. Times* of Oct. 2, 1914; also Stowell, *Diplomacy of the War*, 655-660.

2. German Spirit of Conquest and World Empire a Menace to the World, Including the United States.

3. Monroe Doctrine Would Be Disregarded if Germany Should Be Successful.

4. Imperialistic German Ideas Contrary to Our Principles of Democracy.

5. Our Wealth and Defenselessness Would Make Us a Probable Object of Germany's Next Attack.

6. Germans Feel Revengeful for Our Sympathy with Allies.

7. The War Is, Therefore, One of National Defense.

(a) Of our external territorial possessions.

(b) Of our main territory which may be invaded.

(c) Of our place in the world as a great nation.

8. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§228] Why We Fight Germany.

BY SECRETARY FRANKLIN K. LANE (June 4, 1917).

Because of Belgium, invaded, outraged, enslaved, impover-

ished Belgium. We cannot forget Liege, Louvain and Cardinal Mercier. Translated into terms of American history, these names stand for Bunker Hill, Lexington and Patrick Henry.

Because of France, invaded, desecrated France, a million of whose heroic sons have died to save the land of Lafayette. Glorious, golden France, the preserver of the arts, the land of noble spirit. The first land to follow our lead into republican liberty.

Because of England, from whom came the laws, traditions, standards of life and inherent love of liberty which we call Anglo-Saxon civilization. We defeated her once upon the land and once upon the sea. But Australia, New Zealand, Africa and Canada are free because of what we did. And they are with us in the fight for the freedom of the seas.

Because of Russia—New Russia. She must not be overwhelmed now. Not now, surely, when she is just born into freedom. Her peasants must have their chance; they must go to school to Washington, to Jefferson and to Lincoln, until they know their way about in this new, strange world of government by the popular will.

Because of other peoples, with their rising hope that the world may be freed from government by the soldier.

We are fighting Germany because she sought to terrorize us and then to fool us. We could not believe that Germany would do what she said she would do upon the seas.

We still hear the piteous cries of children coming up out of the sea where the *Lusitania* went down. And Germany has never asked forgiveness of the world.

We saw the *Sussex* sunk, crowded with the sons and daughters of neutral nations.

We saw ship after ship sent to the bottom—ships of mercy bound out of America for the Belgian starving, ships carrying the Red Cross and laden with the wounded of all nations, ships carrying food and clothing to friendly, harmless, terrorized peoples, ships flying the Stars and Stripes—sent to the bottom hundreds of miles from shore, manned by American seamen, murdered against all law, without warning.

We believed Germany's promise that she would respect the neutral flag and the rights of neutrals, and we held our anger and outrage in check. But now we see that she was holding us off with fair promises until she could build her huge fleet of submarines. For when spring came she blew her promise into the air, just as at the beginning she had torn up that "scrap of paper." Then we saw clearly that there was but one law for Germany, her will to rule.

We are fighting Germany because in this war feudalism is making its last stand against on-coming democracy. We see it now. This is a war against an old spirit, an ancient, outworn spirit. It is a war against feudalism—the right of the castle on the hill to rule the village below. It is a war for democracy—the right of all to be their own masters. Let Germany be feudal if she will. But she must not spread her system over a world that has outgrown it.

We fight with the world for an honest world in which nations

keep their word, for a world in which nations do not live by swagger or by threat, for a world in which men think of the ways in which they can conquer the common cruelties of nature instead of inventing more horrible cruelties to inflict upon the spirit and body of man, for a world in which the ambition of the philosophy of a few shall not make miserable all mankind, for a world in which the man is held more precious than the machine, the system, or the State.

(Address before the Home Club, Washington.)

(b) [§229] **Efficiency Versus Freedom.**

BY PROFESSOR DOUGLAS W. JOHNSON.

In regard to municipal government and various forms of social legislation, we have long recognized the high position held by your nation. But in the more vital matter of the relation of the individual to the supreme governing power, we have always held, and still believe, that Germany is sadly reactionary. For half a century your professors, in the employ of an educational system controlled by a bureaucratic government, have taught what we condemn as a false philosophy of government. Your histories, your books on philosophy, your whole literature, glorify the *State*; and you have accepted the dangerous doctrine that the individual exists to serve the State, forgetting that the State is not the mystical, divine thing you picture it, but a government carried on by human beings like yourselves, most of them reasonably upright, but some incompetent and others deliberately bad, just like any other human government. We believe that the only excuse for the existence of the State is to serve the individual, to create conditions which will insure the greatest liberty and highest possible development to the individual citizen. It has never seemed to us creditable to the German intellect that it could be satisfied with a theory of government outgrown by most other civilized nations. That you should confuse efficiency with freedom has always seemed to us a tragic mistake, and never so tragic as now, when a small coterie of human beings, subject to the same mistakes and sins as other human beings, can hurl you into a terrible war before you know what has happened, clap on a rigid censorship to keep out any news they do not want you to learn, then publish a white book which pretends to explain the causes of the war, but omits documents of the most vital importance, thereby causing the people of a confiding nation to drench the earth with their life-blood in the fond illusion that the war was forced upon them, and that they are fighting for a noble cause. Most pitiful is the sad comment of an intelligent German woman in a letter recently received in this country: "We, of course, only see such things as the Government thinks best. We were told that this war was purely a defensive one, forced upon us. I begin to believe this may not be true, but hope for a favorable ending." . . .

How can a nation know the truth, think clearly, and act righteously when a few men, called the "State," can commit you to the most serious enterprise in your history without your previous knowledge or consent, and can then keep you in ignorance of vitally important documents and activities in order to

insure your full support of their perilous undertaking? Such is the thought which has always led America to denounce as false the old theory of "divine right of kings," long imposed upon the German people in the more subtle and, therefore, more dangerous form of "the divine right of the State." Our conviction that such a government as yours is reactionary and incompatible with true liberty, and that it stunts and warps the intellects of its citizens, has been amply confirmed by extended observation in your country, and more particularly by the unanswerable fact that millions of your best blood, including distinguished men of intelligence and wealth, have forsaken Germany to seek true liberty of intellect and action in America, renouncing allegiance to the Fatherland to become citizens here. Some of them still love the scenes of their childhood, but few of them would be willing to return to a life under such a Government as Germany possesses.

(D. W. Johnson, *Plain Words from America*, 14-17.)

K. [§230] GERMAN SUCCESS WOULD MEAN THE DOWNFALL OF DEMOCRACY.

1. Would Put an End to All Efforts to Democratize Germany.
2. Democracy in Russia and France Would Be Struck Down.
3. The Imperialistic Spirit All Over the World Would Be Encouraged.
4. Democracy in the U. S. Would Eventually Be Attacked.

L. [§231] SOME ALLEGED REASONS FOR OUR WAR REFUTED.

1. Specific References on the Section.

Garner, J. W. "Some Questions of Internat. Law in the European War," *Am. Jour. Internat. Law*, vol. X, p. 749 (Oct., 1916).

Morey, W. C. "The Sale of Munitions of War," *ibid.*, vol. X, p. 467 (July, 1916).

Gregory, C. N. "Neutrality and the Sale of Arms," *ibid.*, vol. X, p. 543 (July, 1916).

Dennis, W. C. "The Right of Citizens of Neutral Countries to Sell and Export Arms and Munitions of War to Belligerents," in *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. LX, pp. 168-182 (July, 1915).

For Diplomatic Correspondence:

Am. Jour. Internat. Law, vol. IX, Spec. Suppl., pp. 125-129, 146, 166-172, 259; vol. X, pp. 354-360.

New York Times Current History, vol. II, pp. 448-450 (June, 1915); vol. II, pp. 1064-1069 (Sept., 1915).

2. No National Hatred and Jealousy Felt Toward Germany by the U. S. Before the War.
3. Shipping Food Is a Recognized Right to Neutrals.
4. Shipping Munitions Is the Same, and Habitually Practiced by Germany in Recent Times.
5. The War Was Not Brought About by the Money Power.

(a) See Roosevelt's speech against "A Dollar War," Chicago, Apr.

M. [§232] OUTBREAK OF WAR.

1. Specific References on the Section.

See §§138-142 above.

Whelpley, J. D. "American Armed Neutrality," in *Fortnightly Review*, vol. 107, pp. 705-712 (April, 1917).

Editorial. "Armed Neutrality," in *New Republic*, vol. X, pp. 120-121 (Mar. 3, 1917).

Editorial. "The Decision," *ibid.*, 279-280 (April 7, 1917).

2. Defence of Merchant Ships.

(a) Question of defensive guns.

(b) Question of size and management of guns.

(c) Proposition of armed neutrality.

(d) Captures and destruction continue.

3. Last Attempts to Preserve Peace.

(a) President Wilson's last protest to Germany.

(b) President Wilson's speech to Congress.

4. Formal Declaration of War.

Act of Congress of ———

5. Reception of the Declaration by Central Powers.

(a) Germany, Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey.

6. First Hostile Encounters.

7. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§233] German Defiance.

BY CHANCELLOR THEOBALD VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG

(January 31, 1917).

The Chancellor opened the sitting with a speech of which the keynote words were: "*We Stake Everything.*"

"We have been challenged to fight to the end. We accept the challenge, we stake everything, and we shall be victorious."

He indicated that Germany was ready to accept all the consequences of unrestricted U-boat warfare which had been decided upon. He wound up by saying:

"As regards all that human strength can do to enforce success for the Fatherland, be assured, gentlemen, that nothing has been neglected. Everything in this respect will be done."

At the outset of his address the Chancellor explained why in March and May, 1916, he opposed unrestricted submarine war, and why again in September, "according to the unanimous judgment of the political and military authorities, the question was not thought ripe for decision." On this matter he said:

"By the development of the situation the decision concerning submarine warfare has been forced into the last acute stage. The question of U-boat war, as members of the Reichstag will remember, has occupied us three times in this committee, namely, in March, May, and September of last year. On each occasion in an exhaustive statement I expounded the points for and against in this question. I emphasized on each occasion that I was speaking *pro tempore*, and not as a supporter in principle or opponent in principle of the unrestricted employment of U-boats, but in consideration of the military, political, and economic situation as a whole.

"I have always proceeded from the standpoint of whether

U-boat war would bring us nearer victorious peace or not. Every means, I said in March, that was calculated to shorten the war constitute the most humane policy to follow. When the most ruthless methods are considered best calculated to lead us to victory, and swift victory, I said, then they must be employed.

MUST STRIKE NOW.

"This moment has now arrived," he continued. "Last autumn the time was not yet ripe, but today the moment has come when, with the greatest prospect of success, we can undertake the enterprise. We must, therefore, not wait any longer.

"Where has there been any change in the situation?" the Chancellor ask. "In the first place, the most important fact of all is that the number of our submarines has been very considerably increased as compared with last spring, and thereby a firm basis for success has been established.

"The second co-decisive reason is the bad cereal harvest of the world. This fact already confronts England, France and Italy with serious difficulties, which by means of unrestricted U-boat war will be brought to a point of unbearableness.

"The coal question, too, is a vital question in war. Already it is critical in Italy and France, as you know. Our submarines will make it still more critical.

"To this must be added, especially as regards England, the supply of ore for the production of munitions, in the widest sense, and of timber for coal mines. The enemy's difficulties are rendered still more acute by the increasing lack of enemy cargo space. In this respect time and U-boat and cruiser warfare have prepared the ground for the decisive blow.

"The Entente suffers owing to lack of cargo space. The lack makes itself felt in Italy and France, no less than in England. If we may now venture to estimate the positive advantages of unrestricted U-boat war at a very much higher value than last spring, the dangers which arise for us from U-boat war have correspondingly decreased since that time."

READY TO ACCEPT ALL CONSEQUENCES.

The Chancellor discussed in detail the political situation, and then referred to military affairs as follows:

"A few days ago Field Marshal von Hindenburg described the situation to me thus: Our front stands firm on all sides. We have everywhere the requisite reserves. The spirit of our troops is good, and confident. The military situation as a whole permits us to accept all the consequences which unrestricted U-boat war may bring, and as this U-boat war is the means of injuring our enemies the most grievously, it must be begun.

"The Admiralty Staff and the high seas fleet entertain the firm conviction (which has practical support in the experience gained in U-boat cruiser warfare) that Great Britain will be brought to peace by arms. . . .

"No one among us will close his eyes to the seriousness of the step we are taking. That our existence is at stake every-

one has known since August 4, 1914, and this has been brutally emphasized by the rejection of our peace offer. When, in 1914, we had to seize and have recourse to the sword against Russia's general mobilization, we did so with the deepest sense of responsibility toward our people and conscious of resolute strength, which says: 'We must and, therefore, we can.' Endless streams of blood have since been shed, but they have not washed away the 'must' and the 'can.'

"BEST AND SHARPEST WEAPON."

"In now deciding to employ our best and sharpest weapon, we are guided solely by sober consideration of all the circumstances that come into the question and by the firm determination to help our people out of the distress and disgrace which our enemies contemplate for them.

"Success lies in a higher hand, but as regards all that human strength can do to enforce success for the Fatherland, be assured, gentlemen, that nothing has been neglected. Everything in this respect will be done."

(*New York Times*, Feb. 2, 1917.)

N. [§234] SUMMARY OF REASONS FOR OUR GOING TO WAR.

1. National Injuries—Particularly:
 - (a) Brutal behavior of German agents in this country.
 - (b) Destruction of American property and commercial interests.
 - (c) Murder of American citizens engaged in lawful trade.
2. Violations of International Law, to Our Detriment.
 - (a) Interference with neutral trade.
 - (b) Illegal submarine policy.
3. Attack Upon the American Principles of Equality, Democracy, and Popular Government.
4. Attempt to Form a World Power Dangerous to the Whole Human Race.
5. Impending Danger of an Attack On, and Possible Invasion of, the U. S., Bringing German Military Government to Our Own Doors.
6. Danger to the Future of the U. S. as a Power Able to Defend Itself and Take Its Just Part in the Concerns of the World.
7. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§235] How to Arouse the People.

BY THE SPEAKERS' TRAINING CAMP (June, 1917.).

The Speakers' Training Camp for Education in Patriotic Service, at the close of the six days' session held at Chautauqua under the auspices of the National Security League's Committee on Patriotism Through Education, wishes to put on record the following resolution:

RESOLVED:—I. That it is essential to national security to bring to the American people exact knowledge of the direct issues of the war, of the military and industrial measures neces-

sary for its conduct, and of the varied problems to be solved by the nation.

II. That this work should be forwarded systematically, by public lectures under the direction of an organized bureau, in close co-operation with state and city defense committees, educational authorities, chambers of commerce, agricultural, labor, fraternal, patriotic and religious organizations.

III. That we particularly recommend the organization, by States, of Speakers' Bureaus, utilizing existing forces as far as possible, and that we request the Committee on Patriotism Through Education to immediately undertake this work.

IV. That the Handbook prepared by the Committee on Patriotism Through Education, and now being revised, be especially commended to speakers, writers and readers on the war.

V. That we suggest that the speakers should emphasize:

(1) The patriotic obligation of supporting, with singleness of purpose, the President and Federal Government in all their plans for the effective conduct of the war;

(2) That politics has no proper place in war policies;

(3) That no dual allegiance or hyphenated citizenship be tolerated, but that the public service should be open to all loyal citizens, regardless of racial origin;

(4) That the cause of the Allies is our cause and that loyalty to the United States involves understanding of and loyalty to the nations that fight alongside of us, and we recommend the withholding of criticism of our Allies, either through the press, cartoons, moving pictures, or the stage, as weakening the united forces in the fight for civilization;

(5) That, as a war measure, the concentration of the fullest administrative powers in the hands of individuals, if coupled with responsibility, is consistent with American ideals;

(6) That, as democracy rests upon freedom of speech and of the press, the people are entitled to all the facts regarding the war, so far as consistent with the conduct of military and naval operations.

(7) That, in the language of our President, "No nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid."

(Leaflet issued by National Security League.)

(b) [§236] The War Speech (April 2, 1917).

BY PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON.

Gentlemen of the Congress:

I have called the Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious, very serious, choices of policy to be made, and made immediately, which it was neither right nor constitutionally permissible that I should assume the responsibility of making.

SUBMARINE POLICY.

On the third of February last I officially laid before you the extraordinary announcement of the Imperial German Govern-

ment that on and after the first day of February it was its purpose to put aside all restraints of law or of humanity and use its submarines to sink every vessel that sought to approach either the ports of Great Britain and Ireland or the western coasts of Europe or any of the ports controlled by the enemies of Germany within the Mediterranean. . . .

The new policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their destination, their errand, have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents.

Even hospital ships and ships carrying relief to the sorely bereaved and stricken people of Belgium, though the latter were provided with safe-conduct through the prescribed areas by the German Government itself and were distinguished by unmistakable marks of identity, have been sunk with the same reckless lack of compassion or of principle. . . .

I am not now thinking of the loss of property involved, immense and serious as that is, but only the wanton and wholesale destruction of the lives of noncombatants, men, women and children, engaged in pursuits which have always, even in the darkest periods of modern history, been deemed innocent and legitimate. Property can be paid for; the lives of peaceful and innocent people cannot be.

The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind. It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it.

COURSE TO VINDICATE HUMAN RIGHTS.

The choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation of counsel and a temperateness of judgment befitting our character and our motives as a nation. We must put excited feeling away. Our motives will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, or human right, of which we are only a single champion. . . .

The German Government denies the right of neutrals to use arms at all within the areas of the sea which it has proscribed, even in the defense of rights which no modern publicist has ever questioned their right to defend. The intimation is conveyed that the armed guards which we have placed on our merchant ships will be treated as beyond the pale of law and subject to be dealt with as pirates would be.

Armed neutrality is ineffectual enough at best; in such circumstances and in the face of such pretensions it is worse than ineffectual; it is likely once to produce what it was meant to prevent; it is virtually certain to draw us into war without either the rights or the effectiveness of belligerents.

There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making: we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrong against which we now array ourselves are not common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of human life.

ASKS CONGRESS TO DECLARE STATE OF WAR.

With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense, but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war.

What this will involve is clear. It will involve the utmost practicable co-operation in counsel and action with the Governments now at war with Germany, and as incident to that, the extension to those Governments of the most liberal financial credits, in order that our resources may, so far as possible, be added to theirs. It will involve the organization and mobilization of all the material resources of the country to supply the material of war and serve the incidental needs of the nation in the most abundant and yet the most economical and efficient way possible.

It will involve the immediate full equipment of the navy in all respects, but particularly in supplying it with the best means of dealing with the enemy's submarines. It will involve the immediate addition to the armed forces of the United States already provided for by law in case of war, at least 500,000 men, who should, in my opinion, be chosen upon the principle of universal liability to service, and also the authorization of subsequent additional increments of equal force so soon as they may be needed and can be handled in training. . . .

WANTS THE WORLD TO KNOW AMERICA'S MOTIVE.

While we do these things—these deeply momentous things—let us be very clear, and make very clear to all the world what our motives and our objects are. . . . Our object . . . is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world against selfish and autocratic power and to set up among the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles.

Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people.

We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances . . .

“WE HAVE NO QUARREL WITH THE GERMAN PEOPLE.”

We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling toward them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their Government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. . . .

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic Government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plotting of inner circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interests of their own. . . .

GERMAN SPIES HERE EVEN BEFORE WAR BEGAN.

Indeed, it is now evident that its spies were even here before the war began; and it is unhappily not a matter of conjecture, but a fact proved in our courts of justice, that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under the personal direction of official agents of the Imperial Government accredited to the Government of the United States.

Even in checking these things and trying to extirpate them, we have sought to put the most generous interpretation possible upon them because we knew that their source lay, not in any hostile feeling or purpose of the German people towards us (who were, no doubt, as ignorant of them as we ourselves were), but only in the selfish designs of a Government that did what it pleased and told its people nothing. But they have played their part in serving to convince us at last that that Government entertains no real friendship for us and means to act against our peace and security at its convenience. That it means to stir up enemies against us at our very doors the intercepted note to the German Minister at Mexico City is eloquent evidence.

We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that in such a Government, following such methods, we can never have a friend; and that in the presence of its organized power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no assured security of the democratic governments of the world.

“ABOUT TO ACCEPT GAGE OF BATTLE.”

We are now about to accept gage of battle with this natural foe of liberty, and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German

people included; for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty.

We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been as secure as the faith and the freedom of the nations can make them.

Just because we fight without rancor and without selfish object, seeking nothing for ourselves but what we shall wish to share with all free people, we shall, I feel confident, conduct our operations as belligerents without passion and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the principles of right and of fair play we profess to be fighting for. . . .

It will be all the easier for us to conduct ourselves as belligerents in a high spirit of right and fairness because we act without animus, not in enmity toward a people or with the desire to bring any injury or disadvantage upon them, but only in armed opposition to an irresponsible Government which has thrown aside all considerations of humanity and of right and is running amuck.

We are, let me say again, the sincere friends of the German people, and shall desire nothing so much as the early re-establishment of intimate relations of mutual advantage between us, however hard it may be for them, for the time being, to believe that this is spoken from our hearts.

AFFRONTS PATIENTLY BORNE FOR MANY MONTHS.

We have borne with their present Government through all these bitter months because of that friendship, exercising a patience and forbearance which would otherwise have been impossible. We shall, happily, still have an opportunity to prove that friendship in our daily attitude and actions toward the millions of men and women of German birth and native sympathy who live among us and share our life, and we shall be proud to prove it toward all who are in fact loyal to their neighbors and to the Government in the hour of test.

They are, most of them, as true and loyal Americans as if they had never known any other fealty or allegiance. They will be prompt to stand with us in rebuking and restraining the few who may be of a different mind and purpose.

If there should be disloyalty it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression; but if it lifts its head at all it will lift it only here and there, and without countenance except from a lawless and malignant few.

THE RIGHT MORE PRECIOUS THAN PEACE.

It is a distressing and oppressive duty, gentlemen of the Congress, which I have performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great, peaceful people into

war—into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance.

But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free people as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.

To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.

CHAPTER VI.

TRUE PREPAREDNESS FOR WAR.

A. [§237] GENERAL REFERENCES ON THE CHAPTER.

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"Fortifications in Coast Defense"; "Marine Corps"; "Martial

Law"; "Military and Naval Expenditure"; "Military Law";

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2. Tremendous Scale of Modern Warfare.

- (a) Great number of men put in the field
- (b) Immense provision of clothing, equipment, etc.
- (c) Vast quantity of the most modern weapons.
- (d) Profusion of food and necessaries.
- (e) Enormous hospital and ambulance service.
- (f) Abundant adjunct services of aeroplanes, etc.
- (g) Land transportation on a gigantic scale; railroads, light railroads, trolley lines, trucks, automobiles, wagons, horse and mule transport, man power, etc.
- (h) Profusion of naval ships and supplies, including hundreds of destroyers and submarines, etc.

3. War Will Be a Failure Without Similar Provisions by the United States.

- (a) Present organization by the U. S. Government.
- (b) Hearty co-operation by states, cities, and local governments.
- (c) Work of private societies and organizations.
- (d) Duty of the individual to take part in some kind of organization.

4. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§239] Military Needs of the United States (1915).

BY EX-SECRETARY OF WAR HENRY L. STIMSON.

In any discussion of the military needs of this country the first thing to be avoided is the formulation of any ill-matured suggestions by civilians who have no special knowledge on the subject. Constant change and lack of continuity have been characteristic faults from which our military policy has suffered since the beginning of our national history. . . .

NATIONAL DEFENSIVE NEEDS.

The army and navy are peculiar sufferers from our "pork barrel" system, which is the result of our lack of any national executive budget. So long as the men who are responsible for the efficiency of these two services as a whole—the Secretaries of War and of the Navy—have no hand in the preparation of a budget and no voice to defend such a budget on the floor of the Houses of Congress, while the men who wish to spend the army and navy appropriations upon unnecessary army posts or unfit navy yards have such a voice as well as a vote, a great degree of waste and extravagance is sure to result. Our military system can never be made highly or permanently efficient until a budget system is adopted in this country similar to that which exists in substantially all other

civilized countries. This general governmental need is the first need of our army and navy.

Roughly stated, our national defensive needs, as discussed in the above enumerated report of the General Staff, and as agreed to by all competent military and naval authorities, are comprised under the following heads:

First—An adequate and efficient navy as the primary line of defense.

Second—An adequate system of coast defense to prevent the naval bombardment of our principal seaports and cities.

Third—A small but highly efficient regular army to serve in time of peace as a protection against civil disorder; in time of war as a temporary protection against invasion; and in times of both peace and war to be a pattern and nucleus for the organization of the larger citizens' army upon which, in any serious conflict, our protection must ultimately depend.

Fourth—A citizens' army composed of men who do not make arms their vocation, but who have been willing to spend a short portion of their lives in undergoing the training which modern methods of war make absolutely necessary as a condition of usefulness on the battlefield.

A very brief discussion of the deficiencies of each one of these four classes and the need of immediate steps to remedy it is all that can be brought within the scope of this report.

THE NAVY.

In our need of an adequate and efficiency navy the United States comes second only to Great Britain. We have 21,000 miles of coast line and a rapidly increasing commerce to defend. The general purpose of a navy is purely defensive, although tactically it must always be able to act on the offensive for the purpose of making effective defense of the country. Standing by itself, a navy is not designed for military aggression, such as the invasion of another country. Its function, on the contrary, is to defend our own country and our commerce against such aggression. Yet, in order to do this, it must be able to seek the enemy's fleet and attack it wherever the conditions for American success are most certain. To scatter the fleet or to tie it down to operations near our own coast is to destroy its real defensive ability. In the Napoleonic wars, England was saved from invasion by victories of her fleet which took place hundreds of miles away from her coasts; and a policy which would prevent our own fleet from adopting such a course of operation would be hazardous to our safety.

These considerations, in addition to the fact that we have distant foreign possessions, require that we should have a sea-going navy of adequate size and efficiency. The many vital questions which are still unsettled in naval tactics require that we should have a navy which is up-to-date in all of the various branches of the service.

As a matter of fact, naval authorities today agree that not only has our navy been falling behind, in its general relative strength, to that of other nations, but it is strikingly

deficient in certain vital particulars. It is extremely short in personnel; it is deficient in the number of our capital ships; it has no battle cruisers and practically no scout cruisers; it is extremely lacking in effective submarines and destroyers.

In view of the fact that the navy is practically our only existing defense today, its needs should meet with the promptest and most earnest attention.

COAST DEFENSE.

Our system of coast defense is the best relative condition of any of our land defenses. But its function is very limited. Its purpose is merely to protect our sea-coast cities from a naval raid and damage such as recently befell Scarborough and Hartlepool. It offers no defense against an enemy who has control of the sea and can land an army at any unprotected point of our huge coast line.

Even in our coast defense there are great deficiencies. Our military policy contemplates that its personnel should be supplied half from the regular army and half from the militia. Substantially 50 per cent. of each of these two quotas is lacking and in the case of a sudden emergency, against which it is the purpose of the coast defense to be a protection, many of our forts would be hopelessly undermanned. The amount of ammunition is deficient. The plans of our military advisers contemplate only sufficient ammunition for an hour's firing. The actual supply at present is very considerably behind even that most modest standard and, in many cases of our most important seacoast guns, would be sufficient for only thirty or forty minutes' firing. . . .

THE CITIZENS' ARMY.

It has been the historic policy of this country to depend upon a voluntary army of citizens, called out at the outbreak of war, to defend it in case of any serious conflict. The development of the art of war during the last half-century has been such as to make radical changes in this policy necessary if it is to be successful. Hitherto we have relied upon training and equipping our volunteers after the outbreak of war. In our previous wars we have escaped disaster under this method largely on account of conditions which will in all probability never occur again. In the Civil War we were fighting against an enemy who was as unprepared as ourselves. Each side trained the other as the conflict proceeded. In the War of 1812 we were fighting a nation which was almost wholly absorbed in a great European war and which spent very little attention upon us. Yet in that war we called out, from first to last, 527,000 men to defend us against an enemy which never had a force of 16,000 men in the field at any one time, and whose total forces throughout the war aggregated only about 54,000 altogether. We were defeated in most of our battles, and we lost our capitol at Washington after a force of 5,400 untrained Americans had run away from less than 1,500 British on suffering a loss of only eight killed.

We can safely assume that any serious antagonist whom

we shall have in the future will not be unprepared. Modern war is fought with weapons which require time to construct and training to use to an extent hitherto unknown. Our citizens today are wholly unaccustomed to the use of the military rifle, let alone the modern field piece. The training, equipment and discipline of the modern army is much more complicated than that of fifty years ago and requires very much greater time and expert knowledge. The conditions surrounding the raising and equipment of a force of citizen soldiery have therefore completely changed since the Civil War. To attempt to organize such a force of volunteers in the way in which we did it then would be to invite disaster against practically any army of modern Europe.

TRAINING OF MEN AND OFFICERS.

Under these circumstances it is inevitable that new and broader foundations must be laid for the creation of a body of citizen soldiery in time of war; provision must be made for the training of a force of reserve officers to constitute the junior officers of such a force. Steps have already been taken by the War Department, in the institution of summer camps, where young school and college graduates can, in association with the regular army, get a brief intensive training. We believe that this should be supplemented by a legislation permitting the graduates of such camps to obtain temporary commissions as junior officers in the regular army, on condition of becoming thereafter reserve officers, subject to call in time of war.

Provision should also be made for general training in rifle shooting among our young men both in schools and in colleges. To this end we call attention to the steps which have already been taken in Switzerland and Australia—two of the most advanced and liberal governments in the world—where, from early boyhood, their young men are trained to use the rifle as a necessary part of their education. In these two countries representing in their respective ways the most advanced types of modern democracy and going hand in hand with their freedom of thought and liberalism we find the doctrine that every man owes to his country not only to die for her if necessary but also to spend a little of his life in learning how to die for her effectively. We believe that the institution of a somewhat similar system in this country is not only highly important with a view to its defense in the time of war but we believe that the necessary self-control and discipline which is inherent to such training would be highly conducive to the moral, mental and physical betterment of our youth in time of peace.

WAR MATERIAL.

Finally we find that there is a great shortage in the material in this country necessary to equip a citizens' army for war; particularly in the vital element of field artillery and field artillery ammunition. Such equipment cannot be extemporized nor can it always be purchased after war breaks

out. It takes at least five months for the manufacture of a modern battery of field guns within the United States. At present we have in stock but little more than half the necessary number of field guns to equip a citizens' army of the minimum size believed by our military advisers to be necessary. And we have ammunition sufficient to serve those guns at the rate ammunition is now used, rather less than one day and a half of fighting. We are very insufficient in aeroplanes, being outranked by at least thirteen other nations. Immediate steps should be taken to bring up these shortages.

Taken as a whole, we find that the condition of military unpreparedness of the United States is most serious and lamentable. We believe it is the duty of our citizens, without respect to party, to take the present occasion, when the interest of the country has been aroused by the European war, for insisting that Congress give to the subject its most earnest attention to the end that the foregoing deficiencies may be speedily remedied.

(National Security League, *Document* No. 2; 1915.)

(b) [§240] Organization of a Modern Army.

BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR HENRY J. BRECKENRIDGE

(December, 1915).

Five years ago about this time I was sitting in the office of a prominent Baltimore attorney. I was talking army to him. He was an unusually intelligent man, conservative, fairly learned, at least in the law, and with a reasonable knowledge of affairs. In the course of the conversation he asked me: "Why should a man go into the army? What is there in it to make it a life work? After he has learned to drill and shoot, his life is simply a matter of routine. Larger talents do not bring any larger financial returns. And, altogether, I cannot see that the army is any place for a man who wishes to make the most of his resources, intellect and character."

The attitude of this man is not an uncommon one among intelligent Americans. The European war has drawn the attention of the public mind to things military to an unwonted degree. But there remains on the part of many people a lack of appreciation of what the military service is, of what is required to make a soldier and an officer, and of the fact that the military profession, of a verity, is a learned profession. Despite the vivid demonstration of the last year, there still lingers the impression in some quarters that all you have to do to make a soldier is to put a uniform on his back, shoes on his feet, rifle in his hand, give him ammunition, a knapsack, and the untrained American patriot is prepared to cope with the best trained soldier in the world. The task yet remains to dispel completely the illusion that a sword in the hand, a strap on the shoulder, and the fire of patriotism in the eye of the American volunteer are all that is required to make an officer fit to lead the improvised soldier to victorious conflict with trained armies.

PURPOSE OF THE ARTICLE.

What is endeavored to be demonstrated in this article is that the army is a learned profession; that to be a successful officer of the army requires as high a development of the intellect and character as is needed for success in any other learned profession; that the army is not only a learned profession, but that it is a learned profession with as many intricate, clearly defined, and difficult specialties as are to be found, for instance, in the great profession of medicine.

There are two great divisions of the military profession—first, technical, and, second, tactical and strategical.

I. TECHNICAL.

As medicine has a surgeon, oculist, aurist, gynecologist, pediatrician, psychiatrist, and other specialists, so the army has its surgeon, judge advocate, quartermaster, ordnance officer, engineer and signal officers. The average officer is no more or less fit to perform without preliminary instruction the duties of an ordnance officer, for instance, than is an obstetrician fit to perform an operation for cataract.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

Where do the rifles, bayonets, pistols, scabbards, cartridges, packs, harness, field guns, and mammoth coast artillery cannon come from? Who makes them? Who designs them? The officer of ordnance. A small cartridge looks a simple thing. We speak glibly of great numbers of rifles. Smokeless powder and other high explosives we know to be essential. But we have very little appreciation of what it means to provide them. How many of us appreciate the intricate chemical and mechanical processes required in the manufacture of smokeless powder? How many of us realize that thirty-three complete chemical and mechanical operations have to be gone through with accurately, precisely, carefully, before white cotton, mixed with sulphuric and nitric acids, becomes smokeless powder? And after, with elaborate processes, the powder is made at the Picatinny Arsenal, it must travel from Dover, N. J., to Frankford Arsenal, outside Philadelphia, there to be but an element in the forty complete manufacturing and assembling operations that are required to make a rifle cartridge.

A rifle is a more or less simple-looking mechanism, but to make this rifle 1,223 separate manufacturing operations must be executed.

One round of three-inch shrapnel means 355 operations; to make an automatic pistol, 614, and for the terrible little mitrailleuse, or machine gun, 1,990. The lightest three-inch field gun costs \$1,400, and requires in the making a number of different operations the enumeration of which would be exceedingly tiresome.

And through the different calibres we come to the fourteen-inch coast defense gun made at Watervliet Arsenal at Albany, weighing, when finishing, 138,000 pounds and costing \$55,000, and wound about with 37,000 pounds of wire. The disappearing

carriage for this mighty weapon, that lifts it above the parapet to hurl its mighty missile and racking charge a half score of miles to sea—to attempt to describe its intricacies would but confuse my own and the reader's mind. One of these carriages involves as many as 3,000 separate parts.

It is the officer of the Ordnance Department that must conceive, plan, design, manufacture, issue, and repair all this category of material which goes to make up the implements of an army. What must he know to perform these functions? What must be his training to guide with efficiency the labor of the 6,000 workmen in the six great establishments where the ordnance material of the army is made? . . .

In addition the material that is manufactured in the Government arsenals large quantities are purchased from private manufacturers. Procurement by manufacture requires expert knowledge of manufacturing processes, including machine operations, foundry work, forging, pattern making, leather working, woodworking, pressed steel construction, plating, wheel construction, brass drawing, manufacture of powder and high explosives, grinding of lenses, assembling and testing optical instruments, forging and testing armor-piercing projectiles, etc. It further necessitates expert knowledge of power plants, fuels, oils, machinery, raw materials, and electrical installations. In short, it requires all of the expert knowledge necessary for the economical operation of large manufacturing plants, and the greater part of it pertaining to manufacture of the most exacting type. Chemical testing and research work for powders and higher explosives, as well as analyses and tests of oils, paints, etc., are carried on at the Picatinny Arsenal, and metallurgical, chemical and physical tests and research work are carried on at the Watertown Arsenal in connection with the manufacture of iron and steel, physical tests of material for commercial purposes, and microscopical and physical tests for the department. This class of employment requires very exact scientific attainments of the officers in charge.

SIGNAL CORPS.

Experimental work in general, tests of powder and material, are conducted at the Sandy Hook Proving Ground. For this employment intimate knowledge of interior and exterior ballistics, action of powder and explosives, and manipulation of delicate electrical and other testing instruments are required.

One of the greatest advances made in the art of war during recent years has to do with the service of information. The motorcycle, the swift automobile, the land military telegraph line, field telephone systems, field wireless telegraph outfits, and the aeroplane have revolutionized the system of communication and of obtaining information. The great service of information is specialized in by the Signal Corps, and the efficient handling of all the apparatus that pertains to this service can only be by highly trained and experienced individuals. In case of war a thousand patriots might rush forward for service in the aviation corps. By the time the war was over they might have obtained sufficient knowledge to make them useful.

ENGINEER CORPS.

The engineer is another essential military specialist. The swift building of a pontoon bridge over turbulent streams may be required to win a victory or save an army. Military engineering consists, broadly, of the application of engineering science for the accomplishment of military purposes. And military engineering, therefore, requires an extensive knowledge of military art and also of the art of the engineer. He builds all the harbor defenses. He must be an expert in field engineering in all its branches, including fortifications, the use of explosives, construction of bridges, roads and field railroads, reconnoissance and survey, including field astronomy, photography, and lithography. He must have knowledge of electrical and mechanical engineering, which is required in the operation of searchlights, electrical mines, lighting plants, and power machinery for carrying out all sorts of field work.

MEDICAL CORPS.

It is very natural for the query to arise in one's mind as to why any good doctor would not make an efficient medical officer of the army. There are many reasons. In the first place, the problem of administration in the Army Medical Corps presents features not dealt with in private practice. And the great field of military sanitation as applied in the military service by medical officers is a distinct specialty. It embraces the subjects taught in post-graduate courses in some of the most progressive medical schools under the caption of "Public Health and Preventive Medicine." It includes also those special measures which have been developed entirely within the military service for the care of troops in the field, where large bodies of men are brought together without the modern methods of waste disposal available in towns and cities. A few years ago it was considered impossible for troops to continue to camp on the same ground for a longer period than two weeks without camp diseases becoming epidemic. At the present time in the United States Army, even under unfavorable conditions of climate and terrain, troops remain on the same ground under canvas for indefinite periods, with a continuously low sick list. The special knowledge necessary to inaugurate and maintain these conditions is of the highest importance to the health of the army and to its battle efficiency. Again, the recruitment, instruction, and control of the Hospital Corps and the Army Nurse Corps is a special field for the military surgeon.

The establishment of aid stations, dressing stations, hospitals, and other formations for the care of sick and wounded on the field of battle; the medical officer must understand where these formations should be established in order to obtain the best results, and at the same time not interfere with the movement of ammunition trains, reserves, or other bodies of troops necessary to battle success. To enable him to perform these duties successfully and to obtain a reasonable degree of protection from fire for his wounded, a medical officer must have knowledge of the range and trajectory of projectiles; he must be able

to read a map and to estimate therefrom the places most protected from rifle fire, from artillery fire; the most direct lines of aid to the front and for the evacuation of wounded to the rear; the slopes that are prohibitory for wheeled vehicles, the places where watercourses may be forded, etc. In short, the Medical Corps of the army is the great conserving agency of a destructive organization. To wage war successfully, the greatest amount of destruction must be visited upon the armed forces of the enemy. For this end is required the utmost conservation of the health, energies, and life of the army. And to this great end the highly trained and specialized Medical Corps is absolutely essential.

QUARTERMASTER CORPS.

The capacity for organization and administration required of officers in the Quartermaster Corps of the army is at least equal to that required in the great supply departments of any of the combinations of capital and units of economic production in the world. Problems of paying, feeding, clothing, and transporting armies and their supplies are full of complexities and difficulties, the enumeration of which space does not permit. Nothing is more true than the oft-quoted and vigorous statement that an army marches on its belly. A single weak link in the chain of the supply system may lose a battle, and an uneducated and untrained quartermaster is as useless and defective as would be a novice in the control of the great power plants that have harnessed the falls of Niagara.

JUDGE ADVOCATE.

It may seem a strange statement that the army must have attorneys and counselors just as much as the United States Steel Corporation must have them. For instance, the present Judge Advocate General of the Army, upon the institution of American government in the Philippine Islands, completely organized the various departments of government on the civil side. Of his work, ex-President Taft, the President of the Philippine Commission, which succeeded the Military Governor as the governing authority in the Philippine Islands, said that "Colonel Crowder's activities were limited only by what would be the limitations of a civil government and legislature." Under his administration there were prepared customs regulations, coast trade regulations, and the municipal law of the Philippine Islands, which intrusted the people of the province and municipalities with a great part of the management of their local affairs, thus preparing them for the exercise of self-government. He so amended the Spanish code of criminal procedure by a military order as to make it conform to our common law and constitutional principles. This order still governs criminal procedure in the Philippine Islands. He reorganized the courts of the Philippine Islands and was an Associate Justice on the civil side of the Supreme Court for the first year after its reorganization. During the intervention by the United States in Cuba from 1906 to 1909, the present Judge Advocate General was Acting Secretary of State and Justice. He was legal adviser of the Provisional Governor, President of the Advisory Commission.

and in charge of the electoral administration. Laws regulating the registration of voters and the conduct of elections were framed.

In citing this individual record of service in the army's law department I do it to show what may be the career of an army Judge Advocate, and what is required to enable him worthily to meet the demands of such a career.

II. TACTICAL AND STRATEGICAL.

Let us now turn from the consideration of the great technical specialties that are so necessary to the efficiency of an army and consider why it is that the soldier who walks or rides and shoots and fights can lay claim to the respect that is due worthy members of a learned profession.

Why is it that any man who can tote a pack and carry a rifle cannot be transformed immediately into an effective infantryman? Why is it that one who adds to these capabilities some knowledge of horsemanship cannot in the twinkling of an eye, by the donning of a uniform, be a worthy cavalryman, or, with a little training in pointing a gun, be a pretty good artilleryman? And in the higher fields of leadership, why can't any good American organizer, with sound judgment and courage, attain military success in larger operations?

INFANTRY.

Dashing cavalry may effect a brilliant raid in the rear of the enemy and in a hundred ways vindicate and justify its existence and necessity. Many a critical situation may be saved by the steadfastness and power of the field artillery. But the foundation of the army structure is the plodding, trudging, digging, sweating, burden-bearing infantryman. When the lay mind has been persuaded that the technical specialists cannot be improvised and that even the cavalryman and artillerymen must have some modicum of training before efficiency is attained, extremely persistent is the tendency still to think that the very foundation of an army can be summoned into being as if by magic. Many present-day Americans have no experience with horses. And the individual's conviction that one who is a horseman is therefore superior to himself in that particular line is what makes it fairly easy to convince the lay mind of the necessity of adequately trained cavalry. The same thing applies to the field artillery or any branch of the service that has to do with implements more or less mysterious to the ordinary individual through lack of his acquaintance therewith. But everybody knows he can walk and carry a pack on his back at least a little ways and point a rifle and pull a trigger. And thus there seems to have been in the minds of our people, from the first until the present, an abiding illusion that an infantryman can be improvised. But he can't.

A very simple thing it seems to care for one's feet. But as a matter of fact, the care of the feet in marching is an art in itself and if unlearned the ignorance of it will destroy a command. And marching. An improvised army would be marched to death by trained troops before any physical con-

tact need be gained. In manoeuvring for position untrained and unhardened troops would wilt and drop by the waayside in exhaustion, while trained armies were playing hide and seek with them all over the terrain. The mere factor of physical condition, and not general physical condition, but the particular and special physical fitness trained to perform the peculiar task and meet the special exigencies of service as an infantryman in the field, can only be come at by the most rigorous training.

Any one can charge across an open field. But on that field, seeming from a short distance as flat as the palm of one's hand, the trained infantryman, with his knowledge of the use of ground for cover, is about half as likely to die in such a critical undertaking as the unknowing novice.

THE RIFLE.

The modern rifle is an efficient weapon. Its trajectory is flat up to a considerable range. That is, the bullet in passing through its course over a given distance goes on a level in a plane putting everything in its way in danger, and does not have to describe a curve going up and coming down in order to reach a fairly distant mark. The trained soldier knows this, and knows that the slightest depression in the landscape will give him more or less safety from an enemy rifleman. For instance, a greenhorn, in seeking cover, would naturally choose the slope of a hill away from the enemy, when a trained infantryman would know that he would be in greater safety on the other side of that hill where he would be closer to the enemy, but within that range where the enemy's bullets would travel in a flat trajectory and give him a chance to take advantage of the safety afforded by the slightest depression in the ground, rather than remain behind that hill to suffer the long range plunging fire of the enemy.

How little does the ordinary citizen realize the difficulty of becoming a sharpshooter or expert in the use of the military rifle? Most of us have a vague impression that accurate shooting means merely straight pointing. The ordinary layman has little conception, for instance, of the influence of a slight wind on the course of a rifle bullet at a thousand yards' range. For accurate long-distance shooting this influence of wind upon the bullet must be accurately estimated and allowed for by a graduated instrument on the rifle called a wind gauge, and success or failure in sharp-shooting and sniping may well depend upon the accuracy or inaccuracy with which the problem of windage is solved. There is little understanding by most of us of the effect of light conditions—that with one condition of light there is a tendency to aim too high, and with another condition of light that there is a tendency to aim too low, and that all this must be taken into consideration and accurately estimated and provided for in all fine rifle shooting.

MILITARY ORGANIZATION.

Space does not afford to do more than suggest the thousand details that must be mastered by the proficient officer

of infantry. Problems of organization and problems of equipment have to be worked out by the most painstaking and scientific observation and deduction. For instance, only large experience and accurate estimate has established the general principle that the load of the infantryman must not exceed one-third the weight of the individual soldier if the best efficiency is to be obtained. One knows vaguely that soldiers are organized into companies, battalions, regiments, brigades, divisions, and armies, but why is each unit organized as to number and material, as laid down in tables of organization and drill book? The most profound study of experience has taught that certain organizations are best adapted for the handling of given masses of troops. For instance, the company contains the greatest number of men in which the relation of the personal influence of the individual leader or his subordinates can be maintained. And the battalion has worked out to be the normal fighting unit that can best be handled in actual combat by one man's directions when in the fighting are involved large numbers. And the regiment has been found convenient for the purpose of obtaining a proper supervision of the three battalions. The brigade is organized similarly as a convenient organization in which to combine three regiments, while the division, combined as it is of all arms, infantry, cavalry, artillery, and auxiliary troops, comprises that mass of men most suited for transportation on a single road and for action as a unit in great operations where large armies are involved.

Never has the stress of war called forth the moral qualities which present war conditions require of the infantry: To face destruction by the enemy's artillery when he is five or six miles from a point where he himself can inflict injury in return, suffer casualties in advancing over great stretches of ground without firing a shot, to the face the thunderbolts of large calibre guns and howitzers, to endure the rain of death of shrapnel and high explosives, to meet the withering hail of the hell-spitting mitrailleuse, to face the steel-jacketed sheet of rifle fire, even to suffer death at the hands of one's own supporting artillery, cut the wire entanglement, mount the parapet, to give or receive the death thrust of the bayonet's cold steel. This is what modern warfare requires of the infantryman. To meet the test he must be faithfully and arduously trained. And to give him this training there must be developed the learned and successful officer who comprehends his task.

CAVALRY.

The cavalryman must be reasonably proficient in all that pertains to the lore of the infantryman, but, of course, in a lesser degree. In addition he must be a master of the horse. He must know how best to train man and horse, for the trained man increases the power of the horse to render service, and the trained horse makes infinitely less demand upon the physical strength of the rider than does the untrained horse. Mobility is one of the decisive factors in war. Napoleon said that "The power of an army, like the quantity of

movement in mechanics, is measured by the product of its mass by its rate of motion." Nothing requires more care, knowledge, and practical experience than is needed to develop proficiency in conserving the energy and power of the horse. The cavalry officer must be an expert in this, as also he must be an expert in the use of the pistol and sword. Despite the condition of the western European battlefield, with its trenches and intricate field fortifications, highly trained and powerful bodies of cavalry are as essential to the successful conduct of wars as ever.

FIELD ARTILLERY.

Fine appreciation of what field artillery means in modern war was shown by the colored applicant for enlistment in one of the so-called immune regiment recruited in a Southern State during the war with Spain. A colored recruiting sergeant discussing warfare in general and in particular waxed fervent in his exposition, finally ending an animated account of the excitement of war by telling the applicant that in the armies of the world there were even guns that shot a thousand pounds of steel from ten to fifteen miles. "Great Lawd!" said the discouraged patriot, "none of that for me. A man would run all day and be shot at sundown."

This conversation accurately explains the present conditions of war as far as the effects of artillery fire are concerned. Until 1896, when the French developed the recoil rapid-fire firearms, the artillery always occupied directing positions—in other words, posts from which the targets could be seen from the guns. After the adoption of the long recoil system the general rule was and is to occupy masked or indirect firing positions; in other words, positions from which the targets remain invisible to the gunners at artillery ranges hitherto unheard of in war. But now all normal combats are carried on between gunners that cannot possibly see one another. The officer who is observing the firing of his battery may be a couple of miles in front of his guns, tucked away in an observation trench, perched in a tree or on a haystack, connected with his batteries by land telephone. Or the observer may be hovering over the enemy objective about a mile or more in the air, bringing back and signaling back information as to the effect of the fire. To meet these changed conditions a precise system of range finding by various angle-measuring instruments and intricate optical details has been wrought out and mastered.

The responsibility for accurate sighting by the artillery is greater than ever before. It is impossible for the infantry to advance without the fullest support from the artillery. It is necessary that this support be continued until one's own troops are very near to the enemy and that the enemy fire may be beaten down. But to render this support at the right moment without slaughtering one's own soldiers in the excitement and heat of battle is a great problem. Nothing can destroy the morale of infantry more quickly than lack of confidence in the supporting artillery with the consequent fear that in an assault on an enemy's position not only will there be danger from foe, but equal danger from friend. It is easily

seen that the most thorough and arduous training is necessary to obtain the required degree of perfection. The field artillery officer must be an expert in the erection of field telephones and buzzers, in map making, scouting and panoramic sketching. He must be a horse master, an expert in the observation of human and animal energy, a good mathematician, a field astronomer, and possess a character reliable for coolness, steadfastness, and endurance.

COAST ARTILLERY.

The great coast artillery service really demonstrates itself to the ordinary man. Respect is compelled for the men who handle the giant guns of our harbor defenses, operate the intricate machinery necessary for their manipulation, and execute the complicated calculations that have to be made in estimating ranges. A gun that shoots a projectile weighing a ton 20,000 yards and develops a muzzle energy of approximately 126,000 foot tons speaks for itself. These are the guns that make it possible for the fire to seek the bors in important cities to the protection of the coast artillery as far as the danger of attack from a hostile fleet is concerned. This is the service that offers an asylum to the fleet in case it needs such asylum in the face of a superior enemy or after having been roughly handled. It need not be assumed that the coast artillery protects the coasts. We have about 5,000 miles of coast line, about 300 miles of which are under the potential protection of coast defense guns.

(*New York Times Magazine*, Dec. 5, 1916.)

(c) [§241] A Fable for Everybody.

BY GEORGE ADE.

A Marriage Broker was trying to promote an Alliance so as to get his piece of the Dowry. He said to the young man, "She's a nice Girl. Go home, take a Bath, put on your Good Clothes, go and talk to her; I think it will be all right." The Young Man was skeptical. "The trouble is," he said, "I might go home and take a Bath, and then she wouldn't have me after all!"

We must convince people who shrink from contact with Cold Porcelain that a Bath isn't a bad idea, whether you are going to get married or not!

We must drive home to a lot of Nice People the important Fact that whether the entry of the United States means Real War or merely the opening of a new Commissary, we need Universal Military Training. This country is first in the production of a good many things, but our largest and surest crop—the one that never fails—is the Crop of half-baked Liabilities, between the ages of 15 and 25.

TRAINING GOOD FOR BOYS.

Whether you find him at the Corner of 42nd and Broadway, or on a Depot Platform in Indiana, or steering a Ford through the corn-fields of Kansas, the delightful specimen of Young America, who has just turned 18 and who knows more than his

Parents, is the most obtrusive item in the Picture. Young men are fresh the world over, but the American club is fresher than Green Paint, than which nothing could be fresher.

Some time it would seem that all the women who Didn't Raise their Boys to be Soldiers raised them to be Vaudeville Performers. Nowhere else in the world do Young People accept so lightly in such a take-it-for-granted manner the enormous Sacrifices made in their behalf.

Nowhere else is the directing advice of Elderly People received with such good-natured Contempt.

Nowhere else do Young Folks have so little regard for Vested Authority.

They are too old to spank, but we can line them up and try to convince them that this World is not all Rag-time and Cigarettes.

We can teach them to respect the Flag, obey orders and get at least a glimmering conception of the Eternal Law of Compensation—that he who takes must also give.

TIME TO HIT BACK.

We are now at war with Germany. We have not struck back, but we have taken Blows in the Face, and either we must retaliate or cease to claim relationship with the Human Race. There is no need to Talk Preparedness and Military Service to Intelligent People. They are in favor of striking hard. We must be of some Real Help to the men who have been fighting our Battles. We must devise ways and means of arousing our Fellow Citizens so that they will take up the tasks of this war with Burning Enthusiasm and not with Reluctance.

This is a good time for all of us to say that, regardless of Old Affiliations, we are now ready to follow any Leadership that will courageously show us how to defend our National Honor. And we are against any former Room-Mate who gets Cold Feet at a time like this.

Up to this time the Germans have done all they can to convince Americans that we must battle for our rights or go out of business. They have violated our Hospitality by Infamous Plots. They have murdered our People. They have struck down our Flag. Every time we began to cool down from one insult they landed us Another, just as a Slight Token of Contempt. The Germans have been the best Allies of Patriotic Americans.

REASONS FOR REAL WAR.

Real War will be waged against Germany when all sections of this country are convinced that our most sacred interests are acutely involved. Plenty of people regard the War in Europe as a mere upheaval of Explosive Elements. It is no more related to them than a Famine in India or a Tornado in an Adjoining State. It is something to feel sorry about, but nothing has happened which can materially affect "me and my wife or my son John and his wife." These kindly souls have been told for years that when wheat is \$1.50 a Bushel, and Corn brings a dollar, and Hogs are \$14 a hundred on the hoof, then all is well

in the World, and no one should seek to revise a Destiny which is already 100 per cent perfect.

It is pretty hard to convince these Good People that the War is a Final Struggle between Despotism and Democracy, and that if the Allies lose, every man in the remotest corner of the United States must get ready to wear a Collar made in Germany.

Many of them seem to believe that now, as we enter the War, we are taking up an Idle Quarrel over the Loss of Property. They want to refer the whole thing to a Claim Agent. Let us show them, if we can, that we are fighting to defend our very existence as a free government. We are fighting to win back our Self Respect, without which we are a Pauper Nation.

(d) [§242] Need of Preparedness.

BY PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON (January, 1916.)

It would be a hopeless piece of provincialism to suppose that because we think differently from the rest of the world, we are at liberty to assume that the rest of the world will permit us to enjoy that thought without disturbance.

How can Americans differ about the safety of America?

They (the American people) will at no time seek a contest, but they will at no time cravenly avoid it. Because if there is one thing that the country ought to fight for, and that every nation ought to fight for, it is the integrity of its own convictions. We cannot surrender our convictions.

Think of asking men who can be easily drawn, to come into the field, crude, ignorant, inexperienced, and merely furnish the stuff for camp fever and the bullets of the enemy—we have got the men to waste, but God forbid that we should waste them.

A nation like this should be ashamed to use an inefficient instrument.

I know that peace costs something, and that the only way in which you can maintain peace is by thoroughly enjoying the respect of everybody with whom you deal.

We must go at once to the task of training a very considerable body of men to the use of arms and the life of camps.

I want you to let everybody who comes within earshot of you know that you are a partisan for the adequate preparation of the United States for national defense.

If I am to maintain the honor of the United States, and it should be necessary to exert the force of the United States to do it, have you made the force ready? You know that you have not.

Whenever the ordinary rules of commerce at sea and of international relationship are apt to be thrust aside or ignored, there is danger of the more critical kind of controversy.

America has done more than care for her own people and think of her own fortunes. She has said, ever since the time of President Monroe, that she was the champion of freedom and the separate sovereignty of peoples throughout the Western Hemisphere. She is trustee for those ideals and she is pledged, deeply and permanently pledged, to keep those momentous promises.

We are asking ourselves shall we be prepared to defend our homes and our shores?

Stand ready, and insist that everybody who represents you should stand ready, to provide the means for maintaining the honor of the United States.

Do you want it (the voice of the United States) to be only a voice of insistence? Do you want the situation to be such that all that the President can do is to write messages, to utter words of protest?—Do you wish to have all the world say that the flag of the United States, which we love, can be stained with impunity?

I have come out to tell you from my own knowledge that circumstances over which we have no control may at some time, whether we will or not, draw us into difficulties which will make it absolutely necessary that we should be adequately prepared for national defense.

(Extracts from Speeches in Middle West.)

C. [§243] PREPARATION OF MEN.

1. Specific References on the Section.

See §§131-133, 140-141 above.

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2. How to be Provided.

- (a) Big permanent standing army dangerous and undesirable.
- (b) State militia forces inadequate for the great task.
- (c) Voluntary enlistment irregular and distributes the burdens unequally.
- (d) A national army raised by "selected conscription" the only solution.

3. Reason for Universal Military Service.

- (a) Defense of the State by all able-bodied men who are needed, is an inherent duty.
- (b) Constitution of the United States authorizes "raising armies"; means raising them in such ways as may be necessary for the purpose.
- (c) Men were drafted in the Revolution, War of 1812 and the Civil War.
- (d) This universal duty equivalent to duty of paying taxes and of voting.

4. Method of Selective Conscription Now in Force.

- (a) Digest of the statute of May, 1917.
- (b) President's Proclamation of May, 1917.
- (c) Registration day of June 5th.
- (d) Method of drawing men out of the registration lists.
- (e) Fairness of thus distributing the duty of service equally among all the States.
- (f) Principle and application of exemptions.

5. Training of Soldiers.

- (a) Cannot begin till camps are established, and clothing and supplies are ready.
- (b) Proper length of intensive training from three to nine months.
- (c) Absolute necessity of training in modern warfare, such as trenches, bombs, machine guns, mines, aeroplanes, etc.

6. Supply of Trained Officers.

- (a) Absolutely necessary for any efficient service.
- (b) Regular officers so far as they go, especially in high commands.
- (c) Militia officers and experienced soldiers so far as available.
- (d) Competent men from schools, workshops and farms.
- (e) Absolute necessity of trained officers—no political brigadiers.

7. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§244] Weakness of the Volunteer System.

BY PETER CLARK MACFARLANE.

FAILURE ON THE BORDER IN 1916.

Congress made an attempt to supply this lack of expansion joints in our military system by Federalizing the National Guard and, fortunately, the plan was immediately put to a test in the call for mobilization upon the Mexican border. The result was half ludicrous, half tragic. What turned up at the border was a mass of the best-hearted boys and men in America, but they were not an army.

Theoretically the call of the President on June 18, 1916, added 140,000 trained soldiers to the forces of the United States; and by July 30, 110,000 of the militia were actually on the border; but 45,000 out of the 110,000 were absolutely green men, and, taking the regiments as a whole, they were not equipped for war. There were machine-gun companies without machine guns; there were troops of cavalry without horses; there were horses without shoes; there were field pieces without the animals to draw them, and artillery officers who did not know how to give the necessary commands to fire their guns.

Even after these regiments had been in border camp as long as from two to four months, many of them were still unfit for service, and United States regular army officers were conducting inspections to determine the degree of their readiness, and were rendering written reports thereon.

"It is not fit to take the field in active operations," is a comment often found in these inspectors' returns. And "37 per cent. of green men;" "42 per cent. green;" "over 88 per cent. joined after the call," are notes that tell their own story of the untutored character of these theoretically trained troops.

One great argument for the volunteer army in America has been that in this country everybody is accustomed to the use of firearms. Evidently that day is going. "Of those armed with the rifle, 382 had not fired before the call," is one observation; "494 men had not fired prior to the call and only ten rounds since," is another. Yet the report adds encouragingly: "Men and officers earnest and energetic."

Occasionally a regiment gets something distinctly uncomplimentary pinned upon it, as, for instance: "Officers and men deficient in training and experience necessary for proper care of themselves, men and animals in actual field service." "It would take three months to make these men into good soldiers," and "Could be made efficient in six months," are illuminating reflections upon others. "It will require a year's training to make them efficient," was the pessimistic plaint about another.

But sometimes the reports have a hopeful ring: "The men

look hardy and healthy, and are beginning to look and march like soldiers;" and "three months would make them very good troops." Occasionally, too, the men did better than the officers, and weeding out had to be recommended. "Some of the officers have not made good and should be replaced," is an example.

. . .

VOLUNTEERING NEVER DID WORK.

In the Revolution the voluntary system gave us 89,000 men in the first year, but left us flat with only 29,000 in the last year; and that at a time when bounties of money and land offered as inducements to the individual to volunteer for his country's service had reached as high as \$1,200. Furthermore, this system left the Thirteen States in critical moments with armies that were insignificant, and there was a day when the destinies of the young republic hung by the slender thread of an army of 4,000 men, which was all that Washington could muster when he crossed the Delaware at Trenton.

In the War of 1812 the voluntary system served us even worse. As the result of the short-enlistment period, over half a million different men were mustered into service in a two-year war in which the total force of regular troops landed here by the English invaders was under 20,000. Moreover, the volunteers in our land forces did not conduct themselves in a way to make us proud. Our cheeks flush at the memory of what happened at Detroit, and we hang our heads entirely over the fiasco at Washington when an American alleged army, after sustaining a loss of only eight killed and eleven wounded, abandoned the nation's capital to a British army very much inferior in size. In fact, the single important land engagement of that time which is distinctly to our credit was the Battle of New Orleans; and in that Jackson would undoubtedly have captured the entire British army had not 800 militia on his right failed him by breaking under the attack of a slight English force—thus throwing away a great opportunity. It was fortunate for the volunteer system that Great Britain was too busy with Napoleon to give much attention to the tiny affair on this side of the Atlantic. She fought it in about the way she is to-day fighting the German colonists in East Africa.

THE PRICE OF A VOLUNTEER ARMY.

The record of the militia for inefficiency in this war of 1812 so disgusted Thomas Jefferson that he, always a militia advocate, came out for universal service. According to Frederic L. Heidekoper, in his remarkable book, "The Military Unpreparedness of the United States," the great tribune of democracy wrote to James Monroe:

"It proves more forcibly the necessity of obliging every citizen to be a soldier. This was the case with the Greeks and Romans, and must be that of every free State. Where there is no oppression there will be no pauper hirelings. We must train and classify the whole of our male citizens, and make military instruction a regular part of collegiate education. We can never be safe till this is done."

Nevertheless, in the Mexican War the voluntary system and

period enlistment still flourished and played their fatal tricks. General Scott, for instance, was suddenly halted in his triumphant progress from Vera Cruz to the City of Mexico by discovering that the twelve-month enlistment of seven out of eleven of his volunteer regiments had expired. Did they re-enlist? They did not; and he saw 4,000, or more than one-third of his army, leave him in the midst of an enemy's country; and had to sit down and wait for re-enforcements.

The Civil War, of course, is the classic instance of great American volunteer armies, and here the short-term enlistment was responsible for early disaster, the tragedy of the first Bull Run being due to the hurling of raw troops into action in great haste lest their term of enlistment should expire before they had fired a gun. To be sure, later enlistments were for three years; but before the war was half over the volunteer system had failed, and both sides were resorting to the draft. With this is the North went the petty practice of hiring substitutes. The country was also treated to the scandal of bounty jumping. Besides, the number of desertions under the volunteer system was astounding, being placed on high authority at over half a million out of 2,700,000 enlistments. . . .

(*Collier's*, LIX, 6; March 17, 1917.)

[§245] Democracy of Universal Service.

But there are certain highly commendable features, aside from its effectiveness as an instrument of national defense. One of these is its essential democracy. Rich and poor alike must serve, the sons of the Revolutionary sire and the sons of the immigrant. All will be reduced to the common level of duty to their country, and relationship will be upon the basis of the essential manliness of the individual. The result will inevitably be a better understanding between the classes and between the races; the consequence of better understanding will be better liking, better Americanism, and a readier solution of those problems of assimilation and social adjustment that confront the nation to-day. Indeed, it is doubtful if any instrument or institution would prove so effective in unifying and co-ordinating the human elements in the United States as this one. For that alone it would be worth its costs.

Such a fighting force, moreover, does away with the widow and orphan because it takes for war the young man who has not yet assumed the responsibilities of domestic life. At least two million men would be in the field before reaching the age at which most men begin freely to marry. The same would apply to important business relationships. One of the cruelties of the recent National Guard mobilization was that it snatched away men in the prime of life, with families and with business responsibilities developed, to whom the call of war meant absolute hardship and was in effect a sort of punishment for the faithful devotion of long years to the cause of patriotism.

HARDSHIPS OF A MILITIA SYSTEM.

In investigating the recent mobilization a committee appointed by the Mayor of New York came across scores of instances like this:

From a Letter Carrier: "My pay was stopped; I am married and have children; my family suffered the loss of \$55 a month."

From an Interborough Ticket Agent: "My pay stopped, and so I lost all that during service. I am forty-one years old, married, and have three children."

From a Physician: "My family had to go to the home of my parents, and to use our savings. I had a position in a hospital, but resigned it to do military service, and have no position now; my loss is \$275 a month."

From a Banker's Manager: "After this experience I feel I couldn't give more time to military service. My family and I are thoroughly disgusted. I will not re-enlist."

From a Placer for a Fire Insurance Company: "I will never try to induce friends to enlist in the National Guard. I believe in universal service."

At the same time all this suffering and injustice was being inflicted by the mobilization of 140,000 guardsmen, there were 1,981,298 unmarried males of eighteen and nineteen years of age in the country and 3,775,376 of from twenty to twenty-four years, inclusive. Under universal service that is where our soldiers would come from.

(*Collier's*, March 17, 1917.)

(b) [§246] Foreign Systems, in 1914.

THE GERMAN ARMY SYSTEM.

BY _____.

Compulsory military service by conscription, which automatically applies to all male subjects upon reaching the age of 20. They are then given a rigid physical examination. Those who pass are assigned to various arms of the service, the term of training being two years in the Infantry and Engineers, and three years in the Cavalry and Artillery. Military authorities pretty well agree that the German training surpasses that of any other army in the world. The reason is apparent in this single illustration. Some time ago the Government bought up a large tract of land near Dresden, including all the villages within the boundary of the purchase. It is called the Koenigsbrück Kriegssplatz, or war field. In peace times the Saxony artillery is trained there, in real war problems, worked out with real guns, firing real shells. For instance, the corps is given a certain position and told that an enemy army, including cavalry, infantry, artillery and supply trains is approaching along a certain road. On that designated road there would be tracks, and along those tracks would be mechanically-pulled floats bearing life-sized imitation cavalry, infantry, guns, etc. It would be the corps' business to destroy this army, and it needed no umpire to imagine the results. They were apparent when the smoke clouds cleared away. By such practical problems Germany develops every branch of the military service.

At the conclusion of his term of training (two or three years) the soldier passes into the Landwehr, remaining there until his 38th year, then passing into the Landsturm. Those who, at the age of 20, fail to pass the physical test, are assigned to a reserve

class known as the Landsturm Ohne Waffen (without weapons), which class may, in war time, be called to barracks for training in any sort of service the military authorities determine it can perform.

THE FRENCH ARMY SYSTEM.

Compulsory universal military training without exemptions except for physical disability. Men are called to the colors at the age of 20 years and are in active service for three years. They then pass into the reserve for seven years, being called out twice for a month's training; and then into the territorial army, where they have a single period of two weeks' training. The long reserve service gives about 2,000 men, active and reserve, per battalion.

France also uses her military system for unifying the country. In maneuvers soldiers from the north are sent south, and vice versa. They do not sleep in tents, but are housed by the people of the section in which they happen to be. In this way the people of all sections become accustomed to the habits, etc., of those of all other sections, and learn to care in an intimate sort of a way for parts of their country which otherwise might have seemed to them to be very remote.

THE ENGLISH ARMY SYSTEM.

Is very similar to our own, depending upon voluntary enlistments for the small standing army, and upon additional volunteers for war-time needs. However, in the present war England had to resort to conscription, and also was compelled to devise other laws to prevent strikes in munition and other plants whose products were necessary to the conduct of war. England has shown, under the stress of war, not only the failure of a system such as ours, but the equal need of such industrial mobilization as will, by harmonious co-operation and efficiency, throw the whole force of the nation, industrially and commercially, behind the military in time of war.

THE SWISS MILITARY SYSTEM.

Training really begins in the public schools at age of 10. From 10 to 12 years of age the boys receive severe drills in physical training. At the age of 14 the boy becomes a cadet, is given a rifle and instructed how to use it. He also may volunteer for the Corps, a crack organization of 6,000 physically fit youths.

From 14 to 18 years of age the cadet is drilled one hour each day, in addition to two hours' target practice each week.

On his 18th birthday the Swiss boy joins a military unit in his own town, and for five hours each week for a period of one year receives military training under instruction of army officers, active or reserve.

At the end of this period, or upon his 19th birthday, if he passes a rigid examination, he is sent to a recruit school, where, according to the branch of the service he will enter at the age of 20, he serves from 65 to 83 days.

Then comes the real test, determining whether or not he may

respond to the call to the colors. The examination is so severe that approximately 50 per cent. are rejected. The universal service to country theory is carried out by compelling the rejected to pay from \$2 to \$6, according to their financial ability, as determined by the authorities.

Entering the army, the eligibles spend from 6 to 8 weeks in thorough camp training, and then are put upon the Elite List, or first line. In all they give 75 days of their 21st year to the State.

Every year thereafter, until he has reached the age of 32, the Swiss citizen must serve 75 days with the colors. At the age of 32 he passes into the Landwehr, and for the succeeding 8 years must report for 14 days' drill each year.

Upon his 40th birthday he enters the Landsturm, where he remains for another 8 years, giving 4 days' time each year to the State.

At the age of 48 he passes out of the service.

If the recruit is in mounted branch of service, the State pays one-half the cost of his horse and the balance in 10 installments. The horse is then the soldier's own property.

Politics has no influence upon promotions. Before advancing, a lieutenant must remain in his grade for from 4 to 7 years; a captain, 6 years; a major and lieutenant-colonel, 6 years, etc. There is a healthy competition for promotions and the measure of restrictions is gained from the fact that a second lieutenant of artillery, for instance, must serve 215 days before receiving his commission.

Numerous rifle clubs have brought marksmanship to a high standard.

(d) [§247] Shall We Adopt Universal Military Service?

BY PRESIDENT EMERITUS CHARLES W. ELIOT.

There is endless talk in these days about "preparedness." Both political parties and both candidates for the Presidency advocate a larger Navy and a larger Army. On preparedness and Americanism the Republican platform uses the braver words; but the Democratic Party has voted—with more or less reluctance—the largest appropriations for the Navy and Army that have ever been voted, and also made the most earnest attempt ever made to convert the state militia into a national force. As to the defunct Progressive Party and its leaders, it shouted louder than either of the others for warlike preparation, and, indeed, appeared to advocate war against piteous little Mexico; but its principal doctrines related to social and industrial improvements at home, and it has had no chance to put those doctrines into practice through legislation. Under these political conditions at home and in the present fearful state of Europe, it is important that the American people, and particularly the public men who undertake to lead the people, should consider, first, for what uses the United States needs a navy and an army; and secondly, the sort of navy and army which the United States should prepare.

FAILURE OF ISOLATION.

To undertake the maintenance of a great modern navy and a great modern army, always prepared for immediate action, involves the abandonment of a deeply rooted American policy—the ancient reliance for safety on the physical isolation of the country between two great oceans. The maintenance of a larger navy will not require much new legislation, or much change of customs; but the maintenance of a great land force which can be mobilized in a few days—all ready for service in the field—will require much new legislation, great new expenditures, and many changes in the habits and customs of the people. The policy of maintaining only a small professional army, and even that imperfectly equipped, will have to be abandoned.

Why should the American people make this formidable change in their national habits and their international policy? First, because the industrial and commercial interests of the Nation have completely changed since the Civil War, and can no longer be preserved and promoted in isolation. The country cannot keep its existing machinery running, or sell its surplus foods and raw materials, unless the foreign markets are open to it, and are freely developed. The United States, having become an industrial and commercial World Power, needs to have all the seas and oceans of the world open for its foreign trade in times of peace, and so far as is practicable in times of war also—open for both its imports and its exports of foods, drinks, drugs, raw materials, and manufactured articles. . . .

Secondly, steam and electricity have done away with the physical isolation of the United States. The oceans are not barriers, but highways which invite the passage of fleets, pacific or hostile. The security of America can no longer be trusted to the width of the Atlantic and the Pacific.

If anyone says that the risk of an invasion of the United States by a strong naval and military Power is very small, particularly within twenty years of the close of the present terrifying and exhausting war, the answer is that, since the war in Europe has demonstrated how horrible a catastrophe an invasion would be, the American people may wisely insure themselves against even a small risk of invasion. The only available insurance is a Navy powerful in every respect, and an Army in reserve visibly strong in numbers and visibly prepared for immediate service.

IF WE HAD UNIVERSAL SERVICE.

If the principle of universal military service should be accepted and acted on in the United States, several important consequences would immediately follow:

1. The country would always have on call a trained force for all the duties and services which the Regular Army now performs, and this force could be increased by telegraph and telephone to any desired extent up to the limit of the reserves. Within ten years these reserves would be formidable in number. It would probably be desirable to maintain a special force for a service of two years in the Philippines, the Panama Zone, and other outlying regions; but this force should consist of young

men who volunteered for that special service after they had received the universal training at home, or the better part of it.

2. It would no longer be necessary to maintain any state militia; provided the governors were authorized to call on the national War Department for any troops they might need for local service. But if any state preferred to do so, it might maintain a local volunteer force made up of young men who had already served their first period (sixty to ninety days) in the national army.

3. The Nation would be always prepared for defensive combat with any military Power which might assail it for purposes of conquest or ransom; and, being prepared, would probably be safe from such attempts.

4. In case of rebellion or outbreak of any sort within the country itself, a national force could be promptly put into the field to subdue it.

5. All the able-bodied young men in the country would receive a training in the hard work of a soldier which would be of some service to them in any industry in which they might afterwards engage. They would have become accustomed to a discipline under which many men co-operate strenuously in the pursuit of common objects. They would have mastered the use of some instruments of precision; and would have learned much about personal and public hygiene, and the means of preserving bodily vigor and utilizing it to advantage.

6. The defense of the country would be always in charge of a Navy and Army neither feudal nor mercenary, neither drafted "for the war" nor professional in the sense that its members mean to spend their active lives in the service, but on the contrary composed of all the able-bodied youth of the Nation, acting under a universal sense of obligation or duty, but also willing to serve the country in a hearty co-operative spirit out of love of freedom, justice, and all that makes "home."

7. In case of war, large or small, long or short, the great waste of lives and money which has taken place at the beginning of every war in which the United States has been engaged since the Government was organized would be avoided; because the country would have at call any desired number of competent officers and well-trained men. In case of war alarms, the country would not be obliged to summon untrained militia, or to resort to such crude and unsound methods as Plattsburg camps and college regiments.

MORAL ADVANTAGES OF STRENGTH.

Some moral advantages would result to the United States from maintaining the second navy in the world and a numerous army always ready. A strong democracy, always prepared to defend itself against attacks from without or within, would be less exposed to intentional provocation by critical or jealous governments, and less liable to the occasional internal panics which are apt to cause wastes and other unnecessary evils. Some improvement in the character and efficiency of the American people itself might also be expected, especially in regard to co-operative discipline, self-reliance and self-control. To be always

ready to defend and to maintain American ideals of public justice and liberty would add to the self-respect of the people. If every able-bodied youth were well trained for service in the national army or navy at some serious sacrifice of his ease and earning time, and then held himself constantly in readiness to fight for his country, if it were in peril, until he became too old for soldier's work, the whole people would soon attain to a new sentiment of patriotic duty and self-sacrificing devotion to the country as the groundwork of home, kinship, and friendship, and the representative of public justice and liberty and of progressive hope for mankind. The entire Nation, without distinction of race or class, would be taught to think of itself as a unified and exalted power for good in the world—humane, unselfish, and aspiring. . . .

THE NAVY.

The enlarged American Navy should in times of peace be an active school of practice for scouting, blockading, shooting and manœuvring. The term of enlistment should be short, not exceeding in length whatever period will suffice to give an average young man a sufficient training. The officers would be in times of peace chiefly teachers, for the new men would be joining the Navy in large numbers at frequent intervals. These officers would be, as now, graduates of the Naval Academy, the cadets of the Academy, however, not being nominated by Congressmen, but being selected by their officers on board ship from the successive quotas of young men coming into the Navy. The Swiss rule that nobody shall be an officer in the army who has not served as a private and non-commissioned officer would be of high value in securing an American Navy of proper democratic spirit. The utmost pains should be taken to make the term of service in the Navy valuable to the enlisted man in respect to personal hygiene, manual skill, good mental habits, and character. Every man who serves in the Navy should come out of it a man more useful in the national industries than he would have been without that service, and also a better citizen.

THE ARMY.

The United States has found uses, since the war with Spain, for a fairly equipped Army of something less than one hundred thousand men; and a minority of the states have seen reason to maintain a volunteer militia, in the organizing of which no attention has been paid to the married or single state of the volunteers, and but little to their physical fitness for the duties of a soldier. The militia has also been poorly equipped, or sometimes hardly equipped at all for real work. The trouble between the United States and Mexico has revealed the fact that the Regular Army is in numbers insufficient to guard effectively the long border between the two countries—in addition to its other duties—and that the militia of the states is not only too imperfectly equipped to be rapidly mobilized, but also contains a large proportion of men whom it is not expedient to call upon for military service at a distance from their homes.

IMPERFECTIONS OF THE MILITIA.

The militia in all the states which maintain any militia was intended, so far as it had any function beyond parades and vacation camps, to keep the peace and give aid during brief periods of local disturbance, like riots and the disorders which attend great catastrophes by earthquakes, fire, or flood. A state militia as a rule elects its officers, the privates electing the company officers, the company officers electing the regimental officers, the regimental officers electing the general. The qualities which win votes in such elections are not identical with those which make a good commander in camp, on the march, and on the battlefield. As a national force to be used in any part of the country, or beyond its borders, and for long periods during which the men are detached from their homes and their employments, the state militias are inappropriate. In war with a strong military Power, the militia would not be available for several months, or until all the units had been converted into national units and reofficered in large part. The present Democratic Administration and Congress have rendered a considerable service to the country by giving a clear demonstration to this effect.

Although the Regular Army of the United States is an efficient body of men, well selected, well officered, and possessing a fine esprit de corps, it is not a modern army in the European sense; and it is not the kind of army that a democratic people ought to maintain, having been essentially copied from the English army, which has always been—until “Kitchener’s army” was created—an army officered from the upper classes and recruited by voluntary enlistment from the lower. It has never been a popular or national army in the sense of continental Europe, where conscription or universal military service has long prevailed.

FOR A DEMOCRATIC ARMY.

If the United States sees reason for maintaining any army at all, it will be wise for it to maintain a democratic army, in which all able-bodied young Americans should serve for several short periods, and then be held in reserve for a long period, its officers being selected from the ranks by their instructors and commanders during the prescribed periods of service, and educated as now at the Military Academy to serve for life as teachers of the successive levies of raw recruits, or held in reserve with liberty to follow civil occupations. A few thousand non-commissioned officers would also be kept in the service permanently, or for considerable periods, to serve as instructors to the raw levies and as non-commissioned officers of any force the country might need for sudden and sustained service. . . .

The basic principle of universal service being adopted, and every able-bodied young man having received the elements of a military training, each individual’s post of service in case of war will depend on the determination by a selective authority of the employment in which that individual can be most useful to the country. The men needed in munition factories will not be allowed to go to the trenches; and the men fitted to handle the complicated machinery of a battleship or submarine will not be

allowed to serve in the infantry on land. The reservists especially will be employed each in his most appropriate station, in order that no peculiar personal efficiency may be wasted. From motives of economy and efficiency, none but able-bodied men will be taken into the Navy or Army, and none but able-bodied men will be allowed to remain in the fighting force. . . .

THE SWISS MILITARY SYSTEM.

The Swiss system produces an effective army for national defense with minimum demand on the time of the adult male worker; and this fact should commend it for American adoption. The length of service, as given in the report of Lieut.-Col. George Bell, Jr., to the Army War College in 1911, is "from sixty to ninety days (according to the corps to which the recruit is assigned) in the first year of service, and from eleven to fourteen days in each of seven (cavalry eight) out of the eleven years following. Between thirty-two and forty the Swiss soldier attends one 'repetition course' of eleven days. There are special 'schools' of twenty to thirty-five days for the training of non-commissioned officers. Commissioned officers are trained for the different corps in 'schools' which require attendance (according to corps) of from forty-five to one hundred and five (in two parts) days. Officers and non-commissioned officers are selected and promoted by their teachers and commanders for merit only, which must be proved in service and by appropriate tests and examinations."

The Australians, to be sure, are attempting to produce an effective army by a method which makes even a smaller claim upon the time of the male adult by utilizing for military drill some of the boy's time; but the Australian system has not been in force long enough to demonstrate that it is efficient. The Swiss system has repeatedly given abundant proof of remarkable efficiency.

The Swiss Republic resembles the American Republic in several important respects, although the two territories and situations are strikingly unlike. Switzerland is a federation of distinct political entities called cantons, in which four different languages severally prevail, part of the cantons being Catholic and part Protestant. Industrially the people are agricultural, pastoral, manufacturing, or commercial, but universally democratic in manners and customs. The federal legislation concerning education and taxation is more democratic than that of the United States. The country is annually invaded by large numbers of alien laborers. On the whole, the stout little republic is a safe guide for the United States in respect to the organization of a competent modern army.

AMERICA'S MILITARY NEEDS.

The answer, then, to the question at the head of this article is—the United States needs a navy modeled on the British navy, and an army modeled on the Swiss army; and in order to procure both it needs to adopt the principle of brief universal service in the Army or the Navy. The time lost by the young men from the productive industries and the service of the

family will be a trifling loss compared with the gain from an increased feeling of devotion to the country in the hearts of multitudes, and a quickened sense of responsibility for its welfare. The slight loss of individual liberty will be more than compensated by experience of a strict, co-operative discipline, and by an enlarged sense of comradeship and community interest among the people.

FACING THE FACTS.

Despite the heterogeneous character of the people of the United States as respects race or stock, the masses of the people worship the same precious ideals of liberty, law, and public happiness. At heart they know that these ideals, so dear to them, will have to be protected and furthered by force for many a year to come, the world being what it is. Everybody hopes that the world is going to be very different hereafter from what it is in these grievous days of return to primitive savagery; but the conduct of the liberty-loving nations to-day and to-morrow must be determined by the hard, actual facts. They cannot organize now the perpetual defense of liberty under law; but they can provide promptly, through practicable alliances, securities which will last at least for one generation.

(*World's Work*, XXXIII, 28-34. (November, 1916.)

(e) [§248] Now Let Us Have Universal Military Training.

BY THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR.

It should be borne in mind that the selective draft bill, on which Congress is putting the finishing touches, is an emergency measure and does not provide a permanent military policy, such as this country needs. The enactment of the program now in conference should be supplemented by the adoption of a measure along the lines of the Chamberlain universal training bill.

The United States never again should be caught in the condition of unpreparedness with which we are facing the war with Germany. The way to make sure that we shall be ready when trouble comes is to keep ready. That can be done by adherence to the principle of universal obligation and insistence on universal military training for the young men of the nation. That will keep the United States ever in readiness to protect its rights against all comers.

The overwhelming sentiment throughout the country in favor of the selective draft system, as against the volunteer method of raising an army, shows that the people are taking a common sense instead of a sentimental view of military service. They are not frightened by the idle talk about the dangers of militarism in this free country. They realize that there can be no military autocracy in a land where the people are supreme. And the events of the last three years have made them realize as never before the folly of muddling along without preparedness and depending on the cumbersome and costly volunteer system, in case of emergency.

(*Indianapolis Star*, May 13, 1917.)

D. [§249] INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION.

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2. High Power Production of Military Material.

- (a) Warships.
- (b) Food for the troops.
- (c) Equipments and supplies.
- (d) Ordnance, especially big portable guns.

3. Concentrated Organization of Transportation.

- (a) Merchant shipping.
- (b) Railroads of the U. S.
- (c) Motor transportation of every kind.

4. Governmental Organization Suitable to Handle This Business.

- (a) Departments of the Government.
- (b) Council of National Defense.

- (c) Associated and Subordinate Committees.
- (d) Centralized direction of National Food Supply, Munition Supply, Railroads, etc.
- (e) The President and Congress as Representatives of the Nation.

5. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§250] Economic Aspects of War.

BY PROFESSOR HENRY C. EMERY (FORMERLY CHAIRMAN OF
TARIFF COMMISSION).

INDIVIDUALISM, SOCIALISM AND NATIONALISM.

I shall start far from the immediate subject by suggesting to you that, disregarding the theories of individual philosophers, there are three, and only three, general theories of society, or theories of historical development, which have been held in modern times by large numbers of men, and which have directly influenced the policies of nations. These I shall call individualism, socialism, and nationalism. To the individualist the activities of the present day and the whole course of history are to be interpreted as a struggle between individuals, each seeking his own welfare under the guidance of enlightened self-interest. To the socialist the history of mankind presents itself as primarily a struggle between classes within a given society, each class attempting to secure for itself privileges, prerogatives, and the lion's share of power and material comfort, and each class in turn being overthrown through the rise of a new and more powerful class. Finally, the nationalist reads history as a record of struggle between political groups, races, or nations, and looks upon the problem of national survival, expansion, and supremacy as the vital concern of mankind.

All of these theories have an element of truth and each in turn is likely to be disregarding of the significance of the others. The individualist refuses to recognize the fact, or at least refuses to recognize the necessity, of the struggle between classes and the struggle between nations. He looks upon the interests of labor and capital as harmonious and equitably adjusted by the play of economic forces, and he largely disregards national boundaries as playing any essential role in relation to man's welfare and prosperity. Thomas Cooper, an early president of King's College, New York (now Columbia), said that the word "nation" was merely a grammatical contrivance, corresponding to no reality.

The socialist, on the other hand, fails to recognize the importance of competition within groups and sees little but the united forces of one class facing those of another. At the same time he is as cosmopolitan as is the individualist and believes that the mutual interests of classes throughout the world are powerful enough to break down national boundaries and to make struggles between nations impossible in the future. I leave it to you to search your own minds as to how far you also, with your ideas of the importance of national struggles, disregard the element of truth which lies in the other two theories. . . .

The last theory of society to which I have referred, namely, that of nationalism, is historically the first, but I have put it last because it has been vigorously revived in recent years, both on the basis of new theories of science and on the basis of changed economic conditions. For centuries the bitter struggle between racial and natural groups was so patent and obvious a fact that it was generally accepted as the all-important factor of human affairs, without much theorizing regarding it either on the part of the statesman or on the part of the philosopher. . . .

CHANGES IN CONDITIONS.

It would be hard to exaggerate the change which has come about, both in historical writing and in political thinking, as a result of the theory of natural selection. History has been largely rewritten in the light of this new philosophy, and more and more has the economic element come to be emphasized as the determining factor in the history of national struggles. . . . I have referred to the early period of mercantilism, when every weapon of a nation was utilized to advance its own interests at the expense of rivals. These weapons were various, including protective tariffs, prohibitions and bounties on exports and imports as the occasion might demand, commercial treaties, the arts of diplomacy, and finally war.

The last 25 years has seen the development of a neomercantilism which, although more enlightened in detail than the commercial policy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, still takes as its starting point the rivalry between nations rather than the harmony of their interests, and uses, or stands prepared to use, the weapons of that earlier period. From the doctrine of individualism spring the ideas of free trade, economy, and perpetual peace. From the doctrine of nationalism spring the ideas of protectionism, economic independence, the necessity of increased public expenditure, and the inevitableness of war. . . .

The growth of industry made the problem of control of neutral markets a crucial one for the prosperity of industrial nations, and the rapid growth of population suddenly brought mankind face to face with the problem of the ages; namely, is there room on the earth for the indefinite expansion of all competing races? If not, who shall get off the earth? Which races shall expand and exploit the world's material resources, spreading their own peculiar civilization at the expense of others? Here we have the problem of the struggle for survival and natural selection, not as a scientific theory of the evolution of lower organisms, but as a practical problem of the moment for every nation to face. What race is meekly going to admit its own inferiority without a struggle, and calmly step aside to make room for the expansion of its rivals? . . .

Ideas of this kind are laughed at by many of the most intelligent people in the United States, and it is not unnatural that such ideas should be little recognized in this country in

view of our past history. In the first place, we have always considered ourselves largely isolated from the rest of the world and exempt by our geographical position from the problems of the older nations. In the next place, the extent of territory and the great natural resources of this country made the problem of the pressure of population on subsistence seem almost a ridiculous fancy. . . .

EFFECT OF COMMERCE ON WAR.

First, then, what is the effect of commerce on war? For many years it was maintained by the group of writers most influential in their day that the growth of commerce inevitably meant the end of war, as certainly as it had meant in the past the end of piracy and the lawless regulation of individual affairs by the sword or the pistol.

Economic historians of the present time, however, have dealt with the historic problem of war in a very different spirit from the writers of one or two generations ago. It is now generally recognized that commerce, or at least the economic problems of subsistence, has been not a deterrent of war, but more than any other one thing a cause of war in the past.

Has anything happened to stop this age-long result of commercial rivalry? The most recent wars, such as the Boer War and the war between Russia and Japan, have unquestionably been primarily economic in their nature and, if I have been correct in my statement regarding the economic changes of the last generation and their effect in increasing race consciousness and feelings of international hostility, we may be sure that even more completely than in the past nations will seldom go to war except for commercial advantage, but will ultimately resort to arms when convinced that by victory they will secure for themselves the necessary means of maintaining or expanding their commercial welfare.

Again, it may be said that the United States are not subject to the laws of economic and political development of European nations, and that any commercial gain through war is an impossibility for this country. Such a view seems to me short-sighted in the extreme. We are already in touch with the problems of European politics through our island possessions; we maintain the doctrine that the whole American continent shall be removed from the future aggressions of foreign powers; and we are already reaching the point where the problem of the pressure of population on subsistence is no longer so distant as to be disregarded, but may become a vital problem even within the lives of children now living. . . .

EFFECT OF WAR ON COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY.

Can anything now be put on the credit side to show that war is not always and in every way a deterrent to economic welfare? . . .

In the first place, it is only through war that modern states have been formed, with a strong national government and the possibility of a genuine national economic policy which took the place of the local and territorial economies of an earlier

period. . . . Furthermore, war and colonial expansion have always gone hand in hand, and the development of colonial empires has been one of the important factors in the growth of modern capitalistic production and commerce. . . .

The fact is that war acts in a twofold way. The enormous commercial contracts involved in a great war have in the past made possible the accumulation of large individual fortunes and at certain stages of history, at least, such large individual accumulations have been a distinct spur to great savings and consequent investment on a large scale in industrial enterprises which, in turn, have increased the capital of the community as a whole.

Secondly, the growth of capitalism requires the development of a new psychological type of industrial leader. This new leadership depended on the capacity to undertake vast enterprises requiring consummate ability in organization and direction and the capacity to wait patiently and work continuously for results which could only be accomplished at some future date. But it is exactly in the field of military organization and warlike enterprise that these capacities were first developed. . . .

VITALIZING EFFECT OF WAR.

The growth of industry and trade does not depend solely on the growth of capital and the quantity of labor, as was commonly assumed by the writers of the peace and free trade era. Equally important is the character of leadership in the industrial field, and by this I do not mean only the ability to organize and co-ordinate the forces of production on the part of the captains of industry; I mean also the more subtle qualities of confidence, faith in the future and speculative daring. These are vital elements in commercial progress, but they are of peculiar psychological character and are affected by many influences which are not at all economic in their nature. Is it not to be expected that under the impetus of a great war, when national fervor is at its highest point and the spirit of daring and sacrifice pervades the community, that these influences should also be felt in the field of business, and that men should confidently undertake enterprises which in calmer times would have seemed staggering and impossible in their nature? I believe that on this point ample evidence could be found. . . .

Our Civil War offers many examples of the same kind. The vigor of business life in the North throughout that great conflict is still a matter of amazement for the economic historian. Here again the influence was twofold. The huge Government contracts acted as an extraordinary degree of protection and encouragement, but equally important was the fact that the same spirit of forward endeavor which animated the armies in the field also animated the leaders and the rank and file in the domain of business. . . .

RESERVE PRODUCTIVE FORCE.

No allowance was ever made for the enormous reserve productive force which can be called out in time of emergency.

And yet should we not expect theoretically that a time of great stress (as a result of armed conflict and depletion of the ranks of labor for military purposes) would be in a large measure at least offset by the utilization of this reserve force? Workmen who had already been employed would work harder and longer. The very necessity of the situation would demand better organization and the utilization of the most economic methods of production, while there is a vast reserve fund of labor which, under ordinary circumstances is not employed, can be called upon at such a period. In other words, the destructive influence of war on industry, which would seem to be a patent fact due to so large a proportion of the population being removed from the ranks of industry, proves not to be a net loss at all, but is largely made up from the industrial reserve force. . . .

But one cost of war there is which can be measured in cold figures and for which there seems to be no economic offset. That is the actual enormous governmental expenditure frequently entailed. The piling up of government debt is a burden on the taxpayer of the present and future generations which can not be waived aside, and which goes far to offset any argument which can be made in favor of war from the economic point of view. How is this great problem to be met? The obvious answer is by having short wars, and the obvious way to have short wars is to be prepared beforehand to make them short. . . .

ECONOMIC WASTE OF LABOR.

How, then, are we to estimate the real cost of an adequate military and naval organization in time of peace, and what is the nature of this cost? In the first place, much is frequently said regarding the economic waste which is involved in peace armaments, due to the fact that so large a number of adult young men are taken out of the ranks of industry year by year, thereby reducing the productive capacity of the community, since they might otherwise be employed in increasing the national wealth. . . .

The same argument might easily be made regarding the number of able-bodied young people in our high schools, technical schools, and colleges. A few narrow-minded people deny the advantages of education altogether, and a still larger number are inclined to think that from the economic point of view education beyond the grammar school at least is a net loss to the community, and that the productivity of labor is not increased by education of this kind. . . .

MILITARY EDUCATORS.

If now the military training has educational results of the same kind, compulsory army service is nothing more than compulsory education. I think it is now the opinion of most careful observers of German conditions that the military service of so many of her young men for two years acts exactly in this way. Youngsters are taken from the quiescent life of the farm, or from the somewhat dangerous life of factory communities and are trained in promptness, diligence, obedience, cleanliness,

and fidelity to duty. Furthermore, they are given actual instruction in various lines in the way of increasing their general intelligence, and they of necessity become in some measure familiar with the intricate mechanism of military weapons, which in itself gives a certain training in the knowledge of machinery. Personally, I believe that the efficiency of factory labor in Germany has been greatly increased through this military education, and that the young men who have been through this training become much more efficient in the field of production in later years than they would have been had they not been obliged to undergo this training at all. In other words, the compulsory service might be justified as economically self-supporting on purely educational grounds.

WAR AS INSURANCE.

Another economic phase of the question besides the educational is the fact that preparation of this kind is in the nature of business insurance. It can easily be maintained that, from the education point of view alone, an equally good training could be given for industrial purpose without such vast expenditure for armament and ships, but if it is true, as all history shows, that the safety of the commercial prosperity of any nation may at any time be threatened or overthrown by war, the question as to how this commercial prosperity can be best insured becomes a purely business question.

It is living in a fool's paradise to assume so readily this absence of risk for ourselves if we look ahead for any serious length of time. I suppose none of us anticipates any immediate danger in the nature of international conflict, but the whole point is that if we believe in the possibility of such conflict any time within the next 50 years the time to make a start is now. If we once adopt the policy of delay there is no reason why it should not be extended year by year until the fatal moment comes and finds us entirely unprepared. . . .

WAR AS A TEST OF CHARACTER.

I have sometimes thought that no fairer test of the highest efficiency of peoples could be made than by a duel of two dreadnoughts, each representing the highest scientific skill of its own people. Every capacity of the human mind, except the purely artistic and literary, is tested in a struggle of this kind. Where can a more marvelous result of modern genius be found than in the perfect ship? Even Ruskin was fond of dwelling on this conception; but a duel of two dreadnoughts would not be a test of the vital strength of two peoples. It is not only a question of the relative merits of ships themselves, but also a question of relative members and economic power. That nation which can build the most ships or support the largest armies is the nation which has shown the greatest genius in the acquisition of natural resources and in the accumulation of wealth. In fact, it may well be asserted that war is the most searching test of economic efficiency, and that, on the other hand, economic efficiency is finally the most important factor in determining the issue of military conflicts. . . .

What I wish to emphasize is that all of these factors go together in determining victory or defeat, and that here, as elsewhere, the economic efficiency and the military efficiency of the people go hand in hand. Doubtless we all wish peace to be preserved and dread the arbitrament of war. All I claim is that when nations are forced to this arbitrament it becomes a test not only of "brute strength," not only of military virtues and capacities, but a test as well of their success in the manifold "arts of peace." . . .

(H. C. Emery, *Some Economic Aspects of War*.)

(b) [§251] Linking Up American Industries for Defense.

BY WILLIAM L. SAUNDERS.

PREPAREDNESS ORGANIZATION.

I'll show you better what I mean by drawing it. It's a more convincing way for an engineer. See—here's where we begin in this square with President Wilson. He's the fountain head of this innovation in United States economics—the inceptual impulse in this magnificent project for industrial mobilization.

Then we come to Secretary Josephus Daniels, the energetic Cabinet officer who has made the navy and naval affairs his constant study since he accepted the portfolio. That's his square. From here we advance to the square of the Naval Consulting Board, a body organized a few months ago for the purpose of making available for governmental aid the inventive genius of the country.

The next step is to the square occupied, as I show here, by the Committee on Production, Organization, Manufacture, and Standardization of the Naval Consulting Board. Out of this square, you will note, radiate forty-eight other squares—each square a State. And out of these forty-eight State squares branch 240 sub-squares, each representing the individual field of investigation of that number of committeemen selected by the five leading scientific bodies of the country—the American Institute of Mining Engineers, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, the American Institute of Electric Engineers, the American Chemical Society, and the American Society of Civil Engineers. See—there you are, not to exact scale, but there you are. . . .

The task as mapped out will be conducted thus: Each of the five scientific bodies already named will select a representative from its resident members in every State of the Union. That is, the mechanical engineers will have forty-eight representatives in all. So will the electrical engineers, and the chemists, and the civil engineers, and the mining engineers. Thus, collectively, there will be a representative body or board of five members in every State, one from each of the five societies or institutes.

Now these men will be, without doubt, the leading men in their professions. It will not be a case of politicians selecting them. Their professional associates will do the selecting, and

they will come pretty near to knowing the standing and ability of those who are named. . . .

. . . Then the 240 appointees—five in each State—will get busy. This investigation will not be done by mail. It will be a case of personal visit to plants and manufactories. And here will be a great advantage—it will be done simultaneously. Nobody will wait for movement elsewhere. As I say, it will be personal visit and simultaneous visit. You know how much this beats attending or trying to attend to matters by mail. You know how much attention some men pay to mail inquiries.

DUTIES OF THE COMMITTEES.

Now, these five men in each State will go forth to learn and to list everything in their commonwealth that will be available for the use of Uncle Sam in an emergency. They will locate and classify all our coal, iron, and other mineral resources, so that they may be protected at their source. They will gain a knowledge of the capacity of the mines and mills of the country, and the extent to which they will be able to respond when called upon. They will gather information as to the capacity of every industry which may be capable of supplying things that are needed for the sinews of war.

Industrial preparedness means something more than mere capacity to make shells. The field covers food, clothing, hospital equipment, motors, animals, and telephone, telegraph, and railway accommodations. It also means that the Government should not only know where these industries are and what they can do, but those in control of the industries should know what is expected of them—that is, the exact nature as well as the volume of the requirements.

Soldiers trained for a lifetime are not in a position to render effective service unless they are well equipped with food and supplies. It is better to have one ship of war well supplied with munitions than two with an insufficient supply. Likewise, it is better to have one warship built on modern lines, with all the improvements that the skill of the engineer can devise, than to trust to obsolete conditions. . . .

We don't want the United States to be the manufacturing monopoly of the planet. What if we are inconvenienced through the lack of dye imports? What does the need of dye count in comparison with the need of things that go to repel an invader, or prepare us to stand our ground in an emergency? Other countries ought certainly be allowed to manufacture some things, without making importation prohibitive through high tariff, so that a comparatively artificial industry be erected here. Let them do some of the manufacturing. That's the way they will earn some of the money they need abroad to pay off the heavy bills for what we sell them. Consider the total of our trade—\$2,000,000,000 before the war per annum. Since the war began no doubt it's near to \$5,000,000,000. Can we complain of anything in the way of trade because of war, even though there be some things like dyes we need? No, but we do need to get ready to manufacture anything the United States will need in time of war when it is not a neutral. . . .

SCIENTIFIC CO-OPERATION.

Germany reveals how high a plane of effectiveness may be reached when there is scientific co-operation between Government and national industries. Government inspectors go about among the plants and manufactories of the country and ascertain exactly just to what extent the plant or the factory can aid in Government work. Even in the case of toy manufactories—and it will be agreed that such plants seem but remotely equipped for Government aid—the Government officials have apportioned a section that is devoted to a particular kind of work. This work is measured and fitted to the limits of the plant's machinery and facilities. I am informed that even in the case of the top manufactory there is a decided increase in tone, enthusiasm, and prestige because the plant has been made a part of the great Government preparation scheme. To a considerable degree I have no doubt co-operation with the Government will have the same effect in the plants of the United States. It will be a nobler pride in such co-operation, because it will have been undertaken willingly and not at the autocratic mandate of imperial rulers.

THE CHEMIST IS KING.

Getting right down to the nub of the things, when you talk of preparedness for possible war, it resolves itself into this dictum: the chemist is king. Nitrate of soda is the basis of all our explosives. This is the form in which Chilean nitrate occurs. In the past we have turned to Chile for her nitrate to feed our guns. She has been the source of the nitric acid of explosive industries and general commerce. This war proved that nitric acid could be obtained from the element nitrogen segregated from the air. Germany established great manufactories on the Rhine and has been supplying all her explosive needs. Had she not been able to do this she would now be on her knees to the Allies, for Great Britain is guarding the nitrate beds of Chile very carefully. Why, Germany uses more explosives in a couple of months now than she used during the entire Franco-Prussian war.

This peremptorily points the wisdom of our establishing a plant similar to that of the Germans. It is a vital feature of industrial preparedness. It should be done. In time of war we would have no guaranty that we could gain access to the nitrate of Chile—even if that nitrate could be obtained with the speed and in the quantity desired.

(The New York Times Magazine, Feb. 6, 1916.)

(c) [§252] Relation of the Government to War Industries.

BY PROFESSOR JEREMIAH W. JENKS.

Contrary to a common understanding in the United States there has been very little direct management of business by the governments of Great Britain or France. Great Britain especially has done little in this direction. There has been a rather strict regulation of industries producing or handling war supplies, but practically no direct management of business out-

side of the regular government arsenals and certain special factories, few in number, built by or for the government.

BRITISH REGULATIONS.

Under the "Defense of the Realm" act, full power was given the government:

(a) To require any work in any factory or workshop to be done in accordance with the directions of the government;

(b) To regulate or restrict the carrying on of work in any factory or workshop or to remove the plant;

(c) To take possession of any unoccupied premises for war purposes.

In actual practice, the government gets its work done:

(1) By paying liberal prices to establishments for all work done, while guarding against monopolistic or other extortionate prices;

(2) By restricting or forbidding the making of certain classes of goods not needed for war purposes;

(3) By prescribing rigidly the order in which the various classes of work are to be finished and delivered;

(4) By regulating through various restrictions the distribution of the supply of labor and the conditions under which work shall be done.

PRICES.

Whenever the government takes possession of any war material—food, forage, land or other properties for war use—unless an agreement can readily be reached upon the prices, such price shall be determined by a tribunal created for the purpose, in which both sides are represented. In determining such price regard need not be had to the market price; but if goods are acquired from the producer, there shall be taken into consideration cost of production and the rate of profits usually earned in respect to similar goods before the war, and any other pertinent circumstances.

If the goods be acquired from others except the producer, there shall be considered the price paid for such goods, the rate of profits usually earned on similar goods before the war, and similar circumstances.

CONTROLLED ESTABLISHMENTS.

A controlled establishment is merely one in which the profits of the employer have been fixed and trade union rules suspended. The word "controlled" does not mean that the government directs the work in the establishment any more than in any other establishment.

The net profits of a controlled establishment are 20 per cent. more than the average amount of the net profits for the two financial years completed before the outbreak of the war. In special cases where such a standard would be unfair, an agreement is made between the Ministry of Munitions and the owner as to the standard profits.

When trade union rules are suspended, it is understood that this shall be effective only during the war and that after its

close such rules shall be again resumed as far as is practicable. Any changes in working conditions are to be introduced after consultation with the workmen or their representative. In case of disagreement, such changes are to be determined by a committee on which are representatives of workmen, employers and the public.

PRIORITY RULES.

The regulation of the order in which goods are to be produced and distributed is determined ultimately by a Priority Committee. This committee consisted in the first place of three or four subordinates in different divisions of the Ministry of Munitions who met daily and determined specific questions laid before them. Inasmuch as such questions necessarily involved more or less other departments, there has been added to the committee from time to time representatives of those departments until now the committee consists of some twenty members.

This committee has not final authority, as a question may be taken from them to the heads of departments. In practice, of course, its decisions are almost always final. . . .

LICENSED TRADES.

The carrying on of trades of certain classes that might compete is forbidden except under a license. By issuing permits then to a sufficient number of establishments and by having the power to prevent the transfer of work from these establishments into other private establishments, through refusing permits, a sufficient control is established. Generally speaking, this power is not rigidly exercised excepting within narrow fields or in case of necessity. Under the general act "any company, association, or body of persons shall have power notwithstanding anything contained in any act, order or instrument by or under which it is constituted or regulated to carry on munitions work during the present war." The control exercised is largely through the control of the workmen, it having been agreed upon that any workman who enters into an undertaking with the government to work in any controlled establishment must remain in the establishment to which he has been assigned. Furthermore, if any employer attempts to dissuade a workman from entering into such an undertaking or offers to retain in his employment any workman who has received notice from the Ministry of Munitions to change, the employer suffers the penalty. Again, if a workman leaves a munitions factory contrary to the regulations, employers are forbidden to give him employment anywhere else within six weeks, unless he holds a certificate from the last establishment saying that he left work with the consent of his employer or one from the munitions tribunal saying that the consent has been unreasonably withheld.

SUMMARY.

The government, therefore, does not directly manage establishments. It does (a) tell what to do; (b) determine the order of work; (c) control transport of goods and materials in proper order; (d) forbid workmen who are needed for production

of munitions to enlist; and (e) forbid trade except under license. These regulations are enforced by a committee of subordinates acting in a friendly way by a unanimous agreement. Their decisions are upon disputed questions laid before them and are subject to an appeal to their superior officers.

Their classification may be put into effect by employers or contractors, subject likewise to an appeal. Disputes of all kinds regarding prices, wages and conditions of labor are settled by committees representing all parties.

(National Civic Federation, *Press Service*.)

(d) [§253] **The Railroads' Supreme Patriotic Duty to the Nation (1917).**

BY FAIRFAX HARRISON (CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE ON RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF DEFENSE).

EFFICIENCY OF EXISTING RAILROAD FACILITIES MUST BE INCREASED.

In an appeal to the railroads of the United States to increase their efficiency, so that they will be able to produce more transportation with their present facilities—an absolute necessity if the railroads are to do their full share in the defense of the Nation—the American Railway Association's Special Committee on National Defense has called upon the carriers to demonstrate to the American people what their 262,000 miles of railroads, working as a unit, can accomplish.

“Our railroads and their employes now have an opportunity to show what they can do for their country in a great emergency,” is the announcement of Fairfax Harrison, President of the Southern Railway, and Chairman of the railroads' Executive Committee.

“Furthermore,” Mr. Harrison says, “the Executive Committee has offered suggestions in detail the adoption of which will, it is believed, greatly increase the capacity of the present facilities. It is true that some will entail larger operating costs, but the sacrifices must be made in this national emergency.

“The European war is responsible for conditions that have caused large increases in traffic on American railroads, and as a result they are now overtaxed and they are unable to respond promptly to all demands made upon them.

ORGANIZATION OF CARS AND MOTIVE POWER.

“In the Executive Committee's appeal for greater efficiency, stress is laid on ways to get more work out of the existing freight cars. It is pointed out that a careful study has shown that by heavier loading, by expediting the movement even more than is being done at present, and by speeding up repairs, it is possible that the equivalent to 779,000 additional freight cars might be thrown into immediate use. This would increase the car supply more than 30 per cent.

“By reducing the number of locomotives under repairs, and by increasing locomotive mileage, it may be possible to keep in service 16,625 more locomotives than are in use today on our railroads. This would be equal to an increase of more than 25

per cent. in the number of locomotives available for service.

"The railroads will be foredoomed to failure in this national crisis unless they co-operate loyally and completely in carrying out the policy as to freight car service as laid down by the Executive Committee, and turned over to the Commission on Car Service for administering.

"Although our railroads have carried a record-breaking tonnage since the beginning of the war, there have been many delays, as well as shortages of service, for which they have not been altogether responsible. Nevertheless, these conditions have sorely taxed the forbearance of the public. Now, following these vexing times, our own country has entered the war, and this, of course, will increase and intensify the difficulties under which both the public and the railroads have labored.

"The Executive Committee realizes the difficulty of obtaining the maximum effect of the suggestions for increasing efficiency, owing to the great demand for men in every quarter.

"We are relying for results, however, on our belief that the American railroad man is as patriotic as any other, and that he will respond in this national crisis, just as men in all walks of life are doing.

"We have urged the railroads to have meetings at various places all over their systems, so that their officers and employes can discuss the national situation, and learn its very great seriousness. The greatest possible interest must be aroused in the proposition of increasing the ability of the American railroads to produce a larger quantity of transportation with the existing facilities.

"To bring about this all-important result has been put up to every man in railroad service as his supreme patriotic duty."

MORE WORK WITH EXISTING FACILITIES.

The official bulletin just issued to all the railroads of the United States by the Executive Committee of the American Railway Association's Special Committee on National Defense follows:

The European war is responsible for conditions that have caused very large increases in traffic on American railroads, whose capacities are now overtaxed, and they are unable to respond promptly to all demands made on them.

In other words, there is a demand for transportation that is not being supplied, and it becomes the duty of your Committee to suggest how the present high efficiency of American railroads might be still further raised so as to increase the supply of transportation units with existing plant, forces of skilled and unskilled labor, and supplies of fuel and equipment which cannot be increased because the demand for all of these far exceeds the supply.

Your Committee prefaces its suggestions by saying that to many roads they may be unnecessary, but they are offered to all in the hope that they may find them helpful.

It is also recognized that some of these suggestions will increase operating costs, but their purpose being to increase the

capacity of the plant, the result is deemed to justify sacrifice in a national emergency.

INTELLIGENT USE OF EMBARGOES.

1. One of the greatest opportunities to increase car efficiency lies in better control of an unusual traffic movement through placing embargoes promptly so as to avoid congestion and delay. The importance of keeping yards and terminals, especially in large cities and at seaports, clear of accumulations which cannot be handled expeditiously, cannot be overestimated. The experience of the past year has shown that the number of cars held in such accumulations, together with those unduly detained by shippers, have been the chief causes of car shortage. The importance of this question demands the closest possible attention on the part of transportation officers, so that freight which cannot be moved will not be loaded in cars, which are thereby taken out of service as effectually as if they were not in existence.

2. The Executive Committee has announced a policy as to car service and has entrusted to the Commission on Car Service the duty of making that policy effective. Unless all carriers cooperate loyally and completely little will be accomplished and the railroads of the United States will be foredoomed to failure in a national crisis. We must recognize that although our railroads have carried a record-breaking traffic since the commencement of the war in Europe, there have been many delays and shortage of service for which they have not been altogether responsible, but which nevertheless have sorely taxed the forbearance of the public. Following these vexing conditions our country has entered the war, which increases and intensifies them.

The Committee realizes that it is difficult to obtain the maximum effect of these suggestions because of the great demand for men in all industry and for Government service. It is, however, believed that the American railway man is as patriotic as any other, and will help in this national crisis.

THE RAILROAD MAN'S PATRIOTIC DUTY.

You are urged to have meetings at division points with officers and employes where the seriousness of the national situation can be explained verbally and the greatest interest aroused in this subject of increasing the ability of the American railroads to furnish a larger quantity of transportation with the present plan. This is a result to which it is the patriotic duty of every man in railroad service to contribute his maximum effort.

You are also urged to use the forces of the freight and passenger departments in having meetings with commercial bodies and with shippers so as to enlist their aid in obtaining the desired efficiency.

3. To our railroads and their officers is presented the opportunity of showing what they can do for their country, and your Committee appeals to you to make extraordinary efforts to demonstrate what can be accomplished by the 262,000 miles of our railroads in co-operative and unified service.

(American Railway Association, No. 4; May 9, 1917.)

(e) [§254] Problem of the Nation's Transportation.

BY SENATOR FRANCIS G. NEWLANDS.

A significant thing about the joint committee of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives now considering the methods by which the transportation of the country should be carried on is its very comprehensive title. The word "railroad" does not occur in it. It is the "Joint Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce." As big as the railroad rate question is, as much to the front as the eight-hour law has been and is to be again, as tremendous as the issue between Federal and State control may be, and as charged with new interest as the question of Government ownership undoubtedly is—all these things are but phases of the vast problem which Congress has undertaken to solve by means of this committee under the guidance of the Chairman, Senator Francis G. Newlands of Nevada. . . .

CHANGE IN ATTITUDE OF RAILROAD MEN.

"Two big factors which will make for the success of this undertaking," said Senator Newlands the other day, "are the changed attitude of the railroads toward the public and the new capacity and willingness of the old state rights Democratic Party to be a national party, to legislate for the welfare of the country as a whole in all matters, such as transportation, that have long since outgrown the proper control of the separate states.

"This new power of the Democratic Party, its shedding of selfish provincialism and awakening to the needs of the entire United States, has been demonstrated along many lines in the course of the first Wilson Administration. The party has at least four years more ahead of it for even bigger work, and that surely should include the working out of adequate laws for the furtherance of domestic and foreign commerce.

"The change in the attitude of the railroad men toward Government is just as marked. For many years their attitude was one of contempt. They had everything their own way in the state capitals and in Washington. It was the conventional thing for Government to omit doing what the railroads opposed, and the representatives of the Government were very deferential to the views of the railroad representatives who appeared in opposition to reform measures when the head of this or that railroad concern came for more privilege.

"In a way the railroad men and the representatives of the Government were co-operating in the perpetuation of conditions that were not for the welfare of the public primarily. Then came the period of hostility between the railroads and Government, with the latter trying to remedy the damage of previous legislation and unwise freedom and license, and the railroads fighting every inch of the way against reform. . . .

WATER TRANSPORTATION.

"But the railroad phase of this question of commerce must not be over-emphasized at the expense of other equally vital

parts of any national transportation policy. We must consider all forms of water traffic as well. The ocean steamship, the river boat, the canal barge, and the railway train must all be included as agencies for the same general purpose, and their work must be co-ordinated.

"In Germany the ocean shipping is subsidized by the Government. The railroads are owned by the Government. Every river is developed and improved to its utmost capacity for commercial traffic, and wherever it is necessary to link any two parts of this combination rail and river system by an artificial waterway, Germany has not hesitated to build a canal. . . .

"I am fully aware that in addition to railroad antagonism of the past the whole matter of river improvement for navigation has suffered from popular disapproval due to the piecemeal and provincial way in which the country has always handled the matter of its inland waterways. The whole thing has had a bad name, and the term "river improvements" has been coupled in the public mind with the words "pork barrel." That is because every river proposition in the history of the country has had its origin in the individual initiative of some Senator or Representative, striving to satisfy the local demand of his particular constituents.

"We have never asked our War Department Engineers, or any other body of disinterested experts, to study the river problem of the entire country. That must be done now. We must grasp the idea that there is such a thing as a trunk line river, as well as a trunk line railroad, and that it is a piece of gigantic economic waste not to treat all such rivers and their navigable tributaries as real factors in a national transportation system. . . .

"It should now be our purpose to make over 25,000 miles of waterways in this country as perfect instrumentalities of commerce as our railroads themselves, with every device for co-ordination between rail and boat, such as transfer facilities and sites, with all the means that cheapen transfer, and, above all things, legislation to compel fair treatment of the water carriers by the rail carriers.

OCEAN SHIPPING.

"I have referred to the subsidizing of ocean shipping by Germany as an important factor in the effective and closely knit transportation system of that country, but I realize that "subsidy" is another word which is in very bad odor in this country. It has not been able to live down the notorious early railroad scandals.

"Still, the United States must have a merchant marine, and it is a matter of simple arithmetic that it costs us anywhere from 50 to 100 per cent more to man and operate our vessels than it costs the ship owners of other countries. Unless that difference can be remedied in some way, any such merchant marine as we ought to have will be impossible. But we cannot make up that difference in cost of operation to the United States shipping interests by paying subsidy to owners.

"There is, however, another and a better way of doing it. Our navy, even as it is now, is greatly overbalanced by a

preponderance of fighting vessels out of all proportion to auxiliaries. This condition is becoming more serious all the time, for none of the proposed additions to the fighting fleet ever carries with it a corresponding increase in the equally necessary colliers and other supply vessels, without which the dreadnoughts and the cruisers would be useless in actual warfare.

"We should build such auxiliaries for our fleet and then lease these vessels in time of peace for commercial purposes. That, in itself, would add several hundred vessels to our merchant marine. Furthermore, we could lease these ships for purposes of commerce, partly manned by the sailors who would operate them for the Government in war time, and these men would continue to draw at least a part of their pay from the Government when doing commercial work. This would help to solve the wage problem for the lessees, and the Government would be fully justified in making such payment, because it would assure a permanent naval reserve body of men in constant training in the handling of ships.

FEDERAL INCORPORATION.

"Now, to come ashore, so to speak, from the rivers and high seas portion of the country's commerce needs to the more talked-about matter of land transportation, I fully believe that the country and the railroads themselves are ready for Federal incorporation. It is the logical next step in the getting together of Government and the railroads for the benefit of the public and of the rail properties themselves. It will have all the advantages of Government ownership without its dangers and disadvantages. In spite of all the faults I still believe that this country under private ownership subject to public regulation has the best railway system in the world. . . ."

New York Times Magazine, Dec. 31, 1916.)

(f) [§255] Organizing Industry for National Defense.

BY HOWARD E. COFFIN.

BY HOWARD E. COFFIN (CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS OF THE NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD).

The European War situation of the last year and a half has entirely upset our preconceived notions of a war. We had an idea that an Army and a Navy meant preparedness. We had an idea that the Army and the Navy would take the brunt of any attack upon this country; that the battle should be fought and the naval engagements should take place, and that the winner would be master of the field. Now in Europe today every one knows that it is not any more a question of a navy nor the question of any particular army. The test has gotten down to which country can fastest and longest supply the munitions of war to the men on the fighting line. It has gotten down to the question of what country can fastest and in the greatest quantity supply shells to the guns, and it has gotten down not to the point of professional fighting men but to the question of whether every man, woman, and child of the nation has been engaged and is engaged in the production of some

kind of materials for the armies at the front. It has even gotten to the point where the women of the leisure classes are going into the mills and the factories at Saturday noon and working in seven-hour shifts until midnight of Sunday, in order that the mills may not be closed down during the time that organized labor stops work for its period of rest. . . .

CIVILIAN DUTY OF DEFENSE.

It is vitally necessary that the civilian end of our whole American defense situation be instructed in the part which it must play in any true plan of national defense. Our departmental heads in Washington are largely, of course, graduates of the very best technical schools in the country. They are from Annapolis and West Point, and have been taught the profession of fighting and of military practice at every angle and are masters of their profession. Civilians are unable to give to those men any instructions or directions in their particular line of the work. But from the very nature of their training, the men who head the departments of the Army and Navy have lived and eaten and slept with military problems all their lives. Civilian engineers, on the other hand, have lived and eaten and slept with the industrial problems of the country. The two problems are entirely distinct, and the masters of one cannot possibly, within the human conception, be the masters of the other. We must organize behind the men of the Army and Navy. We must make them realize that they have the support of the country; and in order to do this we must work in time of peace and not wait until trouble comes upon us suddenly.

There are three steps to be taken to get industry organized behind the Army and Navy. Our first step is to find out what we can do in this country in the manufacture of munitions. The second step is to apply that knowledge in a practical way which will put the plants of this country into the service of the Government behind our Army and Navy. And the third step is to create such an organization of the skilled labor of this country that that skilled labor will not get off the job in the event of war, as it did in England and France, and get to the front and have to be pulled back later and reorganized for the work in hand, but will stay where it belongs, at work under governmental supervision which will actually prevent the men from enlisting in the regular service.

I do not know whether or not it has occurred to many people that the old cry of labor that it was obliged to fight the wars into which the governments might plunge the country has been pretty thoroughly exploded, and that the wars are being fought by the bankers and the statesmen and the artists and the tradesmen, etc.; while the skilled mechanic is being kept at home and guarded most carefully by the European governments, because they realize that in the preservation of their skilled mechanics they have the answer to the question of whether or not they will win or lose the war.

Now it is the skilled mechanic of the future who is going to win the wars of this country, because he is the man who is going to produce those munitions in such quantities as will be

used by the fighting line, whereas the banker, if you like, and the lawyer is merely a man who carries a gun at the front—as they put it abroad, is cannon fodder.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ENGINEERS.

In any problem as big as the question of industrial organization of this country for the service of the Government, in any problem as big as the analysis of the industrial resources of the country, we cannot, of course, depend upon any small corps of men or board which may be created for the purpose. Such work must be done by the men who themselves have developed the industries of the country. Therefore, early in the effort of the Naval Consulting Board to organize industry for national defense, we were convinced that in order to do this work as it should be done, and in order to place behind the Government the true industrial strength of this country, it was necessary that the engineers themselves of the United States take up this work. In the event of war, it will be the engineers who will have to direct the munition industries and who will have to co-operate on the closest possible terms so that the Government may accomplish results. Therefore, we felt immediately that we must organize the engineers of the country in this service. At our suggestion President Wilson wrote a letter to the presidents of the five national technical organizations of this country, which are the Mining Engineers, the Civil Engineers, the Mechanical Engineers, the Electrical Engineers, and the Chemical Engineers, asking them to co-operate with the Naval Consulting Board in the initiation of this work, and further requesting that their method of co-operation with this board should be through the selection of one of the leading business men, business engineers, a member of each society of every state in the Union; those five men to be formed into a board of directors, to which would be turned over all official action of the technical organizations, all the combined membership of this organization within that state. This gives us a board of directors of five men organized in every state of the Union, and under them they have 30,000 of the most highly trained engineers of the country.

INDUSTRIAL CENSUS.

Out of about 240 or 250 men nominated for this work by their societies, I believe that there have been only two failures to respond to the affirmative, one due to a death and the other due to some insurmountable obstacle. The engineers are entering the work in the most serious frame of mind; and the method of procedure which I shall outline briefly to you is that under the direction of the Naval Consulting Board, in accordance with the procedure and the practice of the United States Census Office, we are having prepared the necessary forms for the collection of the data on the industries of this country. There are about 30,000 concerns in which, in the first instance, we are interested. We want to make of those concerns a business inventory embodying knowledge such as any business man would

want to have concerning a company with which he expected to enter into serious business relations.

On these forms is filled in the name of the concern on which the report is to be made. The State Directors pass them on to the man in the field—a trained engineer who will understand that he is to get a full and accurate report on the business to which he is assigned; and it is our hope that this first step in true preparedness will go through as any other big business goes through in this country. We want to put the thing through in such a manner that it will serve notice upon our friends on the other side of the water that, when it is necessary for the United States to move rapidly in any question of preparedness, we have the old Yankee ability to do it.

Behind us, too, in all this work is the weight of the chambers of commerce of the country. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States has framed as a referendum to its voting members—comprising chambers of commerce, boards of trade, and national organizations throughout the United States—resolutions which are exactly in accordance with our proposed programme; and, therefore, we shall have not only the engineering ability and the engineering talent of the country engaged in the actual performance of the work, but we shall have the business weight of the country as well.

EDUCATION OF MANUFACTURERS.

But when we shall have taken an inventory of our resources we shall not have gotten very far toward preparedness; because no matter how much data we may acquire as to what the manufacturers of this country may be able to do, the vitally important thing, of course, is to see that those industries are in shape actually to do the work when it is put up to them. This is the second step. There is not a manufacturer in this country who can start on quantity production of shells within one year after the receipt of an order from the United States Government unless he has in time of peace and previously to the receipt of that order done shell work in his plant. Consequently we are going to have to educate the manufacturers of this country in the production of munitions, and we are going to have to show through these educational methods of procedure in this country how to serve the Army and the Navy in time of need.

It does not make any difference what our individual political ideas may be concerning Government ownership and Government operation of munitions plants. We must remember that from 80 to 90 per cent. of the total manufacturing and producing resources of the foreign nations today are engaged in the production of materials for the armies and navies, but principally for the fighting lines of the armies. The navies have used practically nothing as yet; so that nearly everything that is being made may be said to be for the armies.

NECESSITY OF PRIVATE INDUSTRIAL CO-OPERATION.

No one can conceive of a government, whether it be our own or any other, which can, through taxation or otherwise, con-

struct and maintain in time of peace a plant which will be qualified to turn out enough munitions to supply the fighting line in time of war. This means that even though we have Government-owned plants—and the ideal thing would be to have several of them scattered through the Middle West—but even though we have them to act as educational institutions and to act as clearing houses for specifications and blue-prints, in the last equation, in any future war in which this country is engaged, it is going to be the privately-owned manufacturing plants of this country which must feed the guns that will save the Nation. If we can have Government-owned plants, they will come in as assembling plants and as clearing houses for specifications, tools and skilled munition workers. But we must not overlook the fact that Congressional action toward the establishment of Government-owned plants may be on a false basis. As I see it, one of the greatest dangers of this country at the present time is that through the passage by the houses in Washington of bills creating a larger Army, an increased Navy, and a few munitions plants, the country may sit down and fold its hands, and say, "We are prepared."

As a practical working-out of industrial organization for national defense, we purpose to give the private plants of this country small annual orders for munitions. To take a case in point, suppose that we went to a motor car company with an order for a limited number of three-inch shell casings per year, to be produced at any time during the year, during the slack time or otherwise, with the idea that those casings must be delivered every year. Even an insignificant step like that will insure certain things. The purchasing department of the motor car company will learn how and where to buy materials; the manufacturing department of the motor car company will learn how to handle those materials; the company will learn what jig and tool equipment is necessary, and it will learn the heat treatment; the inspection department will learn the governmental standard of inspection; the engineering department will have the blue-prints and specifications covering that work, and all the arguments that arise on new work will be gotten out of the way during the time of peace; the shipping department will learn how to crate and ship the material after it is finished; and the business end of the motor car company will learn something of governmental methods of business. . . .

ATTITUDE OF LABOR.

Let us look for a minute at the labor attitude toward a step of this kind. By such a plan we are insuring against the closing of plants throughout this country, even in time of war. We are insuring employment to the maximum number of workmen even under war conditions. And we are laying once for all the bugaboo of the munitions lobby at Washington. We are giving to the Government a thousand strings to its bow where it now has a few, and we are bringing home to the American laboring man throughout this country the realization that he has some further obligations to the Government than he has felt that he has had to date.

Now the third step, of course, is to gain the support of skilled labor, and there we have of necessity to deal with organized labor. Just as certainly as we insure a government regulation of price upon munitions and just as certainly as we insure to the skilled mechanic of this country that he, without going to the front and carrying a musket, is yet going to be placed in the same relative position, so far as honor is concerned, as though he were carrying a gun in the trenches, just that certainly are we going to enlist the support of the skilled laborers behind any move of this kind. And that is the attitude of such leaders in the organized labor field with whom we have been in touch. The co-operation of labor is one of the most vital elements in any campaign for the introduction of such sound methods of preparedness.

I wonder if many people have a real conception of the intricate problem of the thing about which I am writing. I doubt if anyone can have who has never been actively interested in the quantity manufacture of materials. Perhaps one or two little instances will make the difficulties clearer.

NEED OF MACHINERY.

There are three concerns in this country to-day that make practically all the gauges and inspection tools for this country, and ship much of that same material to Europe. Those concerns are all in New England—incidentally two are in seacoast cities. They have gotten together and have compiled certain figures more or less for their own information. Those figures show that to produce 200,000 shells a day in this country of the sizes required by the Army and Navy would require an equipment in measuring tools and gauges and inspection gauges alone of from 17 million to 20 million tools, and would take the combined capacity of their plants five years to produce them; and the lack of these tools is one of the main reasons to-day why American manufacturers are unable to fill orders from Europe. Not long ago testimony concerning rifle manufacture to the following effect was given in Washington:

"It has taken substantially a year for American manufacturers, with every incentive and under the most favorable circumstances, to manufacture their first rifle for European use. In the manufacture of this rifle, 120 separate and distinct operations are required in order to finish the receiver alone. The receiver is that part of the rifle which contains the bolt and firing mechanism. In other words, 120 gauges of the utmost accuracy must be prepared before this essential part of the rifle can be made. So with the gauges for various other parts in order to manufacture the rifle in quantities. After one complete set is made, additional sets can be made somewhat more rapidly and cheaply, but each must be made independently and separately."

And in that connection here are some figures which have been compiled as to the life of the gauging mechanism. These gauges, after they are once completed, are to be used only for from 8,000 to 10,000 gaugings and then scrapped. The surfaces become so abraded that the gauge is no longer sufficiently accurate for the work, and new gauges must be substituted. . . .

THE PLAN FOR INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS.

It is not that many concerns in this country have not met new conditions quickly and successfully. They have. But these special concerns have manufactured only particular things. Many other items equally necessary for war use we cannot now manufacture at all. As a nation we are not at all ready to supply an army with all its wants. So much of specialized skill is required in the production of munitions of war that it may be truly said to be a new art; and in order that the facilities of this country may be placed in position to combat the difficulties of the taking up of a new art of this kind, it means that we must start the most thorough preparedness now in advance of any time of real trouble.

The plan of the Naval Consulting Board is first to get an accurate census of manufacturing plants; secondly, to have them equip themselves with the necessary tools and train themselves by making a small amount of munitions each year, and thirdly, to enlist skilled labor in the service of the Government to make munitions in time of war rather than to go to the front. Without some such co-operation of industry if a war come we shall send our soldiers, be they regulars, militia, or volunteers, to the front to slaughter and defeat.

(*World's Work*, XXXII, 23-29; May, 1916.)

(g) [§256] The Council of National Defense.

BY GEORGE HARVEY.

NEED.

One of the earliest lessons taught this country by the war was the realization that we must immediately consider plans for commercial and industrial mobilization. It was determined:

That every industrial plant or activity necessary to the maintenance and conduct of military operations in time of war be so organized, mobilized and trained in time of peace as would provide for an uninterrupted support of every branch of the military by the industrial life of the country; and

Such co-ordination of the railroads, with comprehensive transportation plans worked out in advance, as would make it possible to throw all the railroad systems into one, in event of war, for the effective transport of troops, animals, munitions and supplies for the army and navy, and the continued service to the civilian population.

ORGANIZATION.

This idea received the unqualified endorsement of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, and the American Railways Association, and President Wilson created the Council of National Defense, consisting of:—

Chairman, the Secretary of War.

The Secretary of the Navy.

The Secretary of the Interior.

The Secretary of Agriculture.

The Secretary of Commerce.

The Secretary of Labor.

The Council of National Defense was directed by the act creating it to nominate to the President, to be appointed by him, an advisory commission consisting of not more than seven persons, each of whom possessed special knowledge of some industry, public utility, or the development of some natural resource, or was otherwise specially qualified for the performance of such duties as would come within their jurisdiction.

The following Advisory Commission was appointed: Chairman, Daniel Willard; Bernard M. Baruch, Howard E. Coffin, Hollis Godfrey, Samuel Gompers, Dr. Franklin H. Martin, Julius Rosenwald.

FUNCTIONS.

It is the duty of the Council of National Defense to supervise and direct investigations and make recommendations to the President and the heads of executive departments as to the location of railroads with reference to the frontier of the United States so as to render possible expeditious concentration of troops and supplies to points of defense; the co-ordination of military, industrial, and commercial purposes in the location of extensive highways and branch lines of railroad; the utilization of waterways; the mobilization of military and naval resources for defense; the increase of domestic production of articles and materials essential to the support of armies and of the people during the interruption of foreign commerce; the development of seagoing transportation; data as to amounts, location, methods and means of production, and availability of military supplies; the giving of information to producers and manufacturers as to the class of supplies needed by the military and other service of the Government, the requirements relating thereto, and the creation of relations which will render possible in time of need the immediate concentration and utilization of the resources of the Nation.

INFORMATION.

The Council of National Defense adopts rules and regulations for the conduct of its work, which rules and regulations are subject to the approval of the President, and it provides for the work of the advisory commission to the end that the special knowledge of such commission may be developed by suitable investigation, research and inquiry, and made available in conference and report for the use of the council; and may organize subordinate bodies for its assistance in special investigations, either by the employment of experts or by the creation of committees of specially qualified persons to serve without compensation, but to direct the investigations of experts so employed.

Reports are submitted by all subordinate bodies and by the advisory commission to the council, and from time to time the council reports to the President or to the heads of executive departments upon special inquiries or subjects appropriate thereto, and an annual report to the Congress shall be submitted through the President, including as full a statement of the activities of the council and the agencies subordinate to it as is consistent with the public interest, including an itemized account of the expenditures made by the council or authorized by it, in as full detail as the public interest will permit.

E. [§257] MOBILIZATION OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE.

1. Specific References on the Section.

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- Anon. "Food Control," in *ibid*, X, 155-156 (March 10, 1917).
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- Lusk, Graham. "What to Eat in War Time," in *World's Work*, XXXIV, 446-452 (August, 1917).

2. Food Supply.

- (a) Grain and corn.
- (b) Animals.
- (c) Garden products.
- (d) Relation of exports.
- (e) Relation to manufacture of alcoholic beverages.

3. Raising Raw Materials for Use in War.

- (a) Cotton and other fibres.
- (b) Wool.

4. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§258] Enlistment for the Farm.

BY PROFESSOR JOHN DEWEY.

A MESSAGE TO THE SCHOOL BOARDS, PRINCIPALS AND TEACHERS OF THE NATION ON HOW SCHOOL CHILDREN CAN—

Aid the nation.

Increase the food supply of the country in war time and during a world-wide shortage of food.

Conscript the national enthusiasm for athletics to national usefulness.

Assure a vigorous and healthy rising generation.

Reap the advantage of organized effort with its moral and educational results.

Develop constructive patriotism.

THE WAR OF ORGANIZATION.

The War of the Nations is a war of organized social and economic effort. Military force is only one factor in national organization. The ultimate decision as to victory may well be with the farmer. It has been said that success will be with the country that can put the last hundred thousand men in the field—and it is no use to put a hundred thousand men in the field if their stomachs are empty.

The Central Powers have held out against an iron ring because they could feed their home population and their armed forces. Experts have watched, not so much the reports from the battle-field as from the farm. More important than another million men for Germany is the coming grain crop. More im-

portant for us than an army of ten millions is the loyal American farmer. It is food that will win our battles. We must look to all to help in its production and in its economical consumption. The school children of America can serve definitely, effectively and with educational results by helping in the plowing of Uncle Sam's acre.

FOOD PROBLEM.

The world faces a serious food problem. The reports of the International Agricultural Institute show that for the first time in many years there exists a serious deficit in the total available world supply of corn, wheat, rye, barley and oats. This deficit is estimated by David Lubin to be about 150,000,000 bushels less than the normal requirements for countries open to trade. The problem is more than a general one. It is one which we at home in America must face. The crop report just issued indicates that the supply of wheat will be more than 50,000,000 bushels less than last year's supply. In Kansas and Nebraska, the winter kill and drought have made heavy inroads into the total product of those states.

LABOR PROBLEM.

Coupled with this is the general shortage in farm labor. In the Middle West the general industrial development has drained the worker from the farm into the factory. In the North Atlantic states the production of war munitions and other war supplies has taken men from the farms. In the South the negroes have been leaving for the North for work on northern railways and other enterprises where they have been offered profitable returns for their labor. Added to all this is the complicating factor of no immigration of any importance from Europe since the midsummer of 1914 and a large exodus to Europe at the opening of hostilities. There are not enough men to man our farms. If we enlist the school children in this work they can serve with results as beneficial to themselves as to the nation.

What, then, is the duty of the school? In the fight for food, and it will be a fight, school children can help. There will be better results from training drills with the spade and the hoe than from parading America's youngest up and down the school yard. It is of no value to give military drill to boys of fourteen. A rifle is nothing for them to monkey with. But there is work for them that is important, valuable and educational. It offers first of all an opportunity to educators and teachers to develop Constructive Patriotism. It enables the teacher to help evolve in the growing generation the idea of universal service in the great battle of man against nature, which is something American, something great; and which is not a military idea transplanted from Europe. It gives a chance for the expression of the idea of service to one's country which is not of the destructive kind. There can never be any suspicion of a "militaristic" influence. Work of an agricultural nature permits us to mobilize our children in the great national and super-national struggle before us. It will employ for economic

production a great unused labor force which is too young to join the fighting forces. It will give the children healthful exercise, a sense of reality which means so much to children, and a sense of service in performance of work which is really useful.

We can only afford one fad in war time, and that fad is to be farming. But it will be useless for little William Corning Smith, aged twelve, of Kankakee, Illinois, to stick his little spade into his back yard before his admiring parent. Individual, unorganized work on land not properly prepared for agriculture may be worse than useless; it may be wasteful. Random efforts not co-ordinated in a general scheme for utilization of school children in large units will be foolish, misdirected effort. State, county and even national organization are required to make available this latent power. Purely isolated effort will be fruitless, both as aids to the nation and education for the child. Organized work will bring the greater moral advantages of developing the power of concentration along with the interest in national and community service. It will evoke an esprit de corps which may be capitalized for national use, and shift the usual interest in gangs and athletics, both normal and natural, to work which opens the way to loyal industrial educational training.

Organized work will sustain the interest of the school child. There will be none of that drudgery that comes with isolated work. A proper system would take advantage of the social and gregarious instincts and succeed in maintaining an interest sure to flag without social support. There should be scientific mobilization of school children in local districts so that they may be distributed for service in planting, fruit picking, harvesting. They must be available in effective units for rush seasons, though they must not interfere with the labor market or serve as "scabs."

Of course, rural and village schools have the greatest opportunity to organize their children for farm work; but children in the cities may be sent into the country for camps and tent colonies and work on the soil. This would be practicable especially during the vacation period and would give fresh air and health to the children from the congested urban districts. Around our cities many of the farms of older days have been turned into the gentlemen's farms. The Delaware Valley and Long Island have many such estates. On these fertile fields, which have been withdrawn from economic production, the school children might be organized for useful work. There they will gain a knowledge of the world of nature, the discipline of useful work, acquaintance with country life and a broadened vision. Perhaps such an exodus of children might lead to a system of regular yearly migration from city to country which would be of great physical and educational benefit and help turn the tide from country to city.

EMPLOYMENT OF SCHOOL CHILDREN.

Dr. P. P. Claxton, Commissioner of Education in the Department of the Interior, recently said:

"In the schools of the cities, towns, suburban communities, and manufacturing and mining villages of the United States, there are approximately 6,000,000 boys and girls between the ages of nine and sixteen. Most of them are idle more than half of the year. They are in school less than 1,000 hours in the year, and allowing ten hours a day for sleep, are out of school more than 4,000 waking hours,—more than an average of nine hours a day, not counting Sundays. National and State laws make it impossible for most of them to do any profitable work in mill, mine or shop, and many of them are forming habits of idleness and falling into vice. Even during the vacation months, only about ten per cent. have any profitable employment; only about five per cent. of them go away from their homes except for a few days. Still, they must live and be fed and clothed.

"For four millions of these there is access to back yards, side yards, front yards, and vacant lots, which might be cultivated as small gardens for the growth of vegetables and small fruits. Many live where space could be easily had for chickens, ducks, or pigeons. And there are not less than 6,000,000 older boys and girls and adult men and women for whom an hour or two of work each day in a garden would be the best form of recreation and rest from the routine of their daily labor in office or shop, or mill, or mine, and who might easily find the time for it.

"With some intelligent direction, these school children and older boys and girls and men and women might easily produce on the available land an average of \$75 each in vegetables and fruits for their town tables or for sale in their immediate neighborhood; fresh and crisp through all the growing months and wholesomely canned and preserved for use in winter. This would add \$750,000,000 to the best form of food supply of the country without cost of transportation or storage and without profits of middlemen. The estimate is very conservative, as has been shown by many experiments.

"In addition to the economic profits, there would be for the children health and strength, removal from temptation to vice, and education of the best type; and for older persons, rest and recreation in the open air and the joy of watching things grow."

The work should be planned and conducted so as to reap its educational value. The children should not only get some knowledge of farming, but every effort should be made to cultivate nature study, investigation of plant life and growth; study of insects—those which help the farmer and those which hurt him. In addition, some fundamental training in mechanics and arithmetic should be arranged for.

PROPER ORGANIZATION OF THE SCHOOLS.

This is not a dream.

It can be done.

By the teachers of America.

There are about six weeks left in this school year.

Now is the time to organize this work.

School boards and educational agencies should commence to make their plans. Delay is dangerous. This work of national

education and national production will succeed if the teachers and parents co-operate with the school authorities. The work would be worth while even if we were not at war, and if there were no food shortage. But as we are at war and as there is a food shortage, it is the duty of parents, teachers and school boards to consider the organization of school children into farming groups.

Just as children should not act in isolated and scattered ways, so the teachers should seek co-operation in every way. Enlist the sympathies of school boards, of influential citizens, of the farmers, of all existing agencies, like corn clubs and canning clubs; call on county agents and agricultural colleges and experiment stations for aid in making plans and for supervisors. Put as much leadership as possible in the hands of the abler boys and girls. Perhaps some who have not shone in book work will be the first to make good if given active practical responsibilities. The work is for the good of the whole community. Let it be done in a community spirit.

But the first step must be taken by the educators. They are the ones who are in contact with both the youth and the other members of the community. If they rise to the opportunity, the work can be accomplished. They will rise to the opportunity if they realize its nature. It is a chance to link the school with life. It is a chance to develop for the first time in the history of the world in time of war a constructive and industrial instead of a destructive and militaristic patriotism. All can join without distinction of race and creed, or even of previous sympathy. It is service not only for our own country and for the countries on whose side we are fighting, but a service to the whole world when peace shall again dawn.

(*Columbia War Papers*, No. 1.)

(b) [§259] Food supply.

BY PROFESSORS H. R. SEAGER AND ROBERT E. CHADDOCK.

The United States is in the war to help the Allies defeat Germany. The most urgent, immediate, common needs are not men and munitions, but food and ships. The ships we have already begun to supply by taking over those interned in our ports. To supply the food calls for a mobilization as far-reaching as that for organization of an army. The American people, collectively and individually, must face the duty of increasing the food supply with the same seriousness that they face the duty of enlisting for military service.

THE SITUATION.

What is the American food situation? America has been so long called the world's granary that many persons still believe it to be an inexhaustible reservoir of food. It is not. America ceased to feed the world some years ago, and current high prices indicate the difficulty she is beginning to experience in feeding herself. Our food production has not kept pace with the growth of our population. This fact caused anxiety to agricultural experts even before the outbreak of the war. Now, when we must supply food not only to our-

selves, but to our allies, it is the gravest aspect of a grave situation. . . .

FOOD PRODUCTION DECLINING.

The relative volume of agricultural industry has been steadily declining, and the export of surplus foodstuffs and raw material was correspondingly decreasing up to the outbreak of the war. These facts are shown by the following tables. The first described the comparative diversion of population from agriculture to manufacture in the past thirty years:

Percentage increase in total populations, 1880-1910.....	83.3
Percentage increase in total wage earners in manufacturing	142.1
Percentage increase in total wage earners in agriculture	79.7

The same tendency is shown even more strikingly in the statistics of the distribution of urban and rural population in 1880 and 1910. Urban in this case refers to persons dwelling in towns of 2,500 or more population. In 1880, 29.5 per cent. of the American people was urban and 70.5 per cent. rural. In 1910, 46.3 per cent. was urban and 53.7 per cent. rural. The movement of population appears in the following table:

Percentage increase in total population, 1880-1910.....	83.3
Percentage increase in urban population, 1880-1910.....	188.5
Percentage increase in rural population, 1880-1910.....	39.4

The significant result of this tendency of Americans to concentrate in urban communities has been a decrease in the per capita production of staple food products. The per capita production of wheat in the United States thirty years ago in comparison with that of to-day is as follows:

Years	Population	Average Annual Wheat Production	Annual per Capita Production
1876-1884.....	50,156,000	426,922,000 bu.	8.5 bu.
1906-1914.....	91,972,000	712,474,000 bu.	7.7 bu.

To have had the same per capita production in the last nine years as in the earlier period, would have required an annual production of 73,600,000 bushels more than was actually produced. This falling off of eight-tenths of a bushel per capita is all the more significant because concentration of population in cities tends to increase the need of staple food products.

Statistics show an even more marked decline in the rate of increase of farm animals compared with the growth of population, during the four ten-year periods indicated:

	1870-1880	1880-1890	1890-1900	1900-1910
Population	30.1%	25.5%	20.7%	21.0%
Cattle	50.8	43.0	2.0	3.0
Sheep	23.6	2.1	10.9	-0.5*
Swine	89.7	20.4	9.5	-7.4*

It is seen that the production of cereals and food animals has for years failed to keep pace with the population. Especially has the rate of increase of animals been slowing down much more rapidly than the growth of population. In the

case of sheep and swine, during the decade ending in 1910, there was an actual decrease. These evidences of declining per capita food production are the more grave because our common cereals and familiar animal foods must remain our chief dependence. To our allies they are even more essential, since they alone are adapted to overseas transportation.

FOOD EXPORTS DECLINING.

Because of the decreased per capita production, there has been a falling off in our relative exportation of staple food products. The proportion of our wheat crop exported in the periods indicated below, was:

1880-1889	28.2%
1890-1899	34.4
1900-1909	21.7
1910-1914	21.2

. . . This decrease is probable notwithstanding a record winter wheat acreage last autumn of 40,890,000 acres.

NEED OF ACTION.

The facts in reference to our food situation which have been presented prove conclusively the need of action. The aspect that has thus far received the most attention is the high prices and the burden these impose upon consumers. Many have jumped to the conclusion that middlemen and speculators were to blame, and that the remedy was to be sought in government interference with the normal course of trade, or by the expropriation of grain elevators, cold storage plants, and the other machinery for warehousing and distributing food products. Middlemen and speculators may have made unreasonable profits. This should be investigated. As a general statement, however, it is quite clear from the foregoing facts that the primary cause of the current high prices is an actual shortage of foodstuffs in comparison with the extraordinary demand for them. This being true, the remedy must be sought chiefly in measures that will cause an increased production of foodstuffs and an avoidance of waste in connection with distribution and consumption. . . .

The Secretary of Agriculture has well said that this is not a time for hysteria. It is a time, however, for an aggressive, constructive policy led by the authorities at Washington and assisted by the authorities of every state in the Union. The enthusiastic co-operation of the citizens of the entire country must be enlisted. To this end the traditional views that free-born American citizens must not be interfered with, but must be left to work out their own salvation, must either give place to the principle that at a time of national crisis private preferences and conveniences must be sacrificed to the public interest. A wise national program must first be thought out. Then the full power of the government must be fearlessly exerted to bring the program into effective operation. For it must be recognized that food resources are fighting resources. Food mobilization is just as necessary as the mobilization of an army.

AID TO AGRICULTURISTS.

As a first step toward relieving the shortage of farm workers a survey should be undertaken in the principal agricultural states to determine the number of farm workers that will be required. The already existing machinery of public employment bureaus may then be utilized to address a nationwide appeal to all those competent to do agricultural work to turn to it this summer as the surest means of serving their country in its hour of need. If sufficient workers cannot be secured by these means, the same machinery which is being developed to enlist men for the army and navy may be employed to induce some of them to turn to agriculture as an equally important branch of the national service.

In addition to these measures, designed to increase the production of staples, every encouragement and assistance should be given to plans for increasing the production of green vegetables and other crops, by individual families who control vegetables and other crops, by individual families who control garden plots. Such products cannot be exported, but every addition to our supplies of these substitutes for staples in our own consumption, adds indirectly to our exportable surplus of staples. There is gratifying evidence from one end of the country to the other of a determination on the part of millions of families to produce, so far as possible, their own food supplies this summer. The only danger in this movement is that enthusiastic amateur farmers, with larger incomes to experiment with than our professional farmers, may hire workers and use up seed and fertilizers, without obtaining the crops that regular farmers could secure with the same labor and materials. It is a period when everyone with land to cultivate should cultivate it, not by hiring farm workers away from competent farmers who wish to employ them, but by his own labor. A few hours weekly, devoted to garden cultivation by every suburban family, will add substantially to the year's food supply.

AVOIDANCE OF WASTE.

Quite as important as increased food production for a country so habituated to abundant food supplies as the United States, is the avoidance of the needless waste or misdirection of food materials. According to the "Times Annalist," we waste \$700,000,000 worth of food in a year. European countries were never as profligate of food as we have been, and yet the necessity of conserving every particle of food, which the war has imposed upon them, has taught them new ways of avoiding waste that we will do well to copy.

One of the earliest and most sensible methods of economizing food was the introduction of war bread. This may be merely whole wheat bread—which utilizes some 85 per cent. of the wheat kernel instead of the 70 to 75 per cent. utilized in milling white flour—or bread made of mixed flour, containing rye, barley, and even potatoes as well as wheat. Our Agricultural Department should study European experience and, if satisfied that substantial saving could be effected along

this line without detriment to national health and vitality, should urge upon Congress the prompt enactment of the measures necessary to bring us as speedily as possible to a war-bread basis. A prohibitive tax on the manufacture of flour, not conforming to government specifications, would be a simple means of obtaining this end.

Even more serious than the consumption of white bread is the constant waste of food products of all sorts in most American families. Nothing short of a rationing system, like that of Germany, would stop this waste entirely, but much might be accomplished by a nation-wide campaign for food conservation. This might well be taken up by state and local health authorities, since food saving and sanitation and cleanliness go hand in hand.

SAVING IN ALCOHOL.

Besides avoiding all kinds of food wastes, Europe countries have been forced by necessity to curb the consumption of food materials in the production of liquor. A similar step, as a means of food conservation, may not become necessary in the United States, but the substantial additions to our food supplies that would result from the curbing or the suspending of the distilling and brewing business, ought to receive critical attention. Even if not sufficient to justify prohibitive legislation, they strongly reinforce the more familiar arguments in favor of this policy for a country at war.

In outlining the above program of Food Preparedness for the United States we have attempted rather to indicate than to advocate policies. The facts presented prove that a real food crisis confronts us. This calls as urgently for constructive national action as does the declaration that a state of war exists for the organization of the army. The National Defense Council has heard this call, and has signified its appreciation of the magnitude and importance of the task to be accomplished by selecting Mr. Herbert C. Hoover, the hero of Belgian relief, to head its committee on food supplies and prices.

(*Columbia War Papers*, No. 6.)

(c) [§260] Food Economy in Wartime.

BY PROFESSOR L. J. HENDERSON.

HOW TO BUY FOOD.

Economy in food depends first upon buying, *at the lowest possible price*, wisely chosen food products in the proper relative proportions. In order to buy at the lowest price, it is necessary to purchase somewhat large quantities, and it is imperatively necessary to avoid the package foods, especially those which are widely advertised. In most cases such foods sell for more than double a reasonable price.

One food alone should be bought in packages in order to insure the family against the dangers of disease, viz., milk.

The second principle, that governing the choice of the food products which make up the family diet, is substantially the same for all classes who seek to economize at all.

All types of food stuffs should be included, but in very varying quantities. Thus for the sake of economy large quantities of cereal food, moderate quantities of dried beans and peas, and very small quantities indeed of meat should be used. In general similar foods are of equal value regardless of price. As a rule one kind of meat or fish is just as good as another and there is little to choose between the different cereals. The only qualification upon this statement is that some articles, notably milk, eggs, butter, white flour, are specially useful to the cook in the preparation of dishes made largely from cheaper substances, and for that reason should not be entirely dispensed with even though they may be expensive.

In the following table are presented the approximate cost in cents* of one-tenth of a day's ration (for an adult city dweller

*Retail prices in New York City in the year 1916. of average weight and activity) of certain of the cheapest food stuffs:

COST OF ONE-TENTH OF A DAY'S RATION.

	Cents.		Cents.		Cents.
Cornmeal ...	1/2	Bread	7/8	Olive Oil ...	1 9/10
Hominy	1/2	Lard	7/8	Raisins	2 1/10
Oatmeal	1/2	Corn syrup.	1	Dried apples.	2 1/6
Flour	3/5	Beans	1 2/5	Cheese	2 1/3
Sugar	2/3	Potatoes ...	1 2/3	Butter	2 2/5
Broken rice..	3/4	Dates	1 3/4		

From this table it can readily be seen, for instance, that a day's requirements (10/10 of a ration) which may be satisfied with 2/10 of a ration of cornmeal, 3/10 of a ration of flour, 1/10 of a ration of sugar, 7/10 of a ration of beans, 1/10 of a ration of dried apples, 1/10 of a ration of cheese and 1/10 of a ration of butter, would cost about 12 cents. The greater part of the meal should consist of such articles.

But it must be clearly understood that the diet should not be restricted to this table and to similar articles except for short periods of time or in cases of dire necessity. Milk in particular, above all for children, but also small quantities of meat and fish and as much fresh vegetables and fruits as can be afforded, when they are sold at their lowest prices, are most desirable. Nothing but skill in cooking is then necessary to make the diet meet the requirements.

Economy without intelligence and shrewdness is impossible. If these qualities can be applied to the problem of feeding a family it is hardly necessary to consider the scientific principles of nutrition beyond the facts presented in the above table, for careful reflection will lead to a wise choice if it be understood that the actual fuel value of the food is to be sought in such cheap articles as those of the table and that flavor, variety, attractiveness, and certain necessary minute quantities of substances which favor growth and health are to be sought in such luxuries as can be afforded and in skillful preparation.

The third principle in food economy is to use every bit of food purchased for the nutrition of the family. Fat should

not be allowed to burn or to run down the sink. All scraps from the table may be utilized in a well regulated household when the plates are left empty, but these are considerations which cannot be properly stated in this place.

At the present time there are special national needs which in part modify and in part reinforce the above principles. Upon the one hand it is the duty of all Americans, so far as possible without great interference with their normal diet, to substitute other substances, especially corn, oats and rye, for wheat. There are also especial demands upon the meat supply of America, and various other demands are almost sure to arise.

The best way to meet these requirements, which duty imposes upon rich and poor alike, but with even greater insistence upon the rich and well-to-do, is loyally to co-operate with the authorities, to obey their orders and to give hearty support to their plans of every kind.

(Prepared for America at War.)

F. [§261] RAISING OF FUNDS.

1. Specific References on the Section.

See §139 above.

- Anon. "Financing the War," in *New Republic*, X, 282-283 (April 7, 1917).
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2. Taxation.

- (a) Reasons for high taxation during the war (the nation produces war supplies anyhow and should tax profits while making.

3. Loans. President Wilson's Second *Liberty Loan Proclamation*, Oct. 13, 1917.
 - (a) Liberty Loan—"If you cannot enlist—invest."
 - (b) Later loans—absolute security of Government issues.
- 4 Paper Money.
 - (a) To be avoided to the last.
 - (b) Bad experience of the Revolution, War of 1812, and Civil War.
5. Economy of Private Expense.
 - (a) Unavoidable disturbance of many incomes.
 - (b) Not enough for everybody to enjoy the same scale of living.
 - (c) War must be supported out of savings surplus of production over ordinary use.
 - (d) Alternative is prodigious bond issues with heavy total interest.
6. Documents and Extracts on the Section.
 - (a) [§262] Memorial to Congress Regarding War Finance.

BY PROFESSORS OF ECONOMICS.

We, the undersigned, teachers of political economy, public finance and political science in American universities and colleges, respectfully urge upon Congress to adopt the policy of taxation rather than that of bond issues as the principal means of financing the expenditures of our own country in the war on which it has embarked.

The taxation policy is practicable. It will prevent the price inflation which must result from large bond issues. It is demanded by social justice. It will increase the efficiency of the nation in the conduct of the war.

The argument in support of these statements is briefly as follows:

THE TAXATION PLAN IS PRACTICABLE.

The taxation policy is practicable, because the current income of the people in any case must pay the war expenditures. The choice between bond issues and taxation is merely a choice whether the Government shall take income with a promise to repay those who furnish it or take income without such promise. The actual arms, munitions and other equipment and supplies for use in the war, except to the small extent that they have been stored up in the past, must be produced now, during the war itself, not after the war, and moreover must be produced by our own people. The policy of borrowing within the country itself does not shift any part of the nation's burden of war expenditures from the present to the future. All it does is to make possible a different distribution of the burden among individuals and social classes, to permit repayment to certain persons, who have contributed income during the war, by other persons, after the war. If the people can support the war at all, they can do it on a cash basis. Borrowing creates nothing. Except by borrowing abroad, which we cannot do, we can get nothing which we do not ourselves produce.

It may be necessary for a month or two at the outset to issue a limited amount of bonds, pending the collection of increased taxes, but beyond these, which might well be made repayable within a year, no necessity for bonds exists.

TAXATION PREVENTS PRICE INFLATION.

The taxation policy and no other will enable the country to escape the enormous evils of further inflation. The present high level of prices in Europe and America is primarily due to the war bonds and the paper money issued abroad. If the United States joins on a huge scale in this policy of borrowing, prices are bound to become far higher still.

Price inflation is harmful even in times of peace. During a war it is disastrous. It increases the cost of conducting the war. It postpones victory and thus adds to the war's toll of lives as well as to its money expenditures. By every bond issue the Government enhances the price it must pay, and thus creates the need of more bonds. The policy works against itself.

Moreover, inflation of prices works injustice between different classes of society. The burden rests chiefly upon wage earners and salary receivers, whose pay never rises as fast as prices, and upon those who receive fixed or contractual incomes. The hardship which millions of our people are already suffering from the increased cost of living will be made many fold greater if the Government issues billions of dollars of bonds to finance the war.

The manner in which bond issues inflate prices may be briefly explained. The bond policy increases the amount of bank credit, which is equivalent in effect to an increase in the currency.

For example, if the Government takes \$1,000 from a man in taxes, his credit or purchasing power is lessened to the same extent as the Government's is increased. On the other hand, if the Government borrows \$1,000 from him, the quantity of purchasing power in existence is greatly increased. He now has a bond worth \$1,000 on which he can and very often will borrow at the bank. Say he borrows \$800; to lend him \$800 the bank does not have to give up 800 actual dollars. Instead, it gives him a deposit account of \$800 and, inasmuch as most of those who present checks do not ask for actual cash, but have their checks credited to their deposit accounts, the bank can keep this \$800 in checks floating by setting aside, say, only \$200 of actual cash. In other words, this bond issue transaction has resulted in increasing the Government's credit by \$1,000, in decreasing the man's credit by only \$200 and in decreasing the bank's money by only \$200; that is, there has been a net increase of credit currency (checking deposit accounts) of \$600, in contrast with no net increase if taxes had been adopted instead of bonds.

If the man had given up his money in taxes, he would have ceased to compete with the Government and other buyers of commodities and labor, to the extent of \$1,000; but when the Government gives him a bond for his payment, he is still enabled to compete to the extent of \$800. The purchasing power of society as a whole has increased by \$600. This inevitably forces up prices.

The above illustrates the result of a bond issue that is taken by the public. As a matter of fact, if bonds are issued, a large part of them will be taken by banks. It is likely that the Federal Reserve Banks will buy these bonds wholesale by giving the Government checking accounts to the extent of the bonds. This

causes immediate inflation to the full amount of the checking accounts thus created—that is, inflation to 100 per cent. instead of to 60 per cent. of the bond issue, as outlined in the illustration above.

As the Government draws checks on these bank accounts to meet its requirements, the banks will try to recoup themselves by retailing the bonds to the public. To the extent that they succeed, the bonds get into the hands of the ultimate investor with the resulting inflation already described. In so far as the banks are unsuccessful in this distribution, they are almost certain to issue bank notes on the basis of bonds left in their hands and these notes will cause inflation even worse than that due to the checking accounts of the public based on bond collateral.

JUSTICE DEMANDS THE TAX POLICY.

The policy of taxation for war expenditures is demanded by justice. Apart from the injustice arising from price inflation, the policy of paying for the war by bond issues gives property a preference over life; it deals unjustly as between citizen and citizen. The question of taxation versus bonds is not merely one of economics; it is one of morals, of right against wrong.

This war is a great social enterprise. The American people have undertaken it as a people. The future welfare of the country as a whole is involved; the future welfare of every citizen is involved. It is the duty, therefore, of every citizen to share in war's burden to his utmost. For some the duty is to fight; for others to furnish money. For all the duty is without limit of amount. The citizen who contributes even his entire income, beyond what is necessary to subsistence itself, does less than the citizen who contributes himself to the nation.

The man who goes to the front cannot be paid back the life or limb he may lose. The man who stays at home should contribute his just share of the money cost without expectation of repayment. That the soldier or sailor who gives himself to his country should, if he be so fortunate as to return, be taxed to pay interest and repay principal to him who has contributed the lesser thing, money, is a crying injustice. If conscription of men is just and right, conscription of income is the more so; conscription of both is just and right when the nation's life and honor are at stake.

TAXATION WILL INCREASE WAR EFFICIENCY.

The policy of taxation for war expenditures will increase the efficiency of the nation in the war. Its effect in keeping down the cost of the war has already been pointed out. Its effect on the spirit of the people is still more important. The general recognition of the justice of requiring every one, according to his ability, to share the burdens of war, will bind the people together; the sense of injustice in the policy of borrowing will tend to drive them apart, to array class against class. Our soldiers and sailors will fight loyally in any case, but their spirit will be the more indomitable if they feel that every man who stays at home is serving the country to the utmost with his substance. An America in which every citizen without discrimina-

tion is called upon to do and to give all that he can, all that his powers permit, will be a united America, and a united America is bound to be victorious.

SUGGESTED FORMS OF TAXATION.

Without entering into details, concerning which opinions may differ, we recommend that, among the tax measures to be adopted for the war period, the following should be included:

(1) A tax which will take substantially all of special war profits.

(2) A material lowering of the present income tax exemption.

(3) A drastic increase in the rates of the income tax, with a sharper progression in rates as incomes become larger.

(4) High consumption taxes on luxuries.

(*Congressional Record*, LV, 2136, May 10, 1917.)

G. [§263] SPIRIT OF THE NATION.

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2. Treatment of Opponents of the War.

- (a) See letter of the Chairman to the branches of the National Security League May 28, 1917. (See §265.)

3. National Service of Those Who Continue Production So As to Keep the Soldiers in the Field.
4. National Service of Women and Children.
5. Patriotic Feelings and Exercises.
 - (a) Flags and flag exercises.
 - (b) Patriotic songs.
 - (c) Patriotic sermons and addresses.
 - (d) Patriotic meetings.
 - (e) Pageants.
6. Patriotic Teaching.
History Teachers Magazine, VIII, 143-147, 179-182, 188-189 (May-June, 1917).
7. Patriotic Organizations.
 See List in §5 above.
8. Patriotism of Standing Behind the President.
 - (a) Report of Executive Committee of the National Security League, May 2, 1917.
9. Duty of Holding Courage if Disaster Should Come.
 - (a) State official "Emergency Congresses."
 - (b) Red Cross organizations.
10. The War Is a Crusade Against Evil Influences.
 - (a) The spirit of cruelty.
 - (b) The spirit of conquest.
 - (c) The spirit of rapine.
 - (d) The spirit of arbitrary power.
 - (e) The spirit of enmity.
11. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§264] Standing By.

BY S. STANWOOD MENKEN (PRESIDENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE).

Fellow members, let me again say we must rouse the American people by fair statement to their danger. We can not be sure the British navy nor the British nation can withstand the submarine war—whether waged by hundreds or thousands.

We must show that to rely on them absolutely would be staking our all in a gamble upon their victory.

We must point out that many experts fear the submarine will win—and that we must be prepared by night work and by day to strike hard with the finished product of all our resources, for our very life may depend upon it.

We must show the people of America that Germany's position is like that of the strong man, forced to fight with three adversaries; that she would prefer to fight with each singly, or at the most with two, and worsting them, turn in her own time to annihilate the third. The analysis shows the direct simplicity of her strategy. Whether or not England and France are in the serious condition reports from Washington and London indicate, I do not know, though they are far more sinister than the daily press states, but this much is clear and may be accepted as conservative.

Our Allies have been driven far towards exhaustion and there is great danger the U-boats may succeed.

Germany states she desires no active warfare with us. Of course. It would mean more attrition. Then again, it would awaken us, which she does not wish to do until free to hit with all her power and gather the full fruits of victory.

Of course, this must never be.

I do not wish to inflame your minds; I do wish to appeal to your calm reason while there is yet time for thought, but I must in measured words say to you that never has your country been in such danger, and that we must act now.

To-day we enjoy the comforts of our homes; we are frittering over the superficialities of life while the Republic is in danger. If Nero fiddled when Rome burned, are we, the average American, free to criticise? We are trifling about the immaterial while autocracy battles with democracy and all civilization stands imperiled.

(Executive Committee of the National Security League, New York, May 3, 1917.)

(b) [§265] Counter Activities of the Pacifists.

BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE (May 28, 1917.)

Our country being actually engaged in war and the Government being occupied with all sorts of war measures, including conscription, a great many people are of the impression that the National Security League has attained its object and that we have no further work to do. Nothing could be further from the truth. In spite of all our efforts, and in spite of the facts, which prove that our alarm over our country's defenseless condition was well founded, there still remains a large body of citizens unconvinced and half asleep.

PACIFISTS.

These persons are daily receiving encouragement from various so-called pacifist organizations. It is true that they are not as loud-spoken as they were, but there is no evidence of a cessation of their activities. Many of their former demonstrations were too near the verge of treason to be continued at the present time, but their efforts are as insidious as ever and more dangerous. Quietly, by underground methods, their propaganda, coupled with that of those who would weaken the United States and benefit Germany, is being spread broadcast. The members of the National Security League should at once take active steps to counteract this influence and it behooves all of our branches throughout the country to be vigilant and active as never before.

As an illustration of what we have to combat, attention is directed to the propaganda of the No-Conscription League and similar organizations. The No-Conscription League is openly circulating literature in which conscription is described as an order to commit murder, and American citizens are urged to disregard and disobey the law. Other bodies are operating less openly, sending literature of an equally treacherous tendency to carefully selected lists of persons. Under the guise of defending

free speech, they encourage unpatriotic gatherings where speeches verging upon treason and sedition are made. They foster a spirit of resistance to the obligation which all owe to our country.

The Emergency Peace Federation recently boasted in a printed circular that it maintained a strong "Legislative Committee" (in plain language, a lobby) in Washington, Room 648, Munsey Building. It claimed to have organized by letters, telegrams and newspaper articles a vast "inarticulate" (the word is their own) opposition to conscription and stated that it was trying to get in touch with all persons and organizations who would stand with them "when the psychological moment arrived for a concerted demand for peace negotiation." They boasted that their bombardment of Congress has won the votes of over forty of our Representatives in the recent disgraceful spectacle presented by our national legislative body while the President was attempting to obtain approval of his Army program. This organization and similar bodies are forming branches in every town and city in the country where they can obtain a foot-hold.

COUNTERACTING SYSTEM.

The National Security League, through its Committee on Patriotism Through Education, recently devised a plan for combating these activities which will do much to offset their influence. The medium will be a nation-wide system of patriotic meetings and lectures at which trained speakers will set forth the causes of the war, the reasons for the entrance of this country into the conflict, the manner in which we must carry out our part in order to insure the supremacy of democracy over autocracy, and the vital fact that our national safety depends upon our victory. Enthusiastic proffers of assistance and cooperation have been received from many sources—patriotic, fraternal, social and business organizations, college and university presidents and professors, numerous educational bodies, etc. You will be advised later of the detailed assistance you can give this work.

This great war can only be brought to a successful issue by vigorous and concerted action. Those who do not help us to go forward pull us back. The mere dead weight of ignorance and indifference is a terrific handicap. You must do all you can to keep awake the real spirit of patriotism and preparedness in your district and in no way allow your branch of the National Security League to slacken its activities. There are so many things which we can do apart from the great fundamental object of the League, bringing about permanent Universal military Training and Service. We are enclosing a pamphlet on Home Defense League organization. It is one of the most important of the various forms of service which—if not already under way—your branch can render. The National Security League must bestir itself to awaken the people to the great necessity of this war, so that this country may continue to exist a free, alert and respected nation.

(Letter sent by National Security League to its Chairmen of branches, May 28, 1917.)

(c) [§266] Congress and the War (1917).

THE WORK OF THE GOVERNMENT.

BY THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, OCT. 6, 1917.

CONGRESS.

The extraordinary session of the 65th Congress has enacted more legislation of importance than any preceding session in our history. Responding patriotically to the demands of war, it has broken all records in the enactment of great appropriation bills and laws bestowing powers upon the Chief Executive and his assistants. Here are a few of the important legislative enactments:

Joint resolution declaring war against the Imperial German Government, approved April 6.

The first wartime general deficiency appropriation bill, carrying in round figures \$163,000,000, of which \$100,000,000 was to be expended by the President for national security and defense.

The first bond issue bill authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to sell \$5,000,000,000 worth of bonds (of which amount \$3,000,000,000 was for loans to our allies) and \$2,000,000,000 in one year certificates of indebtedness.

The army, military academy and sundry civil appropriation bills which had failed in the 64th Congress. Total appropriations carried about \$422,000,000.

The selective draft law, providing for the raising of an army of one million men by the draft.

A bill authorizing the President to take over any vessel owned wholly or in part by any citizen, corporation or subject of any nation with which the United States may be at war.

The first great war budget, appropriating \$3,281,000,000 for the military and naval establishments on account of war expenses.

A bill temporarily increasing the strength of the Navy and Marine Corps.

The espionage bill and the bill authorizing condemnation of lands for military purposes.

Authorization for an aviation service and an appropriation of \$640,000,000 therefor.

The food control bill and legislation making more effective the war risk insurance bureau.

The second bond issue bill, authorizing an issue of \$4,000,000,000 additional to meet loans to foreign governments, \$2,000,000,000 of one-year certificates of indebtedness and \$2,000,000,000 of five-year war-saving certificates.

A deficiency appropriation bill carrying more than \$5,300,000,000 for the fiscal year 1918. This authorizes additional contract obligations of two billion dollars and raises the limit of cost to carry out the provisions of the shipping act to \$1,734,000,000. It further appropriates for the shipping fund \$635,000,000.

The trading with the enemy bill and the soldiers' and sailors' family insurance bill.

A taxation bill to raise approximately \$2,500,000,000 in revenue toward defraying the expenses of war.

WAR DEPARTMENT.

Without accident or disaster, the War Department already has sent a large expeditionary force to France. Within three months the department constructed sixteen cantonments, or sixteen cities each capable of accommodating a population of 40,000. The sum of approximately \$150,000,000 was spent for cantonment construction. In these cantonments, or virtually en route thereto, there are today about a half million men. When they are trained, others can be readily supplied for similar training. The selective draft law is working smoothly, fairly and successfully.

Following the April announcement of the Adjutant General of the establishment of sixteen officers' training camps, approximately 27,000 young officers received intensive training and are receiving commissions for the various branches of the service. A second series of training camps for officers has begun and the third will begin in January. The Adjutant General's office also procured more than 50,000 trained specialists for the Enlisted Reserve Corps. About 30,000 officers in the reserve corps have been commissioned. At the beginning of the war, we had approximately 20,000 officers. There are now around 80,000 officers.

Development of the "Liberty Motor" which has withstood every aviation engine test is one of the major achievements of the War Department, and the Aircraft Production Board. This was followed by the designing of a standard military truck. Then came the letting of contracts for the great aerial fleet authorized in the \$640,000,000 aviation appropriation bill. This aviation program calls for more than 20,000 airplanes ranging from light training machines to great battle planes. Aviation experts from the Allied countries are in Washington and help to form an "international general staff on aviation."

Twenty-four flying schools have been authorized for training aviators in this country and the majority of them are in operation. There are eight ground schools. Many American aviators are now receiving intensive training behind the battle fronts.

Plans have been made for the construction of a large hospital at each one of the 32 National Guard and National Army cantonments, and for the construction of other large base hospitals at a dozen or twenty points scattered over the country. A thorough-going plan for caring for the wounded and for returning them to civil life, thoroughly fitted to be useful and valuable, has been worked out and is being put into effect.

THE NAVY DEPARTMENT.

The Navy now has in service more than three times as many men and nearly three times as many vessels as when war was declared.

The Navy and Marine Corps constitute a force of more than a quarter of a million men. On April 6 there were 64,680 enlisted men in the regular Navy; now there are 143,726, an increase of 79,046. There are about 12,000 officers in the Navy and 1,122 in the Marine Corps.

Hundreds of vessels of various types, yachts and fast motor-boats, have been taken over and transformed into patrol boats, submarine chasers, mine sweepers and the various types needed for anti-submarine warfare, coast defense and other purposes.

The Atlantic Fleet comprises twice as many vessels as in peace times. Every battleship and cruiser that was in reserve has been fully manned and commissioned. Every warship is now a training school for the instruction of men in gunnery and engineering, and notable results have been achieved, especially in target practice with guns of the smaller calibres used in fighting submarines.

The largest ship construction program in history is being carried out by the Navy Department, comprising hundreds of vessels of various types from super-dreadnoughts to submarine-chasers.

Twenty training camps have been erected, accommodating 85,000 men, for housing and training recruits.

Navy yards have been enlarged, immense foundries, machine shops and warehouses erected; work is being pushed on dry-docks, shipways and piers. A big projectile plant is being erected at Charleston, W. Va., and a \$1,000,000 aircraft factory at Philadelphia. Extensions of the naval gun factory will make that plant one of the largest of its kind. The entire "shore building" program embraces an expenditure of \$100,000,000.

(d) [§267] War, the Constitution Moulder.

BY PROFESSOR EDWARD S. CORWIN (June 9, 1917.)

THE PRESIDENT'S POWER.

The concentration of power and responsibility demanded by war is apt to give a system grounded on the rigid maxims of republicanism a somewhat violent wrench. Fortunately the framers of the Constitution were not wholly unaware of the difficulty, which they proceeded to meet by conferring on the President as Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy all the prerogatives of monarchy in connection with war-making except only the power to declare war and the power to create armed forces. The clause of the Constitution which makes the President Commander-in-Chief may accordingly be described as the elastic block in the closed circle of constitutionalism; in the heat of war the powers it confers are capable of expanding tremendously, but upon the restoration of normal conditions they shrink with equal rapidity. The true nature of the presidential prerogative in war time was comprehended by Lincoln perfectly, who, when he was confronted with the argument that some of his measures were likely to constitute precedents injurious to liberty, answered the objection in his characteristic strain: "Nor," said he, "am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended that the American people will, by means of mili-

tary arrests during the rebellion lose the right of public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the laws of evidence, trial by jury, and habeas corpus, throughout the indefinite peaceful future which I trust lies before them, any more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics during a temporary illness as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life." History has amply vindicated Lincoln's judgment in this matter, for the direct effect of the Civil War in the way of enlarging national power or of altering the relations of the different branches of the national government to one another was comparatively slight. . . .

REGULATION OF TRANSPORTATION AND PRICES.

The Civil War was *war* in the most elementary sense of the term; our assistance to the Allies, even though we eventually send a considerable army abroad, must still be primarily financial and industrial. And this means the regimentation of industry and commerce on a national scale. It means, if Congress follows the President in this matter, lodging in the hands of the national executive the power to direct transportation, to control exports, to prevent—in the President's own words—"all unwarranted hoarding of every kind and the control of food stuffs by persons who are not in any legitimate sense producers, dealers, or traders," the power to requisition food supplies to meet public need, and the equipment necessary to handle them, the power to prohibit unnecessary and wasteful use of foods, and finally the power to fix maximum and minimum prices. No doubt, many of the measures suggested in the President's statement of Saturday, May 19th, which I have just paraphrased, will be of a purely emergency character, and so will pass out of existence with the war. Yet it is clear that for some of them, and for others of a similar nature, the way has already been paved both by industrial development and political agitation long before our entrance into the war had been thought of. Measures of this description look toward the permanent reshaping of both our governmental and our industrial systems, and the power upon which they rest will be relaxed only in part, if at all, with the return of peace.

This, however, is but the beginning of the changes which the war promises to engraft upon our constitutional arrangements. For the new faculties with which the national government will find itself endowed new channels must be provided or else existing channels must be enlarged. The latter is the more economical course, and already it is being resorted to. Moreover, we again perceive the stress of the immediate exigency striking hands with developments which were originally launched much earlier. . . .

USING THE STATES.

An even more striking possibility in the way of constitutional development than those just referred to is foreshadowed by Section 6 of the Conscription act. This section authorizes the President "to utilize the services" not only of all officers and agents of the United States and territories, but of the several

states as well, and it further provides that any person "who in any manner shall fail or neglect fully to perform any duty required of him in the execution of this act, shall, if not subject to military law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction in the District Court of the United States, having jurisdiction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year." . . . The Conscription Act is however vindicated to some degree by certain later utterances of the Court (see especially *ex parte Siebold*, 100 U. S.), and at any rate it is clearly harmonious with the original intention of the Constitution. . . . Pinckney, speaking in this reference on the floor of the Philadelphia Convention said: "They [the states] are the instruments upon which the Union must frequently depend for the support and execution of its powers." . . . An interesting possibility is thus suggested: that, as the states diminish in importance in the legislative field, through the extension of congressional power, they may be afforded an opportunity to justify their continued existence in the capacity of administrative agents of the national government, and so our dual system would be gradually replaced by a federal system approximating to the German and Swiss type. . . .

ENLARGING THE CONSTITUTION.

For several years forces have been accumulating behind the barriers of the old Constitution, straining and weakening them at many points, yet without finding adequate enlargement. Where the stress of war falls coincident with such forces we may expect it to thrust aside accepted principles, not for the time only, but permanently. Certainly if the war is considerably prolonged, we may expect our system to emerge from it substantially altered in numerous ways, with the result, however, it may be, of postponing more radical alterations many years.

(*New Republic*, XI, 153-155; June 9, 1917.)

(e) [§268] The Call to Service.

BY PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON (April 15, 1917).

My Fellow Countrymen:

The entrance of our own beloved country into the grim and terrible war for democracy and human rights which has shaken the world creates so many problems of national life and action which call for immediate consideration and settlement that I hope you will permit me to address to you a few words of earnest counsel and appeal with regard to them.

UNSELFISH WAR.

We are rapidly putting our navy upon an effective war footing and are about to create and equip a great army, but these are the simplest parts of the great task to which we have addressed ourselves. There is not a single selfish element, so far as I can see, in the cause we are fighting for. We are fighting for what

we believe and wish to be the rights of mankind and for the future peace and security of the world. To do this great thing worthily and successfully we must devote ourselves to the service without regard to profit or material advantage and with an energy and intelligence that will rise to the level of the enterprise itself. We must realize to the full how great the task is and how many things, how many kinds and elements of capacity and service and self-sacrifice it involves.

INDUSTRIES.

These, then, are the things we must do and do well, besides fighting—the things without which mere fighting would be fruitless.

We must supply abundant food for ourselves and for our armies and our seamen, not only, but also for a large part of the nations with whom we have now made common cause, in whose support and by whose sides we shall be fighting.

We must supply ships by the hundreds out of our shipyards to carry to the other side of the sea, submarines or no submarines, what will every day be needed there and abundant materials out of our fields and our mines and our factories with which not only to clothe and equip our own forces on land and sea, but also to clothe and support our people for whom the gallant fellows under arms can no longer work; to help clothe and equip the armies with which we are co-operating in Europe and to keep the looms and manufactories there in raw materials: coal to keep the fires going in ships at sea and in the furnaces of hundreds of factories across the sea; steel out of which to make arms and ammunition both here and there; rails for worn out railways back of the fighting fronts; locomotives and rolling stock to take the place of those every day going to pieces; mules, horses, cattle for labor and for military service; everything with which the people of England and France and Italy and Russia have usually supplied themselves but cannot now afford the men, the materials or the machinery to make.

It is evident to every thinking man that our industries, on the farms, in the shipyards, in the mines, in the factories, must be made more prolific and more efficient than ever, and that they must be more economically managed and better adapted to the particular requirements of our task than they have been; and what I want to say is that the men and the women who devote their thought and their energy to these things will be serving the country and conducting the fight for peace and freedom just as truly and just as effectively as the men on the battlefield or in the trenches. The industrial forces of the country, men and women alike, will be a great national, a great international service army—a notable and honored host engaged in the service of the nation and the world, the efficient friends and saviors of free men everywhere. Thousands, nay, hundreds of thousands, of men otherwise liable to military service will of right and of necessity be excused from that service and assigned to the fundamental, sustaining work of the fields and factories and mines, and they will be as much part of the great patriotic forces of the nation as the men under fire.

THE FARMERS.

I take the liberty, therefore, of addressing this word to the farmers of the country and to all who work on the farms: The supreme need of our own nation and of the nations with which we are co-operating is an abundance of supplies, and especially of foodstuffs. The importance of an adequate food supply, especially for the present year, is superlative. Without abundant food, alike for the armies and the peoples now at war, the whole great enterprise upon which we have embarked will break down and fail. The world's food reserves are low. Not only during the present emergency, but for some time after peace shall have come, both our own people and a large proportion of the people of Europe must rely upon the harvests in America.

Upon the farmers of this country, therefore, in large measure rests the fate of the war and the fate of the nations. May the nation not count upon them to omit no step that will increase the production of their land or that will bring about the most effectual co-operation in the sale and distribution of their products? The time is short. It is of the most imperative importance that everything possible be done, and done immediately, to make sure of large harvests. I call upon young men and old alike and upon the able-bodied boys of the land to accept and act upon this duty—to turn in hosts to the farms and make certain that no pains and no labor is lacking in this great matter.

I particularly appeal to the farmers of the South to plant abundant foodstuffs, as well as cotton. They can show their patriotism in no better or more convincing way than by resisting the great temptation of the present price of cotton and helping upon a great scale, to feed the nation and the peoples everywhere who are fighting for their liberties and for our own. The variety of their crops will be the visible measure of their comprehension of their national duty.

The Government of the United States and the Governments of the several States stand ready to co-operate. They will do everything possible to assist farmers in securing an adequate supply of seed, an adequate force of laborers when they are most needed, at harvest time, and the means of expediting shipments of fertilizers and farm machinery, as well as of the crops themselves when harvested. The course of trade shall be as unhampered as it is possible to make it, and there shall be no unwarranted manipulation of the nation's food supply by those who handle it on its way to the consumer. This is our opportunity to demonstrate the efficiency of a great democracy, and we shall not fall short of it!

MIDDLEMEN.

This let me say to the middlemen of every sort, whether they are handling our foodstuffs or our raw materials of manufacture or the products of our mills and factories: The eyes of the country will be especially upon you. This is your opportunity for signal service, efficient and disinterested. The country expects you, as it expects all others, to forego unusual profits, to

organize and expedite shipments of supplies of every kind, but especially of food, with an eye to the service you are rendering and in the spirit of those who enlist in the ranks, for their people, not for themselves. I shall confidently expect you to deserve and win the confidence of people of every sort and station.

RAILWAY MEN.

To the men who run the railways of the country, whether they be managers or operative employees, let me say that the railways are the arteries of the nation's life and that upon them rests the immense responsibility of seeing to it that those arteries suffer no obstruction of any kind, no inefficiency or slackened power. To the merchant let me suggest the motto, "Small profits and quick service," and to the shipbuilder the thought that the life of the war depends upon him. The food and the war supplies must be carried across the seas, no matter how many ships are sent to the bottom. The places of those that go down must be supplied, and supplied at once. To the miner let me say that he stands where the farmer does! the work of the world waits on him. If he slackens or fails, armies and statesmen are helpless. He also is enlisted in the great Service Army. The manufacturer does not need to be told, I hope, that the nation looks to him to speed and perfect every process; and I want only to remind his employees that their service is absolutely indispensable and is counted on by every man who loves the country and its liberties.

GARDENERS.

Let me suggest, also, that every one who creates or cultivates a garden helps, and helps greatly, to solve the problem of the feeding of the nations; and that every housewife who practices strict economy puts herself in the ranks of those who serve the nation. This is the time for America to correct her unpardonable fault of wastefulness and extravagance. Let every man and every woman assume the duty of careful, provident use and expenditure as a public duty, as a dictate of patriotism which no one can now expect ever to be excused or forgiven for ignoring.

The supreme test of the nation has come. We must all speak, act, and serve together!

(*Outlook*, vol. 115, pp. 728-729; April 25, 1917.)

(f) [§269] **The Soldiers' Question: "We Have Given Ourselves. What Will You Give?"**

BY THE MANUFACTURERS' RECORD.

To a group of New York's leading bankers a leading worker for the Young Men's Christian Association, who had been in the trenches and seen the heroism of the soldiers, and who had learned to appreciate the marvelous consecration of these men as they offered their lives in the great battle for civilization, said:

"In the light of what I have seen of self-sacrifice, of heroism, there is not one of you in this room worthy to blacken the shoes of the men who are in the trenches."

RISKING THEIR LIVES.

This was said to a group of men of the highest morality, of a patriotism which has led the nation, of broad generosity in giving to the work of the Red Cross and the Young Men's Christian Association and kindred interests, and giving not by thousands, but by millions. It was not an exaggerated statement, but it was made for the purpose of trying to impress upon these great bankers that the man who gives only of his money, even though he gives deeply of his principal, is giving less than the men who are so willingly giving their lives. The superb sacrifice of 7,000,000 men whose bodies have already covered the battlefields of Europe, while millions of wounded have suffered untold agonies on the battlefields and in hospitals, calls the world as nothing else in all human history of the last nineteen centuries to sacrifice that it may serve.

The man or woman who, facing the awful realities of this war, can move along in his or her accustomed way, seeking to accumulate money, or to pass his or her time in the pleasures or the frivolities or even the usual routine of duties, has not at all grasped the significance of the agony and tragedy through which the world is passing.

Some thousands of American soldiers have already landed in France, and other thousands, and hundreds of thousands and millions will have to follow. These men are not at all unmindful of the reality of the struggle upon which they are entering. Each one knows full well that he is offering his life; and if perchance he be saved to return to his loved ones, comrades all around him and by his side he knows will die. Each man realizes fully that he is going into a war for service. These men are not going from any thoughtless desire for adventure; they are not going without a full understanding of what is meant to lie in the trenches day after day and night after night, and crawl out over the trenches to and through the barbed wires and struggle in a great death grapple. These things are before them, and yet they go forward with a courage which should stir every latent quality of good in every human heart. Before such men those who cannot go should stand with uncovered heads and bemoan the fate that makes it necessary for them to be saved by the sacrifice of the lives of others.

AID THE SOLDIER!

These are the living realities, the verities, of this hour. They call in thunder tones to the nation. They call to every human heart to honor the soldiers and the sailors; to throw around them every possible safeguard to protect them from every temptation; to make their task as light as possible; to furnish every comfort and convenience; to lighten their work and lessen their sorrows; to provide the means for their healthful enjoyment around every camp, and to banish from every camp the accursed liquor traffic and all the evils which follow; to provide the nurses and the stretcher-bearers, and the physicians, and the hospitals which may minister unto them in hours of agony; to provide the facilities for the training of the body and mind

afforded by the Young Men's Christian Association in every camp.

For these things the American people must work wholeheartedly, with an enthusiasm which matches that of the men in the battle line.

Out of the nation's work and the wealth that may be accumulated therefrom must be poured to the fullest limit the money needed for these things.

WHAT WILL YOU GIVE?

A few weeks ago Maryland troops on a parade in the interest of the Liberty Loan carried a banner on which was inscribed:

"We have given ourselves.

What will you give?"

That is the question which the life of every soldier puts before every man and woman in this country.

What will you give to the men who are giving their lives? What service will you render to them to lessen their burdens, to lighten their homesickness, to soften their agony on the battlefield, to save their bodies and to save their souls? What answer will the American people give to the question, "We have given ourselves; what will you give?"

(*Manufacturers' Record*, LXXII, 54; July 19, 1917.)

CHAPTER VII.

HOW TO MAKE WAR SUCCESSFUL.

A. [§270] GENERAL REFERENCES ON THE CHAPTER.

See §§138-142 above.

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B. [§271] COMBATING THE GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN SUBMARINES.

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2. Great Danger of This Situation.

Walker. May 7, 1917.

- 3 Meeting the Danger by Protective Devices of Nets, Etc.
4. Meeting the Danger by Sinking the Submarine.
 - (a) Consequent absolute need of a naval program, including destroyers and patrol boats.
5. Minimizing the Danger by Building New Merchantmen.
 - (a) A program of steel and wooden ships.
6. Destroying the German Submarine Bases.
 - (a) Only possible by armed aeroplanes.
7. Need of Defense of Our Coast Against Submarine Attack.
 - (a) Mines, nets, etc.
 - (b) Patrol system.
 - (c) Big coast guns.
- 8 Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§272] **How the U-Boats Threaten Our General Prosperity.**

FROM THE WORLD'S WORK.

If the German submarines should even approximate their threats of stopping traffic to England, France and Russia it would practically also amount to a prohibition of American export trade. This would immediately have a direct effect upon almost every community in the country as well as the general effect of a depression and probably a panic. Our prosperity is largely measured by the fact that in 1913 our exports amounted to \$25 per capita, and in 1916 \$60. Sixty per cent. of them go to England, France and Russia.

EXPORTS.

A study of the sources of these exports show that they come from practically every section of the country. Grains, cotton, cattle, mules and horses cover nearly the whole country. All these commodities constitute large items. The copper from Montana and Arizona is as important to these states as iron or steel to Pennsylvania and Ohio. The export trade in flour affects Minneapolis, Minn., as the export trade in shoe affects Brockton, Mass. The accompanying maps show in the main essentials how widespread is the interest in our exports and the freedom of the seas from submarines.

What the crippling of this trade would mean for the agricultural states in particular is suggested by the drop in the prices of cotton and wheat—one of the most violent in the history of the market for either of those commodities—which followed immediately upon the heels or the announcement of Germany's new policy. The decline in cotton was the equivalent of \$18.75 to \$25.90 per bale, while wheat dropped precipitately 15 cents per bushel.

The significance of the new situation for the industrial states is indicated by the fact that during the latter part of 1916 exports of steel were running about 22 per cent. of the total production of the industry. In many other industries the pro-

portion of exports to total production has doubtless been much greater than that.

IMPORTS.

But our concern is by no means all on the side of our export trade. A situation of this kind contains serious possibilities concerning imported commodities which enter into the daily needs of the people, and for which we are absolutely dependent upon foreign markets. Take rubber, for instance. We imported last year nearly \$165,000,000 worth of the crude article, approximately two and a half times the amount brought in during 1914, but not enough to meet all our requirements with ease. Among the other important items on the import side of the balance sheet last year were: hides and skins, \$173,000,000; chemicals, drugs and dyes, about \$120,000,000; vegetable fiber, manufactured and unmanufactured, \$135,000,000; mineral and vegetable oils, \$55,000,000; tea, \$20,000,000; undressed furs and skins, \$18,000,000; wood pulp, \$21,000,000. The German submarine blockade, if successful, would not deprive us of all of these, but even an approximate success would so reduce the amount of the world's shipping that we who control little of it would find our imports as well as our exports badly crippled.

(*World's Work*, XXXIII, 561-564; March, 1917).

(b) [§273] Our Submarine Chasers.

By WILLIAM HARD (April, 1917.)

By this time the public eye sees hundreds and even thousands of small boats—regular navy ones and private auxiliary ones—hastening up and down our coasts from Bath, Maine, to Galveston, Texas, shooting the periscopes off submarines. Therefore I submit a count of what we really have and of what we are likely to get. I begin with the regular navy.

GUNBOATS.

We have gunboats. We have twenty-eight gunboats. They are strong enough to kill a submarine all right because they are armed with three-pounders and six-pounders and even four-inchers. They have good teeth. But they are old. Twenty-three out of the twenty-eight were born before the Spanish war. Seven of them are "out of commission"; that is, they have no crews. Two of them are "in reserve": that is, they have only about forty per cent. crews. Only nineteen of them are "in full commission." And of these nineteen, nine are in our Asiatic fleet. Moreover, almost all our gunboats are slow. Only three of them made as much as sixteen knots an hour on their original trips. We have one gunboat building. She was authorized on August 20, 1916. The last Navy List reports her with the double goose-egg. She is "Building, 0.0 per cent. complete." We shall not see many submarines slain by gunboats. They are not fit for this job.

TORPEDO BOATS.

Next we have "torpedo boats." They should be distinguished from destroyers. Destroyers, really modern ones, have a full-

load displacement of from about 900 to about 1,300 tons. These "torpedo boats" have a full-load displacement of from 125 to 375 tons. They are bantams. That, however, is nothing against them. They are larger than our new projected official special "submarine chasers." And they are fast. They made from 24 to 30 knots an hour on their trial trips. But they are not youthful any more as a class. Only two of them were launched as lately as 1901. They seem to be regarded as generally senile. Four of them are "out of commission." Eleven of them are "in ordinary": that is, they have only about twenty-five per cent. crews. One of them is in "reserve." Out of a total of seventeen, just one is "in full commission." Clearly the navy has not thought it worth while to get these boats ready to go out trawling for German tin-fish.

OLD DESTROYERS.

Our next class is called by the navy "Destroyers not serviceable for duty with the fleet." They were launched in 1900, 1901 and 1902. They are intermediate in size between "torpedo boats" and fleet-serving destroyers. They are not too old and they are fast. They all made twenty-eight or twenty-nine knots an hour on trial. They can be used in one way and another. But what has actually been done to get them ready? There are sixteen of them. Eight of them are "in reserve." They have not had full crews practising. Big boats like "armored cruisers," which are of no particular use to us in the war which has been impending over us for two years have had full crews practising. These small and potentially useful boats have not. That accounts for half of the sixteen. The remaining eight have been kept far away from any possible concerted practice against submarines in the Atlantic. Three of them are in the Pacific fleet. Five of them are with the Asiatic fleet, where they defy Von Tirpitz's veterans to break through their cordon and sink the Brooklyn, their revered twenty-one-year-old first class cruiser flagship. Our sixteen "Destroyers not serviceable for duty with the fleet" may conceivably be serviceable for various near-shore duties against submarines, but we are not likely to see them dashing into port with scalps at their bows at any early moment.

MODERN DESTROYERS.

We next come to our real fleet-serving destroyers. There are fifty-one of these. One is "out of commission" and two are "in ordinary"—which leaves forty-eight. Seventeen of these forty-eight were scheduled in the last Navy List as "operating with reduced complements." That means along about sixty per cent. crews. I repeat that we have found full crews for many boats of no genuine prospective use in our prospective war, but we have been unable to find full crews for many boats genuinely prospectively useful indeed.

Our fleet destroyers are splendid boats. All of them, except the three that are "out of commission" and "in ordinary" are attached to our Atlantic fleet. That includes the seventeen which have been "operating with reduced complements" as well as the

thirty-one which are "in full commission." We have forty-eight excellent destroyers where they belong—in the Atlantic. The trouble is that our first-class all-big-gun battleships, if they ever move out of enclosed waters at all even for necessary occasional battle practice in the open sea, will want all—or almost all—of these destroyers with them. We may be permitted to imagine, perhaps, that in certain circumstances a certain number of fleet-serving destroyers might be free to undertake a little anti-submarine activity for the protection of our commerce along our rather prolix coast from Canada to Mexico. But those certain circumstances and that certain number of destroyers would surely be uncertain in the extreme.

SCOUTS.

There is one remaining group of full-sized regular-navy boats especially suited to the rapid protection of commerce. It is a group called "scouts." There are three of them—the Chester, the Birmingham and the Salem. They are third-class cruisers tagged as "scouts" because of their speed. Among all our cruisers of all classes they are the only ones that made as much as twenty-four knots an hour on their trials. They are only ten years old. Each of them is assigned, under our published mobilization-stations plan, to be the flagship of one of our three flotillas of destroyers. But the Chester is "in reserve," and the Birmingham is "in reserve" and "under repairs," and the Salem is "out of commission." It is clear that they are not exactly straining at the leash with every muscle massaged to the minute. Moreover, if they were all fitted to go to sea and if they could be spared from their duties as flotilla flagships, they are quite too large to be risked on anti-submarine work. They are vessels of a full-load displacement of more than 500 tons|

MOTOR BOATS

So we come to our new experiments. For a long time these experiments were confined to boats of pygmy size. Shortly after the war broke out Mr. William Washburn Nutting of the magazine called *Motor Boat* printed a picture of a very tiny motor boat furiously demolishing a periscope with gunfire from her hooded prow. This admirable prophecy was soon brought to a certain sort of general fulfilment on the other side of the Atlantic. Though motor boats might not demolish periscopes every minute, they were seen to have their uses—important uses. Our navy showed interest. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary, showed particular and enthusiastic interest. We placed orders (experimental ones) with our motor boat building yards calling upon them to show ingenuity in meeting our specified needs. In the end we sanctioned a forty-five foot boat from the Lawley yard in Massachusetts and a fifty-foot boat from the Greenport yard in Long Island a sixty-foot boat from the Luders yard in Connecticut and, from the yard of Murray and Tregurtha in Massachusetts, four or five venomous little things called "Viper Sea Sleds" which look like aborted barges and have noses as broad as their bellies and can make as much as forty knots an hour.

WASPS.

This was the era of boats not only pygmy in size but meteor in speed. It was the "wasp" era. We were to have a fleet of "wasps." And we could to-day make considerable use of a fleet of specially designed and specially strong "wasps" for in-shore quiet-water protective patrol work. We did not get it. We did not even get all the few individual experimental boats for which we placed orders. The Luders boat had trouble with its engines; and the Greenport boat, too, had trouble with its engines; and they have never been accepted. There is a fatality about the specifications drawn up by Washington for the things it wants to buy. The Greenport yard can get engines that will go for foreign governments in boats that it sells to foreign governments; but it cannot get engines that will go properly for Washington. This cannot be because Washington is in America. Our navy has just bought a little sixty foot boat called the Chingachook. It was built by the Greenport yard. But it was built purely privately. It was built, and we looked at it, and we bought it, and we have it. The one ordered specially for us a year ago we have not. The only notable result of the "wasp" era in the tale of ships in our regular public fleet, at the time we declared war on Germany, were the four or five "sea sleds," the Lawley forty-five footer and the Chingachook.

FAST PRIVATE YACHTS.

By that time we had gone on into our second and final era, in which we transferred our main interest to a boat much larger than a "wasp" and much slower. But, before speaking of that boat, we should pause to notice the popular notion that we can get "auxiliary" submarine-chasers by the myriad out of our great privately-owned fleet of pleasure motor-craft. It is a notion demonstrably erroneous.

Franklin D. Roosevelt has been as enthusiastic about small boats as anybody in the United States. From the beginning, so far as an outsider can make out, he has been a vigorous supporter of any and all means of getting ready to hit the submarine in the open sea and in bays and gulfs and sounds and narrows and rivers and rivulets. He is an effective young man because, among other reasons, he is an optimistic young man. Yet even he was obliged to tell the yacht-owners of New York that a motor boat, to be an "auxiliary," should be at least forty feet long. Now how many motor-boats have we that are forty feet long? A large number. The Yacht Register says 1,275. But where does that get us?

Let us assume that every one of these 1,275 boats, by the imposition of a three-pounder on its usually frail and at present utterly unsuitable deck, could be transformed into a real "wasp" with a real sting. Some twenty-five ready-made real "wasps" do indeed already exist among them. They were specially built by patriotic sporting owners on special designs officially approved by the Navy Department. Let us assume that all the rest of them can be "wasps," too. It is a frantic assumption. The mass of these boats will never strike a submarine in their

lives. They may render invaluable non-combatant service; and we must have them; and they will deserve, and already have, our most grateful thanks; but it is only a small minority of them that ever will or ever can be real fighters. Let us, however, assume. Let us see 1,275 "auxiliary" submarine-chasers. Where are we then?

SPECIAL ANTI-SUBMARINES.

We are mostly in harbor. A boat has to be much more than forty feet long to be able to go after submarines in the open sea. The boats sent to England so numerous by our Elco yard for anti-submarine purposes are eighty-five feet long. The best technical naval opinion is that they should have been longer. That is why our new projected final submarine-chaser is one hundred and ten feet long. It is a boat of special design, of special shape and strength and general fitness for this special work, and yet it has to be one hundred and ten feet long. How many of our private motor boats are as much as one hundred feet long? Fifty-one. How many are as much as eighty feet long? One hundred and sixty-six, altogether. We shall see no avenging hordes of converted motor boats dashing around Cape Hatteras and Cape Cod day and night hunting submarines through Atlantic storms. They simply cannot do it. They will help us in-shore to be safe. Few of them, very few, will help us do the one thing we must in the end do—down our enemy in the open sea.

Surely it is manifest that our one hope is our official future one-hundred-and-ten-foot boats. I here ask just one question about these boats. How many of them are we going to get? It is understood that the Navy is laying down several score of them in its own yards. The private builders, when they met in Washington, were inclined to think, when most hopeful, that they could furnish 116 of them by the first of next January. Let us double their hopefulness. Let us even treble it. We shall still be dealing, public yards and private yards together, in mere hundreds.

NEED OF RAPID BUILDING.

Is it not clear that if we continue to deal in mere hundreds, we might almost as well have stayed out of the war? Four or five hundred submarine-chasers by the first of next January will not do much more than safeguard our own coast. To defeat Germany in a reasonable length of time we must swamp the German submarine; and, to swamp the German submarine, we must deal in thousands of submarine-chasers—literally and inevitably thousands. And we must go where the submarines are. They are, and always will be, at their thickest and at their most damaging to our commerce and to our peace in the waters about the island on which live those most disagreeable persons the British. Unless we plunge in alongside those most disagreeable persons and proceed to swamp submarines where submarines are, with anti-submarine craft of all types needed, in thousands as required, we shall find next January that the German submarine commanders, so far as anything

that we have done is concerned, are just as strong against the world and against the United States as they are to-day.

To change that prospect, it is becoming evident that we shall have to undertake a deep reorganization of our conceptions of policy and of our methods of organization for manufacture.

(*New Republic*, X, 314-316; April 14, 1917.)

C. [§274] NECESSITY OF A LARGE NAVAL FLEET.

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2. Furnishing First Line of Naval Defense.

3. Variety of Ships.

(a) Battleships, fast cruisers.

(b) Destroyers, submarines.

(c) Mother ships, hospital ships, transports, supply ships, etc.

4. No Invasion Possible While That Fleet Holds.

- (a) But German, British and Italian fleets are unable to keep the sea in squadrons in the North Sea and Channel.

5. Need of Naval Enlistments.

- (a) Keeping up the numbers.
 (b) Providing a reserve.

6. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§275] Naval Power Is Paramount Power.

BY REAR ADMIRAL FRENCH E. CHADWICK.

The navy in all countries has ever been, and, as far as we can now judge, ever will be, a pre-eminent instrument of Government. It was through her navy that Greece destroyed the power of Persia; Rome that of Carthage; the allies at Lepanto that of the Turks; England that of Holland and later that of France in America; the navy of France, in turn, caused the relinquishment of Great Britain's sovereignty over the thirteen Colonies which formed the United States, and a generation later it was the British Navy which made the efforts of the great Napoleon the "baseless fabric of a vision."

VALUE OF A NAVY.

Coming to days within the ken of many still living, the navy was the power which made possible the preservation of the Union in our great civil war by the cutting off of the Southern Confederacy from its means of support by sea and reducing its forces thereby to practical inanition. For had the Confederacy had free access to the sea and control of the Mississippi River, no armies of the North could have conquered well-supplied armies of the South.

So, too, the control of the sea decided the outcome of the Spanish war. When Sampson's fleet destroyed Spain's only battle squadron off Santiago de Cuba, Spain could no longer reinforce her army in Cuba, and surrender was a necessity.

Even as this is written, Germany's every sea outlet is closed by the British fleet, so superior in number to the German, German commerce on the sea is for the time entirely swept away, leaving Great Britain for the moment navally and commercially supreme upon the ocean.

As one attempts to look into the future the vastness of the possible changes startles the imagination, but in it all is ever present the power that goes with the ubiquitous warship, from whose threat no port of the world is free. Military power fades to insignificance, through its narrow limits of mobility, when compared with the meaning of a great fleet.

NAVAL WORLD POWER.

We speak much of our development into a world power through the war of 1898. We were such a power potentially as soon as we had a navy of a strength to enable us to say to another power, "I forbid." And we can only remain a world power through a navy which can command safety and peace.

Linked to such power there must be political good sense

and just dealing. Long habit in obedience and in command, a lifelong study of international relations, a knowledge of the races of men such as no other great profession can offer, an ideal which puts duty as its first law; these enable the navy to furnish its just quota of both the high qualifications mentioned. To it the country can securely trust its honor and safety. It will ever do its duty.

DEFENSE OF THE PANAMA CANAL.

The situation left us by the Spanish war is one which can be maintained only by a powerful fleet, though our acquisitions in themselves scarcely add to the necessity of such a fleet, for meanwhile we have built the Panama Canal.

And while the canal has lightened our strategic difficulties in that our battle fleet can now reach San Francisco from the Caribbean in a fourth of the time it took the Oregon to make her celebrated passage from San Francisco to Key West, there is upon us the heavy burden of the defense of the Isthmus, its position being in effect insular.

It can only remain in our hands by our controlling the sea. Fortifications assist in its defense for the time being, but should we go to war it must finally go into the hands of the power with a superior navy. And being thus isolated and having this insular character, the canal and its fortifications should be in naval control in order that there should be complete unanimity of effort in its defense.

It is safe to say that, however anti-imperialist one may be, there is no American who would see the canal go into foreign control with equanimity. The most pronounced would halt at such a danger.

Thus, whatever one's attitude may be toward the Monroe Doctrine, there are few who would not uphold the contention that we shall not permit any further extension of foreign influence in the Caribbean or in any part of the neighboring Pacific littoral, or in neighboring islands such as the Galapagos. This is not a question of extension of influence, but of safety.

WHAT A NAVY WOULD HAVE SAVED.

Whether with or without a war, a navy would have saved us the six years of humiliation which were to intervene between 1806 and 1812; it would have saved the embargo which was to tie to the wharves in rotting idleness more than a million tons of shipping which had been engaged in foreign trade; to bring grass-grown streets to our greatest ports, and strain the sentiment of the several sections of the Union to the point of separation.

It would have saved the War of 1812, the capture and burning of Washington, and the shameful ineptitude, with one brilliant exception, of our army commanders in that contest. . . . There would have been a cessation of British impressment and there would have been no such Orders in Council as those directed to the destruction of American commerce; or had these come before America was ready with her navy there would have been quick renunciation. . . .

Said Gouverneur Morris in the Senate (and it was the expression of one of the ablest minds of the country): "When we have twenty ships-of-the-line at sea, and there is no good reason why we should not have them, we shall be respected by all Europe. . . . The expense compared with the benefit is moderate, nay, trifling. Whatever sums are necessary to secure the national independence must be paid. . . . If we will not pay to be defended, we must pay for being conquered."

DIPLOMACY BY THE NAVY.

A word must be said as to the navy's diplomatic work. International law is mostly both made and administered by navies. The navy is thus a great and constant school of diplomacy, the right hand of the Department of State. We have had a notable instance, almost as I write, in the events in Mexico, and from none have naval officers received higher praise for their work than from the late lamented Secretary of State John Hay. It is duty such as this which gives the naval profession its breadth and importance in peace, as great in its way as in war.

And the diplomacy of naval officers is always in the direction of peace, though it may sometimes be peace with a strong hand, as in Admiral Benham's most admirable handling of the situation in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro during the revolt of 1895. He brought instantaneous peace between the revolutionary forces and the Government; he upheld international law, stood by the rights of our merchant captains and rendered a service beyond price to Brazil.

Such international uses of the navy accentuate the value of the Marine Corps, now a naval army of 10,267 men and officers. . . . It differs from the army proper in its mobility and ever-readiness for foreign service. Its mobility is that of the navy itself; its transport is ever ready; its supply train is the fleet.

It is an international understanding that seamen or marines may be landed in any part of the world for the protection of life and property, and that such action may even extend to the use of force without being regarded as an act of war. There is no need to expand the value of such a convention which gives the navy such an extension of its field of forceful, and at the same time peaceable, action.

(F. E. Chadwick, *The American Navy*.)

(b) [§276] Naval Militia, 1914.

BY CHARLES C. GILL.

In February Congress enacted a Naval Militia Act which was approved by the President. Under the terms of the Act the naval militia is given until Feb. 16, 1917, to prepare to comply with the organization to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy. After that date the Secretary shall prescribe the arms, armament and equipment of the naval militia, and he is authorized to issue to the Governors of the State, as a loan, vessels, stores, supplies and equipment for the naval militia. The law in many respects is stronger than the Dick

law, under which the organized land militia is operating. The President is authorized in event of war, actual or threatened, invasion or rebellion, to call upon the naval militia to repel such invasion, suppress such rebellion, or to execute his orders, the orders to be issued through the Governor of the State. The naval militia, when called into service, is to be governed by the Navy Regulations. In time of service, officers and men are to receive the same pay as the same grades in the regular service. The naval militia of each State is to have at least five days of military or naval exercise each year. An examining board is to hold examinations from time to time under rules prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy. Commissions and certificates will be given to officers and men who qualify.

The Naval Militia General Board and a board appointed by Secretary Daniels to formulate a standard of professional examinations for officers and enlisted men of the naval militia and to recommend a definite plan for carrying out the other provisions of the Naval Militia Act, began sessions at Washington on Oct. 20. The naval militia held in the fall its first competitive target practice, conducted, as far as possible, under the same conditions as obtain in the navy. A pennant is awarded to the organization which makes the best record, and it is believed that a very spirited rivalry will develop among the naval militia of the different States.

(*American Year Book*, 1914, p. 310.)

(c) [§277] What Shall the Navy Do?

BY PARK BENJAMIN.

Some people who have recently been comparing more or less bewildering figures relative to tonnage, armament, speed, movements and distribution of all sorts of naval vessels from dreadnoughts to motor boats, seem to think that a useful purpose may be served at the present moment, by sending our navy or a part of it to the North Sea. Certainly there is something to make the pulses leap in the thought of the Stars and Stripes flying from the mastheads of our own dreadnoughts as they sweep into action beside the great warships which as proudly wear the meteor flag of England or the tricolor of France or the banner of Savoy or the new scarlet of Russia; but, nevertheless, one must deal with the matter dispassionately and beware of misconceptions. Therefore I begin by remarking that home-made strategy and naval statistics are to the lay mind a delusion and a snare.

RANKING OF NAVIES.

The trouble lies perhaps not in the figures, which mathematically cannot "lie," but in the deductions which the layman draws from them almost invariably under the assumption of "all other things being equal," or at least capable of exact expression. As a matter of fact, all other things are not equal, and so far from being capable of exact expression, they largely rest upon uncertainties and probabilities. It is common, for example, to arrange the navies of the world in an order of strength, and then to conclude that each in turn will of necessity

prevail in war over the one which next follows it. Sometimes this order is based on tonnage, sometimes on the possession of capital ships, sometimes on the sum total of vessels of all classes, and inasmuch as it is an axiom that "good men in bad ships are better than bad men in good ships," one may even construct tables based on the presumed skill as well as on the numbers of the opposing personnels. In time of peace, such calculations may suffice to convey to the public crude general notions of relative efficiencies, but, in time of war, factors, before speculative, become actual, and conditions hitherto in a state of flux become permanent and solidified. For the "chances of war" must be taken with whatever force a nation has at the outset and with only such later additions as it may be possible to make while the conflict is in progress.

MODERN SEA FIGHTS.

In modern times, two whole navies never simultaneously join battle. That happens only in one's club or front parlor. The days of duels between ships, such as the five frigate actions of the War of 1812, have gone by. The sea battle of the future is between groups of units, which may vary greatly in numbers and individual strength and which may meet under all sorts of conditions, from the purely fortuitous to the scientifically prearranged. In such an action it by no means follows that the units which belong to the greater navy will be victorious. . . . The great basic factor of strategy is concentration—or in more homely language, "getting there first with the most men"—and that may depend quite as much upon the skill which places the men and weapons as upon the men and weapons themselves. In the Chile action the Germans won because they got there first with the greater force. In the Battle of the Sea of Japan, the Japanese won because the Russians continued throughout to be the last to arrive and with the fewest men.

Napoleon defined war as "a business of positions," but the use made of the positions is quite as important. The past development of the German Navy is due to its disadvantage of position, as compared with that of the British fleet, by reason of which the latter now remains concentrated in home waters.

When one undertakes to draw comparisons, these are some of the considerations to be borne in mind. And there are others which are even paradoxical if only "numbers" and "other things being equal" are to control the conclusion. Thus, when ships of a stronger navy engage similar ships of a weaker one, and each side inflicts equal damage on the other, the stronger antagonist increases in relative strength. For if A has twenty ships and B has ten, and each destroys five ships belonging to the other, then the relative strength of A increases from 2 to 1 before the action, to 3 to 1 afterward—as every checker player has always known.

SHOULD OUR NAVY OPERATE IN EUROPE?

It is not necessary for present purposes to elaborate this somewhat elementary discussion, since the sole object is to show

that there are a great many factors other than numerical relations to be considered before it can be safely decided whether our naval force should be weakened to supplement that of the Allies, and that as these factors are largely strategic and have to be learned, the layman cannot be expected to know or with entire accuracy to improvise them. Nor should he be misled by present enthusiasms. Of course, we would like to see the fleet, echoing Farragut's battle-cry "Damn the torpedoes," force it way into Wilhelmshaven or the Kiel Canal, and come to grips with the Kaiser's ships at their moorings. And who can help questioning whether the peril incurred is any more formidable to the powerful steel monsters of today than were the forts and mines and guarding ironclad at Mobile to the wooden walls which Farragut led to victory? But Great Britain has refused her whole naval might, and does not attempt a landing on the German shore. The isolated stretch of beach in Flanders is attractive, but the shallows there extend far out to sea, and the endless bombardment of Zeebrugge still seems barren of results.

The latest guess at the existing German battleship force is twenty-seven dreadnoughts and nineteen predreadnoughts, in comparison with which the British fleet is beyond doubt overwhelmingly the stronger. Manifestly if Great Britain declines to attack so inferior a force, the reason lies in the land fortifications and the mines and the submarines which protect it. It is certainly not apparent how our fleet—much less a part of it—can cross the ocean and then tackle not only those defenses, but a fleet larger in numbers than itself behind them, with any better chance of success, nor is it clear how the addition of our vessels to the British array would help to any controlling extent. . . .

If the German fleet could be induced to give battle, then, of course, it might be argued that any addition we could provide would be valuable to the British fleet, despite the latter's preponderance. But the German fleet insists on keeping itself shut up. The British are not doing it, for all their and our naval traditions are against "bottling" the enemy and in favor of getting him to come out and fight. It is only German logic which converts the Kaiser's array into a "fleet in being" purposely held in its base harbors to prevent the British fleet from making landings on the North Sea shore—a truly remarkable elucidation, which perhaps accounts for the brevity of its sallies to kill women and children in English watering places, and to take part in two sea battles, wherefrom it departed sans adieu and somewhat precipitately, through a desire, of course, quickly to resume its "fleet in being" functions.

NEEDS AT HOME.

To people who are staying awake o' nights because of possible "raids" or other hostile attacks along the coast, any diminution of our sea defenses will be unthinkable. The home-made strategists are solemnly advocating the contribution of a few battleships of the older types, which they think can conveniently be spared because outclassed by the newer dread-

noughts. "What is the use of the 'Oregon' if half a dozen like her can be stood off by the 'Pennsylvania,' or of the 'Indiana,' which the 'Arizona' might rip to pieces before the old fighter could get near enough to render her guns effective?" they demand. The answer is that after the dreadnoughts on both sides have met and got through mauling and hammering one another, the unscathed reserve ships of the second line will become extremely important as against what is left of the victor, should the German vessels prevail—so important that Admiral Mahan long ago insisted that "the nation which can then (after the battle of the dreadnoughts) put forward the largest reserves of ships of the older types will win." The ships of Santiago, therefore, are far from useless—they may be very useful indeed—and we cannot spare them.

And there are the people who have already begun to howl to the Navy Department "to station a battleship before our harbor." That is not a battleship's business—and, what is more serious, it smacks of treason—for there is no surer way of consigning the fleet to destruction. It is really charitable to believe that only fools, in a cowardly and futile effort to save their own skins, would be willing to see each of our dreadnoughts overpowered in turn. And lastly the nervous—the very nervous who so recently have been set trembling over the prospective shelling of New York for an hour by a battle-cruiser—"the bombardment of the city by fifty aeroplanes"—the terrors of a blockade, and the "landing of 100,000 troops in Massachusetts Bay"; it will be as a soothing ointment to assure them that the distinguished naval authority who recounted these horrors the other day was merely performing his bounden duty to think battles all the time, and not to omit any contingency however improbable, remote or seemingly absurd—and in addition that these particular atrocities had their genesis only in an imaginary Teutonic hypnotizing or bribery of the Allies whereby they were supposedly induced to step aside and unconcernedly watch the Germans wreak on us their amiable will. Neither pictures of this sort, nor the people who are scared by them, will help us to decide wisely whether to send the ships abroad or not.

(*Independent*, CX, 167-169; Apr. 21, 1917.)

D. [§278] PROVISIONS FOR THE NEW MILITARY NEEDS.

1. Specific References on the Section.

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2. Modern Weapons.

- (a) Rifles, grenades and grenade throwers, machine guns, sharp shooting rifles, etc.

3. Modern Artillery.

- (a) Howitzers, long range guns, large bore guns for smashing defenses.

4. Trench Equipments.

- (a) Steel caps, gas helmets, etc.

5. Provision for Transportation and Trench Distribution.

6. Aeroplanes.

- (a) Scout and fighting.

7. Tanks and Other Moving Fortresses.

8. Maps and Plans.

- (a) For directing attack.

9. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§279] Military Training and Policy.

BY EX-PRESIDENT THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

Our regular army would be strengthened by them at the very beginning and would be set free in its entirety for immediate aggressive action; and in addition a levy in mass of the young men of the right age would mean that two or three million troops were put into the field who, although not quite as good as regulars, would at once be available in numbers sufficient to overwhelm any expeditionary force which it would be possible for any military power to send to our shores. The existence of such a force would render the immediate taking of cities like San Francisco, New York or Boston an impossibility and would free us from all danger from sudden raids and make it impossible even for an army corps to land with any prospect of success.

THE WAR DEPARTMENT.

Our people are so entirely unused to things military that it is probably difficult for the average man to get any clear idea of our shortcomings. Unlike what is true in the military nations of the Old World, here the ordinary citizen takes no interest in the working of our War Department in time of peace. No President gains the slightest credit for himself by paying attention to it. Then, when a crisis comes and the War Department breaks down, instead of the people accepting what has happened with humility as due to their own fault during the previous two or three decades, there is a road of wrath against the unfortunate man who happens to be in office at the time.

There was such a roar of wrath against Secretary Alger in the Spanish War. Now, as a matter of fact, 90 per cent. of our shortcomings when the war broke out with Spain could not have been remedied by any action on the part of the Secretary of War. They were due to what had been done ever since the close of the Civil War.

EXPERIENCE OF 1898.

We were utterly unprepared. There had been no real manœuvring of so much as a brigade and very rarely had any of our Generals commanded even a good-sized regiment in the field. The enlisted men and the junior officers of the regular army were good. Most of the officers above the rank of Captain were nearly worthless. There were striking exceptions, of course, but, taking the average, I really believe that it would have been on the whole to the advantage of our army in 1898 if all the regular officers above the rank of Captain had been retired and if all the Captains who were unfit to be placed in the higher positions had also been retired. The Lieutenants were good.

The lack of administrative skill was even more marked than the lack of military skill. No one who saw the congestion of trains, supplies, animals and men at Tampa will ever forget the impression of helpless confusion that it gave him. The volunteer forces included some organizations and multitudes of individuals offering first-class material. But as a whole the volunteer army would have been utterly helpless against any efficient regular force at the outset of the '98 war, probably almost as inefficient as were the two armies which fought one another at Bull Run in 1861. Even the efficiency of the regular army itself was such merely by comparison with the volunteers.

I do not believe that any army in the world offered finer material than was offered by the junior officers and enlisted men of the regular army which disembarked on Cuban soil in June, 1898, and by the end of the next two weeks probably the average individual infantry or cavalry organization therein was at least as good as the average organization of the same size in an Old World army. But taking the army as a whole and considering its management from the time it began to assemble at Tampa until the surrender of Santiago, I seriously doubt if it was as efficient as a really good European or Japanese army of half the size.

Since then we have made considerable progress. Our little army of occupation that went to Cuba at the time of the revolution in Cuba ten years ago was thoroughly well handled and did at least as well as any foreign force of the same size could have done. But it did not include 10,000 men, that is, it did not include as many men as the smallest military power in Europe would assemble any day for manœuvres.

WEAKNESS OF PEACE MOVEMENTS.

We can never follow out a worthy national policy, we can never be of benefit to others or to ourselves, unless we keep steadily in view as our ideal that of the just man armed, the

man who is fearless, self-reliant, ready, because he has prepared himself for possible contingencies; the man who is scornful alike of those who would advise him to do wrong and of those who would advise him tamely to suffer wrong.

The great war now being waged in Europe, and the fact that no neutral nation has ventured to make even the smallest effort to alleviate or even to protest against the wrongs that have been done, show with lamentable clearness that all the Peace Congresses of the past fifteen years have accomplished precisely and exactly nothing so far as any great crisis is concerned.

Fundamentally this is because they have confined themselves to mere words, seemingly without realizing that mere words are utterly useless unless translated into deeds and that an ounce of promise which is accompanied by provision for a similar ounce of effective performance is worth at least a ton of promise as to which no effective method of performance is provided.

Furthermore, a very serious blunder has been to treat peace as the end instead of righteousness as the end. The greatest soldier patriots of history, Timoleon, John Hampden, Andreas Hofer, Koerner, the great patriot-statesman-soldiers like Washington, the great patriot-statesmen like Lincoln, whose achievements for good depended upon the use of soldiers, have all achieved their immortal claim to the gratitude of mankind by what they did in just war. To condemn war in terms which would include the wars these men waged or took part in precisely as they included the most wicked and unjust wars of history is to serve the devil and not God.

PRACTICE SERVICE.

The four or six months' service with the colors would be for the most part in the open field. The drill hall and the parade ground do not teach more than 5 per cent. of what a soldier must actually know. Any man who has had any experience with ordinary organizations of the National Guard when taken into camp knows that at first only a very limited number of the men have any idea of taking care of themselves, and the great majority suffer much from dyspepsia, just because they do not know how to take care of themselves.

The soldier needs to spend some months in actual campaign practice under canvas with competent instructors before he gets to know his duty. If, however, he has had previous training in the schools of such a type as that given in Switzerland and then has this actual practice he remains for some years efficient with no more training than eight or ten days a year.

The training will be given in large bodies. It is essential that men shall get accustomed to the policing and sanitary care of camps in which there are masses of soldiers. Moreover, officers are wholly useless in war time unless they are accustomed to handle masses of men in co-operation with one another.

SMALL IMPROVISED BODIES OF TROOPS.

There are small sections of the population out of which it is possible to improvise soldiers in a short time. Men who are

accustomed to ride and to shoot and to live in the open and who are hardy and enduring and by nature possess the fighting edge, already know most of what it is necessary that a soldier should know and they can be taught the remainder in a very short time if under the right man. Morgan's Virginia Riflemen, Andrew Jackson's Tennesseans, Forrest's Southwestern Cavalry were all men of this kind; but even these men were of real use only after they were trained for many months or else if their leaders were born fighters and masters of men like Morgan, Jackson and Forrest. Such leaders are rare. The ordinary dweller in civilization has to be taught to shoot, to walk (or ride if he is in the cavalry), to cook for himself, to make himself comfortable in the open and to take care of his feet and his health generally.

It may well be that the Swiss on an average can be made into good troops quicker than our own men; but most assuredly there would be numbers of Americans who would not be much behind the Swiss in such a matter. A body of volunteers of the kind I am describing would of course not be quite as good as a body of regulars of the same size, but they would be immeasurably better than the average soldiers produced by any system we now have or ever had in connection with our militia.

BACK UP THE ARMY.

On the whole, there is no class of our citizens, big or small, who so emphatically deserve well of the country as the officers and the enlisted men of the army and navy. No navy in the world has such fine stuff out of which to make men-o'-warships. But they must be heartily backed up, heartily supported and sedulously trained. They must be treated well, and above all, they must be treated so as to encourage the best among them by sharply discriminating against the worst. The utmost possible efficiency should be demanded of them. They are emphatically, and in every sense of the word, men; and real men resent with impatient contempt a policy under which less than their best is demanded.

The finest material is utterly worthless without the best personnel. In such a highly specialized service as the navy constant training of a purely military type is an absolute necessity. At present our navy is lamentably short in many different material directions. There is actually but one torpedo for each torpedo tube. It seems incredible that such can be the case; let it be the case. We are many thousands of men short in our enlistments. We are lamentably short in certain types of vessel.

(*New York Times*, Nov. 15, 22, 1916.)

(b) [§280] Our Duty in the Air.

BY WILLIAM HARD.

It is true that our first duty in the war is ships; but it may be that there is only a very narrow margin, after all, between that duty and the one that immediately succeeds it—namely, aeroplanes; and so I turn to aeroplanes for the space of one article at this time to try to indicate, on the best information and belief available, the general capacity of the United States

for providing aeroplanes and the approximate number of machines and men that will be needed from the United States in the air of France and Belgium on the western front to extinguish the last rays of German military vision and to make the German army fight and perish really finally totally blind.

ESSENTIAL SERVICE BY AEROPLANE.

There is an American aviator in the United State to-day who has returned to us from the western front expressly to speak to us in this matter with authority. He confirms the report that the French and English now maintain a clear superiority over the Germans in the air but that nevertheless the Germans are able from time to time to increase their output of machines and to offer renewed resistance on a large scale to French and English reconnaissances and even to resume reconnaissances of their own over the French and English trenches and guns in full force at unexpected points. The French and English have a superiority, but a superiority is not enough. What must be got and what can be got, to shorten the war to its shortest by the shortest method, is an absolute supremacy. It can be got by the manufacturing capacity of the United States.

It would mean that we, in the Allied army, would be able, not occasionally but continuously, to shift the locations of guns and of roads and of railways and of masses of men without a German eye upon us, while our own eyes would reach unimpeded from the nearest German trench to the remotest German shell-dump. It would mean that we would shoot at marks spotted by aeroplanes while the Germans would shoot at unspotted guesses, not part of the time but all the time. Such a supremacy is conceivable—and feasible. The French and English are on the edge of it. The trouble is that they seem to be unable, because of the other enormous instant demands on their manufacturing capacity, to go over the edge. A certain number of additional machines and men would push them over. By furnishing those machines and those men the United States would put its strength at the point of decisive service and its flag at the van of victory. The question is: "How many?"

Our returned aviator gives a definite answer. He says: "Five thousand." Five thousand additional machines and men in the air on the western front would bring the war to its last stage, its purely subjective stage, a stage in which just one point would remain unsettled: How much loss, how much continuous agony, is a blinded, random-hitting, wriggling Germany willing to suffer before vomiting out Pan-Germanism and opening a meek mouth for the thin and spiceless but highly nourishing gruel of Pan-Humanism?

NEED OF AVIATORS.

How soon, then, could we furnish five thousand machines and men? First, the men.

We start, we must confess, with almost vacant ranks. The total number of our military aviators does not reach 200. Our training fields are few. There is one at San Diego, California; another at Memphis, Tennessee; another at Mineola, Long Island,

New York; and another, very new, at Essington, near Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. So meagre are our facilities for training that we have been obliged to send recruits, a handful at a time, to fields established by the private enterprise of the Curtis Aeroplane and Motor Corporation at Newport News, Virginia, and at Miami, Florida.

Recruits come forward, just the same, by the thousand. They offer themselves to the Army and to the Navy and to the Aero Clubs of New York and Philadelphia and Chicago and to the Aeronautical Society of America and to magazines like *Flying* and *Aerial Age* and *Aviation* and to every other public and private institution within the range of possible aeronautical influence and opportunity. They even, as in the case of the Aerial Coast Patrol Units, when the navy cannot accommodate them at its one training field at Pensacola, Florida, go and get machines and trainers largely at their own expense or at the expense of their friends and associates and depart into quarters of their own for practice at West Palm Beach. The easiest, quickest thing the United States can do in the way of men for the front is five thousand, ten thousand, fifty thousand aviators.

TRAINING.

But the training of them? For this task it is allowable to assume that the French and English and Canadians will give us a body of trainers in addition to the trainers we ourselves already have. It is allowable to assume that we shall have trainers, in quantity. How long, then, will it take a good trainer to train a good man? Not more than six weeks, if we adopt a certain idea suggested by our fellow-countryman from the French air service.

The root of this idea is to train our recruits, at first, not for work on aeroplanes that fight but for work on aeroplanes that scout. A battle-pilot is a long task. A reconnaissance-pilot is a relatively short one. Let us go into the air service on the western front by its fastest entrance. Our fellow-countryman was himself trained for reconnaissances at Buc in France during a period beginning on a first of July and ending on a fifteenth of August. He then flew, and he afterwards taught others to fly. He has been pupil, operator, and teacher. He knows what can be done, and how. We can go into reconnaissance and release a certain number of Frenchmen and Englishmen for battle and then work on into the battle ourselves. Taking this route, we can reach the front and learn at the front and help emphatically to win the war with less than half of the training-time that would be required for making complete perfected American battle-units. It is an idea of co-operation and of immediate helpfulness. Adopting it, we can begin to send American aviators to France and Belgium and to the western front into actual service long before the summer is out, in numbers limited only by one consideration—the machines. . . .

It is heart-rending to think that in such circumstances a few occasional exceptional manufacturers might skin the government, but it is better to be skinned by a few negligible Americans

than by 67,000,000 Germans. Mr. Ronald Webster of the staff of the *Chicago Tribune* has observed, out of his experience as a militiaman on the Mexican border that the government of the United States spends millions of dollars every year lashing ninety-nine men out of a hundred tight to an immovable pillar of inefficiency and stagnation in order to prevent the hundredth man from walking off with a bridle or a strap or a buckle. No such policy can produce 5,000 aeroplanes by January 1st, 1918. A different policy might—and perhaps will.

FACILITIES FOR BUILDING AIRSHIPS.

The fact is that we have made aeroplanes with very considerable success for the Allies on such models and for such service as the Allies have specified to us, in bulk. This has been the case, for instance, with the machines sent so numerously to the other side by the Curtiss company. The fact is also that we are even now turning out certain European aeroplane-motors in bulk. This is the case, for instance, with the motors now being manufactured on the Hispano-Suiza model by the Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation at New Brunswick, New Jersey. The fact is, further, that the United States is better provided than any other country in the world with firms which, though outside the regular aeroplane business, are capable of being impressed into it.

We are peculiarly rich in wood and in firms that work in wood. Furniture firms and canoe firms, for instance, are admirable candidates for a selective draft into the ranks of the makers of aeroplane -bodies. For aeroplane-motors, besides our present manufacturers, we are happy in possessing an unparalleled number of firms making motors for motor cars and motor boats. From corresponding firms on the other side of the Atlantic there have come some of the best aeroplane-motors of the war. Certain of the largest and most formidable English aeroplanes are equipped with motors built by the English motor car firm Rolls-Royce. Already several of our own motor car and motor boat firms have exhibited aeroplane-motors growing out of their motor car and motor boat experience.

The United States has the equipment, actual and potential, capable of being expanded to the desired capacity within a period of only a few months. And it has the skill, on two conditions: first, that models and instructors are furnished copiously by the French and English to show us such specifications and methods as we may not now understand; and second, that orders are placed by our government not only copiously but continuously for several years to come to justify the expansion undertaken.

BUILDING PROGRAM NEEDED.

I say continuously; because continuity is essential to sound technical progress. The Advisory Committee on Aeronautics has calculated that our permanent air-service will demand an annual supply of 4,000 new aeroplanes. Why should it not be possible for the Administration and the Congress to establish an aerial building program at least as definite as the three-year naval building program laid down in the Navy Act of

August 29th, 1916? Under such conditions we should see sound technical progress rapidly made by manufacturers of a solid sort, experimenting toward the hope of participation in a known business.

Probably nobody in the United States has studied this whole-field more uninterruptedly or more intently than Henry Woodhouse of the Aero Club of New York. I asked him directly whether or not, if the conditions named were met, the United States could produce 5,000 aeroplanes by January 1st, 1918, and then renew all breakages and losses among those five thousand to the end of the war. He replied that in his judgment there was not the slightest doubt that the answer was totally, without reservation of any kind, "Yes."

Will our government try it? Is our government trying it now? Here we walk in the shadow of the Censor, on darkened territory. Yet there are certain footprints discernible even in that gloom and mentionable even under that oppression. . . .

Civilians, commercial civilians, engineering civilians, are taking hold; and the government is letting them take hold. Who they are, and what they are about, it will not be wrongful for me to say if I say it, as I shall, without impinging on immediate statistics. They seem to me to prophesy that happy day when the general principle will be accepted that we do not run West Point to produce manufacturers and buyers and accountants of motors and bridles and socks. The function of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps is to drive aeroplanes into the teeth of German aeroplanes on the western front. The function of fighters is to fight. Let the fighters give us the specifications of what they need and let the rest of us get it and carry it to them. That is what we are for. That is what we can do—and do better than the fighters can.

(*New Republic*, X, 367-369, April 28, 1917.)

(c) [§281] A Million Volunteers Between Sunrise and Sunset.

BY AN ARMY OFFICIAL.

A striking object lesson is being afforded of the unpreparedness of the United States to-day to outfit a large army by the difficulties which foreign military commissions are encountering in obtaining small arms and ammunition in this country.

One foreign nation has been endeavoring for weeks to place an order for 500,000 military rifles, and this number of guns cannot be obtained in America in much less than two and one-half years' time. Every small arms works in the United States long ago had their working capacity contracted for by foreign orders, and even the aggregate of these private works is not more than 400,000 rifles per year. For commercial manufacture of military rifles the work in this country is confined to three plants.

GOVERNMENT ARSENALS.

The military rifles for the United States army are constructed at the government arsenals at Springfield, Mass., and Rock Island, Ill. The total capacity of these two plants does not exceed more than eight hundred rifles each eight hour day

at the Rock Island arsenal. The total reserve supply of arms on hand is about seven hundred and fifty thousand. This reserve is sufficient for the militia, it is estimated, but does not allow of the reserve which the experience of the present war in Europe is showing is necessary for troops actually in the field.

The United States government arsenals are not open to private or foreign orders, and such guns as are now wanted abroad must be made in private establishments.

PRIVATE MANUFACTURERS.

The main difficulty in the construction of military rifles is the equipping of shops with the necessary rifling machines, jigs and gauges, and it is estimated that the cost of equipping a plant capable of turning out five hundred guns a day will exceed \$1,200,000. Private manufacturers have been chary of heavy outlays in the past, especially since in the United States the policy for many years has been to manufacture all military arms in government shops. This is in direct contradiction to the German policy, which has always aimed to develop private plants so that the latter might be in position in war time to undertake military orders on large scales.

For the United States only one private firm has made a specialty of manufacturing arsenal tools. This includes rifling machines, gauges and the entire gamut of equipment to fully equip new works for turning out military small arms. In July last this one plant received an order for \$1,200,000 worth of arsenal tools wherewith to fully equip a small arms arsenal for the Chinese government. The contract made with the Chinese government is sufficient to keep these works steadily employed for two years.

Such was the situation which confronted military buying commissions when, shortly after the outbreak of the European war, efforts were made to obtain in the United States equipment with which to enlarge the established plants of Europe. The equipment so much desired was not to be had. . . .

In the United States the popular fallacy has long existed that in the event of a sudden war it is only necessary to issue a call for volunteers and several million men would be available. In view of the situation as developed in this country by foreign military commissions in their quest for arms it would appear as if this country could not possibly put a million men under proper equipment in less than two years' time. Money is available to-day just as it would be in time of war if the United States were a participant, and there never was a time when orders could be placed more readily in the United States than now provided shops were in shape to produce the material demanded. But shop after shop has had to turn down bids simply because the necessary tools were lacking and because tools were not to be had at any price.

RESERVES OF MEN AND MATERIAL.

The European war has developed that a reserve of one gun for each man is almost necessary for the proper equipping

of an army. The loss of arms on the Continent by destruction, due to service conditions, has been so great that the arsenals abroad are unable to keep up with the demands both of the troops in the field and the recruits being brought forward. To such an extent has this routing off, as it were, of arms taken place that commissions over here, it is said, are buying military rifles of every type obtainable, and not less than twenty thousand single shot Springfields of the 45-70 type were sent abroad in one consignment. Arms are being sought for in all parts of the country and are being gathered in in bunches of one hundred and two hundred from far Western points. The greater number of the twenty thousand Springfields shipped abroad were obtained, it is learned, on the Pacific coast and in the Northwest.

If the situation outlined above could exist in the United States now, what might be expected if this country were suddenly called upon to equip several large armies? The civil war furnishes no criterion, since at that period the North was confronted by force and a section of country in practically the same shape as itself. The South soon found, as its armies grew and as it became necessary to impress into service all able bodied men, that the resources of the South were inadequate to equipping the forces in the field. The navy of the North blockaded the ports of the South, and recourse was had to blockade running. The entire power supply used by General Albert Sidney Johnston at Shiloh, it is known, was supplied by the cargo of one steamer which successfully ran the blockade into the Cape Fear River.

LESSONS OF THE CIVIL WAR.

At the outset of the war the South was able to avail itself of much military equipment captured in forts and army storehouses in the South, but this supply needed constant replenishing and of itself was insufficient for the great armies which afterward assembled in the East and the West. Until the blockade closed every southern port the South was dependent on Europe for the great bulk of its war munitions, and all the really effective heavy guns, save only the Broke rifles, made at the Tredegar Works in Richmond, came from England. These latter were more especially Whitworth and Armstrong guns.

The military efficiency of the North only commenced to come into existence early in 1863, and in the beginning of 1864 the North was producing military material on a scale commensurate with its strength. By 1865 the United States was in condition for the first time in its history to have undertaken a great foreign war, and this strength was typified when the two veteran armies of Generals Grant and Sherman marched through Washington. The country then beheld the United States of America at the zenith of its military strength, with the veteran armies in the field, troops skilled in the actual practice of war and commanded by officers of tried value. At that time the navy of the United States comprised more than 50,000 men afloat.

POSSIBILITIES OF INVASION.

It should not be overlooked, too, that more than one million men had fallen through battle and sickness on both sides, and this fact must not be forgotten when the pacifist of to-day or the "little navy" man declares that after the present war in Europe ends all those engaged will be so exhausted that they will not be in shape to fight any one. The vanquished will be exhausted, it is true, but the victor will be like the North of the United States in 1865, hammered into a fighting shape capable of confronting any nation in the world.

The capital of the United States was captured and burned on one occasion by an invading force, and the records attest that during 1812 the total British forces in America never exceeded 16,000 men. This contingent represented trained troops, and perhaps the most orderly sitting ever recorded in the House of Representatives at Washington was when one of General Dale's British officers mounted to the Speaker's chair, and, with the floor of the House full of British troops, used the hilt of his sword for a gavel and called the House to order.

It is better to impress upon the youth of the country the actual facts of history, ignominious and humiliating though they may be to our national pride, rather than to quietly acquiesce in the fallacy that a million men can be raised over night, and then assume that arms and equipment will fall into their hands like manna from heaven.

(*National Defense*, 40-44.)

E. [§282] MEANS OF SAVING LIFE.

1. Specific References on the Section.

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 Anon. "Red Cross and Its Plans," in *ibid*, 416 (Jan. 6, 1917).
 Macnair, W. "Red Cross at the War," in *Contemporary Review*, III, pp. 19-27 (Jan., 1917).

2. Doctors and Surgeons in Great Numbers.
3. Experienced or Trained Nurses.
4. Preparation of Comforts, Etc.
 - (a) Involving much home work.
5. Red Cross Organization.
 - (a) Everybody should join and support.
6. Modern Surgery.
 - (a) Hospitals, surgical dressings and apparatus.
7. Care of the Wounded After They Return Home.
8. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§283] **The Medical Corps in the Defense Plans.**

BY LIEUT.-COL. WILLIAM S. TERRIBERRY.

It is a remarkable thing that in all the interest aroused on the subject of preparedness and in all the speeches and articles appearing in the public prints we see little or nothing to indicate that any steps are under consideration looking toward providing proper surgical and hospital care for the sick and wounded. We have seen in the last year and a half how vitally important a part of modern warfare is preparation in this respect. The truth of the old adage, "The river passed and God forgotten," is nowhere more plainly exemplified than in our attitude toward the medical profession. The lessons which should have been taught us by our past experience are calmly ignored. The ghastly experiences of our concentration camps in 1898 have apparently quite passed from mind. At any rate, in the eighteen years which have elapsed, almost nothing has been done to correct the defects in the medical department organization which existed at that time. The Dodge Commission, which investigated the conduct of the war of 1898, made as its first and most important recommendation regarding the improvement of the medical service that an adequate corps of trained medical officers be provided.

SMALL PERCENTAGE OF SURGEONS.

The Surgeon General of the Army recently testified before both Military Committees of the Congress that there should be seven trained medical officers to each thousand of combatant troops. In the report of this hearing before the House Military Committee is appended a statement of the needs in the way of trained medical officers for an army in the field of 200,000 men. This statement showed that 2,035 medical officers would be required. The army is allowed at the present time 444 medical officers. The House bill, as originally written, provided for a maximum of 178,000 men and 695 medical officers, or slightly less than four per thousand. To the lasting credit of the House Military Committee it is to be noted that this defect in the Hay bill has been corrected, and the recommendation of the Surgeon General accepted.

The Senate bill provides for an army about 200,000 at peace strength and 236,000 at war strength, and a total of 897 medical

officers, or a ratio of 4.5 in peace and 3.7 in war. In other words, the Senate Military Committee has disregarded not only the recommendation of General Gorgas, the Surgeon General, and the Dodge Commission, but the lessons spread before them by the European war. It is well to bear in mind that the relative reduction in the number of medical officers proposed will apply not only to the army, but to the National Guard and any volunteer troops which may in the future be authorized, as the organization of both of these latter must be the same as that prescribed for the regular army. . . .

England is the only great power besides the United States which rests national security on a small, highly paid, professional army. The English Army is organized on a basis of ten medical officers per thousand of combatant troops—a figure nearly three times as great as has been fixed in the Senate bill.

. . .

RESERVE SURGEONS.

In 1908, at the instance of the then Surgeon General, Brig.-Gen. Robert M. O'Reilly, Congress passed a law providing for a Reserve Corps of Officers. This corps now numbers about 1,600 men, physicians and surgeons of the highest professional excellence. But are they trained medical officers, ready to step in and fill up the skeleton organization of the Army Medical Corps? Most certainly not, and this will be evident when it is stated that the law does not permit of giving these officers training in camps of instruction, except at the expense of the individual. During the last summer several camps of instruction were provided and 173 officers of the Reserve Corps received one week of field work. These officers not only gave their time, but paid all the expenses incident to transportation, subsistence and equipment. Admirable as is the spirit shown, it cannot be contended that one week in camp will transform a civilian physician into anything resembling a trained medical officer.

. . .

LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE.

The proposal to reduce the ratio of regular medical officers to about half the number required will mean that every officer will be fully occupied with the administration and garrison needs of the army and there will be none available for the instruction of the sanitary troops of the National Guard or of any other troops which may be authorized. At the present time there are six medical officers available for the instruction of the National Guard of the entire United States, and there should be not less than one hundred on this duty.

The pity of it is that we cannot learn the obvious lesson from our past experiences.

Those of us who saw the most energetic and adventurous of our men march out in 1898 ready to give up their dearest possession, even life itself, are little likely to forget the scenes we saw in our Southern camps. Of the thousands who never came back, only about 250 died on the battlefield, or as the result of wounds received on the battlefield. The remainder were a need-

less sacrifice offered up on the altar of national carelessness and national indifference.

This indifference shown toward providing an adequate medical department in time of peace cannot be put on the ground of economy. A most superficial examination of the medical history of our last war will be convincing on that point. There were mustered into the service in 1898 about 225,000 volunteers. Fourteen years later 108,000 of these men had applied for pensions. The Federal Government has paid out on account of this little war in pensions over \$50,000,000, and this amount will keep on growing in the years to come. As the great majority of deaths and disability arose from preventable disease, this large sum can be charged to the neglect to provide a proper organization and an adequate number of trained medical officers.

When the next war comes—and it certainly will come some time—shall we have learned our lesson? The answer to this question will be given by the Congress within the next few weeks. Our lawmakers should remember that our people know, as no other people on earth, what constitutes proper medical care of the sick and wounded. Every one will have father, brother or son at the front. If adequate hospital and professional care is not provided for the wounded and sick, then from every community of this land will come a protest that will not and cannot be ignored. That Government which fails in this respect will sacrifice the whole-hearted and united support of its people, a support which is so necessary to the maintenance of morale and the achievement of victory.

(*New York Times*, April 10, 1916.)

(b) [§284] The Red Cross.

BY EDWARD T. DEVINE.

The American Red Cross has received its mandate from the nation. The over-subscription of the liberty loan by 50 per cent. is all but matched by the over-subscription of 20 per cent. to the Red Cross fund. The percentage of excess is less, but in the case of the Red Cross the excess is accepted and the fund thus becomes one of something like a hundred and twenty million dollars. This is more than the entire principal of the Rockefeller Foundation, which so greatly agitated the United States Commission on Industrial Relations a year or two ago; more than has ever been raised at any one time for a philanthropic purpose; more than the endowment of any university; nearly one-third as much as the combined productive funds of all the five or six hundred higher institutions of learning in the United States. Moreover, this fund is not to be an endowment, but is to be regarded as disposable income for quick expenditure. . . .

NEED OF COOPERATION.

The Red Cross, having gathered much experience in its character as a neutral international relief agency, now puts on its shining armor as the relief arm of a belligerent nation. The time for boasting will come when that armor is to be put off. Now is the time for consecration, for vision, for searching of heart, for the making of a program, for wise counsels, for securing public confidence, for establishing co-operation, for courage in policy, for caution in the choice of means. The Com-

mittee on Co-operation appointed by the Red Cross War Council receives at the start rather a rough but perhaps wholesome intimation that co-operation is a reciprocal matter. It seems that there are some sixty war-relief organizations whose officials, valuing their autonomy with the ardor of small nations, see no safety except in the principle of collective bargaining. They have, therefore, formed a federation, or at least an entente alliance, and agree not to make a separate arrangement with the Red Cross, but to confer with the latter through a joint committee of seven. That the relief organizations which have been active in support of the allies while we remained neutral should have some recognized standing in the new plans for giving similar support on a larger scale is obvious, and the very appointment by the Red Cross of a committee on co-operation may justly be interpreted as evidence that such a relation is desired. The problems of reconciling the natural and legitimate desire for the continuance of work already undertaken with the advantages of a unified and co-operative national system should not be beyond the powers of Judge Lovett and his associates in the Red Cross if they are met half way, as they doubtless will be, by the patriotic and energetic leaders of other agencies.

RED CROSS IS INTERNATIONAL.

The Red Cross is an international organization. Its emblem, always accompanied by the national flag, gives protection under the Geneva convention to "matériel," and "personnel" charged exclusively with the care of the sick and wounded. This does not mean that the American Red Cross is indifferent as between its own armies and those of the enemy. It means that in the relief of individual suffering the Red Cross is no respecter of uniforms. On the battlefield its motto is *Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur*. In every land the Red Cross has this international character; but it has also everywhere an ardent national character which is not in the least inconsistent with its obligations under the Geneva convention. It is engaged in very extensive relief operations. It establishes hospitals and equips hospital ships. It mitigates the conditions of prisoners, and it cares for the widow and orphan. It succors those wounded in battle, but also those who suffer from chronic disease. It may rebuild homes, re-establish workers in industry, protect the public health, and do anything else within its resources to make the world safe for humanity.

RED CROSS IS UNIVERSAL.

In these tasks the American Red Cross is entitled to the services of every section of the nation. As no one may hold back unless there happens to be some other channel through which he can work to better advantage, so no one can properly be rejected except on the ground that for the particular task someone else is better qualified. To refuse the services of competent doctors, nurses or social workers because of German names or ancestry, or to refuse the services of Catholic sisters because of their garb, would be alike indefensible. Mr. Wadsworth promptly denounced the rumor that the latter discrimination was to be permitted in a letter to Cardinal Gibbons. If England or France is unwilling to permit American Red Cross agents of German birth or ancestry to aid English or French soldiers, such feelings must no doubt be respected, but it would be appropriate

to put very plainly to our allies the seriousness of any such discrimination against persons whose loyalty and devotion to the nation are beyond question. Not knowing our conditions, they are through ignorance making a colossal blunder about a trivial matter.

. . . To supply doctors and nurses to our own and the allied armies is the first obligation. Could the American Red Cross be expected to send doctors, nurses, ambulances, medicines and money into Germany to become a part of the military resources of the armies against which our armies are engaged? . . . The Red Cross should, of course, guard its phrases to prevent misconstruction; but eventually its policy will be disclosed in action. It will be neutral where neutrality is legitimate and reasonable, and it will be national and patriotic where this is reasonable and legitimate. Thus it will command respect abroad and affection from Americans of every party and section. Already the Red Cross is the best known of all humanitarian agencies. It is not to be doubted that it will be as well beloved as it is known."

(*The Survey*, XXXVIII, 314-315, July 7, 1917.)

F. [§285] SENDING AID ACROSS THE OCEAN.

1. Specific References on the Section.
 - Anon. "American Soldiers for France," in *New Republic*, XI, 97-98 (May 26, 1917).
2. Urgent Appeals.
 - (a) From Great Britain, France and Italy.
 - (b) Their commissions in this country.
3. Roosevelt Plan for a Select Army.
4. War Office Plan for Sending Part of the Regular Army.
5. Necessity of not putting untrained Troops in the Trenches.
6. Supplies.
 - (a) Absolute need of highly organized system of sending supplies and reserved troops after the army and keeping them up.
7. Documents and Extracts on the Section.
 - (a) [§286] The United States as a Sea Power.

BY LINCOLN COLCORD.

The United States once was a maritime nation, in the usual sense of the word; but it is so no longer. Why such a vital transformation came about in our national life is a question that already has a considerable literature, some of it full of the sailor's manly sentimentalism and sincere patriotic fervor, some of it prejudiced by class interests, very little of it written in a spirit of sound historical accuracy.

NEVER MISTRESS OF THE SEAS.

The traditional argument of our shipping men is founded on the broad claim that we were at one time mistress of the seas.

But the soundness of this claim depends wholly upon what is meant. As to tonnage, we unquestionably were carrying just before the Civil War a preponderant share of the world's trade. As to perfection of ships and ability of officers and crews, the case is equally strong in our favor. But if the traditional argument refers not only to a pre-eminence in ocean commerce, but also to the naval power to control competition—that is to say, a power which is not only active but potential—then I think that the premise is at fault.

In the full sense of sea power, the United States never was mistress of the seas. Our two wars with Great Britain scarcely affected the fact of British naval supremacy, American tradition and school history to the contrary. What we settled on the sea in those wars was the superiority of a few individual American ships over a few individual British ships, and the general superiority of American construction and personnel, as evinced in the work of our swift and daring privateers. We convinced ourselves that we would be able at any time to build and man a navy to cope with England's navy; but we have never done it, and the matter still remains in the region of faith. Our two wars were the chief means of convincing England of the wisdom of using her sea power with moderation; but they did not touch the sea power itself. Even at the zenith of our maritime greatness, with our unsurpassed clipper ships ruling every route of water-borne commerce, we depended upon British sea power for the freedom of the seas. England could have stopped our trade anywhere, at any time. That after the war of 1812 she did not attempt to do so, except in a single conspicuous instance, is proof of the general liberality of her sea policy.

EFFECT OF CIVIL WAR ON SHIPPING.

The traditional argument holds that the decay of the American merchant marine was brought about by two main factors; the first of which was the staggering blow delivered by Confederate raiders sent out from England during the Civil War. It is altogether unfortunate for a fair view of England's sea policy that the Alabama incident and others of a similar nature had to occur when they did. They are beside the mark. For the preceding decade conservative feeling in England had been excited by the rapid advance and disproportionate excellence of the American merchant marine. The situation, however, was simmering down; British builders and owners were improving their own merchant marine to compete with ours, and undoubtedly the rivalry would have been allowed to reach its natural results, without the coercion of British sea power. Then came the Civil War, and with it a stiffening of conservative opinion throughout England. The opportunity was seized, against the united protests of British liberals. But after the war these incidents were atoned for in a fair court of arbitration, and British policies became liberal again.

LACK OF PUBLIC INTEREST.

The second factor blamed for the decay of our merchant marine is the policy of a Congress controlled by the interior of

the country. This is only another way of saying that Congress refused to build a big navy or adopt a policy of subsidies. Much as I personally regret the passing of an era with which my whole life has been bound up, I have never been able to agree with the traditional argument on neither count. A merchant marine in sound standing easily recovers from fortuitous blows; for causes of its actual decay we must look deeper, to economic forces. The indifference of Congress to our maritime affairs during the last half century has itself been the result of an overwhelming economic pressure. When Commodore Vanderbilt, in the early days of the steamship era, suddenly sold out his growing steamship lines and turned his energies into railroad development, the action was significant of the whole tendency of the nation. From a strip of States fronting the sea and backed by virgin forests, we had rapidly changed into a continental nation with enormous inland forces to be organized. The maritime impulse of our early days lasted over into the succeeding era, and, as frequently happens in such a situation, reached its maximum when the economic forces that supported it were already on the wane. The break had to come. There was not in the nation sufficient manhood energy and financial power for both internal and external development. To this set of factors must be added still another, the growth of industrialism throughout the western world. Thus for two generations virtually the whole energy of the United States was to be spent upon internal development. The choice, however disastrous it may have been to our former shipping interests, from this distance seems healthy and inevitable.

REVIVAL OF INTERESTS.

But now we have undergone another economic change. A revival of maritime interest is taking place with us today. Our tonnage is advancing by leaps and bounds. In a few years we will possess a more than respectable merchant marine. Shipyards are springing up everywhere along our coast; they probably will be able to compete on equal terms with European yards for a period of five years after the war. There is plenty of capital for the enterprise. Above all, the country is now fairly well developed internally. The farmers and merchants, the men of the interior, are awakening to the significance of maritime affairs. It looks like a real national maritime expansion this time. What international policy shall we pursue?

The conservatives, in the temper of those British conservatives who built the *Alabama* and set her loose upon our shipping, claim that we should look singly to our own interests, and that it is nothing to us what any other nation thinks or does. . . . Their strong views are apt to emanate from an inaccurate belief in our past naval achievements and to disregard the total change that has come upon the relations between commercial and naval sea power with the development of modern armaments and models of propulsion. By closing their minds to the interests and activities of other nations, they lose sight of several very important considerations. . . .

The liberals also believe that it is not for us to be subservient in the matter. Trade and commerce are for all, and no nation must be permitted to hold a monopoly of the ocean routes. . . . The American liberal is quite willing to enter into a discussion of subsidies or preferential tariffs and port charges, at any time when we are actually unable to compete with foreign commerce. But he . . . believes that, regardless of Civil War incidents, the American merchant marine would have gone on developing side by side with the British merchant marine, and without hindrance from British sea power, if it had not been for a shifting of economic forces within our own country. . . .

(*New Republic*, IX, 240-242; Dec. 30, 1916.)

G. [§287] WORKING IN UNION WITH OUR ALLIES.

1. Specific References on the Section.

Bullard, A. "Our Relations With France," in *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 118, pp. 634-640 (Nov., 1916).

2. Working with the Commissions sent over here.

3. An Understanding as to our common Objects.

4. Recognition that at present they are holding back our Enemies from any immediate Power to reach us.

5. If we do not help them hold.

(a) We shall have the Germans on our necks.

6. German Invasion.

(a) Would mean the same kind of military government and treatment of non-combatants as in Belgium, France and Serbia.

7. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§288] No Formal Alliance.

BY COMMISSIONER ARTHUR J. BALFOUR (April 25, 1917).

WILLINGNESS OF AMERICA TO AID.

No man who has had the opportunity which I have enjoyed in the last few days of seeing, hearing and talking to leading members of your State can for one moment doubt the full determination of the American people to throw themselves into the greatest conflict which has ever been waged in this world. I do not suppose that it is possible for you—I am sure it would not be possible were I in your place—to realize in detail, in concrete detail, all that the war means to those who have been engaged in it for now two years and a half. That is a feeling which comes, and can only come, by actual experience. We on the other side of the Atlantic have been living in an atmosphere of war since August, 1914, and you cannot move about the streets, you cannot go about your daily business, even if your affairs be disassociated with the war itself, without having evidences of the war brought to your notice every moment.

NEED OF ASSISTANCE.

I arrived here on Sunday afternoon and went out in the evening after dark, and I was struck by a somewhat unusual feeling which at the first moment I did not analyze; and suddenly it came upon me that this was the first time for two years and a half or more when I had seen a properly lighted street. There is not a street in London, there is not a street in any city of the United Kingdom, in which after dark the whole community is not wrapped in a gloom exceeding that which must have existed before the invention of gas or electric lighting. But that is a small matter, and I only mention it because it happened to strike me as one of my earliest experiences in this city.

FORMAL TREATIES NOT EXPECTED.

Gentlemen, I do not believe that the magnitude of that assistance can by any possibility be exaggerated. I am told that there are some doubting critics who seem to think that the object of the mission of France and Great Britain to this country is to inveigle the United States out of its traditional policy, and to entangle it in formal alliances, secret or public, with European powers. I cannot imagine any rumor with less foundation, nor can I imagine a policy so utterly unnecessary.

Our confidence in this assistance which we are going to get from this community is not based upon such shallow considerations as those which arise out of formal treaties. No treaty could increase the undoubted confidence with which we look to the United States, who, having come into the war, are going to see the war through. If there is any certainty in human affairs, that is certain.

SIGNIFICANCE OF AMERICAN AID.

Two years and a half have gone since the war began, and the great public on this side of the Atlantic has been watching, with deepening interest, the blood-stained drama going on across the ocean, and I am well convinced that as each month has passed, so has the conviction grown among you that after all it is no small or petty interest that is involved in this war, it is no struggle for so many square miles of territory, for some acquisition, some satisfaction of small national ambition. It was nothing short of the full consciousness that the liberties of mankind are really involved in the issue of this struggle that was animating the allied countries.

With such a cause the American public has always been in full sympathy, and now, after watching it through all these months, you have found yourselves impelled to join in the great conflict. I feel perfectly certain that you will throw into it all your unequalled resources, all your powers of invention, of production, all your man power, all the resources of that country which has greater resources than any other country in the world, and already having come to the decision, nothing will turn you from it but success crowning our joint efforts.

(*New York Times*, April 26, 1917.)

(b) [§289] Alliance With the Allies.

BY CARMAN E. RANDOLPH (April 26, 1917).

Making war against Germany, the United States makes with the Entente Powers a spiritual alliance cemented by democratic ideals, a working alliance enlisting our financial aid and whatever reinforcement on sea and land shall speed a victorious peace. The Great Alliance is a fact. Should it crystallize into form?

A FORMAL ALLIANCE POSSIBLE.

A formal alliance is not discouraged by the familiar warning regarding Europe in Washington's Farewell Address—that "it must be unwise to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the vicissitudes of her politics or in the ordinary combinations or collisions of her friendships or enmities." This broad counsel is followed by the shrewdly discriminating advice: "'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliance with any portion of the foreign world. . . . Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectably defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies." An extraordinary emergency now makes an alliance permissible. What considerations of fact, of law, of diplomacy bear on the question of its expediency? . . .

No authorization by Congress is needed; nor the Senate's approval, as for a treaty. While the Compact ranks with a treaty in honorable obligation, it is essentially a military measure—an executive agreement. Emphasizing the right of the President to sign the Compact of London our adhesion would be impolitic, both from our standpoint and that of the Entente.

The President could sign this Compact in virtue of his right, nay, his duty, as Commander in Chief, to make, if circumstances warrant, an agreement with brothers in arms that will at once solidify the striking power of the entire group and avert the possibility that withdrawals of recalcitrant members might leave the Republic in the lurch. . . .

KINDRED AIMS WITH ALLIES.

We may expect a Congress of Nations after the conclusion of peace. Probably some of the problems of the war will necessarily be referred to it for final settlement, but a just assurance of concrete results demands their accomplishment in the very conditions of peace imposed by victors sufficiently powerful to make these conditions effective, sufficiently wise, magnanimous—aye, compassionate—to make them bearable by the defeated peoples.

The aims of the Entente Powers and those of the United States will not be discordant. Conference, sincere and intimate, will not only avert this mischief, but bring reciprocal toleration in matters whereon formal agreement may be unattainable or undesirable. But these aims are, apparently, not entirely identical, nor need they be pressed to identity by mutually reluctant compromises, for it will appear that the variations are quite natural and need not impair the essential unity of method and purpose.

President Wilson said in his memorable war address of April 2: "We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make." To this self-denying ordinance, so rightfully proclaimed, the outraged neighbors of Germany do not subscribe. They have heavy scores to settle, new boundaries to draw, neighborhood problems to adjust; and the "balance of power" purged of dynastic ambitions will concern far-sighted statesmen. The Republic will neither formally commit itself to such aims as these, nor dissuade the Entente Powers from pursuing them.

COMMON UNDERSTANDING DESIRABLE.

We are not surprised, though none the less gratified to know that at present no formal alliance is expected from us. Speaking for the Entente Powers, Mr. Balfour said with characteristic felicity of thought and word: "Our confidence in the assistance which we are going to get from this community is not based upon such shallow considerations as those which arise out of formal treaties. No treaty could increase the undoubted confidence with which we look to the United States, who, having come into the war are going to see it through."

Reserving his right to make hereafter such allowances as military exigencies may demand, the President might properly display to the Powers the firm foundation of their faith and pledge the Republic to the course on which it is firmly resolved—linked with the Entente Powers in a common aim of world-wide concern, to fight with them to the end. The pledge might lose point were the aim supplemented by others, however worthy in themselves; and, accomplishing this, the Great Alliance will clear the way for whatever projects may engage their interest. Indeed, our Commander in Chief could not pledge the Republic to any other than a military obligation.

(*New York Times*, April 26, 1917.)

H. [§290] SOCIAL ORGANIZATION.

1. Specific References on the Section.

See §§134, 263 above.

2. Keeping Up Social Life.

- (a) Labor.
- (b) Children.
- (c) Women's work and place.

3. Political Organization.

- (a) Societies (See §—).
- (b) Government agencies (See §—).

4. Education in Patriotism.

- (a) Regular schools and colleges.
- (b) Special exercises in schools.
- (c) Speaking campaigns (See §—).

5. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§291] Social Preparedness.

BY EDWARD T. DEVINE.

SOCIAL NEEDS.

This nation is not ready either for war or for the competitions and strains of peace. But how shall we prepare? Precisely by pushing forward with ever-increasing vigor the very measures which are included in the demand for social and industrial justice. They are not unfamiliar subjects of discussion here: infant and child protection, a reduction of the death-rate; a longer and more efficient working life, safety from industrial accidents and occupational disease, provision for the economic burdens of sickness by social insurance or otherwise; rigid food inspection; the segregation and humane care of the mentally defective; prison administration on humane and reformative lines; town planning and abolition of overcrowding, of dangerous privies and cess pools, of insanitary alleys and dark tenements; constant repressive action against commercialized vice; a campaign against alcoholism; and, above all, educational reform in the light of our new knowledge as to the conditions of successful agriculture, industry and commerce.

The program of social work was formerly timid, apologetic, pretending at best to urge a liberal investment of surplus revenues for its humanitarian ends. We listened respectfully while philanthropists and appropriation committees measured out the doles which they could afford to give away for what they considered luxuries. . . .

CONTINUOUS ACTION.

The social welfare departments of the modern city or state or nation, and the voluntary agency for the prevention of poverty or disease or crime, can take no such attitude. They are engaged in serious undertakings. They have assumed definite responsibilities. They adopt carefully considered budgets. They require ample resources. Their expenditures are investments. Their returns are in terms of life, vigor, efficiency, power of creation, and capacity for enjoyment.

It is no fanciful analogy that education, hygiene, industrial justice, improved standards of living, belong conspicuously in any program of national preparedness. The national idea is a part of patriotism. The social idea is another, and equally essential part. The good citizen is one in whose mind the two ideas are joined in an inseparable union.

In America, above all other nations, there is a continuing necessity for this reconciliation of the social and the national ideals. Our distances are great. Our people are of mingled races, languages and customs. The task of social integration is imperative. To hold up a national ideal in terms of salutes to the flag is an empty performance unless it is reinforced by evidence of social ideals cherished by all who own allegiance to the flag. . . .

COMMON HUMANITY.

All Europe has moved strangely nearer to us as we have looked with ever-increasing fascination on her agonizing strug-

gles—not yet knowing whether it may not be literally a death struggle for the life from which our life has been drawn. It will not be so—not for long will the nations hate and kill and destroy what they have built. A better England, a more civilized Germany, a fairer France, a greater Russia, will rise from devastated Europe. Where the boundaries will lie, what political systems will prevail, cannot be told; but humanity itself, enriched by the peculiar gifts of the nations we have known, must survive. It is of deep concern to us that it should be so. . . .

There can be neutrality still, a red-blooded, virile American neutrality, not for commercial profit, nor from craven fear of war, but patriotic, persistently seeking the kindred aspects of each people, remembering our friendships, reasoning patiently if firmly about our wrongs if we have them, yielding no particle of the responsibility which we hold, with other neutrals, in trust for the future of mankind.

In the name of this neutrality, for the sake of humanity itself, we must put our house in order. There is no national policy, worthy the name of America, which does not embrace the most progressive, enlightened, sane, and radical social policy. There is no preparedness worthy of consideration which does not embrace social and industrial justice.

(*The Survey*, XXXV, 732-734; March 18, 1916.)

(b) [§292] Save the Children During the War.

By _____

CHILD LABOR.

Immediately after our declaration of war the newspapers were filled with schemes for increasing our labor supply, most of which involved the use of children. Someone in Pennsylvania wanted the places of miners who enlist taken by fourteen-year-old boys. Someone in New Jersey suggested that the schools close for two months to allow the children to be sent to work on farms. In the New York Legislature there is a bill, which is receiving serious consideration, to suspend all restrictions on the hours of labor of women and minors during the war. Probably all these suggestions are made in good faith. Probably a good many people believe that to hurry our children into factories, mines and fields in this emergency and work them unlimited hours would be to give them the privilege of performing a great patriotic service. Indeed those who, like the National Child Labor Committee, have the temerity to suggest that children ought not to be so misused, are too often met with the indignant reply, "Why shouldn't the children help? In war everyone must do his part!" True—everyone must do his part. But what is the children's part?

CHANGES IN LABOR CONDITIONS.

If the war were guaranteed to end in three months, we might possibly be justified in flinging every man, woman and child recklessly into service to hurry the finish. But we have no such guaranty. Some of us feel the Allies' spring offensive is encouraging; some of us believe there may be a revolution in Ger-

many any day; and some of us feel simply that "something is going to happen." Unfortunately we have been feeling for three years that something is going to happen and nothing has happened. If we are wise we shall settle ourselves for a long fight. And since the war is likely to be more industrial than military, so far as we are concerned, one of the first things we do must be to adapt our labor force to war conditions and assure ourselves of an inexhaustible supply of labor for the years to come. Is overworking and neglecting our children now, assuring ourselves of that labor supply? If we adopt sane, selective recruiting and intelligently fill the places of enlisted men with women and older boys and girls, we shall face no immediate labor shortage.

PREPAREDNESS IN CHILDREN.

As for the younger children, we should conserve and develop them just as carefully as Mr. Hoover is going to conserve and develop our food supply. If we are wise and farsighted we shall enforce child labor laws and school laws more rigidly than ever just now. We shall scrutinize and regulate every single use of children in industry, for there must be nothing headless, in this emergency, about our use of human resources. More than that, we shall stimulate educational activity, especially in industrial training, and support as never before public and private child welfare agencies, if we are going to make the most of the material we have in hand. In short, we must protect, train and develop children now for the simple reason that for the future, both remote and immediate, we need a more intelligent and able-bodied set of people than ever. "The nation is under special obligation to secure that the rising generation grows up strong and hardy both in body and character," is solemn warning of England, which has been at war for three years, to America on the threshold of war.

(*New Republic*, XI, May 5, 1917.)

(c) [§293] The Duty of Parents.

BY GENERAL LEONARD WOOD.

Parents do not like to think of their sons becoming involved in actual armed conflict; but the possibility must be frankly admitted. The mother knows that, if the boy has inherited manly qualities, he will respond to the call of his country in time of national peril. The question for her to decide is whether or not, dreading war, she is going to ignore the possibility of it and permit the boy to grow up without proper training or instruction—lacking that information and training which are necessary to make him an efficient soldier, and which, in all probability, will give him a better chance to come through the armed conflict alive. The boy, if he is fit to be a citizen, is going to serve. It is the part of the parent to see that he is given the best possible preparation. The unfortunate creature who wrote the song, "I Didn't Raise My Boy to Be a Soldier," has voiced a sentiment which, were it in any way general, would mean national collapse in case of trouble. None of us raise our boys specially to be soldiers, but we do raise them in the hope that

they will meet the call of the nation for service, whether it be in war or in peace, and not expect to be protected by the boy who has been raised to discharge his full duty. We shall either do our own fighting and defend ourselves, or, as the subjects of another nation, receive our military training under their orders.

The best way to avoid war is to be thoroughly prepared for it. The strong man armed can be both just and tolerant, as can a strong nation armed and prepared; and in both instances the would-be aggressor is much less prone to attack. He will count the cost and realize the danger. The strongest influence in this country for war has been that of those who have prevented national preparedness, and, incidentally, they are the type last to respond in a moment of national peril. The effects of this training of youth are always beneficial: physically, from the better development of the body, correction of physical defects and general all-round improvement; economically, from the habits of promptness and thoroughness; and morally because of the discipline which teaches them to respect the laws and the rights of others. From the standpoint of citizenship, it builds up a spirit of national solidarity, which tends to national strength.

(I. Wood, *Universal Military Training*. Collier's National Service Series, I, 77-79.)

(d) [§294] What For and How.

BY MABEL HILL (1917).

WHAT FOR? FOR THREE THINGS.

- I. To know why we are at war.
- II. To feel that it is right for us to be engaged in this war.
- III. To act wisely and well at the present moment, and to plan to act in the future so wisely and so well that a better and more intelligent and loyal citizenship shall be developed.

HOW CAN WE DO IT?

I. *Form "Study Circles"*—Whether we live in the city or at the seaside or in the country, we can "Get Together." Whether we live in private homes or in hotels, "Getting Together" is the first thing.

II. *What Are We to Study?*—Again we quote from Dr. Lewis: "A thorough understanding of the fundamental situation is needed more than anything else. The vastness of this country, its wide variation of climate, its diversity of agricultural enterprise, and the localization of interests as a result of state lines, have served to divide the United States."

We must therefore study what our American Federal Government stands for as a unifying force in both works and ideals. We must study American democracy—its institutions and problems. We must know.

Where Shall We Gain Our Information?—The city or town library, the state library, and the Federal bureaus will all contribute lists of books and data which will make this knowledge accessible.

III. *Study Circles May Meet Afternoons for Regular Work*—But sometimes the circles should get together in the evening, where martial music, the singing together of war songs, and the reading of the fine new poetry recently produced because of the war, are brought together to stimulate feeling—it is poetry and music which take us over into the realm of war spirit.

IV. *Pageants*—Once during the summer, the Study Circle should organize a pageant; not an intricate pageant which takes time and money, but a simple community pageant which takes in everyone, with a few rehearsals only, but with friendly co-operation and great good will.

V. *Study Circles Should Unite in One Piecc of Work Together*—If various Study Circles are started in a large city, let one vacant room be chosen in the heart of the community, where information may be found for all classes of people. Charts should be prepared by members of the Circle—baby welfare charts, healthgrams, and all kinds of data which will help develop preparedness and good citizenship in the community.

Where Shall We Get This Data?—The Children's Bureau of the Department of Labor at Washington will give advice and send bulletins. The State and Federal Departments of Agriculture will assist. Bureaus of Naturalization are ready to help, and the Commission on the Consecration of Food is particularly ready to give advice. Ask Boards of Health, Boards of Charity. There is more data to be had than there are people willing to ask for it.

VI. *Public School Children*—Try to organize the children during the summer holidays. The Government is attending to the older boys and placing them on farms; but the children from twelve to fifteen years of age, if not organized and shown how they can help their country, may with their natural interests become marauders upon the new farming land outside of the cities. It is easy to organize children at this age into helpers, and it costs less than to develop the juvenile court.

First—Choose leaders who will take a pledge to carry out the plan of the Study Circle—twelve Boy Captains and twelve Girl Captains. In order to make these young captains feel their responsibility and carry out the plan of work, arrange a morning drill of ten minutes for these squads of boys and girls. Unite the work with the police department and the health department. The plans for such work must of course be fitted to the particular community as to detail. But in every case the girls' work should refer to baby welfare and sanitation in the home, while the boys' work should co-operate in cleaning backyards and private alleys and the surroundings of markets, fruit stores, and the like. If possible, the school department should be urged to co-operate with this movement to organize children during the holidays. This campaign means healthier babies, healthier homes, healthier neighborhoods, healthier state, a better America.

VII. *Immigrants*—If the Study Circle is located near immigrant districts, the work must be intensified to fit the foreign-speaking people. Again, the libraries and the Bureau of Immigration are the ones who will help the most.

VIII. *The Result*—The above suggestions for better citizen-

ship do not in any way imply that the good citizen, man or woman, should omit the work for war organization—Red Cross, Special Aid, and Food Conservation. But, Preparedness means Intelligent Thinking and Intelligent Co-operation concerning the acts which make up every-day citizenship in the community. It is this intelligence which we wish to create at this psychological moment.

(*Economics of Citizenship, Bulletin II.*)

I. [§295] PROBLEM OF THE ALIENS.

See §128 above.

1. Specific References on the Section.
 - Van Dyne. *Citizenship.*
 - Scott, J. B. *Reference on Citizenship.*
2. Descendants of Aliens.
 - (a) The status of all citizens of the United States except Indians.
 - (b) Citizens born in America other than of English descent.
 - (c) Children of the foreign born.
3. Naturalized Aliens.
 - (a) Ease of naturalization.
 - (b) Number of naturalized aliens.
 - (c) Status of those who have filed "first papers" (declaration of intention).
 - (d) Aliens from allied countries.
 - (e) Aliens from Germany and other central powers.
4. Alien Friends.
 - (a) From neutral nations.
 - (b) From allied nations.
 - (c) Question of obligatory service in the American Army.
 - (d) Question of service for armies of the country of their origin.
5. Alien Enemies.
 - (a) Status under international law.
 - (b) Privileges under treaties.
 - (c) Obligations.
 - (d) Limitations on movement and residence.
 - (e) Censorship.
 - (f) Internment of vessel crews.
 - (g) Seizure of vessel property.
 - (h) Possible internment of residents and aliens.
6. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§296] Confidence in German Citizens.

BY GEORGE A. PLIMPTON.

We in the United States trace our origin to no one nationality. While our original settlers before the Revolutionary War were the English, Spanish, French and Germans, since then every nationality on the face of the earth has contributed more or less to the upbuilding of our country. The greatness of America and the position which it holds in the world today are due to no one of these races, but to the contributions of all. Our country has been rightly called the melting pot of the world. Here all races become Americans.

GERMAN-AMERICAN CITIZENS.

A war with the mother country of any of our fellow-citizens should make the rest of us exceedingly charitable and liberal towards these fellow-citizens in all our dealings. We should take especial care to guard ourselves from taking an attitude of suspicion towards them. We should always act on the assumption, stated in some of our German-American newspapers, "They are now American citizens, and they should be treated as American citizens." Of course, if any overt act should be committed the offenders will be punished.

My feeling is, however, that in case of a war with Germany we should find that some of the very strongest upholders of our Government would be our German-American citizens, whether naturalized or not. I cannot conceive of any German here wishing to see America worsted. There are many reasons why we should feel confident of the patriotism of our German population.

WHY THE GERMANS CAME HERE.

In the first place, the Germans have come to this country to better their condition, and statistics show that no part of our population have prospered more generally or contributed more to the prosperity of the community. Successful Germans will be found in every class of our population: our bankers, our manufacturers, our farmers, our educators, our musicians, our scientists, our skilled mechanics, and these classes all add to our law-abiding citizens.

Second, a large number of our German population came to this country to escape the very institution for which Germany now predominantly stands before the world—her military system. They do not believe that a nation should be dominated by its military caste—they believe that the army and the navy should be subject to the civil authorities.

Third, while those whose early life was spent in Germany naturally have an affection for the home country—just as Englishmen have for England, Frenchmen for France and the Spaniard for Spain—this affection is not so dominating or so unaffected by reason as to lead the German to stand by Germany, right or wrong, or to approve of unlawful acts which she may commit.

Another thing for us to remember, too, is that the major part of our German population is not of recent immigration, but has been here for at least a full generation, and their German ideas and feelings are honeycombed, so to speak, by American influences.

WAR WITH THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT.

I feel, therefore, that we have no reason to doubt the loyalty of our German fellow-citizens, in any event. I have also confidence in the sanity and tolerance of all Americans. As a people, we must bear in mind, in case of a war, that the war is with the German Government, and not with the German people.

Japan, notwithstanding her stand with the Allies and against Germany, is not only allowing the Germans within her borders to transact their business and go about their work unmolested,

but she is treating these Germans with especial courtesy and graciousness, considering that these Germans are her guests. Surely America can be even more just and generous to our fellow-citizens of German descent.

(*Independent*, LXXXIX, 346; Feb. 26, 1917.)

(b) [§297] To Our Citizens of German Descent.

BY GUSTAVUS OHLINGER.

(Mr. Ohlinger is a lawyer of Toledo, Ohio. His book, *Their True Faith and Allegiance*, published a year or more ago, called the attention of the American people for the first time to the perils involved in the widespread net of German propaganda in the United States.)

ARE GERMAN-AMERICANS ISOLATED?

"Have we deceived ourselves? Are we Americans of German descent standing in the way of our own progress? Why are we isolated in this country of our adoption? Why, in this crisis, this feeling of estrangement which meets us on every side?"

These questions, recently propounded by a newspaper published in the German language, are the most promising indication that has come from the German language press for many years. Many German-Americans are asking themselves the same questions. That they may result in serious heart-searching is the prayer of every patriotic American who has the welfare not only of his country, but of every section of its population at heart.

The German element in the United States finds itself isolated because for twenty years it has been deceived and led astray by men who have sought to exploit its traditions and sentiments for ulterior ends. Some of these would-be leaders have been paid emissaries of the German Government—others, mere non-entities, who, flattered by decorations, gewgaws and audiences bestowed by the "All-Highest," have bartered themselves to further the aims of Pan-Germanism. For twenty years these false prophets have been industriously spreading the tenets of Kultur in the United States, telling Americans of German descent of Anglo-Saxon decadence, extolling German scientific and industrial efficiency, deluding and flattering their hearers with a sense of racial superiority as compared with other elements in our population, warning them against the jealousies and enmities of the "nativists," "Anglo-Americans," and others, and urging them to maintain racial solidarity, so that they might participate in the glories of the day when German thought, German science, and the German language would dominate the world.

GERMAN LANGUAGE PRESS.

Twenty years ago the German language press had fulfilled its mission—the only mission which it ever had in this country—that of serving as a medium between the German immigrants of the 80's and their new environment in the United States. In the 90's that immigration practically ceased, and the German

language press was presented with the alternatives of either adopting the language of the country or of facing extinction. Just at this juncture it received an artificial recrudescence from this new propaganda. It prolonged its life as an alien language press by making itself the mistress and hand-maid of Pan-Germanism.

EFFECT OF KULTUR.

Kultur has produced its proper fruit in the theory of the state as supreme over the individual, a theory that denies to government every moral attribute and makes power devoid of every ethical consideration the only end to be attained. Against this Frankenstein we invoke the ideals of the Declaration of Independence, with its concept of government deriving its just powers from the consent of the governed.

Let our German-American friends expel these false prophets in their midst, renounce forever Kultur and all its works and turn to the life-giving principles which underlie our government. In countless churches throughout this land congregations daily repeat the Apostles' Creed. No believer has ever suggested that this frequent iteration was a reflection either upon his faith or his piety.

Let our citizens of German descent, by word and deed, pledge again and again their devotion to their country and its ideals. Their isolation and their estrangement will cease and they will be children in their father's house.

(Vigilantes Special Service.)

(c) [§298] The Children of the Crucible.

DRAFTED BY THEODORE ROOSEVELT; SIGNED BY OSCAR S. STRAUS
AND MANY OTHER PERSONS OF FOREIGN DESCENT.

(September 11, 1917.)

THE MELTING POT.

We Americans are the children of the crucible. It has been our boast that out of the crucible, the melting pot of life in this free land, all the men and women of all the nations who come hither emerge as Americans and as nothing else; Americans who proudly challenge as a right, not as a favor, that they "belong" just exactly as much as any other Americans and that they stand on a full and complete equality with them; Americans therefore, who must, even more strongly, insist that they have renounced completely and without reserve, all allegiance to the lands from which they or their forefathers came, and that it is a binding duty on every citizen of this country in every important crisis, to act solidly with all his fellow Americans, having regard only to the honor and interest of America and treating every other nation purely on its conduct in that crisis, without reference to his ancestral predilections or antipathies. If he does not so act, he is false to the teachings and the lives of Washington and Lincoln, he is not entitled to any part or lot in our country, and he should be sent out of it. If he does not act purely as an American, he shows that in his case the crucible

has failed to do its work. The crucible must melt all who are cast in it; it must turn them out in one American mould; and this must be the mould shaped a hundred and forty years ago by the men who under Washington founded this as a free nation, separate from all others. Even at that time, true Americans were of many different race strains; Paul Revere and Charles Carroll, Marion Herkimer, Sullivan, Schuyler and Muhlenberg, stood on an equality of service and achieved respect with Lighthorse Harry Lee and Israel Putnam. But the majority of the leaders and of their followers were of English blood. They did not, because of this, hesitate to resist and antagonize Great Britain when Great Britain wronged this nation; they stood for liberty and for the eternal rule of right and justice and they stood as Americans and as nothing else.

ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NATIVE COUNTRIES.

All Americans of other race origin must act towards the countries from which their ancestors severally sprang as Washington and his associates in their day acted. Otherwise they are traitors to America. This applies especially today to all Americans of German blood who directly or indirectly in any manner support Germany as against the United States and the Allies of the United States; it applies no less specifically to all American citizens of Irish blood who are led into following the same course not by their love of Germany but by their hatred of England. One motive is as inexcusable as the other; and in each case the action is treasonable to the United States.

THE PACIFISTS.

The professional pacifists have, during the last three years, proved themselves the evil enemies of their country. They now advocate an inconclusive peace. In so doing they have shown themselves to be the spiritual heirs of the Tories who in the name of peace opposed Washington, and of the Copperheads who in the name of peace opposed Lincoln. We regard these men and women as traitors to the republic; we regard them as traitors to the great cause of justice and humanity. This war is a war for the vital interests of America. When we fight for America abroad we save our children from fighting for America at home beside their own ruined hearthstones. We believe that the large majority of Americans are proudly ready to fight to the last for the overthrow of the brutal German militarism which threatens America no less than every other civilized nation. We believe that it would be an act of baseness and infamy, an act of unworthy cowardice and a betrayal of this country and of mankind to accept any peace except the peace of overwhelming victory, a peace based on the complete overthrow of the Prussianized Germany of the Hohenzollerns.

We hold that the true test of loyal Americanism today is effective service against Germany. We should exert as speedily as possible every particle of our vast lazy strength to win the triumph over Germany. Therefore we should demand that the Government act at once with unrelenting severity against the traitors here at home, whether their treasonable activity take

the form of editing and publishing newspapers, of uttering speeches, or of intrigue and conspiracy.

ONE FLAG, ONE LANGUAGE.

We must have but one flag. We must also have but one language. That must be the language of the Declaration of Independence, of Washington's Farewell Address, of Lincoln's Gettysburg Speech and Second Inaugural. We cannot tolerate any attempt to oppose or supplant the language and culture that has come down to us from the builders of this Republic with the language and culture of any European country. The greatness of this nation depends on the swift assimilation of the aliens she welcomes to her shores. Any force which attempts to retard that assimilative process is a force hostile to the highest interests of our country. It is a force, which, if allowed to develop, will, for the benefit of this group or that, undermine our national institutions and pervert our national ideals. Whatever may have been our judgment in normal times, we are convinced that today our most dangerous foe is the foreign language press and every similar agency such as the German-American Alliance, which holds the alien to his former associations and through them to his former allegiance. We call upon all loyal and unadulterated Americans to man the trenches against the enemy within our gates.

ENEMIES EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL.

We ask that good Americans . . . uphold the hands of the Government at every point efficiently and resolutely against our foreign and domestic foes, and that they constantly spur the Government to speedier and more effective action. Furthermore, we ask that where governmental action cannot be taken, they arouse an effective and indignant public opinion against the enemies of our country, whether these enemies masquerade as pacifists, or proclaim themselves the enemies of our Allies, or act through organizations such as the I. W. W. and the Socialist party machine, or appear nakedly as the champions of Germany. Above all, we ask that they teach our people to spurn any peace save the peace of overwhelming victory in the war to which we have set our hands.

Of us who sign some are Protestants, some are Catholics, some are Jews. Most of us were born in this country of parents born in various countries of the old world—in Germany, France, England, Ireland, Italy, the Slavonic and the Scandinavian lands; some of us were born abroad; some of us are of Revolutionary stock. All of us are Americans, and nothing but Americans.

(Vigilantes Special Service.)

(d) [§299] Evils of Adherence to the German Language.

BY PROFESSOR JOHN WILLIAM SCHOLL (August 12, 1917).

President Wilson, as head of the nation, has taken pains on various occasions to express his belief in the loyalty of the great mass of our citizenship of German extraction. This is not

merely politic, but just, and those who are loyal in every sense of the word should not be confused with those who have a string to their loyalty.

INSTANCES OF UNAMALGAMATED GERMANS.

But there is a minority among our citizens of German extraction who deserve all the condemnation heaped on them by their fellow-citizens. This fact must not be blinked, and the President's words must not be taken as a blanket indorsement of their activities, or be allowed for one moment to check the efforts of good citizens to help the nation clean house.

This derelict minority may amount to some hundreds of thousands of our population, and it is aggregated into hundreds of bunches or communities, with more or less close unity.

It is not much worth while to deal in generalities. We have talked too long about the American melting pot. We should face the facts. A realization of the facts may indicate a remedy for the evils of our present state.

Let us look at a community such as I have in mind. It is made up of Germans, mostly from Württemberg and other southern districts, but with scattering families from the northern regions of Mecklenburg, Pomerania, Posen and Silesia. Almost all of them came here before the founding of the present German Empire, and have no sentimental attachment to it except such as has been bred in them by propaganda since their arrival in America. They were mostly wretchedly poor and came here to mend their fortunes. All of them owe everything they have any enjoy to the opportunity America afforded them. Not many of them were political refugees, though some were infected with a hatred of absolutism and were glad of a haven of refuge in free America.

STICKING TO THE GERMAN LANGUAGE.

They settled together here, associated with one another rather than with English-speaking neighbors, maintained German as the language of the home, and forced the business men of the community to use German in their trade. They established churches in which only the German language was used, and secured pastors who fostered in every way the maintenance of this separatism. The pastor was frequently drawn from abroad, and felt himself a member of the great German family temporarily residing in foreign parts, and his ministering was un-American, to say the least. Even the American pastor was generally steeped in foreign culture. Sometimes the pastor kept a parochial school in connection, and worked against the leveling influence of the American common school. The people subscribed for the local German newspaper and read it and no other.

In this fashion a group of men who become in the course of time naturalized citizens of the United States wilfully cut themselves off from proper connection with the great currents of national life.

There can be no question at all that community of language is the great bond of unity in all national life. Reading with

ease daily, habitually, year in and year out, the master thoughts of English literature, the words of great American leaders like Eliot, Root and hundreds of other men of eminence in public life, the editorials of our great dailies, the thoughtful essays of our serious reviews and magazines, even the news articles in our better journals, is the one most potent cause of unity of sentiment and judgment among the masses of a nation. The leaders think aloud and in print, and the masses think their thoughts after them; or the masses think and the leaders give voice to their thoughts; it matters little how this solidarity of opinion is conceived of. Its one condition is community of tongue. And when we talk glibly of blood being "thicker than water," and of blood "telling," etc., we are merely using symbolic terms to say that a common language creates a community of national aims and ideals.

How can persons become good American citizens when they refuse to employ the only means to that end, the English language?

NEED OF AMERICANIZATION.

Becoming well-to-do landowners and paying taxes is a commendable thing as far as it goes, but it is a very narrow and selfish kind of citizenship that is content with that. There ought to be a desire to understand how this great Anglo-Saxon empire of America grew to be a land of freemen, to know what sacrifices of blood and treasure Americans, and Englishmen before them, have made for centuries to establish and maintain those forms of free government which they so thoughtlessly enjoy today. These newcomers should learn to feel a jealous regard for those liberties under law, and have a sense of responsibility for their maintenance for generations to come.

But all the agencies of this closed community have been working quite contrariwise. An idealized Germany has been held before their view for years. Since the war began three years ago they have been presented a picture of an innocent Germany, land of super-efficiency and success, land of all the domestic virtues, guileless but prosperous, the envy of the greedy Entente Allies, suddenly pounced upon with the thunderbolts of war while all unprepared and unsuspecting, and now heroically struggling in a victorious defense against the whole world.

It makes no difference that the whole world judges differently, or that established facts and German admissions prove this picture a diabolic distortion and inversion of the truth. This community, served by its German-language newspaper, knows no better, for its editor intentionally befuddles their intellects by his lies and poisons their judgment with his own malevolent venom.

J. [§300] TIME FOR NATIONAL GRIT.

1. Specific References on the Section.

Anon. "American Poet's Vision of the Spiritual Glory of War," in *Current Opinion*, LX, 40-41 (Jan., 1916).

Porter, L. S. "The Bright Side of War," in *No. Am. Review*, vol. 203, pp. 883-894 (June, 1916).

Clark, B. "Cowards and Fools—Fall In!" in *Survey*, XXXVI, 325-326 (June 24, 1916).

Anon. "Effect of War on National Vitality," in *Scientific American*, vol. 115, p. 256 (Sept. 16, 1916).

2. In Furnishing the Necessary Men and Preparing Them for Their Work.

3. Industry.

(a) Organizing our whole economic and industrial system so as to be sure that we provide the necessary arms, munitions, food and supplies all the time.

4. Labor.

(a) Rearranging our labor system so as to spare the men who go to the front and avoid strikes and lockouts.

5. Purpose of War.

(a) Holding consistently to the course upon which we have entered of making war not on Germans but on the things that Germany is trying to do in the world. United States is the champion of free government against despotism.

6. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§301] Fighting for the Flag.

BY JOHN F. HARRIS.

PROTECTION BY THE FLAG.

The bushman, the Hottentot, the cannibal have no commerce and no civilization. A nation that trades only within its own borders, limits its horizon. It degenerates almost as much as a community that brings in no fresh blood, that inbreeds, which results in degeneracy and decay. We can only have an extensive commerce if Americans, acting within their lawful rights, are protected not only when within the confines of the United States, but also when without them. I take it that you stand when the national hymn is played, that you uncover your head when the flag is carried past, as it symbolizes to your mind that all the treasure and all the blood of this country would be expended in the restoration or maintenance of the rights of any one individual whoever he may be, when he is within those rights. If the flag does not mean that, it is a rag. If the hymn does not mean that, it is something at which any man may scoff; and if a nation does not protect its citizens, it does not and ought not to long endure. I have touched upon this aspect of the case because I feel deeply upon it, and I feel that everyone may do something toward awakening such a spirit in this country that we would be so prepared, that we could so resist invasion, spoliation, or interference with our rights that no nation would attempt it. . . .

PROTECTION OF ORGANIZED DEFENSE.

At the termination of this war it is a certainty that some power will possess a fleet which has gone successfully through the ordeal of battle, an army disciplined, hardened, and enthused by victory. Great commanders will have been developed. That country will have enormous power and enormous debts. We

possess enormous wealth without the power of protection. The least we should do is to get in a position as rapidly as possible to defend ourselves, if necessary, from the possible, and to my mind probable, encroachments of foreign powers. It is impossible to understand how anyone with any pride of ancestry, any regard for the traditions and honor of the country, or any love for their children, cannot be heartily in favor of the national defense program. There are many subjects that might involve us in war with those who are prepared, and we are unprepared. War today is a complicated and involved science, and to be prepared requires years of thought and greatest effort.

I have four sons, and a very strong feeling with me upon the entire subject is the one that I want to speak and act now and do everything that is within my power so that these children may not say to me when they do respond to their country's call—as they would if such a call became necessary—that the country is unprepared, that they are untrained, and that they will go forth not to an equal war but to a practical slaughter. The millenium is not here, and however much individuals may deplore war, it has devastated the earth since recorded time and will continue long after those who declare it will not come again, are dead, and their descendants likewise.

ORGANIZE DEFENSE.

Of what avail is a tariff system, a currency bill, or a system of jurisprudence if it cannot be enforced? Belgium had all these, but they were set aside and Germany's various systems substituted. We are rich and unprepared. Other countries at the termination of the war will be poor but prepared for war, and as selfishness frequently dominates nations as it does individuals, there is great danger that this country, standing supinely by and living in a fools' paradise, will be devastated by war, and ransoms and penalties imposed so much greater than the cost of preparation and defense that there will be absolutely no comparison.

We today have certainly a paramount issue. The country is alive to it. I believe and hope it will demand such action that our present hopelessly defenseless position will be changed to one of proper defense, which is the best possible guarantee against war.

(*Commerce and Finance*, March 29, 1916.)

(b) [§302] Bywords of the War.

BY JAMES LANE ALLEN.

STATUS OF GERMANY.

That the framer of criminal deeds and the doer of those criminal deeds are criminals together in those deeds.

That the government of a nation can be a criminal.

That the people of a nation can be a criminal.

That the Imperial German Government is powerless as a criminal aggressor without the power of the German people.

That the German people is powerless as a criminal aggressor without direction by the Imperial German Government.

That the Imperial German Government and the German people are adjudged criminal aggressors together in the war they have brought on and now wage.

WAR AGAINST GERMANY.

That the United States Government cannot wage war on the Imperial German Government.

That the American Nation wages war on the German Nation.

That until the German people ceases to carry out as its own the criminal purposes of the Imperial German Government, the American Nation will carry on war to end the criminal conduct of the German Nation.

That this Nation does not desire to wrest from the German Nation measured atonement for its losses and its lost lives.

That there can be no reparation for its wrongs, that there can be no restitution of its innocent dead.

That the American Nation grounds its war upon knowledge of criminal acts which the German Nation has committed against it and upon foreknowledge of criminal acts which the German Nation will commit against it, if ever powerful enough to commit them.

That the American Nation does not dwell aloof from the rest of mankind and that its war on the German Nation is not of single aim.

PROTECTION OF CIVILIZATION.

That this Nation recognizes its own civilization as an inseparable part of the living treasure and fabric of the inoffensive civilization of the world.

That this Nation recognizes the German Nation as a present-day destroyer of peace-loving civilizations.

That this Nation harkens to the warning of the German Nation that it has the right to attack any civilization for the necessitous advantages of its own.

That this Nation harkens to the claim of the German Nation not only to the possession of such right, but to an obligation to implant even though by force its civilization in any part of the world by displacing any other civilization.

That this Nation takes highest cognizance of this supreme proclaimed mission of the German Nation either to destroy or to mold by its civilization all the civilizations of the world and to make of the planet one Prussia in fulfillment of the purposes of the Deity as confided to the German Nation and as to be executed by the German Nation. . . .

That this Nation believes all non-predatory civilizations now existent to have an equal right to exist and believes the continued and combined existence of them all to be best for the richest development and completest happiness of mankind. . . .

WAR TO OVERCOME WAR.

That this Nation does not lay aside peace and take up war of first choice.

That this Nation looks upon war as a state of barbarism.

That this Nation looks upon civilization as peace—as an onward movement of liberty and enlightenment, of inter-related profitable activities and peace.

That nothing but war can overcome and put an end to war.

That when barbarism with war attacks civilization at peace, civilization has no weapon with which to defeat barbarism but the weapon of barbarism.

CONSCRIPTION.

That this Nation in grappling war as its weapon has need of vast military forces to win victory.

That a nation is not a mere population, but a body of citizens organized under its laws as its units of usefulness. . . .

That in a free nation universal obligatory service is not different from universal voluntary service; obligation is recognized as just and natural and disappears in consent.

That no nation could endure whose citizens reserved the individual right to decide whether and how to serve.

That disloyalty is refusal of the service required.

That the treatment to be meted out to the citizen who refuses to defend the nation when at war should be the refusal by the nation any longer to defend that citizen; should be deprivation of all his rights under its laws, the withdrawal from his property and business and from his home and from his life of the safeguards of its government, of the shelter of its institutions, of the protection of its police, and of any foothold whatsoever for him on its soil. Defend or be not defended. . . .

CIVILIAN SERVICE.

That every smallest garden shall be recognized as a corner of the desert battlefield.

That every furrow made by the plow shall run into the soldier's trenches at the front.

That every barbed blade of wheat shall be a spear.

That every bandage for a wounded youth shall be part of the garment of destiny to stanch the ebbing blood of the wounded, the better, world. . . .

MILITARY SERVICE.

That the pick of the Nation shall gather into camps to train for the armies, shall flock to the seashore to await the building of the ships. . . .

That the crowded ships shall carry the armies to other lands—shall sail away with them from their native land to the rescue of other native lands which are fighting also for their land.

That many shall limp back mangled, many shall grope their way back sightless, that many shall be borne back in their long silence as dust to their country's hallowed dust.

That the fate of many shall never be known, only that they fell fighting.

That there shall be Victory.

That Victory shall be the Victory of these Dead. . . .

That now is the beginning of the gathering of the nations

together about the entrance to their long futureward common road, safe to all, unsafe to none.

That as they move onward they shall begin to mingle, ever peacefully.

That as they move forward and mingle more and more with the quiet overflow and interflow of their friendly peoples, they shall ever be drawing nearer to the goal of all human endeavor, of all human hope, when races shall melt into the human race, when nations shall behold their barriers leveled and lost in their one country, the world. . . .

K. DOCUMENTS AND EXTRACTS ILLUSTRATING THE CHAPTER.

(1) [§303] Our Unpreparedness at the Start of the War.

By J. BERNARD WALKER (Editor of the *Scientific American*)

(February 22, 1917).

The Navy as it exists to-day is made up of ships in full commission and of ships not in full commission. Of the former we have 224, of ships not in full commission we have 127. The ships in full commission are those which are fully officered and manned and are either under orders or liable to orders for service without previous notice. The ships not in full commission are those maintained at a Navy Yard and kept ready for use on short notice. They have reduced complements of officers and men. Under this head are included ships "in commission" and "in ordinary," which have complements of officers and men sufficient to enable them to be properly cared for.

COMMISSIONING LAID UP SHIPS.

Ships out of commission have no personnel on board and repairs may be done upon them or not, as the Department sees fit.

In the event of war, only ships in full commission would be immediately available, and of these the most important elements are the battleships, of which we have 14, made up of 13 dreadnoughts and 1 pre-dreadnought; destroyers, of which we have 38; and submarines, which total 38. Less important ships are the armored cruisers, of which there are 3, with eight second and third class cruisers, and 18 gunboats. In the way of auxiliaries we have in commission only 3 transports, 4 supply ships, 20 fuel ships and about a dozen other auxiliaries of the more important type.

Under the head of "ships not in full commission" we have 13 second line battleships of the pre-dreadnought type, 33 destroyers, 5 submarines, and various vessels of less importance in modern warfare, 7 armored cruisers and 17 torpedo boats of moderate speed.

At the outbreak of war there would be an immediate call for putting all existing ships in full commission, and the Secretary of the Navy states that in the effort to do this the Navy would find itself short of 938 officers, 8,049 regulars, and 23,330

reserves, after using 9,000 militia and 463 fleet reserves. He states further that the shortage will increase for each new ship commissioned in 1917 and 1918, and that the three-year program alone will call for 29,127 additional men.

MUST HAVE MORE MEN.

Now this extremely serious shortage in personnel has resulted from the fact that in the past we have authorized the ships without authorizing a corresponding number of officers and men to man them.

I am convinced that the only satisfactory way to remedy these conditions is for Congress, when it provides for new ships, to provide also for the officers and men required to man them at the rate of so many per each 100 tons of displacement.

The New Navy which we are about to build under the wonderful three-year program has been won from Congress mainly by the efforts of the people, and I believe that of all popular efforts to this end, none has been so effectual as the propaganda of the National Security League. The program calls for what is practically a new navy, totalling no less than 156 ships, and including 10 battleships, 6 battle-cruisers, 10 scouts, and a large increase in our destroyer and submarine fleets.

This brings us to the question of the present status of the Navy in respect to ships under construction. Of the dreadnoughts contracts have been let for 9 ships, three of which are about 65 per cent. completed, two have recently been started, and four, being the first of the three-year program, have been let and are about to be laid down. . . .

UNIVERSAL TRAINING FOR ARMY AND NAVY.

I have spoken so far as Chairman of the Navy Committee of the National Security League, but in closing I would like to add a word or two on the most important feature of the situation as it affects the Army. To my mind, for the Army as for the Navy there is just one possible solution of the problem of getting men, and that is the institution of universal military service and training, and I say this without in the least disparaging the patriotic work done in the years gone by by the individual officers and men of the National Guard. It is my conviction that the whole history of this system, *from the war of the Revolution down to the recent fiasco on the Mexican border, has proved, above everything else, that it is inefficient and unjust. There have been many indictments by military men and others of the voluntary system, and none has been so severe as that contained in the recent report of the present Chief of Staff, General Hugh L. Scott.

The way in which the country has risen to the suggestion of military service has been at once one of the most surprising and most satisfactory results of the present movement for preparedness. When the various speakers for the National Security League came together to discuss results, almost without exception they stated that the mere tentative mention of universal service to their audiences throughout the country brought immediate and enthusiastic applause. Evidently the American peo-

ple are ready for this drastic change in our military policy; and if Congress is in close contact, as it should be, with the mass of the people, and the needs of the country it will lose no time in giving legislative approval to this movement.

(2) [§304] Maintenance of the Fleet.

BY CAPTAIN A. P. NIBLACK, U. S. N.

LINES OF DEFENSE.

The first line of the national defense is diplomacy, which, for safety and to avoid misunderstandings, should be in the hands of skilled if not specially trained men. Due to our geographical position, our second line is the navy, which must ever be prepared to act on the offensive as its chief value lies in mobility and initiative. The third line is the sea coast and other fixed defensive, with a mobile land force to protect the land approaches. From its mobility this third line is essentially defensive. The fourth line is the regular army, which, like the navy, is essentially offensive. The fifth line is the trained reserve, and that we have not. As patriotic and as self-sacrificing as are the individuals who compose the militia, no thinking person, with knowledge of the facts, can count the militia as a trained reserve. For all that it is, we should, however, be deeply thankful. The sixth line is the reserve of equipment—guns, ammunition, clothing, food and fuel—together with the manufacturing establishments to turn out whatever additional is needed, from a button to a battleship. Untrained men, as a war asset, are like ore in the mine, cotton in the bale—simply a valuable raw material. The dear old lady who is represented as singing “I did not raise my boy to be a soldier” is quite right, and she was wise not to undertake it. It takes several years of special training to make a soldier, and it is the duty of the general government, and not even of the various States, to undertake this. She had her work cut out for her getting him through the mumps and measles.

USE OF MONEY.

We are prone in this country to regard ourselves as a rich nation. My experience with rich people has been such that I have come to regard mere riches as a severe test of character. Money is certainly not a war asset until it is actually invested in the creation of war material and trained personnel. It is, however, a good thing to use in paying war indemnities, and in that respect we have an attractive bank account. Money not spent in preparedness for war, if no war comes, is not necessarily money saved, for, unhappily, the ideas which spring up like weeds around the noble aspirations of universal peace always tend to sap, strangle and kill the national stamina and deteriorate the national character, whereas the recognition that every citizen owes spontaneously his services to the country in time of war (and hence in time of peace in preparation for war) is an asset independent of national wealth and infinitely more valuable. Except China (and it is almost too late for her to lock the stable door), Great

Britain and the United States are the two remaining countries in all the world which have clung to the voluntary system of enlistment, because, setting the individual above the State, the individual has been clever enough to avoid the discomfort, the loss of time, and the interference with his pleasure and business which universal military service demands. As Rudyard Kipling said, we expect to raise armies "by the same methods we raise money at a charity bazaar. We profess to believe that in the hour of danger there will always be enough men ready, of their own free will, to defend the country." The voluntary system, however comfortable to the millions, is enormously expensive, unfair, clumsy, unreliable, and generally unsatisfactory. Drafting by lot in times of stress is only a palliative, as shown by the disgraceful draft riots during the Civil War.

However, we all get, in the end, what we deserve, and, when the final reckoning is paid in the war now going on in the world, we may even be able to estimate accurately the relative cost of being, say 100 per cent. ready for war as compared with 30 per cent.; and we may even find ourselves, somehow, helping to pay the piper. Whatever legitimate differences of opinion, therefore, we may have as to our national policies as a world power, it would seem to be best, instead of discussing the subject of the maintenance of the fleet on the high plane of patriotic or civic duty, to apply the acid test of business or what pays best in the end.

ON THE PACIFIC.

In the first place, geography has placed a large ocean on either side of us, between us and our powerful neighbors. Looking across the Atlantic, we have always accepted a defensive role and talked, and thought and built to repel an enemy if he should come. This habit of thought, of waiting for something, of holding back, of expecting things to come to us, has almost destroyed our initiative, has kept back our foreign trade, and almost driven our flag from the ocean. We have reasoned that our fleet would give us time to bring up our supposed reserves and enable us to raise an army of volunteers. Facing this comfortable solution, we have turned our back upon the Pacific.

Geography, acquisitiveness or destiny has presented us in the Pacific with Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, Tutuila (Samoa), Midway Island, and Guam, as stepping stones across the Pacific, and by their possession imposed upon us the same policy as if they were actually in the hand of an enemy or rival, because they exist and cannot be sunk. If we fail to make the right use of them geography will turn them against us, just as it turned them away from others and to us. The Pacific permits to us no defensive policy such as we have softened ourselves to in the Atlantic. Our coast line extends to Guam, even if we should scuttle in the Philippines. We can wiggle and squirm and make a wry face over paying the bill, but we can never evade ultimately the cost of adequately fortifying a naval base in the island of Guam, and in a lesser degree in the island of Tutuila, in the Archipelago of Alaska and on Midway Island, just as we have already begun the good work in the Hawaiian

Islands and at Balboa at the Pacific end of the Panama Canal, the reason being, if there were no other, to prevent their being used against us as commercial supply stations or naval bases by an enterprising rival or enemy. Besides, it will pay us to do so. . . .

COAL AND SUPPLIES.

In time of war the high speeds required in scouting and protecting would increase enormously the demand for fuel, and the 10 knots speed for the fleet shows how narrow is the margin, as it gives the very minimum, easily increased by leaps and bounds under stress of weather or war operations. It is estimated that probably 200,000 tons of coal a month would be required along this route in time of war. Two things stand out clearly in this problem, viz., the necessity for adopting the system of towing and coaling at sea and the need of replacing our colliers, supply ships and cruisers with newer, larger and faster ones. These colliers, repair and supply ships, fitted with 5-inch and 6-inch guns and officered and manned by regular officers and men, should be able to give a good account of themselves in time of danger and would not need the sheltering and shepherding that must be given to a heterogeneous lot of chartered and irresponsible craft, none too reliable under the most favorable circumstances. This leads up to the question of either purchasing additional colliers and supply ships, or building them, as we cannot rely on chartering because we will need all the available merchant ships for other purposes, viz., our expanding foreign trade, and maintaining what we have. A purchased ship will require at least two months to overhaul and adapt her to government requirements. During the War with Spain we purchased colliers having a gross tonnage of 42,500 tons at a cost of \$76 per gross ton. Economy and serviceability point to the entire desirability of building ships for the special service required. We have worked out and know every detail of what we want as colliers, oilers, refrigerator, repair, transport, water tank, ammunition, and hospital ships, torpedo-boat destroyers and submarine tenders, mine layers, mine sweepers, merchant scouts, aeroplane transports, tugs, coal lighters and buoy tenders.

In supplies are included reserve ammunition, medical stores, fresh and dry provisions, clothing, equipment, fresh water, "canteen" stores, both afloat in supply ships and at the naval bases. Fuel means the ability to deliver the blow without delay. Delay means the loss of the initiative. Operations can only be based on available means and, in modern war, you cannot plan and then assemble stores to execute the plan. After war is declared it becomes a question of supplies and weapons at the front, or else falling back on the defensive and trying to gather from every source the supplies needed even for the defensive. With fortified island bases each would become a stepping stone to the next, and a centre from which to sally forth, attack and harass, and to which to return for supplies, rest and overhaul. Our real coast line would become, as it were, more remote from our enemy as these obstacles in his path hindered his free movements and, on the other hand, these

island bases would have the effect of extending our coast line out into the ocean for our own forces. As sources of supply they are as valuable to the enemy as to us, unless we fortify them adequately and defend them with submarines, torpedo boats and mine devices. . . .

DEFENCE OF OUR POSSESSIONS.

No one can trouble the fishing industries and rich coal fields in our storehouse of the future in Alaska if there is a fortified base in the Aleutian Archipelago. Tutuila, 5,700 miles from Panama, 2,276 from Honolulu, 3,159 from Guam, and 4,500 from Manila, is only 1,565 miles from Auckland and 2,377 from Sydney, with their supplies of fresh provisions and coal. The Panama Canal has made its beautiful land-locked harbor a priceless heritage in our manifest destiny in the Pacific. Midway Island, at present an indispensable cable relay station, 1,150 miles beyond Honolulu, near the route to Guam, has a harbor with a bar good for seventeen feet draught now, and which the cost of one cruiser would convert into an auxiliary fortified and equipped island base. Many visits, in connection with constructive work and planning, have made its every feature familiar and of deep interest to me, and I look forward to the time when wise foresight will guard this vulnerable outpost in the ocean on which our future lies. . . .

(*Sea Power*, II, March, 1917.)

(3) [§305] Necessity for a Defense Commission with General Staffs for the Army and the Navy.

BY CHARLES G. CURTIS.

It is apparent to those who have followed the course of recent events that our system of government is virtually a failure in many ways, and is quite unable to provide us with either an army or a navy capable of doing its part in defending the country. It cannot even provide the essentials for reasonable fighting efficiency, our navy, for example, having no battle cruisers, scouts, aeroplanes or useful submarines, and our army having practically no modern guns, shops for their rapid manufacture, aeroplanes or ammunition supplies.

IGNORE EXPERT OPINION.

Congress fails as a law-making body, not only because its members are not trained experts and refuse to be guided by those who are, but also because it often permits political influences to overshadow the National welfare, and because there is no expert body with duties defined by laws equipped to advise in the decision of these important questions. Such an expert body has frequently been suggested—under the name “Council of Defense” or “Defense Commission.” The Secretary of the Navy fails as an executive, because he is a civilian and not an expert; his views and acts are frequently controlled by politics, and he has no official advisers whose opinions he values sufficiently to follow. Even the President, from whom one would expect better things, generally disregard the advise of

our best military and naval experts, and devotes much of his time and thought to political matters instead of giving it all to the business of the country.

When our forefathers founded the present system of government, they could hardly have foreseen the very general contempt for all expert knowledge and experience, which has been one of the results of our National self-confidence and lack of training. If Democracy is to survive, some way must be found of changing this attitude on the part of the people.

Experience shows that our admirals and bureau chiefs, who really know what the navy needs, are powerless to impress their views upon Congress or upon the President. This is largely because they are not charged by law or by custom with the duty, either individually or as an official body, and the practice of the secretary has generally been to discourage criticisms or advice not in line with his own views. The bureau chiefs are recognized only as individual heads of the various branches of naval administration. There is no way of ascertaining their collective professional solutions of technical problems. These individual views are presented piecemeal to a non-professional secretary, who has to decide which are right. In short, the bureau chiefs do not embody the combined duties, responsibilities and powers of a general staff.

NEED OF AN EXPERT COUNCIL.

Unlike other nations, we have in the laws governing our naval organization no provision for either a defense commission or a general staff, the one charged with the study of problems of the State and of military and naval questions as presented by experts, and the other charged with the duty and responsibilities of preparing the fleet for war and clothed with full authority to direct its operations.

Practically speaking, the secretary of the navy is the only functionary who is supposed to advise Congress or the President in these important matters; but, since he has no technical qualifications and is a political appointee, it is logically unsafe to leave our naval development to his direction. Certainly the practical experience of the late decade or two shows this to be the case.

It is evident that our Government needs an official body of experts to study the problem continually, to watch developments here and abroad, and to take the initiative in advising the President and Congress what steps should be taken to give us an army and a navy adequate for the defense of the country and efficiently managed. Such a body would operate as a national council or commission. In both our Army and Navy Departments we should also have—what other nations have—a general staff controlled by a chief. This chief of staff should be the executive military head for preparing and directing the naval or the military forces. The chief of the naval general staff should be directly charged by law with the duty of advising the secretary, and through him the President and Congress, what ships and other fighting machines should be built and how they should be managed and operated. He should also consult

with and report directly to the defense commission. Finally, he should be explicitly charged with authority and responsibility—authority to direct the operations of the fleet, and responsibility for its readiness for the purposes for which it is created.

The necessity for a general staff in our navy, and also for a recognized body of experts or defense commission to formulate naval and military policies and to advise Congress is very evident when we consider the extraordinary things which have happened in our navy during the last few years. The following are some of them, though many others might be cited: . . .

IGNORANCE OF CONGRESSMEN.

The ignorance often shown by committees of Congress and their inability to get at the truth in technical matters, is well shown by the questions asked of Admiral Fletcher, when he appeared before the House Committee on Naval Affairs, in December, 1914.

“Mr. Witherspoon: Now, according to the Navy Year Book, Germany had battleships building and authorized—39. Would you say that if she could send all those ships against us we would not be able to resist them?”

“Admiral Fletcher: I should say that we ought to, if we have the greater force.”

“Mr. Witherspoon: Now it has been stated to us that if Germany were at war with us she could not afford either to send more than one-half her ships against us.”

“Admiral Fletcher: That I do not know.”

“Mr. Witherspoon: I am not asking you whether you do or not. Assuming that she could send only one-half her 39, would you not say that we could successfully resist that number?”

“Admiral Fletcher: Yes, sir. I would say so if all our force is available to meet her.”

The ignorance here shown is appalling. Not a single member of the committee seemed to know that the forty United States battleships referred to in the Naval Register included a large majority so antiquated or so inferior that the suggestion of sending them against a foreign fleet would not be entertained for a moment. The truth is that if Germany contemplated sending a fleet to attack this country, she would select only vessels powerful enough to do the work; and, as she has been building a great many more of these powerful warships than we have in the last few years, she necessarily has more of such vessels.

EXPERT QUESTIONS.

Very few people have ever considered how many questions—many of them vital and dependent upon one another—must be intelligently considered and answered by the ablest experts before we can possibly build up an adequate navy. The following are some of them:

What types of warships and how many of each type shall be ordered the first year, and each subsequent years, and how many years shall the program cover?

What proportion of these ships shall be built in the Navy Yards and what in the private yards?

What Navy Yard shall be employed for this purpose and what extensive enlargements and additional construction facilities shall be provided, to enable the Navy Yards to build any considerable number of ships and with any reasonable speed? To provide any substantial increase in construction facilities, such as is needed, will involve a long period of time and great cost.

What steps should be taken to induce the shipbuilders to enlarge their plants adequately and to increase substantially the speed of production?

Shall the contract price be fixed by competition, as heretofore, or in some other way—as by a price-fixing commission?

Shall Government plants for making armor be established a plan which will inevitably result in years of delay and in final failure to get satisfactory armor. Or shall armor be made exclusively in private plants and these plants be encouraged to do the best they can for the interests of the Government as well as their own?

What shall be done in the way of developing the submarine and constructing a large number of this very important arm of the navy as soon as possible, and where shall these submarines be built?

What shall be done in the way of developing the aeroplane and seaplane and constructing a large number of this very important arm as soon as possible, and where shall these aeroplanes be built?

What extensions shall be made in our gun-developing, testing, and manufacturing plants, and where shall these be located? An exceedingly important and difficult matter, for if the enemy's guns are superior, our ships will be of little use.

Where shall additional plants or shops be located? . . .

NEED OF A GENERAL STAFF.

Is it not manifest, then, that there should be an advisory body to Congress and to the President, and if occasion demands to the people—a defense commission. This commission should be a permanent organization, non-political in character, and charged by law with certain duties. It should acquaint itself with our determined National policies. It should study the probabilities and possibilities of their conflict with those of other nations. It should be in close touch with our naval and military organizations through membership of naval and military officers in its own body, and by consultation with the army and navy general staffs. It should consider what may be required of these forces in meeting foreign aggression. It should call upon the two staffs for reports and their views as to the character and extent of the forces required to meet the necessities of the country resulting from its recognized policies, and should then digest these reports in the light of the different questions involved, and finally advise the President and Congress as to the best course.

Our naval organization has no general staff, nor are any of the makeshifts proposed from time to time and limited in their scope by motions of fancied expediency, in any true sense an

embodiment of a general staff. The Navy Department organization to-day consists of a secretary, under whom are a number of bureau chiefs with equal authority, but none of them clothed with the responsibility for the preparation of the navy or its efficient direction in time of war.

There should be provided in our organization a governing military head, under the secretary and supported by a competent staff of advisers. He should be charged officially with the duty of planning what we need in the way of a fleet or other fighting machines and directing its operations. The general staff should control the military side of the organization; and the civil duties which have heretofore been in the hands of the secretary or his assistants, should remain there. On the following page is a diagram showing a simple form of organization for the army and navy suited to our form of government and providing for a national defense commission and general staffs for the navy and army.

(C. G. Curtis, *Necessity for a Defense Commission*:)

(4) [§306] Where the Nation Stands.

BY PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON (June 14, 1917).

THE FLAG.

We meet to celebrate Flag Day because this flag which we honor and under which we serve is the emblem of our unity, our power, our thought and purpose as a nation. It has no other character than that which we give it from generation to generation. The choices are ours. It floats majestic silence above the hosts that execute those choices, whether in peace or in war. And yet, though silent, it speaks to us—speaks to us of the past, of the men and women who went before us and of the records they wrote upon it. We celebrate the day of its birth; and from its birth until now it has witnessed a great history, has floated on high the symbol of great events, of a great plan of life worked out by a great people. We are about to carry it into battle, to lift it where it will draw the fire of our enemies. We are about to bid thousands, hundreds of thousands, it may be millions, of our men, the young, the strong, the capable men of the nation, to go forth and die beneath it on fields of blood far away—for what? For some unaccustomed thing? For something for which it has never sought the fire before? American armies were never before sent across the seas. Why are they sent now? For some new purpose, for which this great flag has never been carried before, or for some old, familiar, heroic purpose for which it has seen men, its own men, die on every battlefield upon which Americans have borne arms since the Revolution?

These are questions which must be answered. We are Americans. We in our turn serve America, and can serve her with no private purpose. We must use her flag as she has always used it. We are accountable at the bar of history and must plead in utter frankness what purpose it is we seek to serve.

REASONS FOR WAR.

It is plain enough how we were forced into the war. The extraordinary insults and aggressions of the Imperial German Government left us no self-respecting choice but to take up arms in defense of our rights as a free people and of our honor as a sovereign government. The military masters of Germany denied us the right to be neutral. They filled our unsuspecting communities with vicious spies and conspirators and sought to corrupt the opinion of our people in their own behalf. When they found that they could not do that, their agents diligently spread sedition amongst us and sought to draw our own citizens from their allegiance—and some of those agents were men connected with the official Embassy of the German Government itself here in our own capital. They sought by violence to destroy our industries and arrest our commerce. They tried to incite Mexico to take up arms against us and to draw Japan into a hostile alliance with her—and that, not by indirection, but by direct suggestion from the Foreign Office in Berlin. They impudently denied us the use of the high seas and repeatedly executed their threat that they would send to their death any of our people who ventured to approach the coasts of Europe. And many of our own people were corrupted. Men began to look upon their own neighbors with suspicion and to wonder in their hot resentment and surprise whether there was any community in which hostile intrigue did not lurk. What great nation in such circumstances would not have taken up arms? Much as we had desired peace, it was denied us, and not of our own choice. This flag under which we serve would have been dishonored had we withheld our hand.

THE GERMAN PEOPLE.

But that is only part of the story. We know now as clearly as we knew before we were ourselves engaged that we are not the enemies of the German people and that they are not our enemies. They did not originate or desire this hideous war or wish that we should be drawn into it; and we are vaguely conscious that we are fighting their cause, as they will some day see it, as well as our own. They are themselves in the grip of the same sinister power that has now at last stretched its ugly talons out and drawn blood from us. The whole world is at war because the whole world is in the grip of that power and is trying out the great battle which shall determine whether it is to be brought under its mastery or fling itself free.

ATTEMPTS TO GERMANIZE EUROPE.

The war was begun by the military masters of Germany, who proved to be also the masters of Austria-Hungary. These men have never regarded nations as peoples, men, women and children of like blood and frame as themselves, for whom governments existed and in whom governments had their life. They have regarded them merely as serviceable organizations which they could by force or intrigue, bend or corrupt to their own purpose. They have regarded the smaller states, in particular,

and the peoples who could be overwhelmed by force, as their natural tools and instruments of domination. Their purpose has long been avowed. The statesmen of other nations, to whom that purpose was incredible, paid little attention; regarded what German professors expounded in their classrooms and German writers set forth to the world as the goal of German policy as rather the dream of minds detached from practical affairs, as preposterous private conceptions of German destiny, than as the actual plans of responsible rulers; but the rulers of Germany themselves knew all the while what concrete plans, what well advanced intrigues lay back of what the professors and the writers were saying, and were glad to go forward unmolested, filling the thrones of Balkan states with German princes, putting German officers at the service of Turkey to drill her armies and make interest with her government, developing plans of sedition and rebellion in India and Egypt, setting their fires in Persia. The demands made by Austria upon Servia were a mere single step in a plan which compassed Europe and Asia, from Berlin to Bagdad. They hoped those demands might not arouse Europe, but they meant to press them whether they did or not, for they thought themselves ready for the final issue of arms.

Their plan was to throw a broad belt of German military power and political control across the very center of Europe and beyond the Mediterranean into the heart of Asia; and Austria-Hungary was to be as much their tool and pawn as Servia or Bulgaria or Turkey or the ponderous states of the East. Austria-Hungary, indeed, was to become part of the central German Empire, absorbed and dominated by the same forces and influences that had originally cemented the German states themselves. The dream had its heart at Berlin. It could have had a heart nowhere else! It rejected the idea of solidarity of race entirely. The choice of peoples played no part in it at all. It contemplated binding together racial and political units which could be kept together only by force—Czechs, Magyars, Croats, Serbs, Roumanians, Turks, Armenians, the proud states of Bohemia and Hungary, the stout little commonwealths of the Balkans, the indomitable Turks, the subtle peoples of the East. These peoples did not wish to be united. They ardently desired to direct their own affairs, would be satisfied only by undisputed independence. They could be kept quiet only by the presence or the constant threat of armed men. They would live under a common power only by sheer compulsion and await the day of revolution. But the German military statesmen had reckoned with all that and were ready to deal with it in their own way.

And they have actually carried the greater part of that amazing plan into execution! Look how things stand. Austria is at their mercy. It has acted, not upon its own initiative or upon the choice of its own people, but at Berlin's dictation ever since the war began. Its people now desire peace, but cannot have it until leave is granted from Berlin. The so-called Central Powers are in fact but a single Power. Servia is at its mercy, should its hands be but for a moment freed. Bulgaria has consented to its will, and Roumania is overrun. The Turkish

armies, which Germans trained, are serving Germany, certainly not themselves, and the guns of German warships lying in the harbor at Constantinople remind Turkish statesmen every day that they have no choice but to take their orders from Berlin. From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf the net is spread.

GERMAN DESIRE FOR PEACE.

Is it not easy to understand the eagerness for peace that has been manifested from Berlin ever since the snare was set and sprung? Peace, peace, peace has been the talk of her Foreign Office for now a year and more; not peace upon her own initiative, but upon the initiative of the nations over which she now deems herself to hold the advantage. At little of the talk has been public, but most of it has been private. Through all sorts of channels it has come to me, and in all sorts of guises, but never with the terms disclosed which the German Government would be willing to accept. That Government has other valuable pawns in its hands besides those I have mentioned. It still holds a valuable part of France, though with slowly relaxing grasp, and practically the whole of Belgium. Its armies press close upon Russia and overrun Poland at their will. It cannot go further; it dare not go back. It wishes to close its bargain before it is too late and it has little left to offer for the pound of flesh it will demand.

MILITARY MASTERS.

The military masters under whom Germany is bleeding see very clearly to what point Fate has brought them. If they fall back or are forced back an inch, their power both abroad and at home will fall to pieces like a house of cards. It is their power at home they are thinking about now more than their power abroad. It is that power which is trembling under their very feet; and deep fear has entered their hearts. They have but one chance to perpetuate their military power or even their controlling political influence. If they can secure peace now with the immense advantages still in their hands which they have up to this point apparently gained, they will have justified themselves before the German people; they will have gained by force what they promised to gain by it; an immense expansion of German power, an immense enlargement of German industrial and commercial opportunities. Their prestige will be secure, and with their prestige their political power. If they fail their people will thrust them aside; a government accountable to the people themselves will be set up in Germany as it has been in England, in the United States, in France, and in all the great countries of the modern time except Germany. If they succeed they are safe and Germany and the world are undone: if they fail, Germany is saved and the world will be at peace. If they succeed, America will fall within the menace. We and all the rest of the world must remain armed, as they will remain, and must make ready for the next step in their aggression; if they fail, the world may unite for peace and Germany may be of the union.

GERMAN PROPAGANDA.

Do you not now understand the new intrigue, the intrigue for peace, and why the masters of Germany do not hesitate to use any agency that promises to effect their purpose, the deceit of the nations? Their present particular aim is to deceive all those who throughout the world stand for the rights of peoples and the self-government of nations; for they see what immense strength the forces of justice and of liberalism are gathering out of this war. They are employing liberals in their enterprise. They are using men, in Germany and without, as their spokesmen whom they have hitherto despised and oppressed, using them for their own destruction—socialists, the leaders of labor, the thinkers they have hitherto sought to silence. Let them once succeed and these men, now their tools, will be ground to powder beneath the weight of the great military empire they will have set up; the revolutionists in Russia will be cut off from all succor or co-operation in western Europe and a counter revolution fostered and supported; Germany herself will lose her chance of freedom; and all Europe will arm for the next, the final struggle.

The sinister intrigue is being no less actively conducted in this country than in Russia and in every country in Europe to which the agents and dupes of the Imperial German Government can get access. That government has many spokesmen here, in places high and low. They have learned discretion. They keep within the law. It is opinion they utter now, not sedition. They proclaim the liberal purposes of their masters; declare this a foreign war which can touch America with no danger to either her lands or her institutions; set England at the centre of the stage and talk of her ambition to assert economic dominion throughout the world; appeal to our ancient tradition of isolation in the policies of the nations; and seek to undermine the Government with false professions of loyalty to its principles.

OUR ONLY CHOICE.

But they will make no headway. The false betray themselves always in every accent. It is only friends and partisans of the German Government whom we have already identified who utter these thinly disguised disloyalties. The facts are patent to all the world, and nowhere are they more plainly seen than in the United States, where we are accustomed to deal with facts and not with sophistries; and the great fact that stands out above all the rest is that this is a peoples' war, a war for freedom and justice and self-government amongst all the nations of the world, a war to make the world safe for the peoples who live upon it and have made it their own, the German people themselves included; and that with us rests the choice to break through all these hypocrisies and patent cheats and masks of brute force and help set the world free; or else stand aside and let it be dominated a long age through by sheer weight of arms and the arbitrary choices of self-constituted masters, by the nation which can maintain the biggest armies and the most irresistible armaments—a power to which the world has afforded

no parallel and in the face of which political freedom must wither and perish.

For us there is but one choice. We have made it. Woe be to the man or group of men that seeks to stand in our way in this day of high resolution when every principle we hold dearest is to be vindicated and made secure for the salvation of the nations. We are ready to plead at the bar of history, and our flag shall wear a new lustre. Once more we shall make good with our lives and fortunes the greatest faith to which we were born, and a new glory shall shine in the face of our people.

(New York Times Current History, XII, 1-5 (July, 1917).

CHAPTER VIII.

QUESTIONS OF PEACE.

A. [§307] GENERAL REFERENCES ON THE CHAPTER.

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B. [§308] ADVANTAGES OF WORLD PEACE.

See §§143-145 above.

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2. Effect of Peace on Accumulations.
 - (a) Protection of private property.
 - (b) Ability to hand property down to heirs.
 - (c) Incitement to hard work.
 - (d) Long lives and large individual contributions to society.
 - (e) Variety of employments.
 - (f) Opportunity for emigration and bettering one's condition.
3. Business Benefits of Peace.
 - (a) Protection of trade and exchange.
 - (b) Protection of foreign commerce.
 - (c) Stable conditions, encouraging foresight in business affairs.
 - (d) Assurance of carrying out contracts.
 - (e) Working out of complicated business arrangements.
 - (f) Maintenance of experts.
 - (g) Application of capital to productive enterprises.
 - (h) Wealth of the United States produced by peace.
4. Benefits of Peace to Civilization.
 - (a) Growth of population.
 - (b) Opportunity for family life.
 - (c) Education and training.
 - (d) Appliances of intellectual life—libraries, museums, galleries, etc.
 - (e) Intercourse with other nations.
 - (f) Effects of peace in the advance of the United States.
5. Aid of Peace to Character and Virtue.
 - (a) Aims to build up nations and individuals.
 - (b) Emphasis on saving life.
 - (c) Aids the feeling of common interests.
 - (d) "Internationalism"—view of the world as having common interests.
 - (e) Contribution of the United States to this feeling.
6. Peace the Religious Virtue.
 - (a) Principle of the founders of Christianity.
 - (b) Looks toward the welfare of our neighbor.
 - (c) Avoids the waste of human life.
 - (d) Gives no play for cruelty and destruction of life.
7. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§309] Principles of a Self-Enforcing Peace.

BY PROFESSOR SIMON N. PATTEN.

How can we build a supernational code that will be accepted as the moral code is accepted—a code that appeals to self-evident principles as does the Declaration of Independence? It will thus be the code of the school, the church and the press, and be as unquestioned as is the multiplication table? The violations will thus become like theft or murder, the sporadic outbursts of individuals suffering from some abnormality. Where they happen we must educate, not punish. If we treat the violators of the super-code as wronged and right the wrong before we strive to punish, fewer violations of this code would happen than of the civil law. It is the failure to see how great principles would work in practice that creates the present confusion and thus makes for race antagonisms.

POPULAR VOTE.

1. The first principle of a code of peace is that all decisions should be made by popular vote. The western world claim

to be democratic and yet in no nation is democracy trusted. The result is that we have arbitrary decisions made by a class and often by a single person that the people are forced to carry out against their inclinations. Should declarations of war be delayed until ratified by popular vote they would not occur. Popular decisions appeal to human nature, and it is the same the world over. It is class decisions that differ, and these we must avoid by taking from every class its power to override popular decision.

HOME RULE.

2. The second principle is equally important. Home rule must accompany popular suffrage to prevent national majorities from oppressing minorities. The antagonisms of race, culture, religion and language could thus be avoided and at the same time the peculiar exigencies of localities would be provided for.

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS.

3. The third principle is the freedom of the seas. The ocean is a common heritage that should be in the control of no nation or group. This freedom must be so limited as to enable every nation to protect its own shores. The recognized three-mile limit will not enable this to be done. The controlled zone should be one hundred miles rather than three. Whatever the limit agreed upon, it alone should be the recognized area for warfare either offensive or defensive. If England extends her blockade of Germany one hundred miles from the German coast, Germany should be allowed an equal area about England to establish her submarine blockade, and we should claim the same zone for our coast defense. But other parts of the ocean should be open to all on equal terms.

NO TAXES ON EXPORTS OF RAW MATERIAL.

4. The fourth principle is that no nation should be allowed to enact export taxes on raw material. The natural advantages are so unequally distributed that a virtual slavery can be maintained if some world necessity were controlled by one nation or if a group of nations should conspire to control world commerce. Manufactured goods do not come in this class, as they can be made anywhere with slight differences in cost.

DISTRIBUTION OF TROPICAL AREAS.

5. The fifth principle demands a fair distribution of tropical areas among commercial nations. All nations need a tropical region to complement their home trade. Perhaps a third of foreign trade will be of this class. But there is ten times the quantity of tropical land to meet this condition. Cuba could supply the sugar of the world and either Java or Brazil its coffee and spices. Nations now monopolize land they will never use. When land hunger ceases a potent cause of war will be removed.

(Am. Academy of Political and Social Science, *Annals*, LXXII, 36-37. (July, 1917.)

C. [§310] WORLD PEACE MOVEMENT.

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See §§146-148 above.

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(a) Experience of the world.

(b) Arbitrations in which the United States has participated.

3. Hague Conferences.

(a) Conference of 1899.

(b) Conference of 1907.

(c) Resulting Conventions.

(d) Hague Court.

(e) Part of the United States.

4. International Organizations.

(a) Churches.

(b) Commercial unions, post, telegraphs, etc.

(c) International Parliamentary Union.

(d) International labor organizations and influence.

(e) Commercial and business connections.

5. Unions of Nations.

(a) European Concert.

(b) Division into Triple Alliance and Triple Entente.

(c) Close Alliances in the War.

D. [§311] PEACEFUL DISPOSITION OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

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(b) Toward the rest of America—Monroe Doctrine.

(c) Toward Asia—Chinese and Japanese policy.

(d) Toward the belligerents in the Great War.

3. Peace Organizations in the United States.

- (a) Societies:
 - American Peace Society.
- (b) Foundations:
 - Carnegie Foundation.
 - Ginn Foundation.
- (c) Plans of Permanent Peace:
 - World Court.
 - League to Enforce Peace.
 - World State.

4 Interest of the United States in World Peace.

- (a) Long practice of arbitration.
- (b) Settlement of Alabama Claims (1872).
- (c) Appeal to the principle in Venezuela Case (1895).
- (d) Arbitration treaties previous to 1913.
- (e) Secretary Bryan's arbitration treaties.
- (f) Attitude on the Declaration of London (1909).

E. [§312] MEDIATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE GREAT WAR.

1. Specific References on the Section.

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- (b) Offer of Serbia to arbitrate with Austria.
- (c) Efforts of statesmen to prevent the war—Grey; Sazonoff; attitude of Emperor William. (See §§94-98 above.)
- (d) Efforts to localize the war.
- (e) Intense interest of the United States in these efforts.

3. Attempts to adjust Difficulties of the United States with Belligerents.

- (a) Suggested arbitration with Germany on Frye question.
- (b) Possible eventual arbitration with Great Britain over seizure of vessels.
- (c) Suggestion of arbitration with Germany over submarine destructions.
- (d) Attempt to bring Germany and Great Britain to an understanding over the zone question.*

4. American Peace Proposals of 1916-1917.

- (a) (Dec. 12) German notes to the Entente Allies and to the Pope.
- (b) (Dec. 18) President Wilson's appeal to the Powers.
- (c) (Dec. 26 to 30) Germany's reply and proposal for a conference of delegates, 1917.
- (d) (Dec. 30 to Jan. 13) Declination by the Allies.
- (e) (Jan. 22) President Wilson's "Peace without Victory."

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- (a) (Aug. 1, 1917) Appeal of the Pope to the belligerent peoples.
- (b) (Aug. 27) Unfavorable reply of President Wilson.

6. Why Did These Efforts Fail?

- (a) Mutual distrust.
- (b) Occupation of Belgium and Northern France by "the Germans."
- (c) Combination of Germany, Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey.
- (d) Desire of each side to gain territory.
- (e) Desire of each side to crush the other side.

F. [§313] DIFFICULTIES OF PEACE AT THE END OF THE GREAT WAR.

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2. Allied Views.
3. Central Powers' Views.
4. Question of Status Quo Ante Bellum.
5. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§314] The Problems of the War.

BY NORMAN ANGELL.

The immediate cause [of this war] was an incident of Balkan politics, and Balkan politics with all its welter of language and nationality difficulties—the relations of Serbs, Bulgars, Roumanians, Turks, Greeks, Albanians, of the Moslems, the Catholics, the Orthodox and Unified Greek churches; the influence and struggle for prestige within the Peninsula of the Austrian, Russian, German, Italian and British foreign policies—has absorbed the life studies of many students.

THE MAZE OF ISSUES.

But the incident leading to the outbreak of war was also a question of Austrian policy, of the everlasting struggle between Germans, Magyars, Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, Ruthenians, Italians, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles.

Of the issues of the Serbo-Bulgarian war of 1885, the tariff wars between Austria and Serbia, the annexation of

Bosnia-Herzegovina, the formation of the Balkan League and the intrigues which provoked the Second Balkan War, which in turn takes us to the Turkish invasions, the emergence of the independent Balkan nations from Turkish supremacy.

And this in turn touches Austrian and Russian policy and Russia's claim to be the leader and protector of the Slav peoples, her interference in Balkan politics, and her designs on Constantinople.

Which brings us to questions of the European alliances, the balance of power, the conflict between Slav and Teuton; the development of German policy since unification; the wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870; the position of Prussia in Germany; the attitude of the Social Democrats; the difference between the new Germany and the old; the influence of the newer German philosophies of Nietzsche, Haeckel, Treitschke, Feuerbach, Schopenhauer, as the reaction against those of Kant, Hegel and Fichte.

The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine and its effect on Franco-German relations; the problems arising from the partitions of Poland, between Prussia, Russia and Austria; German fear of the Slav menace; the influence of the pan-German school; German colonial and naval expansion and the course of Anglo-German relations; the formation of the Triple Alliance, the Dual Alliance, and the Franco-British Entente; the guarantee of Belgian neutrality.

And now we may add the question of the Roumanians in Transylvania, the Italians in the Trentino and Trieste, Italian interests in Dalmatia and Albania, the problem of Schleswig-Holstein, the position of Bohemia.

QUESTIONS OF THE SETTLEMENT.

The settlement raises questions of:

The principle of nationality,

The use of plebiscites,

The value of guarantees,

The value of indemnities,

The validity of treaties and of international law.

The broader questions of the relations of States,

The bearing upon politics of economics and of both upon strategy,

The competition of armaments,

The system of alliances and groupings of the powers,

The alleged rivalry of nations,

The effects of absolutism and democracy upon national policies,

Imperialism and autonomy,

The nature and functions of the State, arbitrations, limitations of armaments, diplomacy and its defects.

How is it humanly possible for the average man concerned with the daily affairs of his life, and with scant leisure for public questions to find his way through this maze?

Now, as already hinted, the problems of this war are only too plain. We started out with the hope that it was to be

the war that would end war. Is that possible? It is surely the fundamental question that we all have in our minds. Is this really to be the last war? In other words,

(1) Is a Society of Nations possible?

From that major question arises the secondary one whose answer alone can give us an opinion. Is conflict between nations inevitable owing to the struggle for life? Is war really a "struggle for bread"? Is war thus biologically inevitable? Is this the true application of evolution to human society? Is peace even desirable? Would mankind in a world of peace "perish from its own moral and physical corruption," as a great English scholar recently declared? Does war make for the "survival of the fittest"? Did Nietzsche believe that "war for its own sake is one of the highest goods that can come to a nation"? Is this true? Do the Germans believe it? Is this a war between conflicting ideals, between the ethics of Nietzsche and the ethics of Christ?

(2) Should the Settlement be based on the Principle of Nationality?

Is nationality a matter of race, language, mode of life, common traditions, or is it made up of all these things? Is the sentiment of nationality a valuable element in the life of civilized peoples or a survival that should be swept away by the increase of travel and interdependence? Is nationality primarily a spiritual force or a demand for political independence? What light is thrown on this question by the position of the Jews; of the French-Canadian; of the Germans in the United States and of the Slav races in Austria-Hungary?

(3) What Frontier Rearrangements are Necessary?

How is the Alsace-Lorraine problem to be solved? Is its retrocession to France likely to cause a war for its reconquest by Germany in the next generation? How is the new Poland to be constituted? Should Italy have the Trentino? or Russia Constantinople? Should the Dardanelles be internationalized? Should the boundaries of Serbia be enlarged?

(4) Can National Greatness be Built upon Military Power?

What makes a nation great? Is it a question of extent of territory? Is a German greater than a Belgian? Is it a question of the happiness, moral elevation and well being of individual citizens? Can these be advanced by military power?

(5) Can We Avoid European Wars in the Future?

How do wars arise? Can they be avoided "by being so strong that your enemy will not dare to attack you"? Are they caused by "the ineradicable wickedness" or the "eradicable folly" of mankind? Is war "the failure of human wisdom" or is it the result of the inevitable rivalry of competing states? Is the tendency of progress towards rivalry or towards co-operation?

(b) [§315] Basis of Durable Peace.

A REVIEW OF A BOOK BY "COSMOS" (Jan. 28, 1917).

TASK OF PEACE.

The task "Cosmos" undertook was a review of the chief conditions bearing on the possibility of enduring peace and a statement of the principles by which efforts at such a peace must be guided. He started from the assumption, generally accepted in this and other neutral countries, that Germany has failed in the aggressive aims with which she made war in the first instance; that the Allies are sure of success in resisting these aggressive aims; that, though the German armies may not be definitely beaten, and the German State may not, and should not, be disintegrated, the Allies will be able to exact from Germany restitution, reparation, and above all, valid security for the future. The facts on which this assumption, or inference, is based are discussed carefully and candidly, and this discussion forms an important and extremely interesting part of the pamphlet; but probably the most effective and suggestive portion is that devoted to two elements in the problem of security for durable peace.

The first is the creation of a tribunal of international justice coupled with an international commission of inquiry, the former charged with the adjudication of justiciable differences in accordance with international law where it exists and is applicable, and the other charged with the investigation and determination of facts in disputes arising between the powers joining in the creation of these agencies.

The second element in the problem of durable peace which "Cosmos" treats most effectively is the removal of causes of war by an agreement for the firmest possible establishment of the "open door" in international trade and for the "freedom of the seas." By the open door is meant the nearest practical approach to the abolition of monopoly and privilege in trade and the nearest practical approach to equality of opportunity in commerce, enterprise, and finance. By freedom of the seas is meant immunity from capture or destruction on the ocean of all private property not contraband of war.

INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL.

In the establishment of an international tribunal, "Cosmos" would have the Allies begin where the Second Hague Conference had arrived at its adjournment. That body had agreed to such a tribunal, but could not agree as to the selection of judges. In agreeing to the tribunal the powers represented in the conference accepted the principles that the tribunal should apply international law where it was applicable, and, where it was not, should adjudicate in accordance with reason and justice, thus laying the foundation for a real court and the gradual creation of a true common law of nations—an invaluable advance.

If such a tribunal should be established by the Allies without waiting for the Central Powers it would, after the arrival

of peace, be a powerful agency for the maintenance of durable peace. "Cosmos" cannot accept the scheme of the League to Enforce Peace, because he thinks no peace will last which is not desired and demanded by the public opinion of the civilized nations. If this sanction be lacking, we must wait. But the creation of an international tribunal authorized to pronounce judgment in accordance with reason and justice or under international law would tend constantly and powerfully to build up this essential sanction.

OPEN DOOR AND FREEDOM OF THE SEAS.

In the "open door" and "the freedom of the seas," as he clearly and happily defines them, "Cosmos" urges two conditions which enlightened opinion is coming to regard not only as essentially helpful but positively indispensable to general and lasting peace. His exposition of their nature, relations, and operation is masterly, and has that fine eloquence which flows from profound sincerity, a lofty point of view, and conscientious clarity. The spirit of his remarkable contribution to the education of public opinion regarding the basis of durable peace is expressed very simply in his concluding paragraph:

SPIRIT OF PEACE.

"In conclusion, then, a durable peace depends upon the victory of the Allies in the present war and upon the establishment in public policy of the principles for which they are contending. It depends upon a withholding of all acts of vengeance and reprisal, and the just and statesmanlike application to each specific problem that arises for settlement of the principles for which the war is being fought. It depends upon the establishment of an international order and of those international institutions that have been here sketched in outline. It depends upon a spirit of devotion to that order and to those institutions, as well as upon a fixed purpose to uphold and to defend them. It depends upon domestic policies of justice and helpfulness, and the curbing of arrogance, greed, and privilege, so far as it is within the power of government to do so. It depends upon the exaltation of the idea of justice, not only as between men within a nation, but as between nations between themselves; for durable peace is a by-product of justice. When these things are accomplished there will be every prospect of a durable peace because the essential prerequisite will have been provided—the Will to Peace.

(*New York Times*, Jan. 28, 1917.)

(c) [§316] The Difficulties of Peace.

BY PROFESSOR KIRSOPP LAKE.

When the war is over the nations of Europe will make what will be called peace, but the fact that the armies will be obliged to stop fighting is far from being a guarantee for permanent peace. It is, of course, impossible to foretell

the details of the conditions of the treaty which will be made at the end of the war, but it seems desirable to state broadly what are the reasons which render doubtful a permanent and durable peace.

NATIONALITY.

The chief reason may be put in a single sentence. No treaty of peace can be permanent which does not grapple fairly with the question of nationality, and it has hitherto proved an insoluble problem for European statesmen to deal with the actual conditions of European life so as to recognize the claims of nationality without encouraging that clash of interests which in the end brings about war.

Nationality is more frequently discussed than defined; in fact, the difficulties of the question begin with the definition. It is clearly not exclusively conditioned by either race or language, and probably the best that can be said is that men belong to the same nation when they possess either a common tradition as to the past, or a common hope for the future, as to what they will do, or their children will do after them. Nationality thus raises life to a higher plane than that of the family or tribe, but falls far short of unity, so that to thinking men the existence of a world of many nations has at all times been a stimulus to visions of something higher.

In theory, then, the world has long recognized the existence of a higher unity, but unfortunately the numbers of those who have been so dazzled by the vision of a commonwealth of the race as to ignore the just claims of nationality have been about balanced by those to whom patriotism has seemed the final form of human virtue, and between them we have been apt to forget that the problem is neither the extinction nor the glorification of nationality, but its proper adjustment in a larger system. . . .

Remarkable for its success, when it has been fairly tried, is the experiment which was started by Rome, and has been carried out by methods which differ only in detail by Great Britain and the United States. Each of these countries has endeavored to respect fully the different nationalities which go to make up the federation or the empire of the whole, and at the same time to prevent the rights of the individual members of the groups from conflicting with the general common good of all.

Some of the recently suggested terms of peace raise the hope that the true Germany—not the Germany which destroyed Louvain and torpedoed the Lusitania and Arabic—will in the end join decisively with England and America and choose to follow the example of the Roman Empire.

UNION OF NATIONS.

One of the good results of this war is the abundant proof that civilization is best and most strongly built up by nations which are united by the enjoyment of local freedom and the sentiment of loyalty to a common heritage of empire which

binds them together in groups by chains, which, as Burke once told the House of Commons, "though light as air, are strong as iron bands," while the opposite policy of distrust and coercion defeats its own object, and breaks down so soon as strain is put upon it.

If this were all, one might look forward with considerable hope to the future of Europe after the war, but in at least two districts—Alsace-Lorraine and the Balkan kingdoms—the question is unfortunately complicated by the existence of nationalities which are not separated by geographical boundaries, but are, as it were, superimposed one on another.

The truth is that—if the problem be not utterly insoluble—the one thing which could solve it would be for both Germany and France to step aside from Alsace, and say in effect, "Gentlemen, it is your misfortune that the inhabitants of your country have two nationalities; the triumph of one means the destruction of the other. We will both withdraw. Henceforth Alsace is a new country. Forget that you have rival traditions as to the past, and learn to have a common hope for your future. That future shall henceforth be neither French nor German, but Alsatian. Though you speak two languages, that need not prevent your being one nation any more than it prevents Walloons and Flemings being all Belgians." Such a policy might succeed, though it is doubtful whether the passions roused in Alsace-Lorraine by foolish rather than bad government for the last forty years could at once be assuaged.

DIFFICULTIES IN THE BALKANS.

Equally unfavorable is the outlook in the southeast of Europe. In the Balkan kingdoms the superimposition of nationalities is so complex that it is impossible to see how any permanent organization can be reached. The countries which have already been organized as self-governing entities—Rumania, Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece—have largely succeeded by a process of expelling the members of other nationalities, and many of these outcasts have been collected, though not United, in what used to be the Turkish provinces of Macedonia and Thrace, in which the confusion is made even worse confounded by the fact that the whole of the seacoast is dominated by a large and flourishing colony of Spanish Jews. How is this district to be cleared up satisfactorily, seeing that even small towns are occupied by two or three nationalities, all animated by the strongest racial hatred? They may unite in war, but they will always quarrel in peace. It will require a wise and united Europe to control them and to refrain from exploiting them as it has done in the past.

COMBINATION OF NATIONS.

It is for this reason that, although the treaty which will mark the end of the war will possibly pave the way to a general improvement, in that there is at least a chance that a great step will be taken towards the combining of nationalities in larger groups, in such a way that a general policy of

home rule will not exclude the central control of common interests, it will probably fall far short of completely solving the question of peace, because both in the west and in the southeast of Europe there are districts in which national distinctions and geographical boundaries do not coincide, and the common hopes which the inhabitants cherish are not for peace in the future, but rather for a successful war of extermination. Unless European statesmen have something better to suggest than any terms hitherto hinted at, we are not in sight of peace at the end of the war, but only of an armed truce.

(*The Nation*, vol. 101, sup., pp. 1-2; Dec. 23, 1915.)

(d) [§317] Effect of a Peace Without Victory.

BY HILAIRE BELLOC (June 21, 1917).

Let us suppose that such a settlement required the evacuation of territory now occupied and even the renovation of damaged towns—but that not at the command of the victors, but by the consent of an unvanquished foe. Let us suppose that in name at least the independence of the nations was recognized and that the new Europe of which men have dreamed were established so far as the mechanical arrangement of frontiers can establish it—but that not at the dictation of a conquering army, but by the permission of those which the army had hoped to defeat and had failed to defeat. What would be the effect upon the soul of Europe? What would be the effect upon its will, its traditions, its ideals, above all, what would be the effect upon its future of such a surrender, for surrender it would be?

SPIRITUAL DOMINATION OF PRUSSIA.

In the first place, the coming generations would be under the spiritual domination of Prussia. Prussia and the Germany which she has indoctrinated would say with justice, "All the world came against us. Upon the East we were victorious, for we dissolved the political cohesion of our enemies there. Upon the West blow upon blow was met with entire resistance, and we emerged from the great ordeal triumphant." Prussia would say this with justice, and the opponents of Prussia, though they might deny such a truth with their lips, would acknowledge it in their hearts. The German people, inclined in some measure to regard their crimes as the universal conscience regards them, will be able to say, "Yes, we did ill, but we did it in a good cause and the Prussian nation has survived."

Men would naturally and inevitably say that the power which had so defended itself successfully was in the order of things. They would imitate it even where they did not revere it.

In general, the Europe of the future would suffer (for I think it is a suffering) from the modern German attitude towards the world. . . . At any rate, if the German, pleasing or unpleasing, according to taste, holds the fort, he

is the master of our future. The national soul of the various allied peoples would be under the impression of defeat. The national soul of the Germans would be under the impression of victory. . . .

SMALL NATIONS.

Consider, again, what sort of nations those would be who would arise in this new and Prussianized Europe. There would be a Poland, no doubt. It would be a Poland moderated and controlled from Berlin. That is inevitable.

It would be forbidden access to the sea. It would be mutilated. It would be under tutelage.

There would be a Scandinavian group—a Holland, and perhaps a Belgium, but not one of those five small nations would exist save at the will of the German organization, of which they would be the fringe.

FRANCE AND ENGLAND.

There would be a France, as there will always be, but it would be a France that said to itself: "I was beaten once in war. In the second occasion I made the supreme sacrifice, I took the brunt of the fighting, I drove the vastly superior enemy to earth; I wore him down until he was just on breaking point. But the fruit of that vast and salutary effort was not gathered. The Alliance failed, and I received nothing save what I received at the will of my enemies." And there would be an Italy—an Italy that would say, "I helped the Alliance, and for my reward I have incorporated this or that district which is of my own blood, but the power which held them once may hold them again, and my seas are not mine own."

More especially there would be an England which would say to itself—and the more bitterly because men would hesitate to say it publicly and openly: "I accepted the challenge and I fought hard, but I could not do my will, and now at every moment with these new fashions of war I am in peril. My old pride is gone and my old State." . . .

PRUSSIAN THEORY OF THE FEW.

The Prussian attitude towards this tremendous business of domestic or social organization is well known to us. We have seen it, not only in the Prussian losses, but most strikingly in the attitude of the Prussian Socialist party and in, I do not say the unwillingness, but the incapacity of the Prussianized German to act save under orders. His inability to organize from below.

. The modern German conception—the Prussian conception of a settlement in this vast affair, is that the proletarian majority shall be given a certain security and sufficiency by law, but that all power and direction, and enjoyment for that matter, shall remain with the possessing few. . . . No scheme which leaves power—especially economic power—in the hands of the populace, has any meaning to the Prussian mind. It conceives of the mass as a herd—to be

kept efficient, ordered, trained to work for masters. And the Prussian herd agrees. Well, in the strictest sense of the term that idea means servitude. It means, using the words in their most accurate sense, without rhetoric and without violence, the return of slavery in Europe. . . .

WHAT IS TO BE DECIDED.

The power of the people to order their lives, the power of acting from below, the renascence of human dignity in the mass, is lost. Of such magnitude is this war. Upon such a scale is the business upon which we all in our various capacities are engaged. And those who continue to think of this war in terms of the old diplomacy, of arrangement for this and for that, of whether this decayed family or that shall nominally wear a crown and the rest of it, are like children playing with toys when there is mortal illness in the house. Take care. We are within the next few months to decide whether all that we have known as Europe and all that we have known as England is to continue or no, and if the siege is not prosecuted to its full conclusion, and if complete victory is not attained, we have lost.

(*Land and Water*, June 21, 1917.)

G. [§318] CONFLICTING IDEAS OF PEACE.

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2. International Rivalries.

3. Territorial Difficulties.

4. Economic Difficulties.

5. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§319] British Ideas of Peace.

BY PREMIER DAVID LLOYD GEORGE (June 29, 1917).

NO PEACE TILL AIMS ARE WON.

In my judgment the war will come to an end when the Allied armies have reached the aims which they set out to attain when they accepted the challenge thrown down by Ger-

many. As soon as these objectives have been reached and guaranteed, this war will come to an end; but if the war comes to an end a single minute before it will be the greatest disaster that has ever befallen mankind.

No doubt we can have peace now at a price. Germany wants peace—even Prussia ardently desires it. They said give us some indemnity for the wrongs we have done, just a little territory here and a little there, and just a few privileges in other directions, and we will clear out. We are told that if we are prepared to make peace now Germany will restore the independence of Belgium. But who has said so?

No German statesman has ever said he would restore the independence of Belgium. The German Chancellor came very near to it, but all the junkers fell on him and he received a sound box on the ears from the mailed fist.

The only terms on which Germany has suggested restoring Belgium are not those of independence, but of vassalage. Then came the doctrine of the status quo and no annexation and no indemnities. No German statesman has accepted even that.

INDEMNITIES AND GUARANTEE.

But what did indemnity mean? Indemnity is an essential part of the mechanism of civilization in every land and clime. Otherwise what guarantee have we against a repetition? Then, it is said, that is not what you are after. You are after our colonies, and probably Palestine and Mesopotamia. If we had entered into this war purely for the German colonies we would not have raised an army of three or four millions. We could have got them without adding a single battalion to the army.

Our greatest army is in France. We are there to recover for the people who have been driven out of their patrimony the land which belonged to them.

As to Mesopotamia, it is not and never has been Turkish. You have only to read the terrible reports to see what a wilderness the Turks have made of the Garden of Eden. What is to happen to Mesopotamia must be left to the peace conference, and there is one thing that will never happen to it. It will never be restored to the blasting tyranny of the Turks. The same observation applies to Armenia.

As to the German colonies, that again is a matter which must be settled by the great international peace conference. When we come to settle who must be the future trustees of those uncivilized lands we must take into account the sentiments of the peoples themselves and whether they are anxious to secure the return of their former masters, or whether they would rather trust their destinies to other and juster and gentler hands. The wishes, desires and interests of the people themselves of all those countries must be the dominant factor in settling their future government.

Peace must be framed on so equitable a basis that the nations would not wish to disturb it. It must be guaranteed by destruction of Prussian military power, so that the confi-

dence of the German people shall be put in the equity of their cause and not in the might of their armies. A better guarantee than either would be democratization of the German government.

No one wishes to dictate to the German people the form of government under which they should choose to live. But it is right that we should say that we will enter into negotiations with a free government of Germany with a different attitude of mind and a different temper and different spirit and with less suspicion and more confidence than we should

As to the military situation, there is no doubt that the startling developments in Russia have modified the military situation this year temporarily to our disadvantage, but permanently for the better. What happened on the western front showed what could have been accomplished this year if all the allied forces had been ready to bring all-round pleasure to bear.

In training, equipment, and experience our army is infinitely better than it has ever been. The finest collection of trench-pounding machines which any army has ever seen is now in the possession of the British forces.

VICTORY Surer THAN EVER.

The Russian revolution, beneficent as it undoubtedly is, great as will be its results both this year and even more hereafter, undoubtedly has had the effect of postponing complete victory. But Russia will regain her strength with a bound, and become mightier and more formidable than ever.

Although these distractions had the effect of postponing complete victory, they made victory more sure than ever, more complete than ever, and, what is more important, they made surer than ever that quality of victory.

The Premier said that many hearts had been filled with gloomy anxiety, contemplating the prospect of a peace with a government whom we feel to-day to be dominated by the aggressive and arrogant spirit of Prussian militarism.

All the Allied governments will, in my judgment, be acting wisely if they draw that distinction in their general attitude toward the discussion of peace terms.

ference to settle the future of democracy with representatives present of the most reactionary autocracy in the world. Russia was now unshackled and free, and her representatives at the peace conference would be representative of a free people, fighting for freedom and arranging a future democracy on the lines of freedom. The Russian revolution would insure not merely a more complete but a higher and more exalted victory than ever was contemplated before.

"Meanwhile," the Premier proceeded, "France, Italy and Great Britain had to bear a greater share of the burden." He continued:

"The strength of Great Britain, once more flung into the breach, has once more saved Europe and human liberty. But now Russia is gaining strength every day. It has a capable

government. It never had a better one, and her power in the future would be inspired by freedom.

"America, always the mainstay of freedom, is beginning to send her valiant sons to the battlefields of Europe to rally around the standard of liberty. That is why victory now is more assured and more complete than we could have hoped for.

"Europe is again drenched with the blood of its bravest and its best, but do not forget the great succession of hallowed causes. They are the stations of the cross on the road to the emancipation of mankind.

"I again appeal to the people of this country and beyond that they should continue to fight for the great goal of international rights and international justice, so that never again shall brute force sit on the throne of justice nor barbaric strength wield the sceptre over liberty."

(*New York Times*, Nov. 30, 1917.)

(b) [320] French Project of a Buffer State.

BY A GERMAN STATESMAN.

Challenged by Chancellor Michaelis to tell the world whether or not the French government had entered into a secret treaty with the Czar Nicholas of Russia, before the recent revolution, by the terms of which the Czar bound himself to support French pretensions not only to Alsace and Lorraine, but to German territory on the left bank of the Rhine, M. Ribot has made a reply, in which, while characterizing a large part of the German Chancellor's insinuations in his speech as lies, he makes this surprising admission:

"M. Doumergue (ex-Premier and Foreign Minister), after a conversation with the Czar, demanded and obtained M. Briand's authorization to take note of the Czar's promise to support our claim to Alsace-Lorraine, and to leave us free to seek guarantees against fresh aggression, not by annexing territories on the left bank of the Rhine, but making an autonomous state of these territories, which would protect us and also Belgium against invasion."

This is a decidedly interesting avowal of French intentions concerning the adjustments which, premising the success of the Entente Allies in the war, might be expected to follow. It promises, indeed, a considerable step toward the dismemberment of Germany and the formation of another new state in Europe. The left side of the Rhine is the left side as one faces down the stream, and that means the territories of the Rhine Palatinate or Rhein-Pfalz, Rhine-Hessen, Birkfeld, and the great Rheinland proper, and it includes the cities of Worms, Ludwigshafen, Cologne, Coblenz, Aix-la-Chapelle, Krefeld, Cleves and others. It is a region larger, territorially, and much more populous and richer than Alsace and Lorraine together.

(*Boston Transcript*, Aug. 6, 1917.)

(c) [§321] Russian Ideas of Peace.

BY THE RUSSIAN PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT (March 19, 1917.)

Citizens: The great work has been accomplished. By a powerful stroke the Russian people have overthrown the old regime. A new Russia is born. This coup d'état has set the keystone upon long years of struggle.

RUSSIAN STRUGGLES.

Under pressure of awakened national forces, the act of October 30, 1905, promised Russia constitutional liberties, which were never put into execution. The first Duma, the mouthpiece of the national wishes, was dissolved. The second Duma met the same fate, and the government, being powerless to crush the national will, decided by the act of June 16, 1907, to deprive the people of part of the legislative rights promised them.

During the ensuing ten years the government successively withdrew from the people all the rights they had won. The country was again thrown into the abyss of absolute ruin and administrative arbitrariness. All attempts to make the voice of reason heard were vain, and the great world struggle, into which the country was plunged, found it face to face with moral decadence and power not united with the people—power indifferent to the country's destinies and steeped in vices and infamy.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.

The heroic efforts of the army, crushed under the cruel weight of internal disorganization, the appeals of the national representatives, who were united in view of the national danger, were powerless to lead the Emperor and his government into the path of union with the people. Thus when Russia, by the illegal and disastrous acts of her governors, was faced with the greatest disasters, the people had to take the power into their own hands.

With unanimous revolutionary spirit, the people, fully realizing the seriousness of the moment and the firm will of the Duma, established a Provisional Government, which considers that it is its sacred duty to realize the national desires and lead the country into the bright path of free civil organization. The government believes that the lofty spirit of patriotism which the people have shown in the struggle against the old regime will also animate our gallant soldiers on the battlefields.

WILL DO ITS UTMOST IN WAR.

On its side the government will do its utmost to provide the army with everything necessary to bring the war to a victorious conclusion. The government will faithfully observe all alliances uniting us to other powers and all agreements made in the past.

While taking measures indispensable for the defence of

the country against a foreign enemy, the government will consider it its first duty to grant to the people every facility to express its will concerning the political administration, and will convoke as soon as possible a constituent assembly on the basis of universal suffrage, at the same time assuring the gallant defenders of the country their share in the parliamentary elections.

The Constituent Assembly will issue fundamental laws, guaranteeing the country the immutable rights of equality and liberty.

PRINCIPLES OF LIBERTY.

Conscious of the burden of the political oppression weighing on the country and hindering the free creative forces of the people during years of painful hardships, the Provisional Government deem it necessary, before the Constituent Assembly, to announce to the country its principles, assuring political liberty and equality to all citizens, making free use of their spiritual forces in creative work for the benefit of the country. The government will also take care to elaborate the principles assuring all citizens participation in communal elections, which will be carried out on a basis of universal suffrage.

At the moment of national emancipation the whole country recalls with pious gratitude those who, in the struggle for their political and religious ideas, fell victims of the vengeance of the old power, and the Provisional Government will joyfully bring back from exile and prison all those who thus suffered for the good of their country.

In realizing these problems the Provisional Government believes it is executing the national will, and that the whole people will support it in its efforts to insure the happiness of Russia.

(*New York Times*, March 20, 1917.)

(d) [§322] Germany's Terms of Peace.

BY CHANCELLOR GEORG MICHAELIS (July 28, 1917.)

The speech of David Lloyd George, the British Premier, at Queen's Hall, London, and the recent debate in the British House of Commons, again have proved with indisputable clearness that Great Britain does not desire peace by agreement and understanding, but only a conclusion of the war which means the enslavement of Germany to the arbitrary violence of our enemies.

BRITISH TERMS.

Proof of this may be seen in the fact that Sir Edward Carson (member of the British war cabinet) recently declared in Dublin that negotiations with Germany could begin only after the retirement of German troops beyond the Rhine. In response to a question put by Commoner Joseph King, A. Bonar Law, the spokesman of the British Government in the House of Commons, modified this declaration by fixing

the standpoint of the British Government as being that if Germany wanted peace she first of all must declare herself willing to evacuate the occupied territories.

We possess clear proofs that the enemy gives assent to a declaration going even further than that impudently made by Sir Edward Carson. You all know that detailed information regarding the French plans of conquest, approved by Great Britain and Russia, has been circulated for weeks past in the neutral press, and that it has not been denied up to the present.

FRENCH SEEK CONQUEST.

It would be of the greatest importance for the enlightenment of the whole world regarding the true reasons for the continuation of the sanguinary massacre of nations for it to be known that written proofs of our enemies' greed for conquest have since fallen into our hands. I refer to reports of the secret debate on June 2 in the French Chamber of Deputies.

I ask the French Government this question: Does it deny that ex-Premier Briand and Premier Ribot, in the course of that secret sitting, at which were present Deputies Moutet and Cochin, who had just returned from Petrograd, were forced to admit that France, shortly before the Russian revolution, had come to an agreement having in view vain plans of conquest with a Government which Premier Lloyd George described in his last speech as a 'corrupt and narrow autocracy'?

I ask if it is true that the French Ambassador at Petrograd, in response to a request sent by him to Paris, received instructions to sign a treaty prepared in advance by M. Doumergue (ex-Premier and Foreign Minister), after negotiations with the Russian emperor?

Is it true or not that the French President at the instance of General Berthelot, head of the French military mission to Rumania, formally entrusted him with a mandate, and that M. Briand afterward sanctioned this step?

This treaty assured to France her frontiers, but amended on lines of previous wars the conquest of 1870 to include, besides Alsace-Lorraine, Saarbruecke and vast territorial modifications on the left bank of the Rhine.

As desired by France when M. Tereschenko (the Russian Foreign Minister) took office, the Russian Government protested against the French aims of conquest, which also included that of Syria. . . . The delegates from the Russian armies also are in agreement with this.

Regardless of this manifest proof of the revulsion of the Russian people against a policy of aggrandizement, Premier Ribot refused in the secret session of the French Chamber to undertake any revision of the French war aims, and announced the fact that Italy also had received guarantees of great territorial aggrandizements.

In order to divert their ambitions on the left bank of the Rhine of a character of greed and conquest, he announced

the necessity of a buffer state, but the opposition speakers cried out, amid a din of contradictions: 'It is disgraceful!'

AID OF RUSSIA.

I would like also to mention that Premier Ribot, after a pacifist speech by Deputy Augagneur, replied that the Russian generals had declared that the Russian armies never were in better condition or better equipped than then. Here appears in perfect clearness the desire to let the Russian people go on shedding their blood in behalf of the unjust ambitions of France.

"This desire has been fulfilled, but not as Premier Ribot anticipated, for we can hardly presume he had such an absolute lack of humanity as that, though foreseeing the failure of the Russian offensive, yet he insisted upon it, thinking it would give another hour's respite pending the entry of America into the war.

GERMANY AND CONQUEST.

This desire has been fulfilled, but not as Premier Ribot speech the interpretation that I only consented to the majority resolution with an ill-concealed reservation of Germany's desires for conquest. I am obliged to deny the imputation as to an object of which there can be no doubt. Besides, the resolution implies—which is quite clear—that the enemy must also renounce any ideas of conquest.

Dr. Michaelis added that it was manifest Germany's enemies were not in the least considering such denunciation and that the French meeting held in secret was fresh proof that her enemies were responsible for the prolongation of the war, and were "actuated by lust of conquest."

The enemy press endeavors to force upon my inaugural the Chancellor concluded, "will steel our strength and determination in the future."

(e) [§323] What Are the American Terms?

BY SENATOR WILLIAM E. BORAH (July 24, 1917.)

GERMAN IDEAS OF PEACE.

Mr. President, something was said a few days ago in the Senate about peace; peace was discussed. This is not a propitious time, generally speaking, to discuss peace or to propose peace if we intend to have that peace which is permanent and which endures. With an enemy that is apparently marching on to victory, we shall hardly be listened to on their part; we cannot discuss peace with them. Does anyone suppose that Germany at this hour would consider any proposal of peace other than the peace which takes care of Germany's interests as Germany alone sees those interests? Does anyone suppose the Central Powers, with Russia caving in, with the submarine war growing stronger and more effective apparently every day, with France, apparently at the height of her fighting power, not able in all probability to

go beyond the point which she now holds—with those conditions presented to the German mind, does anyone suppose that we could discuss peace with them upon any basis whatever other than terms which Germany would practically dictate?

AMERICAN TERMS.

No, Mr. President; we have not arrived yet at the time when we can discuss peace with those powers against which we are arrayed; but I think this much ought to be said, lest I be misunderstood: I am not so sure but that the time has come when the American people should have presented to them more definitely and specifically the terms and conditions upon which we are fighting the war and the terms and conditions upon which we would cease to fight it. I believe that there ought to be laid before our people a more specific program as to what we propose to attain, as to what we propose to accomplish, and as to the terms and conditions upon which the war, so far as America is concerned, can end. I think we ought to say in as clear terms as possible just what America demands as a pre-requisite of peace.

I say this not, sir, with the view of dealing with Germany or with the expectation that she would accept from us at this time any proposal which we might submit, but I say it in behalf of our own people and of permitting them to know definitely and specifically the things for which they are expected to fight and the things which shall constitute the end of their task. We cannot carry on this war, in my judgment, without a thoroughly aroused and sustained public opinion in favor of the war, which does not at this time exist; and one of the reasons, in my opinion, why it does not exist is because of the nebulous and uncertain terms and conditions upon which we are supposed to be in the war, and the utter want of knowledge as to what conditions will take us out of the war. No one seems to know what will constitute the end. America ought to hold the reins of peace every hour and at all times.

AN AMERICAN ISSUE.

Mr. President, Viviani, in that remarkable address bidding farewell to the American people, told us that the great mistake the German government made was in not knowing the French and English people; that they sent their ambassadors to France and England to study government and to practice the arts of diplomacy, but they misunderstood or did not read at all the noble qualities of the masses. Let us not as a government make that same fatal mistake with reference to our own people. Let us keep in mind that the ways of government and the paths of diplomacy overshadowed by no sacrifice are often far from the sad and dusty lanes down which the people march to war. Government and diplomacy may be interested in the future of Constantinople and the Bagdad railway, but out yonder in the open where every move toward war means sorrow and sacrifice, where families are to

be separated and broken, where husband and brother and son are to be offered upon the altar, that altar must be our country—you must speak to them of things of home and of the flag, you must give them an American issue for which to die.

After we have declared war and taken the steps upon part of the Government which necessarily follow, we come then to deal with another world entirely. We leave the field of form and formality and find ourselves in the world of the concrete, of the real, where hearts throb and grieve and men are preparing to suffer and die. From this forward you must deal with the man on the street, in the field, and in the factory; the man of simple and fixed but noble national instincts; the man, bless God, in whose moral and intellectual fiber are ingrained the teachings and traditions and aspirations of a century of national life—a national life separate, distinct, exceptional and sublime. You will not change these things overnight. The American citizen must live his character. You cannot transplant in a few weeks the habits and ideas, the methods and ways, of the people. We have our allies, and with them a common purpose; but America is still America, with her own institutions, her individuality, the moral, the intellectual conceptions of her own people; she is still a sun and not a satellite. Sir, if our own institutions are not at stake, if the security of our own country is not involved, if we as a people and as a nation are not fighting for our own rights and the honor and lives of our own people, our declaration of war was a bold and impudent betrayal of a whole people, and its further continuance a conspiracy against every home in the land.

(*Congressional Record*, LV, 6004-6005; July 26, 1917.)

(f) [§324] **Promise to Restore Belgium.**

BY PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON (June, 1917.)

Your Excellency is good enough to express the thanks of the Belgian people for the participation of America in feeding the people of your stricken country. This work, in which so many Americans have been enthusiastically engaged since the beginning of the war, is one which has brought as much of benefit to them as to the innocent civilian population whom it was intended to aid.

America engaged upon this work as being the only means, however inadequate, of expressing our deep and sincere admiration for the valiant nation that had gone forth unhesitatingly to meet the onslaughts of a ruthless enemy rather than sacrifice her honor and her self-respect.

The American people have been able to understand and glory in the unflinching heroism of the Belgian people and their sovereign, and there is not one among us who does not to-day welcome the opportunity of expressing to you our heartfelt sympathy and friendship, and our solemn determination that on the inevitable day of victory Belgium shall be

restored to the place she has so richly won among the self-respecting and respected nations of the earth.

(From President Wilson's greeting to the Belgian war mission, July, 1917.)

(g) [§325] The Great Parallel.

BY THE NEW YORK TRIBUNE (November 2, 1916.)

OUR INTEREST IN HUMANITY.

Let us not forget that peace now in Europe would be precisely the thing peace in 1864 would have been in America. Now, as then, the war is approaching its decision; but now, as then, the great question is not decided. Nor should any man or woman ever forget the great question. It was posed the hour in which Germany invaded Belgium. It was raised yesterday when German masters in Belgium adopted the methods of the ancient Pharaohs and drove a people before them into slavery. It was raised by the Lusitania; it is being raised in the plains of Rumania, where new reports of German barbarities reveal the fact that the German idea lives and marches still.

We have no interest in the question of frontiers; we have no stake or concern in the matter of the possession of Constantinople or the partition of Asia Minor. We are as little concerned with some of the incidental issues of the Great War as was Europe with some phases of the Civil War. But we are interested in the preservation of humanity, of civilization and of law from the assault which the Germans have made upon them and the menace which a survival of the German idea would have for them. . . .

GERMAN IDEALS.

The German method and the German ideal are old. Frederick the Great did in Silesia what William II is doing in Belgium. At the end of the war he kept Silesia, and this encouraged his successors to new acts of equal immorality. For nearly two centuries the German idea, first Prussian, has marched from one war to another to accomplish the purpose of all Germans, the domination of Europe and the mastery of the world.

When the German people have resumed the control of their own government, when the German people have renounced the policies and the purposes of their rulers, then peace may come without the despoliation of Germany as peace came to France in Napoleon's time and left the France of the Ancient Regime undisturbed. But if Germany can remain as she is, if the German rulers can bring back from this last terrible war of conquest a new Silesia, a new Alsace-Lorraine, a new Schleswig, then we shall have new wars until that time when at last the German idea is crushed in the blood and slime of a final defeat.

All that civilization means remains at stake. Nothing has yet been decided as to the momentous question raised by

Germany in the first week of August, 1914, when she sent the vanguard of hosts into Belgium, to burn, to slay, to ruin a nation, because it stood between Germany and a purpose and dared to defend its honor and its independence. Those who fired Louvain and sank the *Lusitania* rule Germany; they remain faithful to the spirit of these crimes, and while this condition endures peace is impossible for long, and peace now would be a crime against posterity.

EXAMPLE OF 1864.

Half a century cannot have completely obliterated in the American mind the memory of the great decision, the greatest decision of our national history. Democracy on this continent, perhaps in the world, was saved because the simple, loyal men and women of that brave time faced the new sacrifice and performed their terrible duty without flinching. No one who has heard the story of those days from the lips of those who were alive then can fail to realize how great, how crushing were their grief and sorrow, how hideous the war that they willed should continue.

This war was born of German determination to crush all that came between Germany and world domination. It was provoked after long preparation, it was prosecuted with fiendish brutality which endures to the present moment, and with each succeeding month gives new proof of German spirit and German methods. It can only end when this German spirit is exorcised, whether it ends at the Rhine or the Spree, whether in 1917 or 1927. It can end only in one way, because to believe that it could end save in German defeat would be to believe that we were witnessing the end of all that makes for sweetness and light, for human happiness and human aspiration in this world.

(*New York Tribune*, Nov. 2, 1916.)

(h) [§326] The Status Quo Ante-Bellum.

BY CHESTER JOHNSTON (July 14, 1917.)

GERMANY DESIRES "STATUS QUO."

In the discussion of our entry into the world war side by side with liberated Russia, certain proposals are being made which contain elements of grave danger. Briefly, the proposal is to split the defenders of liberty against Germany into two opposing camps, democratic Russia and the United States to stand together, stalwartly resisting the "imperialistic tendencies" of France, of Italy and England; the tricky formula, "peace without annexation or contribution" is evoked.

This means, I suppose, that, once Belgium and Poland have been evacuated, the matter will stop there; nothing is said concerning the repayment, by Germany, of the enormous contributions she has already exacted from Belgium.

Let us see just what this will mean. Germany is beaten, and knows it. Submarine ruthlessness—the gambler's last throw—is an admitted failure. Therefore Germany desires to

call a halt, and instantly to prepare for "the next war," in five or ten years' time, when her new crop of cannon fodder is ripe for harvesting.

That is why Germany is now eager for the "status quo ante." Next time she expects to win.

WHAT WOULD STATUS QUO BE?

Let us see what the "status quo ante" practically means. It means, to begin with, the continued mutilation of Poland, the complete negation of President Wilson's just demand for a Poland "united and independent"; for Prussia has no intention of giving up her Polish provinces. She intends, instead, to extirpate the Poles.

It means, next, the perpetuation of grievous wrongs in Austria-Hungary, where 28,000,000 Slavs and Latins are held in shameful helotry by 20,000,000 Teutons and Magyars; the tearing of the Serbian nation into three fragments; Croatia and Slavonia being ruled by Hungary, with the characteristic injustice of the Magyar toward subject races; Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia being held by Austria; while Montenegro and Serbia, nominally independent, are kept in economic bondage. A like mutilation of the long tried Szecho-Slovak nation in the north.

Further, it will mean the practical ownership by the Teuton overlords of Bulgaria, and of the "Turkish" Empire, with a perpetuation of the infamous tyranny and massacres so long practiced in Armenia and Syria.

Thus to betray these subject and long-tortured peoples would be little short of infamous. But to betray them in the name of "a finer humanity and democracy" would be a ghastly jest.

GERMAN IMPERIALISM.

But that is not all. After her wars of 1864-66, Germany, beside breaking Austria, annexed Hesse, Hanover and Nassau, which she had ruthlessly conquered. She drilled their men and used them in her war of 1870 against France. Seizing Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, she drilled their men, and is using them to-day in her war against France and her allies.

She will do exactly this now if "peace without annexation or contribution" leaves in her talons Austria-Hungary (now, in fact, a vassal), Bulgaria and the vast "Turkish" Empire, which is, to-day, ruled from Berlin. This will give her, within the decade, some 200,000,000 of population, with a Prussian-trained army of some 10,000,000 men.

That is precisely what she wanted. That is what the "democratic and humanitarian" policy of the status quo ante of "peace without annexation or contribution" will give her. It is hard to decide which quality would be more marked in this: suicidal folly or wickedness.

MUST LIBERATE THE OPPRESSED.

What would be the result, for the two powers, Russia and the United States, who are now invited to commit this piece

of folly and crime, in the name of "democracy and humanity"? Germany has frankly told us. Germany intends to conquer Western Russia, which will then be not Germanized but enslaved. As for ourselves, Germany's purpose was crisply stated by Rear Admiral von Goetzen at Manila in 1898:

"We intend to take a billion or so of your dollars from New York and other places. The Monroe Doctrine will be taken charge of by us, as we will then have to put you in your place, and we will take charge of South America, as far as we wish to."

It is a fundamental principle in law that a man intends the natural results of his actions. Do those who are now trying to set Russia and the United States against France, Italy and England intend the natural, nay, the inevitable result of what they propose, in the name of "democracy and humanity"?

No; at whatever cost—at the cost of three years more of war if need be—these cruelly enslaved races must be liberated; those that are strong enough must have complete freedom and independence; those that are still too weak, through prolonged slavery, must be protected by the Entente powers till they are strong enough to stand alone. Gentlemen, if this be "imperialism," make the most of it.

(*New York Times*, July 18, 1917.)

H. [§327] PROSPECTS OF EVENTUAL WORLD PEACE THROUGH ORGANIZATION

1. Specific References on the Section.

See §§153-155 above.

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2. Documents and Extracts.

(a) [§328] Disarmament No Remedy.

By H. C. NUTTING.

The radical advocate of peace may perhaps at times feel impatient that the great mass of citizens are so slow to catch

the inspiration of his theme. This failure to respond, however, is due in large measure to the inconclusive character of many of the arguments advanced in support of the peace propaganda. In particular the following points invite attention:

EXAMPLE OF CANADIAN BORDER.

In the first place, it is contended that the way to secure peace is to prepare for it by disarming; and attention is directed to the long, unguarded boundary line between the United States and Canada—the inference being that our peaceful relations with Canada are due to the fact that there are no engines of war on the border. But is not this a case of confusing cause and effect, i. e., is it not rather true that disarmament is here an effect of the increasing spirit of fraternity between the United States and Canada and the elimination of possible causes of serious dispute between the two countries?

The correctness of this analysis might be more evident, perhaps, if we should for the moment suppose the situation to be a very different one—that Canada was occupied by a nation diverse in stock, traditions and ideals; that both the United States and Canada were populated to a point where land hunger was developing; and that a strip of country lay between which each coveted, and which each felt it a point of national honor to secure and hold.

If these were the conditions, our present peaceful frontier would undoubtedly wear a very different aspect. As it is, the two countries are so much at one that thousands of immigrants yearly cross the border, hardly conscious that they are passing from one country to another, and the absence of any questions likely to lead to serious dispute renders it as unnecessary to garrison this border as it is for the individual States of the Union to fortify themselves against one another.

If, therefore, the present condition of the boundary line between the United States and Canada has any lesson to teach, it is simply this: that mutual understanding and common interests and the elimination of possible causes of serious dispute lead the way naturally and almost automatically to disarmament.

DOES ARMAMENT BRING WAR?

In the second place, it is argued that armament is, in and for itself, the ultimate cause of war. This argument presupposes nations living at peace until nation A builds a dreadnought; then nation B becomes suspicious regarding the intentions of nation A, and builds two dreadnoughts; this alarms nation A, which builds two additional dreadnoughts, and so on; finally the suspicion engendered by this competition in armament results in war.

The objection to this argument is that it wholly disregards two fundamental facts: (1) that some among the nations of the earth entertain burning national or racial ambitions that

cannot be realized except by the use of force; and (2) that some preach openly, and freely adopt, as their guiding policy, the principle that might makes right. Given one nation of the first class stirred by such ambition and guided by such a philosophy, and rivalry in armament follows as a matter of course; for the neighbors must either submit to aggression or prepare to defend themselves, and they naturally choose the second alternative.

It is interesting to note that even some rather uncompromising advocates of peace—though still demanding, somewhat illogically, immediate disarmament—are beginning to incline to the view that war cannot be eliminated finally except by a process of education that will uproot aggressive national and racial ambitions, establish the principle that right is might, and make every one content to submit to an award of arbitration, even though it is a disappointment. It is hard to understand, however, how even the most ardent advocate of peace can hope for a consummation of this kind in the near future; and, on the other hand, when one views the present turmoil in Europe, the plans of the League to Enforce Peace do not seem to offer any prospect of immediate relief. It certainly would require a large and effective world police force to cope with a situation like the present.

NATIONAL DEFENSE.

In pushing the peace propaganda, two other very flimsy objections are raised against adequate preparation for national defence. One is the assertion that so large an army would be required that it would be necessary to resort to conscription. But those who advance this objection seem to forget the great difference between the situation in North America and conditions in Europe. For its inland borders the United States needs no considerable guard; and nature interposes a fortification of some thousands of miles of water on east and west. The harbors of both coasts could certainly be made safe, and an adequate second line of defence provided for, without enlisting an army that would drain the resources of the country or appear to neighbors across the sea to menace their respective countries.

FINANCE OF WAR.

The other objection is based on financial considerations. We are informed that any adequate plan for national defence would cost too much money, and the prudent householder is warned that "taxes would go up." Stated thus bluntly, this argument has a rather sordid look. It appears in a more respectable guise when we are told what good use could be made of the money that is now spent on military equipment and pensions—how we might endow colleges, extirpate tuberculosis, etc. But this matter can be viewed from a very different angle. The Nation has recently pointed out that the United States spends more money annually for chewing gum than it does for school books. If we need a larger ap-

propriation for education or sanitation, why not begin the retrenchment with chewing gum rather than with the national defence?

(*Nation*, vol. 101, supp., pp. 3-4; Dec. 23, 1915.)

(b) [§329] Judicial Settlement of International Disputes.

By JAMES BROWN SCOTT.

LIMITED JURISDICTION.

I deem it indispensable that any international court of justice which it is hoped to create must be one of limited jurisdiction. We cannot ask the nations to create overnight an international court with the extensive jurisdiction that national courts possess. We must be content to wait upon experience, not to anticipate it. If we can but make a beginning, and if in a small way and within a limited range, we do the task well which has been entrusted to our hands, we may expect to be entrusted with something larger. If the nations be shown that the international court meets their expectations, that it can safely be trusted with larger jurisdiction, and that their interests can be confided to judges sworn to administer the law without fear or favor, they will enlarge the jurisdiction of the court, so that it may become adequate to the needs of nations. Time is required for this, and we must not overlook the element of time in international institutions, especially where we are asking things to be done which have never been done before or where the experience has been so slight in comparison with the need. The utmost extent to which the nations could go is stated in the preamble to the Pacific Settlement Convention, in which the safety of states and the well-being of their peoples are declared to rest upon the principles of equity and right. That is to say, an international court of justice shall be a court in the technical sense of the word, that the duties of the judges shall be judicial, and that they may not step beyond the domain of equity and of right. But it may be wise to delimit the field, to agree that but a small category of the cases covered by equity and right shall be submitted to the court, and, as the result of experience, to invest it with the full jurisdiction of a judicial tribunal. And, finally, for I dare not go into details, the court should determine its own jurisdiction, however large or however small that jurisdiction may be.

JUSTICIABLE QUESTION.

There are many questions of a legal nature which should not be submitted to the court, because courts deal with judicial or justiciable questions, to use a phrase which is much in vogue to-day. Whether a question is judicial or justiciable and within the scope of the court, or whether it is a legislative or an executive question—or, in other words, whether the question is judicial on the one hand or political on the other—must be passed upon before the court can perform its function. A nation in controversy should not pass upon

the nature of the dispute, if justice is to prevail. National courts invariably determine their own jurisdiction, and since the date of the Jay Treaty, which brought arbitration again into repute between nations, mixed commissions and international tribunals have defined their jurisdiction, and properly so, because the power is inherent in a court. The court which we would install at The Hague is to be permanent, in the sense that it is to be definitely composed in advance of litigation. The judges are to be lawyers by profession, who from experience will act under a sense of judicial as distinct from diplomatic responsibility. Its jurisdiction is to be limited to disputes of a justiciable nature; that is to say, cases involving law and equity. It is to interpret the convention creating it, and thus determine its own jurisdiction, and, in the language of the preamble to the Pacific Settlement Convention, it is to be accessible to all in the midst of independent powers.

(c) [§330] Platform of the World's Court League.

BY THE LEAGUE.

We believe it to be desirable that a League among Nations should be organized for the following purposes:

1. A World Court, in general similar to the Court of Arbitral Justice already agreed upon at the Second Hague Conference, should be, as soon as possible, established as an International Court of Justice, representing the nations of the world, and, subject to the limitations of treaties, empowered to assume jurisdiction over international questions in dispute that are justiciable in character and that are not settled by negotiation.

2. All other international controversies not settled by negotiation should be referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, or submitted to an International Council of Conciliation, or Commissions of Inquiry, for hearing, consideration and recommendation.

3. Soon after peace is declared, there should be held either "a conference of all great Governments," as described in the United States Naval Appropriation Act of 1916, or a similar assembly, formally designated as the Third Hague Conference, and the sessions of such international conferences should become permanently periodic, at shorter intervals than formerly. Such conference or conferences should (a) formulate and adopt plans for the establishment of a World Court and an International Council of Conciliation, and (b) from time to time formulate and codify rules of international law to govern in the decisions of the World Court in all cases, except those involving any constituent State which has within the fixed period signified its dissent.

4. In connection with the establishment of automatically periodic sessions of an International Conference, the constituent Governments should establish a Permanent Continuation Committee of the conference, with such administrative powers as may be delegated to it by the conference.

(d) [§331] · A League to Enforce Peace.

BY PRESIDENT A. LAWRENCE LOWELL.

ANTEDATES THIS WAR.

In spite of its ominous sound, the suggestion of a league of nations to enforce peace has no connection with any effort to stop the present war. It is aimed solely at preventing future conflicts after the terrific struggle now raging has come to an end; and yet this is not a bad time for people in private life to bring forward proposals of such a nature. Owing to the vast number of soldiers under arms, to the proportion of men and women in the warring countries who suffer acutely, to the extent of the devastation and misery, it is probable that, whatever the result may be, the people of all nations will be more anxious to prevent the outbreak of another war than ever before in the history of the world. The time is not yet ripe for governments to take action, but it is ripe for public discussion of practicable means to reduce the danger of future breaches of international peace.

ARBITRATION.

Treaties for the arbitration of international disputes are good. They have proved an effective method of settling questions that would otherwise have bred ill-feeling without directly causing war; but when passion runs high, and deep-rooted interests or sentiments are at stake, there is need of the sheriff with his posse to enforce the obligation. There are, no doubt, differences in the conception of justice and right, divergencies of civilization, so profound that people will fight over them, and face even the prospect of disaster in war rather than submit. Yet even in such cases it is worth while to postpone the conflict to have a public discussion of the question at issue before an impartial tribunal, and thus give to the people of the countries involved a chance to consider, before hostilities begin, whether the risk and suffering of war is really worth while. No sensible man expects to abolish wars altogether, but we ought to seek to reduce the probability of war as much as possible. It is on these grounds that the suggestion has been put forth of a league of nations to enforce peace.

FOUR POINTS OF THE PLAN.

Without attempting to cover details of operation, which are, indeed, of vital importance and will require careful study by experts in international law and diplomacy, the proposal contains four points stated as general objects. The first is that before resorting to arms the members of the league shall submit disputes with one another, if justiciable, to an international tribunal; second, that in like manner they shall submit non-justiciable questions (that is such as cannot be decided on the basis of strict international law) to an international council of conciliation, which shall recommend

a fair and amicable solution; third, that if any member of the league wages war against another before submitting the question in dispute to the tribunal or council, all the other members shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against the state that so breaks the peace; and, fourth, that the signatory powers shall endeavor to codify and improve the rules of international law.

The kernel of the proposal, the feature in which it differs from other plans, lies in the third point, obliging all the members of the league to declare war on any member violating the pact of peace. This is the provision that provokes both adherence and opposition; and at first it certainly gives one a shock that a people should be asked to pledge itself to go to war over a quarrel which is not of its making, in which it has no interest, and in which it may believe that substantial justice lies on the other side. If, indeed, the nations of the earth could maintain complete isolation, could pursue each its own destiny without regard to the rest, if they were not affected by a war between two others or liable to be drawn into it; if, in short, there were no overwhelming common interest in securing universal peace, the provision would be intolerable. It would be as bad as the liability of an individual to take part in the *posse comitatus* of a community with which he had nothing in common. But in every civilized country the public force is employed to prevent any man, however just his claim, from vindicating his own right with his own hand instead of going to law; and every citizen is bound, when needed, to assist in preventing him, because that is the only way to restrain private war, and the maintenance of order is of paramount importance for every one. Surely the family of nations has a like interest in restraining war between states.

ENFORCEMENT DOES NOT INCLUDE DECISIONS.

It will be observed that the members of the league are not to bind themselves to enforce the decision of the tribunal or the award of the council of conciliation. That may come in the remote future, but it is no part of this proposal. It would be imposing obligations far greater than the nations can reasonably be expected to assume at the present day; for the conceptions of international morality and fair play are still so vague and divergent that a nation can hardly bind itself to wage war on another, with which it has no quarrel, to enforce a decision or a recommendation of whose justice or wisdom it may not be itself heartily convinced. The proposal goes no farther than obliging all the members to prevent by threat of armed intervention a breach of the public peace before the matter in dispute has been submitted to arbitration, and this is neither unreasonable nor impracticable. There are many questions, especially of a non-justiciable nature, on which we should not be willing to bind ourselves to accept the decision of an arbitration, and where we should regard compulsion by armed intervention of the rest of the world as outrageous.

DIMINISHING EFFECT.

No one will claim that a league to enforce peace, such as is proposed, would wholly prevent war, but it would greatly reduce the probability of hostilities. It would take away the advantage of surprise, of catching the enemy unprepared for a sudden attack. It would give a chance for public opinion on the nature of the controversy to be formed throughout the world and in the militant country. The latter is of great importance, for the moment war is declared argument about its merits is at once stifled. Passion runs too high for calm debate, and patriotism forces people to support their government. But a trial before an international tribunal would give time for discussion while emotion is not yet highly inflamed. Men opposed to war would be able to urge its injustice, to ask whether, after all, the object is worth the sacrifice, and they would get a hearing from their fellow citizens which they cannot get after war begins. The mere delay, the interval for consideration, would be an immense gain for the prospect of a peaceful settlement.

(*Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 116, pp. 392-400; Sept., 1916.)

(e) [§332] We Cannot Dispense With Force.

By PRESIDENT EMERITUS CHARLES WILLIAM ELIOT.

A few philanthropists believe that the world would get on better if there were no armies and navies and no use of force to resist wrong-doers; but non-resistance seems to almost everybody an impracticable international policy at mankind's actual state of progress. The nations have not yet come into Emerson's "region of holiness" where passion passes from them. On the contrary, never before was outrageous violence so rife in the world, and resistance to it by force so indispensable. The policy of non-resistance is nowhere applied to burglars, murderers, or maniacs. No more can it be applied to Europe, in full view of invasions of Belgium and Serbia, Armenian massacres, and the sudden sinking of passenger steamers, merchantmen, and fishermen. Non-resistance is an admirable moral goal; but reaching it seems at the present day as far off as when Buddha taught, twenty-five hundred years ago, that the use of force was never justifiable or even expedient.

MAINTENANCE OF PEACE.

Since peaceful international relations will need for decades the firm support of a trustworthy protective international force, the United States ought to be in a position to supply part of that force. It is America's clear duty to her inheritance of liberty and to civilization itself to take an effective part in the maintenance of peace and of the freedom of the seas when the present war is over. For the discharge of this duty, and for her own security, America needs a strong navy and a strong potential army, both kept always ready. She can secure neither without adopting the principle of

universal service. Such are the lessons of German's outbreak in 1914, and of the fifty-year-long Prussian preparation for that outbreak in such secrecy, and with such protestations of innocency, that the other European nations were taken by surprise when the German armies rushed over Belgium bound for Paris.

After peace had been maintained by force for some years, and the world sees that the alliance of a few strong nations to prevent war is effective, and can be trusted, it will be possible to take steps toward a general reduction of armaments, and so to lift a crushing burden from the productive workers of the world. The formation of such an alliance within the next few months would contribute effectively to the arrest of the present horrible destructions, and to the arrangement by conference and negotiation of satisfactory terms for a durable peace. Should not the United States of America be a member of that beneficent alliance? Its past history, its present needs, and its future hopes answer—Yes!

To insure the country against invasion, to help on democratic government in the world, and to give greater security to humanity for its progress in arts, letters, science, and ethics, free from such terrific crumbings and crashes as the last two years have witnessed, would cost the United States much money, much labor over new legislation, and much patience and self-control on the part of the masses of the people. But are not the results to be attained worth to America and the human race all they would cost?

FITTING MEN TO THEIR TASKS.

The present war has demonstrated that the actual fighting force in any campaign has to be supported, equipped, and served by the incessant labor of men and women who greatly exceed in number the actual fighting men, and represent a great variety of civil employments. The principle of universal service skilfully applied will utilize in war time many sorts of special capacities in the individual men. Thus, many young mechanics will be sent to munition factories instead of into the field. Teamsters and chauffeurs will be put into the transportation corps; clerks into the quartermaster's department; medical students and practitioners into the first-aid stations and the hospitals. The Navy will have first choice each year of the young engineers and electricians. The airplanes will be manned by men whose age and previous training qualify them for that work. The selection of the individual for any one of these special functions will be made by his first military teachers; but the personal choice of the individual will naturally be regarded by the selecting authority, if supported by evidence concerning his previous training.

FOUR PREPAREDNESS PROPOSITIONS.

The following propositions, in my judgment, represent an accurate analysis of the present situation with reference to the preparedness movement and the duty of the United States toward the problem of more permanent world peace.

I. We need preparedness for national defense.

The instinct of self preservation is one of the fundamental forces of nature and when justly exercised in the defense of the individual or the nation cannot be adjudged other than moral.

II. We cannot get adequate preparedness unless we combine with it an international policy which will restrain its use for aggrandizement and will pledge its use to the maintenance of international law.

This is because of democracy's instinctive fear of the possible misuse of military power. A trip through the Great Middle West will convince anyone that the rank and file of Americans are not in the mood to support a movement for a great military power dedicated solely to the cause of national defense. President Wilson accurately interpreted the American spirit when recently he said:

"America will have forgotten her traditions, whenever, upon any occasion, she fights merely for herself under such circumstances as will show that she has forgotten to fight for all mankind. And the only excuse that America can ever have for the assertion of her physical force is that she asserts it in behalf of the interests of humanity. When America ceases to be unselfish, she will cease to be America. When she forgets the traditions of devotion of human rights in general which gave spirit and impulse to her founders, she will have lost her title deeds to her own nationality."

This high tradition of unselfishness indicates that America will respond to any movement for preparedness if it be dedicated not only to national but to international interests at one and the same time.

III. The Democratic instinct thus proves itself sound, because in the long run an unselfish international policy will result in the best possible selfish protection.

IV. Without an international policy that makes peace more lasting, the nations of Europe must enter another race for armaments which, together with their war debts and the rebuilding of their industries, will create an urgent need for money that will force them to institute a destructive competition for markets that will react against the progress of democracy by complicating all of our fundamental problems.

If, at the end of the war, no method but war is left for the settlement of the inevitable disputes that will arise between nations, Europe will be driven to institute this race for markets in order to prepare herself for the next war, and the probable effect of such a race for markets upon our American problems will be as follows:

A. OUR EXPORT PROBLEM.

Our foreign markets will be greatly narrowed and in some lines closed by the reduced power to buy on the part of the European nations. Indirectly, the power to buy

will be reduced among other nations. Our foreign markets will be further restricted by the high protective tariffs which the European nations will maintain at the close of the war, first, as a method of securing greater income and second, as a method of making each nation as nearly self-sufficient as possible, for self-sufficiency is a great military asset.

B. OUR TARIFF PROBLEM.

It will be suggested that we can meet such a situation by erecting high tariff walls. But in many cases nothing short of a prohibitory tariff will meet the situation, and a prohibitory tariff would result, first, in a serious reduction of our governmental income, and second, would further restrict our export trade, because between nations as between individuals it takes two to make a trade. Therefore, any serious restrictions on our imports would, in a long run, limit our exports.

C. OUR TAXATION PROBLEM.

If the urgency of the situation should force us to a high protective tariff, our income would be so seriously reduced that we would face great deficits. These deficits would suggest an increasing amount of direct taxation, and efforts at direct taxation invariably produce violent protests and serious class strife. Throughout history, nations have gone down in efforts to levy direct taxes to the satisfaction of all classes.

D. OUR LABOR PROBLEM.

If Europe throws upon our markets vast amounts of goods produced by labor that for patriotic reasons accepts abnormally low wages, it is clear that the higher wages of American labor will be thrown into a serious competition. There is, I know, a disposition upon the part of some to believe that labor will be so scarce in Europe at the end of the war that European wages will be kept up. But it must be remembered that to an unprecedented degree women have been drafted into the industrial army of Europe and that every year a vast number of boys are entering manhood and becoming available for industry. There is reason to believe that more labor will be available at the close of the war than before.

In addition, the intensity of this unprecedented and relentless commercial competition will divert public thought and energy from the fundamental problems of social progress. And this would mean an intensifying of our class strife and labor difficulties.

All this presents a grave outlook but it must be remembered that if at the end of this war some method other than war can be established for the settlement of future disputes that Europe will be relieved to some extent of this abnormally urgent need of money and therefore America can escape this complication of her problems.

NEW IDEALS OF LOYALTY.

V. In addition to material defense, a policy of preparedness for national defense as a means toward international peace can be made the center around which will gather a national movement in which may be awakened in Americans new ideals and new loyalties and new ambitions such as the Europeans are gaining as a sort of by-product of the sacrifice and suffering of war.

Along this road lies the surest approach to a durable peace. If we will follow it, as I feel sure we will, our high confidence in democratic institutions and in the destiny of America will be justified.

(Am. Academy of Political and Social Science, *Annals*, LXXII, July, 1917.)

(c) [§333] Economic Factors in an Enduring Peace.

BY E. E. PRATT (Former Chief of the U. S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce).

The economic factors responsible for the war and the economic interdependence of the nations of the world, upon which the war has thrown a new light, point the way toward the conditions of an enduring peace. In the first place, each nation must have access to raw materials and markets for its products in order to insure industrial development along the lines for which it is best suited. Secondly, there must be no preferential tariffs. Before the war Russia was dependent upon Germany to a very considerable degree as a market not only for rye and wheat, but for mineral products as well; and German influence had permeated Russian trade and industry. Now if Great Britain establishes a tariff on foodstuffs and raw materials and gives a preference to colonial goods in return for colonial tariff preferences to British manufactures, Russia will be forced again to sell her wheat to Germany. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, that England's markets, especially for foodstuffs, be opened to Russia and that British and American capital be invested in Russian industries. The United States also will expect freer entrance for its products into certain foreign markets. Discrimination against American goods, as now practised by France and Canada, cannot safely continue.

Commercial treaties are not sufficient to prevent disagreements. In some cases they even create difficulties for third parties, if not for those directly concerned; and their shortcomings emphasize the need of broader international agreements on many subjects that now cause disputes among nations. There is opportunity for this country to adopt a vigorous policy on international agreements with regard to the parcel post, patents and trade-marks, commercial statistics, commercial travelers, customs and sanitary regulations, and many similar matters, which could be satisfactorily handled by this method.

There might also be uniform shipping rules. At present the rebates given by certain steamship companies furnish one of the standing causes of disputes in the shipping world; but no one nation will force its steamship companies to eliminate rebates as long as steamship companies of other nations are free to offer them. Such difficulties might, however, be adjusted by an international agreement similar to the Brussels Sugar Convention. International control might likewise settle the long-continued controversies over points of strategic commercial importance, such as the Dardanelles and the railroad across Afghanistan or through Bagdad.

One of the strongest weapons of the proposed League to Enforce Peace would be its control of a certain number of raw materials, through the fact that members of the league produce the greater part of the world's supply. If, for example, a league among the nations thus had control of certain of the essential raw materials to which I have directed your attention and could, in the event of war, sufficiently curtail the shipment to any country of those essential raw materials, it would be a question of only a few weeks or a few months before the nation opposing the league would be forced into peace.

(American Academy of Political and Social Science, *Annals*, LXXIII, 138-139; July, 1917.)

I. [§334] WORLD REORGANIZATION.

1. Specific References in the Section.

See §§153-155 above.

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2. World Congress.

3. A World Court.

4. Enforcement of Peace.

5. World Federation.

6. Documents and Extracts on the Section.

(a) [§335] Foundations of a League of Peace.

BY G. LOWES DICKINSON.

POSSIBILITIES OF A CONCERT.

Let us note, first, for our encouragement, that the lamentable condition under which Europe has been suffering for many centuries past, was not always its condition in the past, and need not be in the future. There was a time

when the whole civilized world of the west lay at peace under a single rule; when the idea of separate sovereign states, always at war or in armed peace, would have seemed as monstrous and absurd as it now seems inevitable. And the great achievement of the Roman Empire left, when it sank, a sunset glow over the turmoil of the Middle Ages. Never would a medieval churchman or state have admitted that the independence of states was an ideal. It was an obstinate tendency, struggling into existence against all the preconceptions and beliefs of the time. Now there is hardly a philosopher or historian who does not urge that the sovereignty of independent states is the last word of political fact and political wisdom.

DIVERSITY AND COMMON ACTION.

And no doubt, in some respects it has been an advance. In so far as there are real nations, and these are coincident with states, it is well that they should develop freely their specific gifts and characters. The good future of the world is not with uniformity, but with diversity. But it should be well understood that all the diversity required is compatible with political union. The ideal of the future is federation; and to that ideal all the significant facts of the present point. It is idle for states to resist the current. Their trade, their manufactures, their arts, their sciences, all contradict their political assumptions. War is a survival from the past. It is not a permanent condition of human life. And, interestingly enough, this truth has been expressing itself for a century even in the political consciousness of Europe. Ever since the great French wars, there has been a rudimentary organ, the "concert," for dealing with European affairs as a whole. There is hardly an international issue for a hundred years past with which it has not concerned itself. It has recognized, again and again, not in theory only, but in practical action, that the disputes of any states are of vital interest to all the rest, and that powers not immediately concerned have a right and a duty to intervene. Not once, but many times it has avoided war by concerted action. And though its organization is imperfect, its personnel unsatisfactory, and its possibilities limited by the jealousies, fears and ambitions of the several powers, it represents a clear advance in the right direction and a definite admission, by statesmen and politicians, that internationalism is the great and growing force of the present. What we have to do, at the conclusion of this war, is to discover and to embody in the public law of Europe the next step toward the ultimate federal union. We must have something better than the concert. We cannot hope to have the federation. What can we do?

A CONGRESS OF THE POWERS.

Now, that the preliminaries of peace have been settled, we must hope, on right lines. There should be a congress to regulate the carry-

ing out of them in detail, and to provide for the future peace of Europe. There is plenty of precedent for such a congress. The Congress of Vienna followed the Treaty of Paris, and comprised representatives of every European power. The Congress of Paris followed the Crimean War, and at that congress Austria was represented, though she was not a belligerent, and questions quite irrelevant to the immediate issues of the war were under discussion. The future settlement of Europe concerns everybody. Many of the non-belligerents are directly interested in the territorial changes that are likely to be made. Many are interested in the fate of small states. All are interested in peace. This war is not only the belligerents' war, nor must the peace be only the belligerents' peace.

Assuming now that the congress is assembled, what will be its business? First, to appoint an international commission to carry out the territorial rearrangements, on the principle of the interests and wishes of the peoples concerned. This will be a process long and arduous in proportion to the amount of the territory concerned, and the character of the populations. At the best, readjustments of boundaries and allegiance can only imperfectly solve it. But the best chance of a good solution is an impartial commission.

A LEAGUE OF PEACE BASED ON TREATY.

This, however, important though it be, should not be the main work of the congress. Its main work should be the creation of an organ to keep the peace of Europe. From many quarters has come the suggestion of a "league of peace."

If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany will be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia and ourselves, jointly or separately.

The powers, I propose, should found a league of peace, based on a treaty binding them to refer their disputes to peaceable settlement before taking any military measures. The success of the league would depend on the number of powers entering into it. A league, for instance, of Great Britain, France and Russia, would do little more than perpetuate the present entente. A league joined by Italy would be in a better position. One joined by the United States might be invincible. But the thing to be most aimed at is the inclusion of the German powers. And that is one of the main reasons why, in the event of a victory by the Allies, everything possible should be done not to alienate Germany from the European system.

SANCTION OF THE TREATY BY FORCE.

But, it will be said, what is the use of relying on treaties? This raises the question of the sanction of the treaty; a

question of great importance, and one which, unfortunately, divides those who believe in and desire peace. The one party—the extremest pacifists, and perhaps the more logical—say that treaties must be their own sanction. The whole point of peace is that men rely on law, not on force. And to attempt to secure peace by arms is, and always has been, the fundamental error of mankind. This attitude, I think, goes along with the complete and uncompromising application of Christian ethics. Those who hold it would probably say that force should never be resisted by force. They would expect to conquer force by meekness. They are the real Christians. And I respect and honor them in proportion to their sincerity. But I cannot go with them. What is more important, I know well that almost nobody goes with them; and that, in particular, no government would act, now or in any near future, upon such presumptions. It will be impossible, I believe, to win from public opinion any support for the ideas I am putting forward, unless we are prepared to add a sanction to our treaty. I propose, therefore, that the powers entering into the arrangement pledge themselves to assist, if necessary, by their national forces, any member of the league who should be attacked before the dispute provoking the attack has been submitted to arbitration or conciliation.

ECONOMIC PRESSURE.

Military force, however, is not the only weapon the powers might employ in such a case; economic pressure might sometimes be effective. Suppose, for example, that the United States entered into such a league, but that she did not choose, as she wisely might not choose, to become a great military or naval power. In the event of a crisis arising, such as we suppose, she could nevertheless exercise a very great pressure if she simply instituted a financial and commercial boycott against the offender. Imagine, for instance, that at this moment all the foreign trade of this country were cut off by a general boycott. We should be harder hit than we can be by military force. We simply could not carry on the war. And though, no doubt, we are more vulnerable in this respect than other countries, yet such economic pressure, if it were really feared, would be a potent factor in determining the policy of any country. It is true that no nation could apply such a boycott without injuring itself. But then the object is to prevent that greatest of all injuries, material and moral, which we call war. We can then imagine the states included in our league agreeing that any offender who made war on a member of the league, contrary to the terms of the treaty, would immediately have to face either the economic boycott, or the armed forces, or both, of the other members. And it is not unreasonable to think that in most cases that would secure the observance of the treaty.

(*Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 115, pp. 516-524, 691-700; April-May, 1915.)

(b) [§336] A Permanent International Conference.

By H. G. WELLS (February 21, 1915).

There is one thing very obvious, and that is the necessity for some controlling world authority if treaties are to be respected and war abolished. While there are numerous sovereign States in the world each absolutely free to do what it chooses, to arm its people or repudiate engagements, there can be no sure peace. But great multitudes of those who sincerely desire peace forever cannot realize this. There are, for example, many old-fashioned English liberals who denounce militarism and "treaty entanglements" with equal ardor; they want Britain to stand alone, unaggressive, but free; not realizing that such an isolation is the surest encouragement to any war-enamored power. Exactly the same type is to be found in the United States, and is probably even more influential there. But only by so spinning a web of treaties that all countries are linked by general obligations to mutual protection can a real world-pacification be achieved.

The present alliance against the insufferable militarism of Germany may very probably be the precursor of a much wider alliance against any aggression whatever in the future. Only through some such arrangement is there any reasonable hope of a control and cessation of that constant international bickering and pressure, that rivalry in finance, that competition for influence in weak neutral countries, which has initiated all the struggles of the last century, and which is bound to accumulate tensions for fresh wars so long as it goes on. . . . What is now with each week of the present struggle becoming more practicable is the setting up of a new assembly that will take the place of the various embassies and diplomatic organizations, of a mediæval pattern and tradition, which have hitherto conducted international affairs.

This war must end in a public settlement, to which all of the belligerents will set their hands; it will not be a bundle of treaties, but one treaty binding eight or nine or more powers. This settlement will almost certainly be attained at a conference of representatives of the various foreign offices involved. Quite possibly interested neutral powers will also send representatives. There is no reason whatever why this conference should dissolve, why it should not become a permanent conference upon the inter-relations of the participating powers and the maintenance of the peace of the world. It could have a seat and officials, a staff, and a revenue of its own; it could sit and debate openly, publish the generally binding treaties between its constituent powers, and claim for the support of its decisions their military and naval resources.

The predominance of the greater powers could be secured either by the representatives having multiple votes, according to the population represented, or by some sort of proportional representation. Each power could appoint its representatives through its foreign office or by whatever other means it thought fit. They could as conveniently be elected by a legislature or a nation. And such a body would not only be of enormous authority in the statement, interpretation, and enforcement of

treaties, but it could also discharge a hundred useful functions in relation to world hygiene, international trade and travel, the control of the ocean, the exploration and conservation of the world's supplies of raw material and food supply. It would be, in fact, a World Council. . . . Though the general will and welfare may point to the future management of international relations through a world congress, the whole mass of those whose business has been the direction of international relations is likely to be either skeptical or actively hostile to such an experiment. All the foreign officers and foreign ministers, the diplomatists universally, the politicians who have specialized in national assertion, and the courts that have symbolized and embodied it, all the people, in fact, who will be in control of the settlement, are likely to be against so revolutionary a change.

For it would be an entirely revolutionary change. It would put an end to secrecy. It would end all that is usually understood by diplomacy. It would clear the world altogether of those private understandings and provisional secret agreements, those intrigues, wire-pullings, and quasi-financial operations that have been the very substance of international relations hitherto. To these able and interested people, for the most part highly seasoned by the present conditions, finished and elaborated players at the old game, this is to propose a new, crude, difficult, and unsympathetic game. They may all of them, or most of them, hate war, but they will cling to the belief that their method of operating may now, after a new settlement, be able to prevent or palliate war.

Peace must be organized and maintained. This present monstrous catastrophe is the outcome of forty-three years of skillful, industrious, systematic world armament. Only by a disarmament as systematic, as skillful, and as devoted may we hope to achieve centuries of peace.

No apology is needed, therefore, for a discussion of the way in which peace may be organized and established out of the settlement of this war. I am going to set out and estimate as carefully as I can the forces that make for a peace organization and the forces that make for war. I am going to do my best to diagnose the war disorder. I want to find out first for my own guidance, and then with a view to my co-operation with other people, what has to be done to prevent the continuation and recrudescence of warfare.

Such an inquiry is manifestly the necessary first stage in any world pacification. So manifestly that, of course, countless others are also setting to work upon it. It is a research. It is a research exactly like a scientific exploration. Each of us will probably get out a lot of truth and a considerable amount of error; the truth will be the same and the errors will confute and disperse each other. But it is clear that there is no simple panacea in this matter, and that only by intentness and persistence shall we disentangle a general conception of the road the peace-desiring multitude must follow.

Now, first be it noted that there is in every one a certain discord with regard to war. Every man is divided against himself. On the whole, most of us want peace. But hardly any

one is without a lurking belligerence, a lurking admiration for the vivid impacts, the imaginative appeals of war.

(c) [§337] Minimum Program.

BY THE CENTRAL ORGANIZATION FOR A DURABLE PEACE.

1. No annexation or transfer of territory shall be made contrary to the interests and wishes of the population concerned. Where possible their consent shall be obtained by plebiscite or otherwise.

2. The States shall guarantee to the various nationalities, included in their boundaries, equality before the law, religious liberty and the free use of their native languages.

3. The States shall agree to introduce in their colonies, protectorates and spheres of influence, liberty of commerce, or at least equal treatment for all nations.

4. The work of the Hague Conferences with a view to the peaceful organization of the Society of Nations shall be developed.

The Hague Conference shall be given a permanent organization and meet at regular intervals.

5. The States shall agree to submit all their disputes to peaceful settlement. For this purpose there shall be created, in addition to the existent Hague Court of Arbitration, (a) a permanent Court of International Justice, (b) a permanent International Council of Investigation and Conciliation.

6. The States shall bind themselves to take concerted action, diplomatic, economic or military, in case any State should resort to military measures instead of submitting the dispute to judicial decision or to the mediation of the Council of Investigation and Conciliation.

7. The States shall agree to reduce their armaments.

8. In order to facilitate the reduction of naval armaments, the right of capture shall be abolished and the freedom of the seas assured.

9. Foreign policy shall be under the effective control of the parliaments of the respective nations.

Secret treaties shall be void.

(d) [§338] The League of Nations.

BY H. N. BRAILSFORD.

The constitution and principles of the League of Nations shall be determined by a congress which shall sit [within one year from the conclusion of peace]. At this congress, in addition to the late belligerents, the United States of America shall be represented, and to it such other civilized sovereign states as the American President shall name, shall be invited. The following sketch conveys suggestions for the constitution of the League:

1. THE PREVENTION OF WAR.

The signatory states agree to refer all disputes incapable of adjustment by diplomacy—(a) if justiciable, to a court of arbitral justice; (b) if non-justiciable, to a standing council of

inquiry and conciliation, to which their governments will nominate representatives for a term of years. They undertake neither to make wars nor to mobilize against each other until the court or council has, within a stipulated time, issued its award or recommendation, nor for a stipulated time thereafter.

The executive of the League [representing the governments of the great Powers] shall, in case of a threatened breach of this fundamental obligation, concert effective measures, military or economic, to insure its observance. The signatory states will support this common action, subject to the several undertakings into which each of them may enter on their adherence to the League.

The executive will concert measures for mutual defense when a signatory state is attacked by any state which refuses to submit its case to the appropriate tribunal or council.

Should any state fail to accept and give effect to the recommendations of the council of conciliation or the award of the tribunal, the executive will forthwith determine what collective action, if any, is required to meet this situation.

The executive, subject to safeguards to be agreed upon, shall determine the right of any state to be admitted to the League, and may expel, subject to safeguards and the right of appeal, any state which has violated its constitution. The right of secession is recognized.

No treaty of alliance, past or future, shall bind any state adhering to the League to support an ally who had engaged in war without submitting his case to a court or council of the League, or has become involved in war by reason of his failure to accept or give effect to the award or recommendation of a court or council of the League.

2. NATIONALITY.

The signatory Powers will define in a declaration, to be embodied in the constitution of the League, their resolve to accord to all racial minorities in their European territories full liberty for the use of their language, the development of their culture, and the exercise of their religion.

3. REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS.

The Powers will consider measures for a general reduction of armaments on land and sea. [This might provide (a) for the limitation of the term of service in national armies, say to six months in the infantry; (b) for the suspense of all building of capital ships for a term of years until a permanent agreement could be reached as to ratios of building.]

4. THE LAW OF WAR AT SEA.

This may be remodelled on the principle that embargoes on commerce, blockades, and the capture of enemy merchant vessels are permitted only in public wars sanctioned or declared by the executive of the League. In private, unauthorized wars the strictest definition of neutral rights as maintained by the American school will be enforced.

5. HUMANITY IN WARFARE.

The convention regulating warfare shall be revised, particularly as regards aircraft, submarines, floating mines, the use of gas, and the exception of food destined for a civilian population from the rigors of a blockade.

6. A CHARTER OF COMMERCIAL FREEDOM.

(a) The signatory Powers shall accord to each other in their home markets "most favored nation" treatment; (b) in their non-self-governing colonies they will impose tariffs (if any) for revenue purposes only; (c) they will concert measures to secure "the Open Door" to all foreign enterprise in undeveloped regions, particularly in China; (d) they will appoint as an organ of the League an international commission to insure free access for the trade of all the signatory Powers to raw materials and other natural resources.

(*New Republic*, X. 187-190; March 17, 1917.)

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